Distinction: However, when he says that the document was written and handed over properly, he is not believed to say there was a Moda'a or it was Amanah, Migo that he could say that it is forged.

Implied question: Why is this unlike when [the witnesses say] "we were minors or coerced" [when we signed], in the Mishnah in Kesuvos (18b)?

Answer: There, they do not agree that the document was written properly. They say that they were coerced or minors, and Pasul for testimony. It was never written properly;

Therefore, a Migo helps. We cannot say that verbal [testimony] cannot weaken a document, for they do not admit that there was a proper document.

Implied question: Why does [Rav Nachman] say in Kesuvos (19a) that [without Kiyum, the borrower] is believed to say that it was paid, Migo that if he wanted, he could have said that the document is a forgery?

Answer: Also there, he does not weaken the document [through saying that he paid it].

Explanation: Rav Huna, who says there that one (a borrower) who admits that he wrote (authorized) a document, [the lender] need not validate it...

He holds that he is not believed through a Migo even to say that he paid it, even though he does not weaken the document, unless he claims that it was forged.

Question: Since Rav Nachman agrees that he is not believed to say that it is an Amanah document, or there was a Moda'a...

Why did he say to Rav Huna, who said that [if the borrower admits that he wrote it, the lender] need not validate it "why do you 'steal' [teach deceptively]? If you hold like R. Meir, say that the Halachah follows R. Meir!"

Perhaps also Rav Huna said about [claims of] Amanah and Moda'a, that [the lender] need not validate it, which Rav Nachman agrees to!

Answer: Rav Huna said even regarding a claim of "it is paid" that he need not validate it, since he did not distinguish at all;

Now, according to Rav Nachman, even Rabanan who argue with R. Meir there [about whether witnesses are believed to say that they were coerced, minors or Pasul], agree regarding [that they are not believed to say that the document was] Amanah or there was a Moda'a.

Implied question: A Beraisa below (154b) says that if one said that a document was Amanah, he is not believed. We wanted to say that R. Meir and Rabanan argue about this!

Answer: Rav Nachman would establish it like everyone.

Explanation: This is unlike retracting their testimony. They merely add to their testimony.

Implied question: When their signatures are available elsewhere, they are not believed. We do not say that they add to their testimony!

Answer: Even so, when their signatures are not available elsewhere, they are believed through a Migo, since they do not totally retract their testimony.

Note: Above (31b DH v'Zu), Tosfos says that Migo does not apply to two people, for they would want to make different claims! Here, if we assume that only two signed the document, it suffices to believe one of them in order to disqualify the document.

Explanation: We must say that he wrote to her also "and in your Peros", like the Mishnah in Kesuvos (83a);

If he wrote to her only "in your property", he still eats the Peros. [Waiving rights] "in your property" helps only if she sold or gave it, that it stands.

Observation: We could have said that he wrote a good expression, or that [others] gave to her on condition that her husband has no rights in it;

Or, we could have said that her husband gave to her. It says below (51b) that [in such a case] her husband does not eat the Peros.

Question: What proof do we bring from Rav Kahana?

Suggestion: We bring that the expression "Din u'Devarim" helps, even though it is an inferior expression.

Rejection #1: Perhaps all these that we bring (Rav Kahana and Rava) discuss a good expression [and there is no source that an inferior expression helps]!

Rejection #2: "I do not want it" is a good expression, like is proven in Kerisus (24a)!

Answer #1 (defense of Suggestion): Some say that since [Rav Kahana] said that an inheritance that comes to someone from elsewhere, but it did not come already, this implies that we discuss an inferior expression]!

If it were a good expression, even if it already came, why couldn't he stipulate about it?!

Answer #2 (Ri): We bring a proof that even though we hold that Ein Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam, in any case he can remove himself from Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam.

Question: Even without Rav Kahana, we could bring that one can remove himself from Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam, just like She'er, Kesus v'Onah (below, 126b). R. Yehudah said, for monetary matters, his stipulation is fulfilled!

Even R. Meir argues only because he holds that one who stipulates against the Torah, his stipulation is void!

Answer #1: There is different, for he makes an absolute Tenai. Here, we discuss one who does not say in the way of a Tenai, just he says "I have no Din u'Devarim in your property."

Answer #2: Here, he says by himself. She did not ask him. One might have thought that this is empty words, like we say in Bava Metzi'a (66a), since she should have stipulated, and her husband stipulated;

We bring from Rav Kahana that to remove oneself, it helps;

We bring also Rava's teaching, i.e. for which inheritance does a Tenai help? For one that comes through Chachamim's enactment, like Rava taught;

However, a Torah inheritance, e.g. "I have no Din u'Devarim in the inheritance of my father", it does not help at all;

We bring Rav Huna's teaching to show that the reason he can remove himself is since it was enacted for his benefit, he can say "I do not want that benefit."

Explanation: We need not bring a proof about the expression Din u'Devarim. It is logical that when it did not yet come to him, the expression Din u'Devarim helps, just like a good expression helps in general;

Question: Why did we need Rav Kahana's teaching?

Suggestion: It was for R. Yanai's teaching (that it helps to write to her during Eirusin).

Rejection: He holds in Yevamos (93a) that Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam!

Answer: Rather, it is because we hold that Ein Adam Makneh;

Rava's teaching alone is not enough without Rav Kahana, for from Rava we do not learn that one can stipulate about Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam;

Implied question: Rava refers to food (feeding one's wife), which is Lo Ba l'Olam!

Answer: There is it is not a Chidush that she has no food. Must she accept food b'Al Korchah (against her will)?! When she wants, she retracts;

Rav Huna's Chidush is only that she can uproot her earnings from her husband.

