QUESTIONS: Rebbi Chama b'Rebbi Chanina states that one who gives a gift to his friend is not required to inform him. Rebbi Chama derives this from the gift which Hash-m gave to Moshe Rabeinu. Moshe Rabeinu did not know that his face was radiating until the people told him. RASHI (DH Eino Tzarich) explains that, according to Rebbi Chama, one is not required to inform his friend about a gift even though he might be left wondering who gave him the gift.

The Gemara questions Rebbi Chama's opinion from the Beraisa. The Beraisa teaches that one is supposed to inform his friend when he gives him a gift. The Beraisa derives this from the fact that Hash-m informed Moshe that he was going to give the gift of Shabbos to the Jewish people. Raban Shimon ben Gamliel says that this teaches that when a person gives a gift of food to a child, he should inform the child's mother (by smearing part of the food on the child's face so that the mother will see and ask the child who gave him the food).

The Gemara answers that Rebbi Chama means that one does not have to inform the recipient of the gift when the recipient eventually will realize on his own that he received a gift. When the Beraisa states that one should inform the recipient, it refers to when the recipient will not find out about the gift on his own.

RASHI (DH Tzarich l'Hodi'o) explains that the Beraisa's reason for why a person must inform a child's parent about the present he gave the child is in order to increase love and friendship among Jews.

A number of questions may be asked on Rashi's explanation of the Gemara.

(a) Rashi's words seem contradictory. First, when he explains why Rebbi Chama says that one does not need to inform the recipient of the gift, Rashi says that one might have thought that he should inform the recipient so that the recipient will not sit and wonder from where the gift came. Rashi later, however, explains that the reason why one should inform the recipient of the gift is in order to increase love among Jews. Why does Rashi change the reason for why one should tell the recipient about the gift?

(b) How does the Gemara prove from the gift that Moshe Rabeinu received that one is not required to inform his friend about a gift even when the recipient will be left wondering about it? In the case of Hash-m's gift, Moshe Rabeinu did not know about it even after he received it (as the verse cited here demonstrates), and thus he certainly did not wonder about it. How can the Beraisa derive from the gift given to Moshe Rabeinu that when a recipient will wonder about where the gift came from, the giver still does not need to inform him? (KIKAYON D'YONAH)

(c) There is another reason why the Beraisa cannot prove from the gift given to Moshe Rabeinu that one is allowed to give a gift and leave the recipient wondering. In the case of Moshe Rabeinu, when he would eventually find out that he had been given a gift he would not be left wondering about its source. As soon as he discovered the radiance with which Hash-m graced him, he knew exactly where it came from -- from Hash-m, for only Hash-m is capable of giving such a gift. (CHIDUSHIM U'VI'URIM)

(d) Later, when Rashi discusses the Beraisa which derives from the gift of Shabbos that one is supposed to inform the mother when he gives her child a gift, why does Rashi explain that the purpose of informing the mother is in order to increase love and friendship among Jews? Perhaps the reason is so that the mother will not wonder who gave the gift to the child (in case the child did not finish eating it by the time he reached his mother), as Rashi explains earlier.

(e) How does Raban Shimon ben Gamliel derive the requirement that one must tell the child's mother that he gave the child a gift from the case in which Hash-m told the people that he will give them the gift of Shabbos? In the case of the gift of food that one gives to a child, one must inform the mother after he gives the gift to the child. In the case of Shabbos, Hash-m informed the people that he would give them a gift in the future.

(a) Rashi explains that when Rebbi Chama states that one is not required to tell his friend about a gift, his intent is to teach that it is acceptable to leave one's friend wondering from where the gift came. He does not explain that Rebbi Chama's intent is to teach that it is acceptable to give a gift without increasing friendship, because the Gemara later teaches that in the case of Moshe's gift from Hash-m (his shining face), the recipient eventually found out about the gift and discovered who gave it to him, even though the giver did not inform him. That case teaches that a gift will increase friendship even when the giver does not inform the recipient about it. Therefore, Rebbi Chama would not have taught that one may give a gift and not inform the recipient, because the case of the gift of Moshe Rabeinu already teaches that. What, then, is Rebbi Chama teaching? Rashi explains that one might have thought that the giver must inform the recipient so that the recipient will not be left wondering where the gift came from until he finds out who gave it to him.

