1)

(a)What is the penalty for Shechting a Bechor that has no blemish outside the Azarah?

(b)Rebbi Yehudah permits an expert to examine a Bechor that fell into a pit on Yom-Tov and is in danger of dying there. Considering that Rebbi Yehudah is the one who is stringent by Muktzeh, when must the animal have become blemished?

(c)On what grounds does Rebbi Shimon forbid examining the animal?

(d)Why could Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon not possibly be arguing about Muktzeh?

1)

(a)For Shechting a Bechor that has no blemish outside the Azarah - one is Chayav Kares.

(b)Rebbi Yehudah permits an expert to examine a Bechor that fell into a pit on Yom-Tov and is in danger of dying there. Considering that Rebbi Yehudah is the one who is stringent by Muktzeh - the animal must have become blemished before Yom-Tov (in which case it is not Muktzeh).

(c)Rebbi Shimon forbids examining the animal - because it is a form of Tikun, similar to judging, which is also forbidden on Yom-Tov for that reason (see Tosfos Yom Tov and Tiferes Yisrael).

(d)Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon could not possibly be arguing about Muktzeh - because in this Mishnah, it is Rebbi Yehudah who is lenient and Rebbi Shimon who is strict; whereas by Muktzeh, they hold the reverse opinions.

2)

(a)What then, is the basis of their Machlokes?

(b)Then why do they argue about a Bechor which fell into a pit? Let them argue by any Bechor that is blemished?

(c)In which case is Rebbi Yehoshua lenient on account of the animal's pain?

(d)If the Chidush of the Tana is that one may not bring the animal out of the pit even if it is to alleviate its pain, then why does Rebbi Yehudah say 'Lo Yishchot' and not 'Lo Ya'aleh v'Yishchot'?

2)

(a)The basis of their Machlokes is - whether a Chacham is permitted to examine a blemish of a Bechor on Yom-Tov or not.

(b)The reason that they argue about a Bechor which fell into a pit - is to teach us that in spite of the possible Heter of 'Tzar Ba'alei Chayim' (the pain of the animal - for which reason Rebbi Yehoshua is lenient in a similar case), our Tana is strict and forbids taking it out.

(c)Rebbi Yehoshua is lenient on account of the animal's pain - when an animal and its child fell into a pit. Rebbi Yehoshua permits 'cheating' i.e. taking the one out with the intention of Shechting it, and then changing his mind and taking the other one out.

(d)The Chidush of the Tana is indeed that one may not bring the animal out of the pit even if it is to alleviate its pain - but that we learn from the Reisha, when the Tana says 'Yered Mumcheh ... '. The Seifa, where Rebbi Yehudah says 'v'Im Lav, Lo Yered v'Yishchot', speaks when he had already transgressed and taken the animal out of the pit.

3)

(a)What is then Rebbi Yehudah's Chidush? Why would we have even thought that the animal may then be Shechted, seeing as this statement refers to a Tam (that has no blemish)? What is the final case?

(b)What is the Chidush?

3)

(a)We establish the case when the animal had a passing blemish already before Yom-Tov, and now on account of the fall, the blemish became permanent.

(b)We may have thought that, since the animal had a blemish on Erev Yom-Tov, the owner definitely had his mind on it (and that it would not therefore be Muktzeh). Rebbi Yehudah's Chidush is that we do not say that.

4)

(a)Rebbi, in a Beraisa, permits an expert to examine a Bechor Tam that fell into a pit. In which point is Rebbi even more lenient than Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah?

(b)What will be the Chidush if the text in the Beraisa omits the word 'Tam'? Why can we not ask that if the blemish only occurred on Yom-Tov, is it not obvious that it is Muktzeh?

4)

(a)Rebbi, in a Beraisa, permits an expert to examine a Bechor Tam that fell into a pit - he is even more lenient than Rebbi Yehudah, inasmuch as he permits the Bechor to be Shechted, even if it only became blemished on Yom-Tov.

(b)If the text in the Beraisa omits the word 'Tam' - the Chidush will be that, if the blemish only occurred on Yom-Tov, it will forbidden to Shecht it because it is Muktzeh. That may be obvious according to Rebbi Yehudah (whose opinion regarding Muktzeh we know), but not according to Rebbi, who is teaching us here that he holds like Rebbi Yehudah regarding Muktzeh.

5)

(a)Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya says 'Harei Amru Ein Ro'in Mumin b'Yom-Tov'. To whom does 'Amru' refer?

(b)What was the relationship between Rebbi and Rebbi Shimon?

(c)Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya goes on to differentiate between a blemish that occurred before Yom-Tov and one that occurred on Yom-Tov? In which point does he disagree with the Tana of our Mishnah (in Rebbi Shimon)?

(d)In which case do Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon agree (according to Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya) that the animal is Muchan, and may be inspected (l'Chatchilah) and Shechted?

