1)
How do we refer to a case where Reuven sells Shimon something worth ...
... five Dinarim for six?
... six Dinarim for five?
What is the significance of these two terms? What is the difference between them?
The Seifa of our Mishnah rules that if Reuven sells Shimon an article worth six Dinarim for five, Reuven is permitted to retract. What would be the Din if he sold him an article worth seven, for six?
This is the opinion of R. Chisda in our Sugya. Like which Amora (in Perek ha'Zahav) does he hold?
1)
We refer to a case where Reuven sells Shimon something worth ...
... five Dinarim for six as 'Sh'tus Ma'os'.
... six Dinarim for five as 'Sh'tus Mekach'.
In fact, 'Sh'tus Ma'os' means a fifth more (or less) than the price, whereas 'Sh'tus Mekach' means a sixth less (or more) than the price.
The Seifa of our Mishnah rules that if Reuven sells Shimon an article worth six Dinarim for five, Reuven is permitted to retract. In fact the Tana might just as well have presented the case where he sold him one worth seven, for six, because, as we just learned, there is no difference between Sh'tus Ma'os and Sh'tus Mekach.
This is the opinion of Rav Chisda in our Sugya, who holds like Shmuel in Perek ha'Zahav.
2)
On what grounds does Rav Huna rule that in a case where Reuven sells Shimon something worth five Dinarim for six, and then the price rises to eight, it is Shimon who has the right to retract (and not Reuven)?
What would allowing Reuven to retract be akin to?
What would the Din be if the price rose to seven Dinarim (instead of eight)?
2)
Rav Huna rules that in a case where Reuven sells Shimon something worth five Dinarim for six, and then the price rises to eight, it is Shimon who has the right to retract because he is the one to have been cheated initially; and not Reuven, since it is only because he overcharged Shimon in the first place that the sale is not already concluded.
Allowing Reuven to retract would be akin to rewarding the sinner.
If the price rose to seven Dinarim (instead of eight) the Din would be exactly the same (because Reuven would still be overcharged).
3)
What do we mean when we say 've'Tana Tuna'?
What problem does this create with Rav Chisda's Chidush?
How do we solve the problem?
3)
When we say 've'Tana Tuna' we mean that our Mishnah supports Rav Chisda ('Tuna' is equivalent to 'Tana Didan' [our Tana]), when it says 'Ra'os ve'Nimtze'u Yafos Mocher Yachol Lachzor bo ve'Lo Loke'ach'.
The problem then is why we need Rav Chisda, seeing as we already know that from a Mishnah.
We answer that if not for Rav Chisda, we would have thought that in Rav Chisda's case (where the price also went up) both parties are permitted to retract.
4)
What does Rav Chisda say in a case where Reuven sells Shimon something worth six Dinarim for five, and the price drops to three?
And what is his proof from the Seifa of our Mishnah?
Seeing as both rulings of Rav Chisda seem to be contained in our Mishnah, why do we need Rav Chisda to echo them?
What Chidush would our Mishnah then be teaching us ...
... in the Reisha (where the wheat turned out to be inferior [according to our text 'Ha Asa le'Ashme'inan de'Loke'ach Yachol Lachzor Bo']. See M'lo ha'Ro'im)?
... in the Seifa (where the wheat turned out to be superior)?
4)
In a case where Reuven sells Shimon something worth six Dinarim for five, and the price drops to three, Rav Chisda rules that only Reuven can retract, and not Shimon.
And his proof is from the Seifa of our Mishnah 'Ra'os ve'Nimtze'u Yafos, Mocher Yachol Lachzor Bo, ve'Lo Loke'ach' (based on the same explanation as the Reisha [M'lo ha'Ro'im]).
Even though both rulings seem to be contained in our Mishnah, we nevertheless need Rav Chisda to teach them because we might otherwise have thought that in Rav Chisda's case, the Tana will hold that both parties are permitted to retract (seeing as at the end of the day, both of them are being overcharged) ...