(b) Even though Moshe Rabeinu did not know right away that his face radiated, he eventually found out, and at that point he may have wondered from where the gift came.

(c) Why, though, would Moshe Rabeinu wonder? Moshe Rabeinu certainly knew Who gave the gift to him. The answer is that Rashi does not say that the recipient will wonder who gave him the gift, but rather why he received it and under what circumstances it was given to him. Moshe Rabeinu would have been left wondering in the merit of what Mitzvah he received this reward. Rebbi Chama teaches that even though the recipient will be left wondering, the giver is not required to inform him of the gift. He may leave the recipient to figure out on his own from whom, and why, he received the gift.

(d) When Rashi presents the reason for why one must inform the mother when he gives a gift to her child, why does Rashi not say that the reason is in order that the mother not be left wondering from where the gift came?

If this would be the reason to inform the mother about the gift, Hash-m would not have told Moshe Rabeinu to inform the Jewish people about the gift of Shabbos. When the Jews were given the gift of Shabbos, they immediately knew that they had received it -- and from Whom and why -- and thus there was no necessity to tell them about it in advance. The same applies to the reward for observing Shabbos; they would find out about it as soon as they received the reward, and at that time they would have no questions about Who gave it to them or why. Therefore, from the case of the gift of Shabbos it cannot be proven that it is acceptable to give a gift and leave the recipient confused about it.

The reason why Hash-m wanted Moshe Rabeinu to inform the people about the gift of Shabbos was in order to increase the love between Hash-m and His people (see next paragraph). Accordingly, the requirement to tell a mother about a gift given to her child must be for the same reason.

(e) How, though, can the requirement to inform a mother that one already gave a gift to her child be derived from Hash-m's command to Moshe Rabeinu to inform the people that He will give them the gift of Shabbos? Rashi in Shabbos (10b) explains that since the purpose of informing the recipient is in order to increase love and friendship, informing the recipient consists of two different elements. First, at the time that the giver gives the gift to his friend he should inform him so that their friendship will be increased. Second, the giver should also notify his friend in advance that he plans to give him a gift, so that the recipient will prepare himself to receive the gift and will not be embarrassed or shocked when the gift is given to him. (M. Kornfeld)

OPINIONS: The Gemara teaches that the Rav of a city may make an Eruv Tavshilin on behalf of all of the residents of his city. Any resident of the city (who resides within the limit of the Techum Shabbos) who forgot to make his own Eruv Tavshilin prior to Yom Tov may rely on the Rav's Eruv Tavshilin. RASHI explains that the reason why people outside of the city may not rely on the Rav's Eruv Tavshilin is because the Rav does not have them in his mind when he is Mezakeh the Eruv Tavshilin to the people of his city.

What is the Halachah in a case in which the Rav specifically has in mind to make the Eruv on behalf of the people outside of the Techum of his city? May they rely on the Eruv Tavshilin in such a case? Although people for whom the Eruv was made must be able to benefit from the food of the Eruv on Shabbos, and those who live beyond the Techum cannot get to the food on Shabbos, may people outside the city who made an Eruv Techumin, which enables them to come within the city's Techum Shabbos, rely on the Rav's Eruv Tavshilin?

(a) The RE'AH, RAN, and MAGID MISHNEH (Hilchos Yom Tov 6:7) write that there is no evidence that the Eruv Tavshilin works for the people outside of the Techum even when the Rav has them in mind. The Gemara says unconditionally that the Eruv works "for those people within the Techum Shabbos."

According to these Rishonim, people outside of the Techum who did not make an Eruv Techumin (and thus are unable to reach the Rav's home on Yom Tov) certainly may not rely on the Rav's Eruv Tavshilin, because they cannot get to the food of the Eruv Tavshilin. The Re'ah adds that even one outside the Techum who made an Eruv Techumin and is able to come to the Rav may not rely on the Rav's Eruv Tavshilin (presumably because this was not included in the Rabanan's enactment of Eruv Tavshilin; they permitted the Rav to make an Eruv Tavshilin only on behalf of the residents of his city).

