Opinion #1: Rashi explains that it is not enough to have one Kilbis in an open barrel, as it is possible that it merely fell in the barrel somehow.

Question #1: Rabeinu Efraim asks that the Beraisa later states if a Nochri brings a boat full of barrels and one Kilbis is found in one of them, they are all considered permitted. This implies that if the barrels are open the law is more lenient (the opposite of Rashi's explanation). We say regarding open barrels that if a Kilbis was found in one of them, it is probably in the others as well, and they somehow escaped the barrel!

Question #2: There is an additional difficulty. If we suspect that one Kilbis just fell into the barrel (and therefore one is not a sign that the barrel contains kosher fish), why don't we suspect that two Kilbis also "fell" into the barrel? Perhaps the Nochri put them in the barrel!

Opinion #2: This is why Rabeinu Efraim explained that the opposite of Rashi's opinion is correct. One Kilbis is good enough if the barrel is open, as we can say that others must have been here and fallen out somehow. There is no suspicion that the Nochri put it there, as on the contrary, we are lenient with open barrels! However, for closed barrels we require two Kilbis.

Answer: However, one can answer Rashi's explanation by saying that the case later is different, as two Kilbiyos were found in one of the (open) barrels. However, here there is no barrel which has two Kilbiyos, and therefore the barrels are invalid. (This answers the first question of Tosfos quoted above.)

Opinion #1: Rashi explains that the Mishnah is saying that these are the only signs of a kosher fish, which therefore proves difficult to Rav Huna and Rav Nachman.

Question: This is difficult. If so, when the Gemara answers that this is only regarding those fish whose heads are similar to unkosher fish, meaning that they require fins and scales, what kind of answer is this according to the opinion that either the head or spine have to be apparent? Why don't we just check the spine, as there is no unkosher fish that has a spine?

Opinion #2: It therefore appears that the Gemara is only asking its question regarding the head. (In other words, it is not asking its question according to the opinion that the head and spine are required, as the Mishnah did not want to get into signs that involve the inner parts of the fish. However, if a head is a good enough sign by itself, it should have been stated. This is why the Gemara asks its question on the opinion that either a head or spine is good enough.)

Implied Question: The Tana doesn't count having a spine among the signs of a kosher fish, namely fins and scales. (Why not?)

Answer: This is because it does not list signs that are inside the body (as opposed to scales and fins that are outside the body).

Question: Isn't their brine also a Torah prohibition, as the Gemara states in Chulin (112b) "that are impure" includes their brine and sauce?

Answer: Certainly their brine is prohibited according to Torah law. However, their brine is nullified by majority (of kosher fish), while their body is not nullified, as an entire being is not nullified.

Explanation: The case there was where there was only type of fish on the boat.

Implied Question: There was an opinion that forbade the fish. (What reason is there to forbid the fish if there was only one type of fish which was seemingly the source of these scales?)

Answer: It is possible the scales were there previously (and not from these fish).

Explanation: When the Gemara says a Kilbis was found, it means enough Kilbis to show that this is kosher. This means two Kilbis that are found in an open barrel according to Rashi, and two fish found in a closed barrel according to Rabeinu Efraim (see Tosfos DH "Ka'an" earlier).

Question: Why doesn't Rava answer that the signs that fish eggs are kosher are not Torah law? This would be a reason why we can't check for signs. A similar answer is given in Chulin (64a) regarding the signs of kosher eggs, that they are not Torah law. The Gemara there asks, why don't we check the signs of the egg? The Gemara answers, this is because the signs are not Torah law.

Answer #1: Rabeinu Tam says that this proves that the signs of kosher fish eggs are indeed Torah law.

Opinion: This is why Burbutch is permitted, even though we do not see that they have scales, being that they have signs of a kosher fish (their eggs are sharp on one side and round on the other) and fish eggs (their eggs are laid outside their body, see Avodah Berurah).

Answer #2: It is possible to push this aside and say that the signs of fish eggs are not Torah law.

Answer #2 (cont.): The Gemara did not give this answer here because you might still ask that the words, "They are only bought from an expert" implies that there is no way that it is permitted to buy from someone who is not an expert.

