1)
Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi argue in our Mishnah about a Bari who is writing out his property to his sons. On what grounds does Rebbi Yehudah require him to write in the Sh'tar 'me'Hayom u'le'Achar Misah'?
Why would a person want to write out his property (without the Peiros) to his sons in his lifetime?
What does Rebbi Yossi say?
1)
Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi argue in our Mishnah about a Bari who is writing out his property to his sons. Rebbi Yehudah requires him to write in the Sh'tar 'me'Hayom u'le'Achar Misah' - because otherwise, he will be giving it to them after his death, something which a Bari cannot do (as we have already learned).
A person would want to write out his property (without the Peiros) to his sons in his lifetime - in a case where he wants to marry another woman without his sons losing out, by his property becoming Meshubad to their stepmother's Kesubah.
Rebbi Yossi rules that - he does not need to write in the Sh'tar 'me'Hayom u'le'Achar Misah' (for reasons that will soon be disclosed).
2)
What does our Mishnah say about a case where a father writes all his property to his son ...
... concerning the father selling the property, or the son selling it, as long as the father is still alive?
... in the event that the father did sell it?
... in the event that the son sold it?
Would it make any difference if the 'father' were to write out the property not to his son, but to somebody else?
In the initial case, what will happen to the property if, after the father sold the Peiros, first the son, and then the father, die?
2)
In a case where a father writes all his property to his son, our Mishnah rules ...
... that the father is not permitted to sell the property completely, because it is sold to the son, and the son is not permitted to sell it completely (during the father's lifetime) because it belongs to the father.
... in the event that the father did sell it - it is sold until the time of his death (meaning that the sale of the Peiros is valid).
... in the event that the son sold it that - it (the 'Guf' [the actual field]) is sold, but only from the time of the father's death.
If the 'father' were to write the property (not to his son, but) to somebody else - the same Din would apply.
In the initial case if, after the father sold the Peiros, first the son, and then the father, die - the son's heirs will receive the Guf and the subsequent Peiros of their grandfather's property, since the son acquired the Guf of the field from the moment that the father wrote it to him.
3)
We query our Mishnah from a Mishnah in Gitin. What does the Mishnah there say about someone who gives his wife a Get 'me'Hayom u'le'Achar Misah'?
How do we reconcile this with our Mishnah, which validates 'me'Hayom u'le'Achar Misah' (as we just learned)?
3)
We query our Mishnah from a Mishnah in Gitin, which states that if someone gives his wife a Get 'me'Hayom u'le'Achar Misah' - she is a Safek Megureshes, because we are not sure whether he meant the Get to take effect in retrospect (immediately) in the event that he dies, or whether he changed his mind, and wants the Get to come into effect only after his death, which is not possible.
We reconcile this with our Mishnah, which validates 'me'Hayom u'le'Achar Misah', (as we just learned) - by differentiating between Isur (the Mishnah in Gitin) and Mamon (our Mishnah), where we can interpret his words to mean 'the Guf from today, and the Peiros from after his death' (which is not applicable in the case of the Get).
4)
What did Rav Nachman reply when Rav Huna asked him to ask Rabah bar Avuha whether the Halachah was like Rebbi Yossi in our Mishnah or not? Why was he hesitant to comply with Rav Huna's request?
What were they both doing by Rabah bar Avuha?
Rav Huna instructed him to ask anyway, promising that he would supply the reason. What did Rabah bar Avuha citing Rav, reply?
What reason did Rav Huna subsequently give for Rebbi Yossi's ruling?
4)
When Rav Huna asked Rav Nachman to ask Rabah bar Avuha whether the Halachah was like Rebbi Yossi in our Mishnah or not - he declined, - because, he explained, he did not even know Rebbi Yossi's reason, so what was the point of asking whether it was Halachah.
They had both gone to visit Rabah bar Avuha, who was sick.
Rav Huna instructed him to ask anyway, promising that he would supply the reason. Meanwhile, Rabah bar Avuha citing Rav, replied - 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Yossi'.
Rav Huna gave Rebbi Yossi's reason as 'Zemano Shel Sh'tar Mochi'ach alav' (the date on the Sh'tar is its valid date) Otherwise, what would be the point of inserting it, if he only handed it over later).