... and our Mishnah, which is speaking where the price did not rise, would then be teaching us ...
... in the Reisha (where the wheat turned out to be inferior [according to our text 'Ha Asa le'Ashme'inan de'Loke'ach Yachol Lachzor Bo']) that the purchaser can retract (and that we do not say that just as the purchaser always claims that the article is inferior, so too, does the seller claim that it is superior, and that consequently, even though the seller promised him superior wheat, he anticipated that it would be inferior (in which case, it ought not to be considered Ona'ah.
... in the Seifa (where the wheat turned out to be superior) that the seller can retract (and that we do not say that the purchaser always claims that the article is inferior (as the Pasuk says in Mishlei "Ra Ra Yomar ha'Loke'ach"), but that really, the seller intended to give him superior wheat [in which case, it is not considered Ona'ah]).
5)
How does Rav Papa extrapolate from our Mishnah 'Shachmasis ve'Nimtzas Levanah' that the sun is red?
How would we have otherwise translated 'Shachmasis'?
How do we prove that the sun is really red?
Then why does it appear white to us during the day?
5)
Rav Papa extrapolates from our Mishnah 'Shachmasis ve'Nimtzas Levanah' that the sun is red since there are only two known color-species of wheat, white and red.
Otherwise, we would have thought that 'Shachmasis' means black.
We prove that the sun is really red from the fact that this is how we see it in the mornings and evenings.
It appears white to us during the day because its brightness distorts the color in our eyes.
6)
We cite a Beraisa in connection with Tzara'as "u'Mar'eihu Amok min ha'Or", 'ke'Mar'eh Chamah min ha'Tzeil'. What does the Tana mean?
How will we reconcile Rav Papa with the Beraisa, bearing in mind that Tzara'as is white and not red?
If, as we believed when we queried Rav Papa from the Beraisa, the sun is really white, how would we explain the fact that it is red in the mornings and evenings?
What does 'Ika de'Amri Ipcha' mean?
6)
We cite a Beraisa in connection with Tzara'as "u'Mar'eihu Amok min ha'Or", 'ke'Mar'eh Chamah min ha'Tzeil', which means that the Tzara'as appears deeper than the skin, like the sun appears deeper than the shade.
We reconcile Rav Papa with the Beraisa, bearing in mind that Tzara'as is white and not red by restricting the comparison of Tzara'as to the sun to the corollary between sun and shade (but not to its color).
If, as we believed when we queried Rav Papa from the Beraisa, the sun is really white, we would then ascribe the fact that it is red in the mornings and evenings to the fact that it passes the rose-garden in Gan Eden (which is in the east) in the morning, and the entrance to Gehinom (which is in the west) in the evening.
'Ika de'Amri Ipcha' means that according to others, the sun appears red in the morning, because its rays shine westwards where it catches a reflection of Gehinom; whereas in the evening it turns red because its rays shine eastwards, catching the reflection of the rose-garden in Gan Eden.
84b----------------------------------------84b
7)
We learned in our Mishnah 'Yayin ve'Nimtza Chometz, Sheneihen Yecholin Lachzor Bahen'. On what grounds do we try to establish the author as Rebbi? What does Rebbi say in a Beraisa about 'Yayin ve'Nimtza Chometz' (regarding Ma'asros)?
What does the Tana Kama say?
To establish our Mishnah even like the Rabbanan, we cite Rebbi Ila'a. What does Rebbi Ila'a learn from the Pasuk in Korach "ve'Lo Sis'u Alav Chet ba'Harimchem es Chelbo Mimenu"?
What then, makes wine and vinegar two species in the realm of buying and selling? What makes it different than inferior and superior wheat?
7)
We try to establish our Mishnah 'Yayin ve'Nimtza Chometz, Sheneihen Yecholin Lachzor Bahen' like Rebbi, who says in a Beraisa that 'Yayin ve'Nimtza Chometz' is considered two species (and if one takes Ma'asros from one on the other, the Ma'asros are invalid).