5)

(a)Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya says 'Harei Amru Ein Ro'in Mumin b'Yom-Tov' - 'Amru' refers to Rebbi Shimon bar Yochai.

(b)Rebbi was a disciple of Rebbi Shimon bar Yochai.

(c)Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya disagrees with the Tana of our Mishnah in Rebbi Shimon with regard to a blemish that occurred before Yom-Tov, which the expert only examined (contrary to the Halachah) on Yom-Tov - according to the Tana of our Mishnah, Rebbi Shimon forbids the Bechor to be Shechted on Yom-Tov, whereas Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya maintains that he permits it (seeing as, in essence, it was fit).

(d)According to Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya, Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon agree that the animal is Muchan, and may be inspected (l'Chatchilah) and Shechted - if it is born on Yom-Tov already blemished (and we shall see later exactly how this speaks).

26b----------------------------------------26b

6)

(a)In the latter case (when the Bechor is born on Yom-Tov already blemished), Rav Nachman's father holds that it may be eaten only if the expert examined it (bedi'Eved). What proof do we initially bring for Rabah bar Rav Huna, who holds that it is permitted to examine it even l'Chatchilah, from the three cases of Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya in the Beraisa?

6)

(a)In the latter case (when the Bechor is born on Yom-Tov already blemished), Rav Nachman's father holds that it may be eaten only if the expert examined it (bedi'Eved), but that he may not do so l'Chatchilah. Initially, we bring a proof for Rabah bar Rav Huna, who holds that it is permitted to examine it even l'Chatchilah - from the fact that the Beraisa mentions this case, after two cases: that if a blemish occurred on Erev Yom-Tov, it is only permitted bedi'Eved, if it is born on Yom-Tov, it is forbidden (according to Rebbi Shimon). Consequently, when the Beraisa adds that if it is born on Yom-Tov already blemished, it is permitted, it must mean even l'Chatchilah); otherwise, the Tana should have incorporated the third case together with the first.

7)

(a)Rebbi Oshaya quotes a Beraisa in which Rebbi Shimon forbids the inspection of a Bechor even if the blemish occurred on Erev Yom-Tov. How does this clash with the opinion of Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya in the previous Beraisa?

(b)What do we deduce from this Beraisa with regard to a Bechor that was born on Yom-Tov with a blemish?

(c)How do we prove this from our Mishnah, where Rebbi Shimon says that wherever the blemish was not recognizable is not Muchan?

(d)So how do we explain the Beraisa of Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya?

7)

(a)Rebbi Oshaya quotes a Beraisa in which Rebbi Shimon forbids the inspection of a Bechor, even if the blemish occurred on Erev Yom-Tov (and even bedi'Eved) - clashing with the Beraisa of Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya, which permits it bedi'Eved, according to Rebbi Shimon (and which was the basis of our proof in the previous question).

(b)We deduce from this Beraisa - that Rebbi Shimon (who is the Chachamim mentioned there) now permits a Bechor that was born on Yom-Tov with a blemish, only bedi'Eved (and not l'Chatchilah, as we previously proved from the Beraisa of Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya).

(c)We bring a further proof for this from our Mishnah, where Rebbi Shimon says that whenever the blemish is not recognizable, it is not Muchan. Now this cannot mean that it is not recognizable at all, because that would be obvious. What it must therefore mean is that a Bechor that was not shown to a Chacham before Yom-Tov, is not Muchan on Yom-Tov - even bedi'Eved (not like the Beraisa of Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya).

(d)The Beraisa of Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya - was a misquotation, introduced by Ada bar Uchmi, who tended to misquote Beraisos.

8)

(a)Rav Hillel asked Rava whether 'Yesh Muktzeh l'Chatzi Shabbos' or not. What problem did Rava have in establishing the case?

(b)How do we finally establish it? What is the She'eilah?

(c)Rava replied 'Yesh Muktzeh l'Chatzi Shabbos'. How does he then explain the Beraisa of Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya, which permits the Bechor that was born on Yom-Tov with a blemish, if the expert proclaimed it to be a blemish. Why should we not say there too, 'Yesh Muktzeh l'Chatzi Shabbos'?

(d)How does Rava rule according to the second Lashon? Do we now have a proof for this from the Beraisa of Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya (from the case cited in c.)?

8)

(a)Rav Hillel asked Rava whether 'Yesh Muktzeh l'Chatzi Shabbos' or not. Rava had difficulty in establishing the case (bearing in mind that Stam Muktzeh refers to 'Gerogros and Tzimukin' - figs and grapes that were placed on the roof to dry) because if they were already fit when Bein Hashemashos arrived, then why should they be Muktzeh?! And if they were not, then since they were not prepared before Shabbos, they would obviously be Muktzeh (min ha'Torah, like Rabah, because of "v'Heichinu es Asher Yavi'u")!?