5)
How will we reconcile the above ruling of Rav with his ruling in Gitin, where he requires the insertion of the date, like Rebbi Yehudah?
How do we know that he did not simply retract there from his opinion here?
What can we comment on the Ge'onim, who cite the Minhag in the Yeshivah like Rebbi Yehudah, even by Mamon?
Rava asked Rav Nachman whether Rebbi Yehudah argues even in the case of a Sh'tar which contains a Kinyan. What did Rav Nachman reply?
This means that Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi argue where there is no Kinyan. How does one then acquire the property?
5)
To reconcile the above ruling of Rav (like Rebbi Yossi) with his ruling in Gitin, where he requires the insertion of the date like Rebbi Yehudah - we confine that ruling to Gitin (where there is no Kinyan, and due to the Chumra of Arayos).
We know that he did not simply retract there from his opinion here - because if he had, the Sugya would have said so.
We can comment on the Ge'onim, who cite the Minhag in the Yeshivah like Rebbi Yehudah even by Mamon that - strictly speaking, they too, rule like Rebbi Yossi (because otherwise they would not have used the term 'Nahagu'), and that the Minhag is merely a Chumra.
When Rava asked Rav Nachman whether Rebbi Yehudah argues even in the case of a Sh'tar which contains a Kinyan, he replied - in the negative (because if there was a Kinyan, he would acquire the property from the time of the Kinyan in any case).
This means that Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi argue when there is no Kinyan, in which case - one acquires the property with the Sh'tar.
6)
Rav Papi disagrees with Rav Nachman however. He draws a distinction between 'Aknaya u'Kenina mineih' and 'Kenina mineih ve'Aknaya'. How do both of these terms appear in a regular Sh'tar with a Kinyan?
According to Rebbi Yehudah, why does ...
... 'Aknaya u'Kenina mineih' not require 'me'ha'Yom u'le'Achar Misah'?
... 'Kenina mineih ve'Aknaya' nevertheless require 'me'ha'Yom u'le'Achar Misah'?
Rav Chanina mi'Sura pointed out that most Chachamim had never heard of this distinction, and he was surprised that the Sofrim had. What are the ramifications of this comment?
What did the Sofrim of Abaye and of Rava reply when this was put to them?
6)
Rav Papi disagrees with Rav Nachman however. He makes a distinction between 'Aknaya u'Kenina Mineih' and 'Kenina Mineih ve'Aknaya'. In a regular Sh'tar (with a Kinyan) - 'Aknaya appears at the beginning of the Sh'tar (to say that the owner was Makneh to the beneficiary via the witnesses with a Kinyan Sudar), and 'u'Kenina mineih' appeared at the end.
According to Rebbi Yehudah ...
... 'Aknaya u'Kenina Mineih' does not require 'me'ha'Yom u'le'Achar Misah' - because 'u'Kenina mineih' at the end of the Sh'tar is a form of repetition, which serves to strengthen the rights of the beneficiary, dispensing with the need to write 'me'ha'Yom u'le'Achar Misah'.
... 'Kenina mineih ve'Aknaya' requires 'me'ha'Yom u'le'Achar Misah' - because the inverted order of the phrases implies that 've'Aknaya' comes to explain 'Kenina mineih' and nothing more.
Rav Chanina mi'Sura claimed that most Chachamim had never heard of this distinction, and he was surprised that the Sofrim had. What he meant was that - 'Aknaya u'Kenina mineih' is no better than 'Kenina mineih ve'Aknaya' and that neither dispenses with the need for 'me'ha'Yom u'le'Achar Misah' (like Rav Nachman).
When this was put to the Sofrim of Abaye and of Rava however - they replied that they were fully aware of Rav Papi's distinction.
7)
What did Rav Huna b'rei d'Rav Yehoshua say about this.
According to him, Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi argue over a case of 'be'Duchran Pisgami de'Havi be'Anpana'. What does he mean by that?
When Rav Kahana cited this entire Sugya to Rav Z'vid , he replied that his version of Rava Amar Rav Nachman's statement concurred with Rav Huna b'rei d'Rav Yehoshua. What was his version of Rava's original statement?
