In the case where a Shechiv-M'ra divided his property between his wife and his sons, leaving over only one date-palm, Ravina initially thought that - the wife could only claim the date-palm for her Kesubah (but not from the sons' portions).

Had the husband not left over the date-palm - he would have permitted her to claim her entire Kesubah out of the sons' portions.

Rav Yeimar objected to Ravina's ruling - because if she cannot claim from the sons' portions, she cannot claim from the date-palm either (since if she was Mochel the one, she was Mochel the other).

Rav Yeimar therefore ruled that she was entitled to claim her entire Kesubah out of the sons' portions as well as the date-palm - because once a husband leaves over property, however little, she sees no point in protesting as long as that property has not been assessed, in which case her silence cannot be construed as Mechilah.

Rav Huna ruled that, if a Shechiv-M'ra wrote all his property to someone other than his son, then - if the beneficiary is an heir then he takes the property as an inheritance; if not, he takes it as a gift.

He actually wrote a Lashon such as 'Nechasai lach' which is ambiguous, and can be interpreted according to the situation.

We assume that if the beneficiary is an heir, he means to give it to his as a Yerushah - in order not to negate the Torah law of Yerushah.

Rav Huna mentioned specifically a Shechiv-M'ra - because he was referring to Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah (who in turn, presented the case of a Shechiv-M'ra), but not necessarily to preclude a Bari.

Rav Nachman was surprised at Rav Huna's ruling because, he told him, if he intended to rule like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah, then he should have said so.

Rav Nachman therefore established the actual case to which Rav Huna must have been referring - where Reuven said to Shimon (who was a Shechiv-M'ra) 'To whom will you leave your property, to Levi?' To which Shimon replied 'To whom then?' ...

... and Rav Huna is coming to teach us that even in such a case, there is a distinction between Matanah and Yerushah (see also Rabeinu Gershom).

Rav Ada bar Ahavah initially suggests that the difference between Yerushah and Matanah concerns an Almanah being sustained from her husband's estate - meaning that if the beneficiary received the estate in the form of a Matanah, the widow will not be sustained from it.

The basis for Rav Ada bar Ahavah's distinction (that if the property was a Matanah, the Almanah cannot be sustained from it) is - the Mishnah in Gitin, which rules that an Almanah cannot be sustained from Nechasim Meshubadim.

What makes a Matnas Shechiv-M'ra a Kinyan de'Rabbanan (the Takanas Chachamim 'Divrei Shechiv-M'ra ki'Chesuvin ve'chi'Mesurin Dami') is - the fact that, min ha'Torah, one cannot acquire a gift after the donor's death ...

... and the Rabbanan instituted it - in order to avoid the Shechiv-M'ra dying when he sees that his last request is not being fulfilled.

Rava now objects to Rav Ada bar Ahavah's suggestion on the basis of a 'Kal va'Chomer' - if the Almanah is sustained from her husband's property that belongs to the heirs mi'd'Oraisa, then she certainly ought to be sustained from property that the beneficiary receives only mid'Rabanan.

And when the Mishnah in Gitin rules that an Almanah cannot be sustained from Nechasim Meshubadim it is referring to - a case where the Lekuchos either purchased the property or received it as a gift with a Kinyan d'Oraisa.

Rava therefore concludes by citing Rav Acha bar Rav Ivya (whom we discussed earlier) who ruled that if someone says 'Nechasai lach, ve'Acharecha li'Peloni' - assuming that the first person is an heir, the second person (Acharecha) receives nothing according to Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah, since 'Nechasai lach' in such a case, is seen as a Lashon Yerushah, in which case, it will automatically pass on to his heirs after his death.

And that is precisely what Rav Huna meant with his distinction - If the beneficiary is an heir then he will receive it as a Yerushah, in which case it will go to his heirs after his death, even if the donor added 've'Acharecha li'Peloni'; whereas if he is not, then, upon his death, it will go to 'Acharecha'.

Despite the fact that Rav Huna referred to 'Shechiv-M'ra she'Kasav' - he really meant 'she'Amar', because there is no fundamental difference between the two.

We cannot accept the Shechiv-M'ra's words 'Acharecha li'Peloni' - because, having made the first beneficiary a Yoresh, trying to stop the process of Yerushah constitutes 'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah'.

In a case of 'Acharecha' where the first beneficiary was an heir Rav Ilish - wanted to abide by the Shechiv-M'ra's instructions.

Rava, citing the words of Acha bar Rav Ivya, compared Rav Ilish initial ruling to the rulings of 'Dayni de'Chatzatzta'. According to Rabeinu Chananel this means graveyard Dayanim (see Rashash). Alternatively, it might mean - 'compromising Dayanim' (from the word 'la'Chetzotz', to divide).