(b)The case must be - when they were fit with the advent of Shabbos, but then water fell on them, rendering them unfit, and later, they became fit once more. The She'eilah is whether we apply the principle of 'Migo d'Isketza'i l'bein Hashemashos, Isketza'i l'Kula Yoma' to the middle of Shabbos, to say that since it became Muktzeh for a short while during Shabbos, it remains Muktzeh for the remainder of Shabbos, or not.

(c)Rava replied 'Yesh Muktzeh l'Chatzi Shabbos'. Nevertheless, the Beraisa of Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya permits the Bechor that was born on Yom-Tov with a blemish, if the expert proclaimed it to be a blemish (and we do not say 'Yesh Muktzeh l'Chatzi Shabbos') - because it speaks when the expert was already sitting there when it was born. He saw the blemish immediately, in which case, the Bechor was never Muktzeh.

(d)In the second Lashon, Rava rules 'Ein Muktzeh l'Chatzi Shabbos. There is no proof from the Beraisa of Rebbi Shimon ben Menasya (which seems to permit a Bechor which was initially unfit - when it was born - and then it became fit, when the expert examined it) because it speaks, as we explained in the previous answer, when the expert was already sitting there when it was born.

9)

(a)If someone was eating grapes (or figs) on Erev Shabbos, and he left some over to take up to the roof, to become raisins (or dried figs), the Beraisa forbids them to be eaten on Shabbos unless one prepared them (verbally) before Shabbos. Why does the Tana find it necessary to add that he was first eating the grapes?

(b)Will this Halachah extend to other fruits that one places to dry, such as peaches or quinces?

(c)What problem do we have with establishing the case?

9)

(a)If someone was eating grapes (or figs) on Erev Shabbos, and he left some over to take up to the roof to become raisins (or dried figs), the Beraisa forbids them to be eaten on Shabbos unless one prepared them (verbally) before Shabbos. The Tana finds it necessary to add that he was first eating the grapes - to teach us that, despite the fact that at the time of eating, he certainly had his mind on them, they still become Muktzeh unless he prepared them before Shabbos.

(b)This Halachah does extend to other fruits that one places to dry, such as peaches or quinces.

(c)We have the same problem establishing this case as we had earlier; namely - if the fruit is fit, then why should it require preparation?! And if it is not, of what use is the preparation?!

10)

(a)Why can we not establish the case ...

1. ... when the fruit had already dried and was now fit to eat, only the owner did not know that?

2. ... when it was fit when Shabbos came in, but subsequently become unfit and fit again on Shabbos?

(b)Why will preparation be ineffective in this latter case?

(c)So how do we establish the case? In which case will we both need preparation and the preparation will be effective?

10)

(a)We cannot establish the case ...

1. ... when the fruit had already dried and was now fit to eat, only the owner did not know that - because Rav Kahana has already taught us that if the fruit is fit when Shabbos come in, it is permitted, even if the owner was not aware of it (and it would not therefore require preparation).

2. ... when it was fit when Shabbos came in, but subsequently become unfit and fit again on Shabbos - because if we hold 'Ein Muktzeh l'Chatzi Shabbos', then why should preparation be necessary, and if we hold 'Yesh Muktzeh l'Chatzi Shabbos', then of what use is the preparation?

(b)Preparation will be ineffective in this latter case - because when Shabbos came in, they were permitted anyway, so what would preparation achieve?

(c)We establish the case - when the fruit is slightly ready to eat, so that some people would eat it as it is, and some people would not. It is in such a case that preparation will be effective, because by preparing the fruit, he demonstrates that he pertains to those who will eat it as it is.

11)

(a)How does Rebbi Zeira prove from beans and lentils on Yom-Tov that 'Ein Muktzeh l'Chatzi Shabbos'?

(b)How does Abaye refute that proof on the basis of all pots at Bein Hashemashos of Shabbos?

(c)Why in fact, is there no Kashya from the one, and no proof from the other? Why are they not connected with Muktzeh l'Chatzi Shabbos?

11)

(a)Rebbi Zeira proves from beans and lentils - which are initially fit to chew raw, then, when placed in the pot on Yom-Tov, they become unfit (for as long as the pot is on the boil), and then, when the cooking process is complete, they become fit again, that 'Ein Muktzeh l'Chatzi Shabbos' (since eating beans and lentils on Yom-Tov in this way is a fact of life).

(b)Abaye refutes that proof on the basis of all pots at Bein Hashemashos - which are boiling hot when Shabbos comes in (and which should therefore remain Muktzeh the whole of Shabbos - due to the principle 'Migo d'Isketza'i l'Bein Hashemashos ... '.

(c)In fact, there is no Kashya from the one, and no proof from the other - because the She'eilah of Muktzeh l'Chatzi Shabbos, concerns something that becomes Muktzeh outside of one's control (because, for that period, one pushes it out of one's mind); whereas pots that are cooking, are considered within his control, and his mind is therefore on them (even during the time that they are not fit), in which case they are not Muktzeh.

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