7)
Rav Huna Brei d'Rav Yehoshua agreed with Rav Papi, in that - there is no difference between 'Aknaya u'Kenina mineih' and 'Kenina mineih ve'Aknaya'.
According to him, Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Yossi argue over a case of 'be'Duchran Pisgami de'Havi be'Anpana' which means - a Sh'tar that is meant as a record (one that does not contain a Kinyan at all, like that of Rav Nachman).
When Rav Kahana cited this entire Sugya to Rav Zvid , he replied that his version of Rava Amar Rav Nachman's statement concurred with Rav Huna b'rei d'Rav Yehoshua. In his version of Rava Amar Rav Nachman's original statement - Rebbi Yehudah did not require 'me'ha'Yom u'le'Achar Misah' whichever way the two Kinyanim were stated in a regular Sh'tar, and that he only argued with Rebbi Yossi in the case of 'be'Duchran Pisgami de'Havi be'Anpana' (as we just explained).
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8)
According to Rebbi Yochanan, if, after the son sold the property, he died, the purchaser will not receive it when the father dies. Why not?
How do we reconcile this with what we explained in the Mishnah, that the son's heirs will inherit their grandfather's property, even if he died only after their father (even according to Rebbi Yochanan)?
What can we infer from the Seifa of our Mishnah, 'Machar ha'Ben, Ein le'Loke'ach ad she'Yamus ha'Av?
How will we then reconcile this with Rebbi Yochanan's ruling?
8)
According to Rebbi Yochanan, if, after the son sold the property, he died, the purchaser will not receive it when the father dies - because he holds that whoever owns the Peiros is considered the owner ('Kinyan Peiros ke'Kinyan ha'Guf' Dami'). Consequently, the son's sale is invalid (since he died before receiving the property).
This does not contradict what we explained in the Mishnah (that Rebbi Yochanan concedes that the son's heirs will inherit their grandfather's property, even if he died only after their father) - because, since there, the son did not withdraw from the property before his death, he inherits it even in the grave, as we have already learned, enabling his heirs to inherit it from him.
We can infer from the Seifa of our Mishnah, 'Machar ha'Ben, Ein le'Loke'ach ad she'Yamus ha'Av' - 'Ha' Meis ha'Av, Yesh lo' (that should the father die, the purchaser does receive it).
We will reconcile this ruling with that of Rebbi Yochanan - by restricting the Mishnah to where the son died after his father.
9)
Resh Lakish disagrees with Rebbi Yochanan. In what way does his interpretation of the Seifa of our Mishnah differ from that of Rebbi Yochanan?
Why is that?
In another Machlokes, Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish argue over whether someone who purchases a field for the Peiros reads the Parshah when bringing Bikurim or not. What does each one hold? What is the basis of their Machlokes?
What do we learn from the Pasuk in Ki Savo "Asher Tavi me'Artz'cha"?
9)
Resh Lakish disagrees with Rebbi Yochanan. According to him - the Seifa of our Mishnah speaks even where the son died before his father ...
... because he holds 'Kinyan Peiros La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami' (the person who owns the Guf is considered the owner of the property, and not the one who owns the Peiros).
In another Machlokes, Rebbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish argue over whether someone who purchases a field for the Peiros reads the Parshah when bringing Bikurim or not Rebbi Yochanan - based on his previous ruling 'Kinyan Peiros ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami', holds 'Meivi ve'Korei'; whereas Resh Lakish - who holds 'Kinyan Peiros La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami', holds there 'Meivi ve'Eino Korei'.
We learn from the Pasuk "Asher Tavi me'Artz'cha" that - even someone who owns only the Peiros is obligated to bring Bikurim (see Tosfos DH 'Meivi').
10)
Having taught us in the case of Bikurim that 'Kinyan Peiros ...
... ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami', why did Rebbi Yochanan find it necessary to repeat this ruling with regard to our case (of 'Machar ha'Ben')?
... La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami', why did Resh Lakish find it necessary to repeat it with regard to our case?
