Rav Acha bar Huna asked Rav Sheishes whether, when the seller declares 'Chutz mi'Cheruv P'loni' or 'Chutz mi'Sadan P'loni' (with reference to Ch'ruv ha'Murkav ve'Sadan ha'Shikmah), the purchaser does not acquire any other carob or sycamore trees, or whether it is only the one he specified that is precluded from the sale.

Rav Sheshes replied - 'Lo Kanah' (that he does not acquire any of them).

Considering that the seller specified only one field, the logic behind Rav Sheishes' ruling is the fact that a Ch'ruv ha'Murkav and a Sadan ha'Shikmah are not sold anyway, so why we assume that he mentioned it nonetheless to incorporate all the trees of the same species.

Nevertheless, he chose to specify that particular tree ...

... according to Rebbi Akiva (who holds Mocher be'Ayin Yafah Hu Mocher) - in order to retain a path to get to it.

... according to the Rabanan (who hold Mocher be'Ayin Ra'ah Hu Mocher) - in order to reinforce his rights on it (in the way that we explained on the previous Amud).

Rav Acha queried Rav Sheishes however, from the Beraisa which says, in the same case, 'Lo Kanah', which he interpreted to mean that he did not acquire that carob-tree, but that he did acquire all the other carob-trees in the field.

To which Rav Sheishes replied that - 'Lo Kanah' extends to the other carob-trees in the field as well.

And he proved his answer from a case of someone who sells his field, stipulating 'Chutz mi'Sadeh P'lonis' - where he clearly sold him all his other fields. In our case too, a Ch'ruv ha'Murkav and a Sadan ha'Shikmah are considered as separate fields (like we explained earlier).

The S'vara behind both cases is that - if Reuven sells Shimon one field and then acts stupidly by (unnecessarily) precluding another of his fields from the sale, he is not going to sell him all his other fields, on the basis of the one that he stupidly precluded (though this appears to clash with the respective S'varos that we gave earlier according to Rebbi Akiva and the Rabanan).

Some texts read (in Rav Sheishes' answer) 'Ela li'Demei, Hachi Nami li'Demei' which means that - when Reuven said 'Chutz mi'Sadeh P'lonis' or 'Chutz mi'Cheruv' or 'mi'Sadan P'loni', he meant to deduct from the field that he was selling him, an area to the value of that specified field or tree.

In the second Lashon, even Rav Acha bar Huna took for granted that in the case of 'Chutz mi'Cheruv P'loni, Chutz mi'Sadan P'loni', the seller has not sold all his other fields, and ...

... the She'eilah he asked was - whether, if he said 'Chutz mi'Chatzi Ch'ruv Ploni ... ', he meant to include the other half of the Ch'ruv or the Sadan in the sale, or whether it too, was precluded, like the other trees were ...

... to which Rav Sheishes replied - 'Lo Kanah' (like he did in the first Lashon).

When the Beraisa says (with regard to the same case) 'Sha'ar Charuvin Lo Kanah' - it means to incorporate the other half of the tree that he precluded from the sale.

Rav Amram asked Rav Chisda whether, in a case where Reuven deposited something by Shimon with a Sh'tar, he is believed if he claims that he returned it. He might ...

... be believed, because of a 'Migu' - that he could have claimed that the article was lost, broke or that it died b'Oneis (in which case, he would have been believed with a Shevu'ah).

... not be believed (in spite of the 'Migu') - because the owner can claim 'Sh'tarcha be'Yadi Mai Ba'i' (What is your Sh'tar doing with me; You should have taken it back when you paid?) ...

... rendering Shimon's 'Migu' a 'Migu be'Makom Eidim'.

Even though Shimon is believed, the Sh'tar serves - to counter Shimon, should he claim 'Lo ha'Dam' ('Lo Hayu ha'Devarim me'Olam'), denying that he ever received the Pikadon.

There is no point in calling the witnesses and asking them whether his claim is corect - because we ruled in the previous Perek that even 'someone who receives a deposit in front of witnesses ('ha'Mafkid es Chavero be'Eidim'), is not obligated to return it in front of witnesses (Eino Tzarich le'Par'o be'Eidim)'.

Shimon counters Reuven's claim 'Sh'tarcha be'Yadi Mai Ba'i' with the argument that had he claimed 'Ne'ensu', he would have been believed, despite the fact that Reuven was holding the Sh'tar.

The fact that Shimon did not ask for the Sh'tar back when Reuven purportedly returned the article, is not a proof that he did not return it - because a. it sometimes happens that the owner claims that he has lost the Sh'tar (in which case the trustee cannot get it), and b. the trustee is not worried about this in the knowledge that he will always be able to say that an Oneis occurred, and be believed, Sh'tar or no Sh'tar.