Answer #2 (cont): However, this is incorrect. If the signs are still recognized as the fish was not smashed up and the seller says that it is a kosher fish, meaning that there are two good reasons that it should be permitted, they can even be bought from someone who is not an expert. This is as the Gemara states in Chulin (63a) regarding eggs that one can buy from a seller who says that they are from a type of bird that is kosher. The Ri understands that this is why the Gemara had to answer that they were smashed up.

Question: This is still not clear, as if the seller says that he salted it himself he is believed, even though he is not an expert.

Answer: It is uncommon for most sellers to be present when the fish are salted.

Question #1: Rabeinu Yehudah asked questions on Rabeinu Tam's explanation. If the signs of fish eggs are Torah law, we are saying that the source of the Beraisa is not even a Beraisa! The Beraisa states that the signs of fish eggs are the same as the signs of bird eggs. (Why would it say they are the same as bird eggs if the signs of fish eggs are Torah law while bird eggs are not Torah law, as stated above?)

Question #2: Rabeinu Yehudah also asked from the Yerushalmi here that says that Nasan bar Rava came before Shmuel and said that he knows the difference between unkosher fish eggs and kosher fish eggs. Unkosher fish eggs are round, while kosher fish eggs are long. He saw a Salfusa. He asked, what is the law regarding this? This means that he showed him the fish egg of a kosher fish. Nasan said it was unkosher. Shmuel said, you are not embarrassed that you said regarding a kosher egg that it was unkosher? You will end up saying that a nonkosher egg is kosher! This indicates that there are some fish eggs that look like kosher eggs, just as this is true regarding birds eggs, as some raven eggs are similar to pigeon eggs. This implies that signs are not Torah law, and one therefore should not rely on the signs of fish eggs.

Opinion: However, one cannot forbid the Burbutch fish, because it truthfully has scales when it is in the water, and sheds them when it comes out of the water.

Explanation: The order of these cases is in the style of, "not only this, but also this." This is because grain in a storehouse lasts longer from where they are gathered, and in the place they are gathered it lasts longer than when it is in a boat.

Explanation: The Gemara explains that the reasoning of Rebbi Meir is that he suspects even a minor suspicion, and will therefore decree that other places are forbidden due to the place where it is truly forbidden. The Rabbanan who do not suspect a minor suspicion do not make this decree. The Gemara implies that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel also does not suspect a minor suspicion, and therefore argues on Rebbi Meir.

Question: This is difficult, as if so there is a contradiction in Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and a contradiction in two Halachic rulings.

Question (cont.): We said that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel here does not suspect a minor suspicion. Yet in Shabbos (135b) the Mishnah states that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that any human child that lives for thirty days is not considered a Neifel. This implies that if he did not live thirty days, for example if he was eaten by a lion, he is considered a Neifel, despite the fact that most women do not give birth to a Neifel. This implies that he does suspect a minor suspicion.

Question (cont.): The Mishnah also states in Bechoros (23b) that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that if someone buys a nursing animal an its child from a Nochri, it is exempt from the laws of Bechor (the firstborn animal if it later gives birth to another animal). This is because it would not have mercy on another animal (and nurse it) unless it gave birth to that animal. This implies that the fact that it is nursing another animal alone is not enough reason to say it is exempt from Bechor. This must be because Rabban Shimon suspects the minority of animals that nurse other animals even though they themselves have not given birth.

Question (cont.): The law is like the Rabbanan in this case, as we do not suspect a minor suspicion. This is as we say in Chulin (11b) that according to Rebbi Meir who suspects a minor suspicion, how can "he" eat meat? Being that the Gemara does not ask how can "we" eat meat, it indicates that we do not suspect minor suspicions. However, regarding Bechoros and the case of the Neifel we rule like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel who does suspect a minor suspicion!

Answer: Certainly Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel does not suspect minor suspicions, as implied by our Gemara. The case of Neifel is different, as Neifel is a common minor suspicion.

Answer (cont.): There is certainly reason to suspect common minor suspicions. This is evident from the Gemara in Yevamos (121a) regarding a person who sees another person fall into "water without apparent borders" or he saw that he was deathly ill. The wife of such a person is considered forbidden, despite the fact that we say that most people who are deathly ill die. We suspect the minor suspicion that he lived because it is a common minor suspicion.