How else could we have explained the 'Tz'richusa' (the need to repeat the ruling) from the point of view of ...
... Rebbi Yochanan?
... Resh Lakish?
10)
Having taught us in the case of Bikurim that 'Kinyan Peiros ...
... ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami', Rebbi Yochanan nevertheless found it necessary to repeat this ruling with regard to our case (of 'Machar ha'Ben') - because we would otherwise have thought that a father will automatically be Mochel his rights in the Guf (that he owns through his Kinyan Peiros) to his son.
... La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami', Resh Lakish found it necessary to repeat this with regard to our case - because we would otherwise have thought that in our case, even he will agree that the Kinyan Peiros of the father is considered like the Kinyan ha'Guf, because a person is never Mochel what he himself needs (even for the benefit of his son).
Alternatively, we could have switched the 'Tz'richusa' (the need to repeat the ruling) on to the other foot, and explained that ...
... had Rebbi Yochanan learned his Din in our case we would have thought that really he holds 'Kinyan Peiros La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami', only here he doesn't, because a person is never Mochel his own needs (even for the benefit of his son)
... had Resh Lakish learned his Din in our case, we would have thought that - really he holds 'Kinyan Peiros ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami', only here he doesn't, because a father will automatically be Mochel his rights in the Guf (that he owns through his Kinyan Peiros) to his son.
11)
In a case where Reuven gives property to Shimon (to acquire after his death), but stipulates 've'Acharecha li'Peloni, ve'Acharav Yirash P'loni', what does the Beraisa (which we already cited earlier) rule in the event that ...
... Shimon dies?
... 'Acharecha' dies?
... 'Acharecha' dies in Shimon's lifetime? Why does ' Acharav' not inherit it?
How did Rebbi Yochanan query Resh Lakish from this Beraisa?
Reish Lakish reminded Rebbi Yochanan however, that Rav Hoshaya (as well as Rav), already answered the Kashya for him. What did Rav Hoshaya mean when he said 'Acharecha Sha'ani'?
11)
In a case where Reuven is Makneh property to Shimon (to acquire after his death), but stipulates 've'Acharecha li'Peloni, ve'Acharav Yirash P'loni', in the event that ...
... Shimon dies, the Beraisa (which we already cited earlier) rules - 'Kanah Sheini'.
... 'Acharecha' dies - 'Kanah Shelishi' (Acharav).
... 'Acharecha' dies in Shimon's lifetime - 'Yachzeru Nechasim le'Yorshei Rishon'. ('Acharav' does not inherit it because he was only supposed to receive it from the 'Acharecha').
Rebbi Yochanan queried Resh Lakish from this Beraisa - in that, seeing as Shimon only received the Peiros, according to Resh Lakish, the property ought to revert to Reuven's heirs (rather than to Shimon's).
Resh Lakish reminded Rebbi Yochanan however, that Rav Hoshaya (as well as Rav), already answered the Kashya for him. When Rav Hoshaya said 'Acharecha Sha'ani', he meant that - the Lashon 'Acharecha li'Peloni' implies that he is giving each one the Guf as well as the Peiros.
12)
What is the problem with another Beraisa, which specifically states 'Yachzeru le'Yorshei Nosein'? On whom is the Kashya?
How do we basically answer the Kashya?
On what grounds do we refute the text which reads 'Ela Acharecha Nami Tana'i hi'?
12)
The Beraisa, which specifically states 'Yachzeru le'Yorshei Nosein' - poses a Kashya on Rebbi Yochanan (since, according to him, the property really ought to go to the Yorshei Rishon (like we saw in the previous Beraisa).
Basically, we answer the Kashya by establishing a Machlokes Tana'im (and this latter Beraisa, holds 'Kinyan Peiros La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf' Dami), whereas the previous Beraisa holds ' ... ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami'. And to that end we will shortly cite yet another Beraisa.
We refute the text which reads 'Ela Acharecha Nami Tana'i hi' - because that would imply that our previous answer on Resh Lakish was wrong, and that the Machlokes Tana'im is a new approach to answer the S'tirah in his words, and that is simply incorrect, as we shall now see.