Question: Rav rules in Kesuvos (84b) like R. Shimon ben Gamliel, who says that if she died, her husband inherits her, even if he wrote "I have no Din u'Devarim in your life and in your death", but not for his reason;

R. Shimon ben Gamliel holds that a husband's inheritance is mid'Oraisa. Rav holds that a husband's inheritance is mid'Rabanan, and Chachamim strengthened their words like Torah law;

Why are Peros different? He can remove himself from them, because they are mid'Rabanan!

Answer #1: Inheritance is different, for it falls to the husband. Her heirs are like strangers in this inheritance with respect to the husband. Therefore, he cannot remove himself;

However, here he can remove himself from Nichsei Melug, and they will remain in the hands of the one who has them now, i.e. the woman.

Answer #2: Chachamim strengthened [their words] only for a matter that has a source in the Torah, such as inheritance, for there is Torah inheritance;

However, something that has nothing like it in Torah (such as eating the Peros of her property), Chachamim did not strengthen [their words about it].

Answer #3: Peros are not common, therefore Chachamim did not strengthen [their words about it], like we say in Kesuvos (56b) "everyone has a Kesuvah, but not everyone has Peros";

[Peros] are not as common as inheritance, for every woman has Nichsei Tzon Barzel that her husband will inherit [if she dies first].

Even when we marry off an orphan [from Tzedakah], a Mishnah (Kesuvos 67a) teaches that we do not give to her less than 50 Zuz. Therefore, inheritance of Tzon Barzel is common, and Chachamim did not distinguish in a husband's inheritance. In all inheritances, he cannot stipulate.

However, Peros are not common. Many do not have Nichsei Melug. Therefore, Chachamim did not strengthen [their words about it, and he can remove himself from it].

Explanation #1 (Rashbam): If he said also "I do not accept [responsibility] to redeem her, and I am not concerned for Peros of her Nichsei Melug that [Chachamim] enacted for me", his Tenai helps while she is still an Arusah, and he did not yet acquire her land for Peros.

Support (Rashba): A Beraisa in Kesuvos (47b) says that they enacted redemption corresponding to Peros. This shows that Peros was the primary enactment, and he can say so ("I do not want her Peros, and I will not redeem her.")

In Kesuvos (58b) the Gemara challenges Rav Huna's teaching from this that they enacted food corresponding to her earnings, and we answer "rather, it should say that they enacted her earnings corresponding to food."

Rejection #1 (Rashba): Really, we cannot say so. Just the contrary, redemption is primary, like the Ri derived in Kesuvos (47b);

Citation (47b): Why does [the Beraisa] say [they enacted redemption corresponding to Peros], "therefore her husband eats Peros"? One might have thought that he does not eat them. Rather, he stores them [in case he will need to redeem her];

[The Beraisa] teaches that this is better. Sometimes [her Peros] do not suffice, and he will redeem her from his own money.

Rejection #2: Also, it says above there "granted, they enacted Peros for a husband, for [if not], if she would be captured, he would have enmity, and refrain from redeeming her.

Inference: It was enacted for her benefit.

Rejection #3: The Yerushalmi in Kesuvos explicitly says regarding the Mishnah "if she made Nisu'in, her husband has more [rights than a girl's father]. He eats Peros in her lifetime"...

[It says about this] if a husband said "I do not want to eat [Peros], and not redeem her", we do not consent.

Implied question: Why does the Mishnah say that redemption corresponds to Peros? Redemption is primary!

Answer #1: It taught so only to teach that she cannot say "I will not be redeemed, and I will not give Peros";

Even though it was enacted for her benefit, [she cannot say so] lest she assimilate [if she remains in captivity] amidst the Nochrim.

Answer #2: Also, this is unlike food, about which she can say "do not feed me, and I will be work for you." There, she does not uproot the enactment of food, for if she does not work and is not fed, tomorrow she can work and be fed;

However, if she said "I will not be redeemed, and I will not give Peros", she totally uproots the enactment of Peros, for Peros [of her property] for all her days are in place of her redemption.

Answer #3: Peros are different, for his Yad (power of acquisition) is like her Yad. He acquires in the land itself;

However, her earnings, how can he acquire them? They are not intact (in the world now). We cannot say that he acquires in her actual hands!

Support: We find like this that Reish Lakish argues with Rav Huna in Kesuvos (58b), and holds that her earnings are primary. He does not change the text of the Beraisa [like Rav Huna did, to say that earnings correspond to food]. Rather, he teaches that they enacted food corresponding to her earnings.

Even so, R. Tam says that the husband cannot say in a case that her earnings do not suffice [to feed her] "spend your earnings for your food", like is proven in Gitin (12a) and Kesuvos (70a);

It asks "if her earnings do not suffice, the question returns. Since he is obligated to [feed] her, how can he forbid her through a vow?"

Explanation: One is what he wrote in her Kesuvah for [her to collect from it] 100 or 200. What a man gives to her from his own, the expression "writing" is appropriate, and not "designation", e.g. "one who writes all his property to his sons";

One is what he designated for her in her Kesuvah corresponding to her dowry that she brought from her father's house;

Also the dowry is called Kesuvah, for in Kesuvos (47b) it taught that her burial is in place of her Kesuvah, i.e. her dowry;

We do not say [that burial is] corresponding to 100 or 200, for in Kesuvos (53a), we say that an Arusah has no burial (even though all agree that she has a Kesuvah if he wrote one to her)!

And one (the third) is who entered his own appraised property. He appraised a field corresponding to the addition he added for her, from his property, to the 100 or 200.

Explanation (cont.): These three monetary matters are written in the Kesuvah in this order. First is 100 or 200, and afterwards the dowry she brings with her "and brought to him", and afterwards "the Chasan wanted and added from his own." The Rashbam did not explain like this.