(b) However, the RASHBA (in Chidushim and in Avodas ha'Kodesh, Beis Mo'ed 4:2:1) writes that those who live outside the Techum but made an Eruv Techumin may rely on the Rav's Eruv Tavshilin when he specifically states that he has them in mind. If the Rav made no specific declaration of his intent, however, they are not included in his Eruv Tavshilin.

This also seems to be the intention of Rashi here when he writes that the only reason why the Eruv Tavshilin does not work for those outside the Techum is because the Rav does not have them in mind. Rashi implies that if the Rav expressly says that he has them in mind when he makes the Eruv Tavshilin, it will work for them.

(c) The ME'IRI cites the CHOCHMEI TZARFAS (the Ba'alei ha'Tosfos) who write that even if the Rav does not specifically state that he includes them in his Eruv, he automatically includes everyone in the town and everyone who can reach the town with an Eruv Techumin. Only people who cannot reach the town even with an Eruv Techumin are not included in the Rav's Eruv Tavshilin.

(d) The TALMID HA'RASHBA says, like the Rashba, that the Rav normally does not have in mind the people outside of the Techum who made an Eruv Techumin. However, the Talmid ha'Rashba maintains that when the Rav does have in mind those people, his Eruv Tavshilin works even for those who cannot come into the town. (The Talmid ha'Rashba says that the Rav intends to include those who did not make an Eruv Techumin but who transgress the prohibition of Techumin and come into the town anyway. It is not clear whether the Talmid ha'Rashba also means that the Rav includes even those who are too far away to arrive on Yom Tov even with an Eruv Techumin. Perhaps they must be physically able to partake of the food of the Eruv Tavshilin in order to be included.)

QUESTIONS: The Gemara relates that a blind man was learning before Shmuel on Yom Tov. Shmuel saw that he was sad and asked him why. The blind man answered that he forgot to make an Eruv Tavshilin. Shmuel said that when he made his Eruv Tavshilin, he had in mind that it should serve for anyone in the city who forgot to make his own, and therefore the blind man may rely on his Eruv. The following year, Shmuel again saw that the blind man was sad, and again the blind man told him that he did not make an Eruv Tavshilin. Shmuel responded that since the blind man forgot to make an Eruv Tavshilin again, he was "Poshei'a" and may not rely on Shmuel's Eruv, while everyone else may rely on it.

RASHI (DH l'Shanah) explains that the second incident, when the blind said again that he forgot to make an Eruv Tavshilin, occurred on Rosh Hashanah. For that reason, the blind man could not make an Eruv Tavshilin with a condition (Tenai) by saying on the first day of Yom Tov, "If today is not really Yom Tov and tomorrow is, then I am making the Eruv today, and if today is Yom Tov and tomorrow is not, then I do not need an Eruv to cook tomorrow for Shabbos" (see 6a and 17a; such a condition cannot be made on Rosh Hashanah, because the two days of Rosh Hashanah are considered to have one long Kedushah, and not two separate Kedushos).

Rashi's explanation is difficult to understand.

First, why does Rashi write specifically that the second incident occurred on Rosh Hashanah? If Rashi is bothered with why the blind man did not simply make an Eruv Tavshilin with a condition, and for that reason Rashi explains that the incident occurred on Rosh Hashanah, then Rashi should write that the first incident occurred on Rosh Hashanah as well. (MAHARSHA)

Second, why does Rashi not suggest a much simpler explanation for why the blind man was unable to make a conditional Eruv Tavshilin? Rashi should explain that the blind man remembered on Friday, the second day of Yom Tov (SHITAS RIVAV, RAN), or on the first day of a two-day Yom Tov which fell on Friday and Shabbos (as opposed to Thursday and Friday). In both cases, one who forgot to make an Eruv Tavshilin on Thursday may not make it on Friday with a condition. (See MAHARSHA, MAHARAM SHIF, KIKAYON D'YONAH, and others.)

