QUESTION: The Gemara relates that the daughter of Nechunya "Chofer Shichin" (the digger of water wells) fell into a deep water cistern. News of the tragedy was brought to Rebbi Chanina ben Dosa. After the first hour, he said, "Shalom." After the second hour, he said, "Shalom." After the third hour, he said, "She has arisen [from the pit]." When the people asked him whether he is a prophet, he replied that he is not a prophet, but that he knew that Nechunya's daughter would emerge unharmed because it is not possible that "the matter in which the Tzadik excels should cause his offspring to suffer." The Gemara adds that despite this axiom, Nechunya's son died of thirst. Even though Nechunya dedicated his life to providing water to the people who came to Yerushalayim during the festivals (Rashi), his son died of thirst because Hash-m is "exact in justice with those who are close to Him." When a person has perfected himself in an area of Avodas Hash-m, Hash-m demands from him more exacting standards.

If Hash-m does not punish a Tzadik with the same thing in which he excels in his service of Hash-m, as Rebbi Chanina ben Dosa expressed and as the first incident demonstrates, why did Hash-m allow Nechunya's son to die of thirst?

(a) TOSFOS here and in Yevamos (121b) explains that the death of Nechunya's son by thirst is not considered a form of justice with the same matter with which Nechunya excelled. His son suffered from a lack of water, while Nechunya excelled in providing water. In contrast, if his daughter would have died by drowning in a water cistern, that decree would have been carried out with the same action in which Nechunya excelled -- the provision of water. Hash-m does not punish a person in such a way.

Alternatively, although Nechunya dug wells, he did not provide the water to fill them. The water came naturally through rainfall. Consequently, it was possible for his son to die from a lack of water, while it was not possible for his daughter to die in the pit of a well. (This is the explanation of RASHI in Yevamos 121b (DH Chofer Shichin), according to the understanding of the ETZ YOSEF. This explanation does not conform with the Yerushalmi's description that "he honored his Creator with water.")

(b) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES here suggests that there is no such rule that Hash-m does not exact justice from a person with the object of the Mitzvah in which he excels. Hash-m has His own considerations based on His infinite wisdom which mortals cannot comprehend.

When Rebbi Chanina ben Dosa said that it is not possible that "the matter in which the Tzadik excels should cause his offspring to suffer," he was not explaining why Nechunya's daughter suffered no harm, but rather he was describing his prayer to Hash-m on behalf of Nechunya's daughter.

(c) The MISHNAS ELIYAHU explains that the axiom that Hash-m does not permit harm to befall a person from the object of the Mitzvah in which he excels applies only to a person who performs the Mitzvah entirely l'Shem Shamayim, for the sake of Hash-m, with no other motives. No harm befell Nechunya's daughter when she fell into the water cistern because Nechunya's motivation for providing water for the visitors to Yerushalayim was purely l'Shem Shamayim. Perhaps, however, at a later time the purity of his motivation was compromised in a small way and he did not do the Mitzvah solely for the sake of Hash-m. As a result, Hash-m was "Medakdek k'Chut ha'Se'arah" with the righteous, and Nechunya's son died of thirst. (See also Insights to Shekalim 14:1 and Yevamos 121:2.)

QUESTION: The Gemara relates that the daughter of Nechunya "Chofer Shichin" (the digger of water wells) fell into a deep water cistern. News of the tragedy was brought to Rebbi Chanina ben Dosa. After the first hour, he said, "Shalom." After the second hour, he said, "Shalom." After the third hour, he said, "She has arisen [from the pit]."

People asked the daughter of Nechunya, "Who rescued you from the pit?" She replied that a ram being led by an elderly man saved her. Rashi explains that this was the ram of Yitzchak being led by Avraham Avinu.

When the people asked Rebbi Chanina whether he is a prophet, he replied that he is not a prophet, but that he knew that Nechunya's daughter would emerge unharmed because it is not possible that "the matter in which the Tzadik excels should cause his offspring to suffer."

What is the significance of the ram which Nechunya's daughter saw?

ANSWER: The PNEI YEHOSHUA explains the significance of the ram of Yitzchak which saved Nechunya's daughter. The fact that she fell into a pit indicated that there was a Divine decree that the daughter of Nechunya must die. The prayer of Rebbi Chanina was effective to suspend the decree. However, there is a principle that once a decree is issue, it cannot be annulled. The ram of Yitzchak hinted that someone else was taken instead of Nechunya's daughter, in the same way that the ram was offered instead of Yitzchak Avinu.

The Pnei Yehoshua cites other examples of this principle. The Gemara in Chagigah (4b) relates that the Malach ha'Maves told Rav Bibi that he once killed the wrong woman. Rav Bibi asked him, "What did you do with the years that she was supposed to live?" The Malach ha'Maves answered that those years were given to young Torah scholars who were forgiving of those who slighted them.