Answer (cont.): The Gemara in Bechoros (ibid.) is discussing a case where we saw the animal nursing before the birth of the animal it is nursing, as it is certainly from the minority of animals that do so. However, in general the laws of Bechor will not apply to the offspring of an animal that nurses. This is the law.

Question: Perhaps their argument is that one says that they are worshipped and one says they are not worshipped?

Answer: The Gemara understands that even the Rabbanan understand it was worshipped, as the Mishnah does not say that the Chachamim say that only one that has in its hand...is worshipped.

Question: In our chapter earlier (34b) regarding cheeses from the house of Unayki, Rebbi Meir did not decree that all cheeses are forbidden due to this place! (Why not, if he suspects a minor suspicion?)

Answer: The Mishnah there (34b) is different, as even there only a minor amount of the animals were sacrificed for idols. If we would make a decree that the cheeses from other places are also forbidden, it would be a minor suspicion of a minor suspicion. However, in our Gemara, in the place of Rebbi Meir everyone worshipped every statue.

Answer (cont.): Rebbi Meir also made a decree regarding the Kusim due to the statue of the pigeon that they found on Har Grizim which everyone in the area worshipped (see Chulin 6a).

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that this is a statue of a dead king made in his memory.

Explanation #2: Rabeinu Tam explains that this is a statue of a living king made for his honor.

Proof #1: This is apparent from the "Andreti" of Nevuchadnezer (made when he was alive).

Proof #2: Additionally, the Medrash states that Caesar Adriyanus walked with Rebbi Yehoshua for relaxation in the city, and showed him statues made in his (Adriyanus') honor.

Explanation #1: Rashi explains that Rebbi Meir only forbids this statue. Being that they love him, they will bow down to him. Rashi also explains that a statue standing by the entranceway to the country is more important (which is why Rebbi Yochanan said that this is the case of our Mishnah). However, Rebbi Meir did not forbid other statues.

Question #1: This is difficult. The Mishnah (41a) says that if a person found an image of a hand or foot, they are forbidden. "Found" implies in the marketplace or field. Even according to Shmuel's understanding that the case there is when they are on a base, and Rashi explains that this means they are on a base upon which they worshipped, this is difficult. The term "found" does not imply they are worshipped. Rather, the Mishnah merely implies that they have a wide base which enables them to stand alone, and it is apparent they were not broken off from a bigger statue (but rather made that way).

Question #2: There is an additional question. Our Gemara implies that a regular statue of kings is worshipped. On the contrary, in Shabbos (72b) the Gemara implies that they are not normally worshipped. The Gemara there says, "If he saw a statue and bowed down to it...if he accepted it as a god etc." (This implies that it is uncommon to do this.)

Explanation #2: Rabeinu Tam therefore explains that our Gemara is discussing the leniency of the Rabbanan. It means that the Rabbanan's leniency in our Mishnah is specifically regarding a statue of kings that is by the entranceway of the country. The Rabbanan permit these, as they are certainly made for beauty (and not worship).

Answer: Rabeinu Elchanan answers the questions on Rashi. The Mishnah is certainly discussing the opinion of Rebbi Meir, who did not forbid other statues. The case later regarding the statue of a hand or foot is discussing the vllages. These statues in villages are certainly forbidden, even according to the Rabbanan, as they certainly are made to bow down to them.

Answer (cont.): This makes the following understandable. When the Gemara later (41b) analyzes Rebbi Yochanan's position (i.e. question, see Bach) and says that he holds that the statues themselves are forbidden and the Mishnah (41a, "If one finds broken pieces of idols, they are permitted") is like Rebbi Meir, it could not have brought the second part of the Mishnah (regarding finding a statue of a hand or foot). This is because that part of the Mishnah is even like the Rabbanan, as we have explained.

Answer (cont.): The Gemara in Shabbos (72b) that implies that a statue is not usually worshipped is not discussing a statue of kings, but rather rulers. Our Gemara is referring to kings.