(a) The first time the blind man forgot to make an Eruv Tavshilin, he discovered that Shmuel always includes in his own Eruv Tavshilin anyone who forgot to make his own Eruv. Why, then, was the blind man sad the second year? It cannot be that he knew that Shmuel did not include him in his Eruv Tavshilin because he was "Poshei'a," because it is obvious from the conversation of the second year that the blind man was unaware of the exclusion of a "Poshei'a." It must be that in the second year there was some other factor which the blind man thought would disqualify him from being included in Shmuel's Eruv. Shmuel corrected him and said that while it is true that the Eruv does not include him, it is not because of the reason the blind man thought, but because the blind man was "Poshei'a."

Rashi writes that the second incident occurred on Rosh Hashanah in order to explain the mistaken pretense of the blind man. The blind man mistakenly thought that since he forgot (a second time) on Rosh Hashanah, he could not be included in Shmuel's Eruv Tavshilin. Shmuel corrected him and said that had this been the first time he forgot he would have been included; however, since he was "Poshei'a" (he forgot a second time) he was not included in the Eruv Tavshilin. Why did the blind man think that Rosh Hashanah is different (and that he would not be included in Shmuel's Eruv), and why was he mistaken in his assumption?

1. The CHACHAM TZVI (end of #130, cited by the GILYON HA'SHAS) explains that the first year, Yom Tov indeed fell on Friday and Shabbos. The second year, Yom Tov fell on Thursday and Friday. The Chacham Tzvi posits that if a person forgets to make an Eruv Tavshilin before Yom Tov, it is better for him to make a conditional Eruv Tavshilin himself on the first day of Yom Tov (Thursday) than to rely on the Rav's Eruv. The blind man's mistake was that he thought that the two days of Rosh Hashanah are not one long Kedushah but two separate Kedushos, like every other two-day Yom Tov (like the opinion of Neharda'i on 6a). Therefore, he thought that he needed to make his Eruv with a condition on the first day of Rosh Hashanah (Thursday) and that he could not rely on Shmuel's Eruv, which is why he was sad (because he preferred not to have to make an Eruv with a condition). Shmuel corrected him that Rosh Hashanah is really one long Kedushah, and an Eruv with a condition may not be made on the first day of Rosh Hashanah.

2. The PNEI YEHOSHUA suggests a similar scenario. The second year, Yom Tov was Thursday and Friday, and the blind man thought that even on Rosh Hashanah a conditional Eruv may be made. The blind man was sad because he remembered only on the second day of Rosh Hashanah (Friday), and by then it was too late to make a conditional Eruv. He thought that Shmuel did not include in his Eruv anyone who forgot to make an Eruv before a two-day Yom Tov, because one who forgot could make an Eruv with a condition on the first day of Yom Tov, and certainly no one would forget to make an Eruv two days in a row (both on Erev Yom Tov and on the first day of Yom Tov). The blind man assumed that Shmuel certainly did not take into account the possibility that one would forget to make an Eruv two days in a row, and thus Shmuel did not have such a person in mind when he made his Eruv. Shmuel corrected the blind man and told him that the two days of Rosh Hashanah comprise one long Kedushah, and an Eruv may not be made with a condition on the first day of Rosh Hashanah, and, therefore, Shmuel did have in mind anyone who forgot to make an Eruv on Erev Rosh Hashanah. However, the blind man was not included in his Eruv for another reason -- because he was "Poshei'a."