By the same token, a debtor is not believed when he claims that he paid - because, seeing as he cannot exempt himself by claiming 'Ne'ensu', when paying his debt he has no business to leave the Sh'tar with the creditor, (and is therefore not believed when he claims that he paid).

The fact that, that had Shimon claimed 'Ne'ensu, he would have had to swear (as the Torah writes in Mishpatim "Shevu'as Hash-m Tihyeh Bein Sheneihem"), does not create a problem (with the Migu) - because in our case too, Shimon is only believed with a Shevu'ah.

The Dayanei Golah (Shmuel and Karna) and the Dayanei Eretz Yisrael - (Rebbi Ami and Rebbi Asi) argue in a Beraisa (see Rashash) over a Sh'tar Kis that Reuven produces against Shimon's Yesomim.

The Din of a Sh'tar Kis - the Sh'tar that Shimon gives Reuven upon receipt of the money. is determined by the ruling of the Nehardai (in Bava Metzia).

The significance of the Nehardai's ruling that Iska is half a loan and half a Pikadon is - that Reuven bears responsibility for the half that is a Pikadon (should any sort of Oneis occur), whilst Shimon accepts responsibility for the half that is a loan.

The source of the oath that Reuven has to swear to Shimon's Yesomim (despite he fact that it is normally the defendant who swears) - is the principle that one cannot claim from Yesomim without a Shevu'ah.

In the current case, the Yesomim claim that - their father may have returned the Pikadon (or that he did return it).

We know that the Yosemim's father did not specifically inform his sons that the Pikadon was not returned - because the Yesomim are obligated to swear to that effect.

If Reuven had produced a Sh'tar-Chov against them, both would have agreed that Reuven would swear and claim his debt, which is what the Dayanei Golah hold in the current case. The Dayanei Eretz Yisrael say that - he swears and claims half (the half that is a loan).

We try to equate Rav Chisda, who just believed the trustee in spite of the Sh'tar held by the owner - with the opinion of the Dayanei Eretz Yisrael.

We conclude however, that even the Dayanei Golah would concede to Rav Chisda that, in a case that did not involve Yesomim, the trustee is believed, because a case involving Yesomim is different - inasmuch as had their father paid, he would have informed them of the fact before his death.

The Dayanei Eretz Yisrael counter this argument however, by pointing out that - he may well have died before he had a chance to inform them.

Rav Huna bar Avin issued two rulings 'Tarti': a. 'ha'Mafkid Eitzel Chavero bi'Sh'tar, ve'Amar lo "Hechzartiv lach", Ne'eman', and b. 'Sh'tar Kis ha'Yotzei al ha'Yesomim Nishba ve'Govah ha'Kol''. Tarti' actually means - that the two statements are contradictory.

We reconcile them (in exactly the same way as we reconciled Rav Chisda with the Dayanei Golah) - by differentiating between a regular case of a trustee, and one which involves Yesomim.

Rava rules (in the above Machlokes) 'Nishba ve'Govah Mechtzah' (like the Dayanei Eretz Yisrael).

Mar Zutra, who rules like the Dayanei Golah, reconciles his ruling with that of Rava by pointing out that - he learned the opinions of the Dayanei Golah and the Dayanei Eretz Yisrael the other way around.

We query Rava's ruling like Rav Chisda from the Sugya in Shevu'os, where, in order to clarify a certain issue there, Rami bar Chama establishes the Halachah that even those who hold 'ha'Malveh es Chavero be'Eidim, Ein Tzarich le'Par'o be'Eidim' concede that 'ha'Malveh es Chavero bi'Sh'tar, Tzarich le'Par'o bi'Sh'tar/be'Eidim'. And the Gemara says there that Rava agrees with Rami bar Chama ...

... creating a problem with Rava in our Sugya - where he rules like Rav Chisda, who holds 'ha'Malveh es Chavero bi'Sh'tar, Ein Tzarich le'Par'o bi'Sh'tar'/be'Eidim.

We might answer by interpreting the statement that Rava agrees with Rami bar Chama's ruling (not literally, but) in accordance with the Sugya there. Alternatively, we can interpret it literally, and still resolve the discrepancy by explaining the Gemara to mean that - Rava agrees with the first half of Rami's statement 'ha'Malveh es Chavero be'Eidim, Ein Tzarich le'Par'o be'Eidim', but not with the second.

Ravina and Rav Ashi insert the previous Sugya (beginning with Rav Amram's She'eilah of 'ha'Mafkid es Chavero bi'Sh'tar') in this Perek - because of the opinion of the Dayanei Golah, which appeared in the previous Sugya (and who are otherwise rarely quoted).