The Pnei Yehoshua adds in the name of the Zohar that this redirecting of a Divine decree is the source for the custom of Kaparos on Erev Yom Kippur (see REMA OC 605:1, and MAGEN AVRAHAM there). The slaughter of the chicken is designated as an atonement for the person if there was a decree issued that he should die.

The Pnei Yehoshua also explains that this is the reason why the people asked Rebbi Chanina if he was a prophet only after Nechunya's daughter revealed what had happened. When the people heard about the ram, they realized that there indeed had been a decree that Nechunya's daughter should die, and that she was saved from the decree only because someone or something else took her place.

Once the people knew that there had been a Divine decree, they asked Rebbi Chanina why he was so certain that his prayer to annul the decree would be accepted. Rebbi Chanina replied that since Nechunya had done the Mitzvah of digging wells for the people who ascended to Yerushalayim at the time of the festival, he was certain that Hash-m would not have allowed Nechunya's own daughter to drown in a well. (D. Bloom)

QUESTION: The Gemara cites a dispute between Rav and Shmuel. Rav maintains that when the Torah obligates a person to pay for damage caused by his Bor, it refers to the damage the Hevel (bad air) does to the thing that fell in, but not to the damage caused by the Chavatah (the blow the object received upon impact with the bottom of the Bor). Shmuel maintains that one is liable for both the damage caused by the Hevel and the damage caused by the Chavatah.

The Mishnah states that when an ox or donkey falls into a Bor less than ten Tefachim deep and dies, the owner of the Bor is exempt from liability because a Bor less than ten Tefachim deep is not capable of killing. However, if the animal did not die but was merely damaged, the owner must pay for the damage. The Gemara suggests that the reason why he is exempt if the animal dies is that the Chavatah of such a small Bor cannot kill. The Gemara rejects this proof and explains that the reason why he is exempt is that a Bor less than ten Tefachim deep does not have Hevel.

What is the Gemara's attempted proof? Is it an attempt to prove the opinion of Rav or the opinion of Shmuel?

(a) RASHI (DH Lav) explains that the Gemara is asking a question on both Rav and Shmuel. The Gemara understands at this stage that although a Bor less than ten Tefachim deep indeed contains bad air, the owner is exempt because under ten Tefachim the Chavatah is not powerful enough to kill. Rav and Shmuel agree that one is liable for Hevel. Accordingly, the Mishnah is a challenge to both of them, as the Mishnah implies that a person is not liable to pay for damages caused by the Hevel in his Bor. The Gemara answers that a Bor less than ten Tefachim does not contain enough Hevel to kill, and that is why the owner is not liable.

The PNEI YEHOSHUA notes that the Gemara could have answered, according to Shmuel, that the Mishnah refers to a Bor that does not contain Hevel. An example of such a Bor is one whose width is greater than its depth, as the Gemara later (51b) discusses. If a Bor is ten Tefachim or more deep, the owner is liable because of the Chavatah. This implies that the Gemara's question is directed solely at Rav's opinion. However, Rashi understands from the fact that the Gemara does not specify whose position is being questioned that the Gemara is challenging both opinions. The Gemara asks its question on both opinions because it does not want to assume that the Mishnah refers specifically to a Bor whose width is greater than its depth.

The Pnei Yehoshua explains Rashi's next comment (DH Lo) as well. Rashi writes that when the Gemara answers that the Bor under ten Tefachim deep does not contain Hevel, it means that it certainly does not contain the ability to kill with Chavatah. The Pnei Yehoshua explains that, consequently, the Mishnah -- which exempts one from liability in the case of a Bor under ten Tefachim -- is not a challenge to Shmuel who maintains that the owner is liable only for Chavatah of more than ten Tefachim.

(b) The RASHBA suggests that the Gemara's question is directed only at Rav's opinion. The Rashba cites RABEINU CHANANEL (see also Tosfos to 51a, DH Amri) who explains that when the Gemara originally suggests that the owner of a Bor of less than ten Tefachim is exempt when the Bor kills because there is not sufficient Chavatah to kill, the Gemara knows that the Bor has sufficient Chavatah to damage. However, at this stage the Gemara assumes that a Bor under ten Tefachim possesses no damaging Hevel at all. (This approach differs from that of Rashi (DH Lav), who says that a Bor under ten Tefachim also possesses Hevel.)

According to this approach, the Gemara's question was directed only at Rav. The Gemara originally assumes that in a Bor of less than ten Tefachim there is not sufficient Hevel even to damage. Consequently, when the Mishnah states that the owner is liable for damage, but not for death, caused by his Bor of less than ten Tefachim, it must be because the Torah states that one is liable for the Chavatah of his Bor, and not for Hevel. The Gemara concludes that the same distinction applies also for Hevel; in a Bor of less than ten Tefachim there is not enough Hevel to kill but there is enough to damage. Hence, the Mishnah does not contradict Rav. (See also TOSFOS RABEINU PERETZ.) (D. Bloom)