3. The TZELACH gives a slightly different explanation for the blind man's mistake. The blind man lived outside of the Techum. He made an Eruv Techumin before Yom Tov and came to Shmuel on Thursday, the first day of Rosh Hashanah. His Eruv Techumin was destroyed on that day. He thought that the status of the Kedushah of the two days of Rosh Hashanah remains in doubt (perhaps it is one long Kedushah, and perhaps it is two separate Kedushos). Consequently, he thought that he could not make an Eruv Tavshilin with a condition (since Rosh Hashanah might be one long Kedushah). He also assumed that he could not rely on Shmuel's Eruv Tavshilin, because the next day he would be at home, outside of the Techum, and unable to come to Shmuel (since his Eruv Techumin was destroyed during the first day of Yom Tov, and since the two days of Rosh Hashanah might be two separate Kedushos the Eruv Techumin he made for the first day was ineffective for the second day). Shmuel told him that he was incorrect. The two days of Rosh Hashanah are considered one long Kedushah, and thus the blind man could have come to the town on the second day of Rosh Hashanah based on the Eruv Techumin that existed on the first day. Shmuel told him that there was another reason for why he was not included in the Eruv Tavshilin -- because he was "Poshei'a."

(This explanation needs further clarification, because even if Rosh Hashanah is two Kedushos, the blind man could have solved the problem of the lost Eruv Techumin by simply making another Eruv Techumin, out of doubt, in the same location as the first.)

(b) Perhaps Rashi is bothered with the Gemara's words, "the following year." The ruling of Shmuel in the second incident would have applied on any successive Yom Tov, and not only on Yom Tov the following year (for example, the first incident could have occurred on Pesach, when the first two days of Pesach fell on Thursday and Friday, and the second incident could have occurred on Shavuos, when Shavuos fell on Friday and Shabbos). The Gemara emphasizes that the blind man's mistake occurred "the following year" in order to teach that his mistake was able to happen only the following year -- it was a mistake that could occur only once a year. That is why the Gemara says that the second mistake occurred "the following year," when it was possible to make the same mistake as the year before. (ROSH YOSEF)

What Yom Tov occurs once a year and has properties shared by no other Yom Tov? It is the Yom Tov of Rosh Hashanah, the status of which is one long Kedushah, in contrast to every other Yom Tov, the status of which is two separate Kedushos. The Yom Tov of Rosh Hashanah was the only time the blind man could have made his mistake. What exactly was his mistake?

On Fridays, the blind man never came to Shmuel, for he was involved in preparations for Shabbos (even when Yom Tov occurred on Friday). He visited Shmuel only from Sunday to Thursday. Therefore, Shmuel could not have seen him in a sad mood except on Thursday, the first day of a two-day Yom Tov. However, on an ordinary two-day Yom Tov he would not have been sad about having forgotten to make an Eruv, because he could have made a conditional Eruv on that day, the first day of a two-day Yom Tov. The only time Shmuel could have seen him in a sad mood was on the first day of a two-day Rosh Hashanah, when Rosh Hashanah was on Thursday and Friday. Since the two days of Rosh Hashanah are one long Kedushah, he was unable to make an Eruv with a condition, and thus he was sad.

Why, though, does Rashi make a point that it was Rosh Hashanah only when he describes the second incident? Rashi infers that both incidents occurred on Rosh Hashanah only from the fact that the Gemara emphasizes that the second incident occurred "the following year." (This is why Rashi mentions this point in his Dibur ha'Maschil "l'Shanah.") (M. Kornfeld)

QUESTION: The Gemara relates that a blind man "was arranging his Mishnayos" before Shmuel on Yom Tov. Shmuel saw that he was sad and asked him why. The blind man answered that he forgot to make an Eruv Tavshilin. Shmuel said that when he made his Eruv Tavshilin, he had in mind that it should serve for anyone in the city who forgot to make his own, and therefore the blind man may rely on his Eruv. The following year, Shmuel again saw that the blind man was sad, and again the blind man told him that he did not make an Eruv Tavshilin. Shmuel responded that since the blind man forgot to make an Eruv Tavshilin again, he was "Poshei'a" and may not rely on Shmuel's Eruv, while everyone else may rely on it.

Why does the Gemara need to mention that the blind man "was arranging his Mishnayos" in front of Shmuel? Of what relevance to the incident is the fact that the blind man was learning Mishnayos when Shmuel found him in a sad mood? Moreover, why did the blind man sit there in a sad mood when he realized that he forgot to make an Eruv Tavshilin? He should have asked Shmuel, the Rav of the city, what to do.