The Tana Kama considers them one species.
To establish our Mishnah even like the Rabbanan, we cite Rebbi Ila'a, who (after inferring from the Pasuk "ve'Lo Sis'u Alav Chet ba'Harimchem es Chelbo Mimenu" that taking from the bad on the good, is considered a sin) extrapolates that for a sin to have been performed (for separating from bad wine (vinegar) on good wine, the Ma'aser must be valid (see Ritva), which means that they are considered the same species.
What makes wine and vinegar two species in the realm of buying and selling is the fact that some people prefer wine and others, vinegar (unlike inferior and superior wheat, where everyone prefers the latter and which are therefore considered one species, as regards buying and selling).
8)
Our Mishnah validates a Kinyan Meshichah on 'fruit' (which incorporates grain) even though it has not yet been measured. Why is that?
Where must the Meshichah take place?
For the Kinyan to be effective, Pisuk Damim must already have taken place. What is Pisuk Damim?
Why is prior 'Pisuk Damim' crucial to the Kinyan?
8)
Our Mishnah validates a Kinyan Meshichah on 'fruit' (which incorporates grain) even though it has not yet been measured because measuring is merely a formality and not a Kinyan.
The Meshichah must take place either in a Simta or in a Chatzer that is jointly owned by the seller and the purchaser.
For the Kinyan to be effective, Pisuk Damim must already have taken place. This constitutes determining the price of the fruit (either by following the standard price, or by fixing a price of their own ['e.g. so much per Eifah'].
Prior Pisuk Damim is crucial to the Kinyan because without it, the parties will end up arguing over the price, and the purchaser will refuse to pay the price demanded by the seller, rendering the sale ineffective.
9)
What does the Tana advise a smart purchaser to do, to acquire fruit that is lying in the owner's domain if, for whatever reason, Meshichah is hard for him to do?
What does the Tana mean when he requires the purchaser of flax to 'move it from one place to another'? Why will Meshichah not suffice?
And what does he then say about acquiring flax that is still attached to the ground?
'Rebbi Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan "Madad ve'Hini'ach al-Gabei Simta, Kanah" '. What exactly is a 'Simta'?
What is the reason for this ruling?
9)
If, for whatever reason, Meshichah is hard for him to do, the Tana advises a smart purchaser who wants to acquire fruit that is lying in the owner's domain to rent the location of the fruit (in which case he will acquire the fruit simultaneously).
When the Tana requires the purchaser of flax to 'move it from one place to another', he means that he is obligated to pick it up and acquire it with Hagbahah, because Chazal only instituted Meshichah by things that are too heavy to acquire with Hagbahah (such as the Reisha of our Mishnah, which is speaking about large, heavy bundles).
He then states that one acquires flax that is still attached to the ground by detaching some of it (and this will be explained later in the Sugya).
'Rebbi Asi Amar Rebbi Yochanan "Madad ve'Hini'ach al-Gabei Simta, Kanah" '. A 'Simta' is a private path (or a small area at the side of the road designated for people to put down their loads and rest a while).
The reason for this ruling is because a Simta is considered like the purchaser's own domain in this regard.
10)
What did Rebbi Asi retort when Rebbi Zeira suggested that maybe Rebbi Yochanan was referring specifically to where the seller poured the fruit into a receptacle belonging to the purchaser?
According to Rebbi Zeira's contention, would the purchaser acquire the fruit if the seller poured it ...
... on to the floor of the Simta?
... into a receptacle belonging to himself purchaser that is lying in the Simta?
How do we try to prove from the statement of Rebbi Yanai Amar Rebbi 'Chatzar ha'Shutfin Konin Zeh mi'Zeh', that Rebbi Zeira must have conceded that Rebbi Asi is right?
What has this ruling to do with the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan currently under discussion?
10)
When Rebbi Zeira suggested that maybe Rebbi Yochanan was referring specifically to where the seller poured the fruit into a receptacle belonging to the purchaser, Rebbi Asi retorted that Rebbi Zeira was talking like a novice, because then Rebbi Yochanan's ruling would not have contained any Chidush.