Rav Ilish was embarrassed - because he was afraid that Rava would suspect him of erring in other rulings too (when he was not there to correct him).

Rava consoled him however, by quoting the Pasuk in Yeshayah "Ani Hash-m be'Itah Achishenah" which implies that - whenever Tzadikim need salvation, Hash-m sends it (here too, when Rav Ilish needed correction, Hash-m sent him Rava, an indication that when Rava was not there, he had not erred [see also Mesores ha'Shas]).

The Tana Kama of our Mishnah rules that if someone writes his estate to others, ignoring his children - what he did is valid, but the Chachamim are displeased with him for uprooting the Din of Yerushah min ha'Torah.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that - if his sons are not behaving as they should, then what he did is praiseworthy.

We ask whether the Rabbanan argue with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel or not. They might argue with him on the grounds that - sometimes, bad children bring up good ones (as we will see later).

We try to resolve this She'eilah from a Beraisa which discusses an incident that occurred with Yosef ben Yo'ezer, who declared Hekdesh a wine [or oil]-drawing vessel full of Dinrim - to prevent his errant son from inheriting it.

The errant son subsequently married - the daughter of the crown-maker of Yanai ha'Melech.

When he opened the fish that he bought his wife - after she had given birth, he discovered a precious stone.

His wife advised him to sell the stone to the treasurers of Hekdesh, rather than to the King's treasurers - because she knew that the latter would under-assess it.

She also warned him that, when having the jewel evaluated - he should not name a price - due to the principle 'Amiraso li'Gevohah, ki'Mesiraso le'Hedyot' (One's word to Hekdesh is like handing it to a Hedyot), in which case the deal is concluded, and he will not be able to retract.

The price they quoted for the stone - which they wanted for the Choshen Mishpat (see Rashash) was thirteen wine-drawing vessels-full of Dinrim.

When the treasurers informed the son of Yosef ben Yo'ezer that they only had seven vessels-full of gold coins in the kitty, he replied - that he would accept what they had, and the remaining six, he declared Hekdesh.

We try to prove from the statement 'Yosef ben Yo'ezer brought in one, but his son brought in six' that - the Rabbanan must agree with Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, since the statement is clearly a praiseworthy one, vindicating Yosef ben Yo'ezer's actions (though this proof only seems to be clear according to the second explanation in the following answer).

The statement may have been made by the assessors for the sake of the records. Alternatively, it was made by - all the Chachamim of the generation, in order to learn from it, as we explained.

From the alternative version 'Yosef ben Yo'ezer brought in one, but his son took out seven' (which has derogatory connotations) - we learn that the Rabbanan must argue with Raban Shimon ben Gamliel.

This leaves us with two conflicting proofs, which means that - at this point we do not know whether the Rabbanan argue with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel or not.

We resolve our She'eilah from a statement by Shmuel, who told Rav Yehudah - not to deprive one son of his Yerushah in favor of another, even from a bad son to a good one, a clear proof that the Rabbanan argue with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (otherwise, like whom will Shmuel hold?)

And the 'Kal va'Chomer' that he added is - not to deprive a son in favor of a daughter.

We Pasken like Shmuel in spite of Rebbi Yochanan's principle 'Halachah ke'Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel be'Mishnaseinu ... ' - because Shmuel does not agree with it.

We can extrapolate from Rava, who rules with regard to a certain Mishnah in Avodah-Zarah like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel - that he does not hold like Rebbi Yochanan either.

Regarding the many principles stated in Shas (such as 'Halachah ki'S'tam Mishnah', 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Akiva me'Chavero' ...), we must bear in mind - that they are all Halachah, except when the Gemara rules otherwise.

When a man, whose sons were not going on the right path, left his entire estate to Yonasan ben Uziel - the latter sold a third, declared a third Hekdesh and returned the remaining third to the original heirs.

He made a point of first selling a third and declaring a third Hekdesh, before returning the last third to the original heirs - to clarify to Shamai ha'Zaken (whose reaction he anticipated), that he was not returning the property to the original heirs as a Shali'ach of their father, but because he, as the rightful owner, was entitled to do with it as he saw fit.

Shamai ha'Zaken approached him with his stick and his satchel - to rebuke him for contravening the wishes of the donor (who did not want his sons to benefit from his property).

To which he replied that - just as he (Shamai) was powerless to negate his sale and his declaration of Hekdesh, so too, was he powerless to negate his gift.

The basis of Shamai's argument was - the principle 'Mitzvah le'Kayem Divrei ha'Meis'.

Its ramifications were that - since Yonasan ben Uziel had contravened the donor's wishes, his gift to the heirs was Bateil, and so was the initial gift to Yonasan ben Uziel (in which case the sale and the Hekdesh were invalid too).