ANSWER: RAV YAAKOV D. HOMNICK proposes an innovative approach to explain the words of the Gemara. The Mishnah earlier (15b) states that when Yom Tov occurs on Friday, one may not cook on Yom Tov for Shabbos unless he makes an Eruv Tavshilin before Yom Tov. The Gemara asks what is the source for the institution of the Rabanan that one may not cook on Yom Tov for Shabbos without an Eruv Tavshilin. The Gemara quotes Shmuel who says the source is the requirement to "remember the Shabbos day to make it holy" (Shemos 20:8). RASHI (DH Zochrehu) explains that "the verse cautions you to remember it (Shabbos), and when one makes an Eruv Tavshilin he remembers it, for he makes it only because of Shabbos."

The Gemara there then quotes a Tana who derives it from the verse, "That which you bake, you shall bake, and that which you cook, you shall cook" (Shemos 16:23), from which Rebbi Eliezer infers that one may bake on Yom Tov for Shabbos only when one already started to bake for Shabbos before Yom Tov. RASHI (DH Es Asher) explains that the verses teaches that although one usually may bake and cook on Friday for Shabbos, there is a type of Friday on which "one may not bake for the morrow" (i.e. when Yom Tov falls on Friday).

It is clear from Rashi's explanation that Shmuel understands the enactment of Eruv Tavshilin to be a positive Mitzvah d'Rabanan to actively do something to remember Shabbos. That is why Shmuel understands that the Rabanan based their enactment of Eruv Tavshilin on the verse that expresses a positive Mitzvah to remember Shabbos. (The prohibition against cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos without an Eruv is merely a secondary result of the positive Mitzvah to remember Shabbos.) In contrast, the Tana understands that the institution of Eruv Tavshilin is essentially a prohibition against cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos. He infers from the verse which teaches the Mitzvah to bake and cook on an ordinary Erev Shabbos that there is a prohibition against baking and cooking on Erev Shabbos which is Yom Tov.

A practical difference between Shmuel's understanding of the enactment of Eruv Tavshilin (a positive Mitzvah to remember Shabbos) and the Tana's understanding (a prohibition against cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos) is whether or not the Rav of the city may make an Eruv Tavshilin for all of the residents of the city. If the enactment of Eruv Tavshilin is essentially a Mitzvah to establish a remembrance for the honor of Shabbos (as Shmuel says), then the Rav certainly may make a communal remembrance for Shabbos on behalf of his city. In contrast, if the enactment of Eruv Tavshilin is essentially a prohibition against baking on Yom Tov for Shabbos unless one already started to bake something before Yom Tov, the fact that the Rav has a baked item in his home does not eliminate the prohibition for the other residents of the city; the enactment of Eruv Tavshilin states that they may not bake unless they baked something before Yom Tov.

The simple understanding of the Mishnah (15b) seems to express the view of the Tana, since the Mishnah expresses the concept of Eruv Tavshilin in terms of a prohibition against cooking on Yom Tov for Shabbos ("one shall not cook on Yom Tov for Shabbos...").

Accordingly, the blind man, who was well-versed in the Mishnayos, followed the simple understanding of the Mishnah and maintained that the enactment of Eruv Tavshilin is essentially a negative prohibition, and thus he maintained that the Rav of the city cannot make an Eruv for other residents of the city. Shmuel, however, maintained that the enactment of Eruv Tavshilin is a positive Mitzvah and thus the Rav may make an Eruv Tavshilin for his city. (Shmuel maintained that no proof can be derived from an inference from the Mishnah's wording.) The blind man, when he realized that he forgot to make an Eruv Tavshilin, did not ask Shmuel for a Halachic ruling to permit him to rely on the Rav's Eruv, because the blind man's personal view was that the Rav's Eruv is not valid for the rest of the city. He therefore sat in front of Shmuel sullenly, in the hope that Shmuel would take the initiative and offer him a lenient ruling. Even though the blind man's personal opinion was that the Rav's Eruv is not valid for other people, if the Rav of the city -- Shmuel -- permits it, then one certainly may follow the Rav's ruling. (This is why Rashi emphasizes that "Neharde'a was his (Shmuel's) city.")