The Beraisa rules that if Reuven received a different coat from ...

... the tailor than the one that he gave him to repair - he is permitted to wear it until the owner comes to pick it up.

... the doorman than the one that he handed him to hang up in a Beis-Aveil or at a wedding - he is forbidden to wear it.

Rav queried Rebbi Chiya about the discrepancy between the two rulings. He maintained that it ought to be forbidden to use the coat in the Reisha no less than in the Seifa - due to the principle 'Sho'el she'Lo mi'Da'as Gazlan Hu'.

Rebbi Chiya answered that - what we assume here is that the owner of the coat that Reuven received asked the tailor to sell it for him, and by mistake, he sold Reuven's coat, and paid the owner (see Ritva).

This only applies however, if the Uman himself returned the wrong coat, but not if it was his wife of children who returned it.

Rav Chiya b'rei de'Rav Nachman qualifies the ruling even if it was the Uman himself who returned it - confining it to where he returned the coat S'tam; but if he said 'Here's your coat', then it is evident that he erred and Reuven is forbidden to wear it.

Abaye volunteered to show Rava the swindlers of Pumbedisa. When Reuven would ...

... ask an Uman (a professional) for the coat that he had given him to repair - he would reply 'Lo Hadam' (It's not true).

... claim that he had witnesses that the coat that he saw by him was the very one that he had given him to repair, the latter would counter that it was not the same coat.

... asked him to produce it for the witnesses to identify - he refused.

Nevertheless, Reuven could not take the coat on the basis of the witnesses' testimony - because the witnesses only caught a glimpse of a coat that resembled Reuven's, but did not get a chance to look at it properly to ascertain that it really was his.

Rava justified the Uman's behavior - based on the Beraisa (that we discussed on the previous Daf) which rules against the Uman, provided the owner saw (and recognized) the article. Otherwise, he has no claim against him.

Rav Ashi advised Reuven, if he was smart - to pull the Uman aside and admit that he owed him a large sum of money, which is presumably why he was holding on to the coat, and that if they assessed its value together, it may turn out to be worth more than the debt, in which case, he was willing to pay his debt, and redeem his coat.

According to Rav Acha b'rei de'Rav Ivya however, if the Uman was smart too - he would decline his offer, on the grounds that the assessors had already assessed it and that, in fact, it was not worth more than the debt.

When we query our Mishnah that denies an Aris the right to establish a Chazakah 'Amai, Ad Ha'idna Palga ve'Hashta Kula', we mean - why it is not a Chazakah, seeing as an Aris takes only half the produce, whilst the Aris in our Mishnah, took the entire harvest (which the owner would certainly not have allowed him to do, unless he had actually purchased it).

To which Rebbi Yochanan replied 'Masnisin be'Arisi Batei Avos'. What distinguishes Arisei Batei Avos from other Arisin is - the fact that they are hired for life (and after their death, the contract extends to their children).

What he therefore means is - that, unlike regular Arisin, who would generally divide the crops with the owner on an annual rote basis, the Arisei Batei Avos and the owner would take two or three years each alternately, thereby making a Chazakah impossible.

If however, an Aris Batei Avos brought other Arisin down to the field to work there, he establishes a Chazakah - because if he was still an Aris, the owner would not allow him to send other Arisin down to the field in his place without his express permission.

Even this will not constitute a Chazakah however - if he distributed the work among the Arisin with his own participation, because we assume that if the work proves too much for the Aris, the owner will automatically authorize him to employ other Arisin to assist him.

When Rav Nachman bar Rav Chisda asked Rav Nachman bar Ya'akov (see Tosfos) whether an Aris may testify, he meant to ask him - whether if someone claims the field from his employer, he is permitted to testify on his behalf, or whether, since he receives fruit from the field, he is prejudiced.

Rav Yosef, who was sitting in front of the latter, quoted Shmuel, who ruled in the affirmative, a problem - since a Beraisa rules that he may not testify.

Rav Yosef however, reconciles Shmuel with the Beraisa by establishing the latter when there is fruit in the field, by which he means that - the Aris has not yet taken his portion of the fruit. Consequently, it lies in his interest to ensure that his employer retains ownership of the field; Because if he doesn't, the claimant will take the field, together with the fruit (as is the Din regarding a Nigzal).

Whereas Shmuel speaks where there is no more fruit in the field, since he has already received his portion (Rabeinu Gershom), in which case it makes no difference whether his employer retains the field or loses it. Nor is he prejudiced, inasmuch as the owner will probably hire him again next year if the field remains in his possession is because a. there is no guarantee that he will hire him again the following year, and b. - an Aris is easily replaceable.

A creditor or guarantor may testify on behalf of the debtor - provided the latter owns another field from which he can claim.

We do not consider the guarantor prejudiced even then, because if the debtor has another field, it will save problems should he have other creditors, who will otherwise take the one field, leaving the guarantor with the obligation of giving the second creditor the other one - because to worry that a. the debtor will not pay his debt on time, and b. that he has other debtors who will claim his field is too far-fetched.

The first purchaser may also testify for the second purchaser only if he has another field. This means that - if, for example Reuven sold one field to Levi and another, to Yehudah, Levi may testify on behalf of Yehudah (against Shimon's claim) if either Yehudah has another field that he bought from Reuven or if Reuven himself still possesses another field that he has not yet sold (or if he sold it to Yisachar, but after selling to Yehudah).

Otherwise Levi is forbidden to testify on his behalf because he is prejudiced - inasmuch as, once Yehudah loses the field that he bought from Reuven, Reuven's creditor will demand that he (Levi) pays the debt.

On the other hand, the second purchaser (Yehudah), is permitted to testify on behalf of the first one (Levi), whether he (the first purchaser or the seller) has other fields or not - because either way, the creditor always goes to the second purchaser first.

This too, will be prohibited however - if Reuven sold Levi the field with Achrayus and does have other fields from which he can claim, because then, should Levi lose his field to Reuven's creditor, he will turn to him (Yehudah).

An Areiv Kablan is - an Areiv who takes the money from the creditor and hands it to the debtor. As opposed to an ordinary Areiv, from whom the creditor cannot claim as long as the debtor is able to pay - an Areiv Kablan must be prepared to pay, should the creditor decide to go to him first (even if the debtor has the money [see Rashash]).

Some say that an Areiv Kablan may testify for the debtor, provided he has another field (just like an ordinary Areiv can). Others forbid it - because the more fields the debtor has, the more chance there is that the creditor will claim one of them, and leave him alone.

An Areiv who possesses Beinonis (medium-quality fields) might find it worthwhile to testify on behalf of the debtor who otherwise owns Ziburis - if the field in question is Beinonis (because in doing so, he encourages the creditor to claim from the debtor and not from him).

If a regular Areiv owns Beinonis and the debtor Ziburis (poor-quality fields) - then the creditor can only claim from the debtor himself, and not from the Areiv.