According to Rebbi Zeira's contention the purchaser would not acquire the fruit, if the seller poured it ...
... on to the floor of the Simta.
... into a receptacle belonging to the purchaser that is lying in the Simta.
We try to prove from the statement of Rebbi Yanai Amar Rebbi 'Chatzar ha'Shutfin Konin Zeh mi'Zeh' that Rebbi Zeira must have conceded that Rebbi Asi is right by presuming that he is speaking where the owner poured the fruit on to the floor of the Chatzer.
The connection between this ruling and the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan currently under discussion is that Rebbi Yanai happens to have been the latter's Rebbe (whose opinion we assume that he follows).
11)
We refute the proof from Rebbi Yanai, by establishing his statement where the owner poured it into the purchaser's receptacle. And we prove this from a statement of Rebbi Ya'akov Amar Rebbi Yochanan. What did he say about a seller who measures out fruit for the purchaser and places it in a Simta? What does 'in a Simta' mean?
How do we then reconcile Rebbi Asi's statement citing Rebbi Yochanan?
We query Rebbi Asi further from our Mishnah 'Madad ve'Lo Mashach ... ', which presumes that this took place in a Simta. How do we know that the Tana is not speaking where the owner poured the fruit into the purchaser's receptacle?
How will Rebbi Asi reconcile the Mishnah with his own opinion?
11)
We refute the proof from Rebbi Yanai, by establishing his statement where the owner poured it into the purchaser's receptacle (and not on the floor of the Chatzer). And we prove this from a statement of Rebbi Ya'akov Amar Rebbi Yochanan, who ruled that if a seller measured out fruit for the purchaser and placed it in a Simta (which must now mean on to the floor of the Simta) the purchaser does not acquire it.
This actually clashes with Rebbi Asi's opinion who must have erred in his understanding of Rebbi Yochanan.
We query Rebbi Asi further from our Mishnah 'Madad ve'Lo Mashach ... ', which presumes that this took place in a Simta. This cannot be speaking where the owner poured the fruit into the purchaser's receptacle because then the Kashya would not be confined to Rebbi Asi, but would extend to all the Amora'im in the Sugya, including Rebbi Yanai Rebbi Ya'akov and Rebbi Yochanan.
Rebbi Asi reconciles the Mishnah with his own opinion by establishing it (not in a Simta but) in a Reshus ha'Rabim (where even the vessels belonging to the purchaser do not acquire).
12)
What could we can then extrapolate from the Reisha 'Mashach ve'Lo Madad, Kanah'?
We have a problem with this however, from a series of rulings by Abaye and Rava cited earlier in the Perek. According to them ...
... what does one acquire with Mesirah?
... what is the major distinction between Mesirah and Meshichah (location-wise)?
In that case, how will Abaye and Rava establish ...
... the Reisha of our Mishnah?
... the Seifa 'Im Hayah Pike'ach, Socher es Mekomo'? From whom is he supposed to rent it?
12)
We could then extrapolate from the Reisha 'Mashach ve'Lo Madad Kanah' that Meshichah acquires in the Reshus-ha'Rabim.
The problem with this is from a series of rulings by Abaye and Rava cited earlier in the Perek, according to whom ...
... one acquires a ship and a large species of animal with Mesirah.
... the major distinction between Mesirah and Meshichah (location-wise) is that whereas Mesirah acquires even in the Reshus ha'Rabim or in a domain that belongs to neither of the parties, Meshichah only acquires in a Simta or in a domain that belongs to both of them.
Consequently, Abaye and Rava will establish ...
... the Reisha of our Mishnah where the purchaser pulled the fruit from the Reshus ha'Rabim into his own domain.
... the Seifa 'Im Hayah Pike'ach, Socher es Mekomo' by amending it to read 've'Im bi'Reshus Ba'alim Hi, Im Hayah Pike'ach, Socher es Mekomo'.