1)

(a)Due to the fact that our Mishnah uses the Lashon 'Hit'u Zeh es Zeh', rather than 'Chazru Zeh ba'Zeh', we extrapolate that it is not the employer who tricked the employee, but one of his employees.

(b)We initially reject the suggestion that the employer instructed an employee to employ a laborer for ...

1. ... four Zuzim, and he employed him for three because of the Sevara 'Savir ve'Kabil', he accepted to work for three Zuz, so what complaints can he have?

2. ... three Zuzim, and he employed him for four, giving him to understand that he (the Shali'ach) is the employer because then the Shali'ach would indeed have to pay him four Zuzim.

(c)This is based on the Beraisa which rules, in a case here Reuven employed Levi to work for Shimon, but gave him to understand that the work was for him, that he must pay Levi in full out of his own pocket, and then claim from Levi for the benefit that Levi received.

2)

(a)So we establish the case when the Shali'ach employed the new laborer on the understanding that the employer would pay him four Zuz (but he only pays three, as he stipulated with the Shali'ach).

(b)If the going rate is four Zuzim, the employer would have to give him four Zuz anyway but we are speaking when some laborers get paid four Zuz and others, three.

(c)And his complaint is that, had the Shali'ach not promised him four Zuzim, he would have taken the trouble to look for another employer who pays four.

(d)Alternatively, we establish the Mishnah where the new employee is a Balabos, by which we mean that he is himself an employer, who needs some extra money, but who would not have lowered himself to work for three Zuz.

3)

(a)In yet a third answer, we again establish the Mishnah by a working-class employee, who claims that because the Shali'ach hired him for four Zuzim, he did superior-quality work (for which he ought to receive four Zuzim). This cannot be substantiated however because we are speaking where his work entailed digging a water-ditch around the field, and the ditch has already been filled with water.

(b)In our final answer, we revert to the very first suggestion, that the employer instructed an employee to employ a laborer for four Zuzim, and he employed him for three. His complaint, (based on the Pasuk in Mishlei "Al Timna Tov mi'Ba'alav ['Don't withhold good from a potential recipient']) despite the fact that he accepted to work for three, is that the Shali'ach deprived him of the extra Zuz.

(c)If the employer instructed the Shali'ach to offer the laborer three Zuzim, and he went and offered him four, if the laborer responded with 'Whatever the employer said', assuming that the Shali'ach told him ...

1. ... that he would pay him himself then he is indeed obligated to pay him four Zuzim (because, in any event we assume that the employer was not insinuating that the employer may have offered him less than four Zuz, but that perhaps he offered him more).

2. ... that the employer would pay then he receives the three that the employer stipulated and he has complaints against the Shali'ach (as we learned above).

(d)We ask what the Din will be in the reverse case, where the employer said four, and the Shali'ach, three, and where the laborer responded in the same way whether he believe the Shali'ach, in which case he will receive three, and end up with complaints against him for depriving him of a higher wage, or whether he suspects that the employer really said 'four', which is what he will therefore receive.

4)

(a)To resolve the She'eilah, we quote a case where a woman appoints a Shali'ach to 'fetch her Get', and the Shali'ach quotes her as having asked him to 'receive her Get on her behalf', upon which the husband handed the Shali'ach the Get, adding the words 'as she said'. The ramifications of the Shali'ach's change of Lashon are that the woman really asked him to become a Shali'ach l'Holachah (the husband's Shali'ach), in which case the divorce would only take effect once the woman received the Get, whereas according to the Shali'ach's version, she had appointed him to be a Shali'ach l'Kabalah (her Shali'ach) and she would be divorced as soon as her husband handed him the Get.

(b)We try to prove from Rav Nachman Amar Rabah bar Avuhah Amar Rav, who rules there that the woman is not divorced that clearly, the husband believes the Shali'ach at surface value; otherwise, she ought to be divorced at least upon receipt of the Get.

(c)Rav Ashi refutes this proof however by attributing the non-validity of the Get to the fact that the Shali'ach declined to become the husband's Shali'ach (because it was too much trouble to bring the Get all the way to the woman). He was only willing to be her Shali'ach, which he could not be, because she had not appointed him as such. And this is irrespective of whom the husband believes.

(d)Even if he were to change his mind and take the Get to the woman, intending to be a Shali'ach l'Holachah, his Shelichus would not be valid, since having refused to be a Shali'ach l'Holachah when receiving the Get, he cannot then become a Shali'ach without a fresh Kinyan.

5)

(a)We would have been able to resolve our She'eilah had Rav presented the reverse case where the woman appointed the Shali'ach as a Shali'ach l'Kabalah, but he informed the husband that she had asked him to become a Shali'ach l'Holachah.

(b)Had he then maintained that the husband relies on ...

1. ... what the woman really said, then he would have ruled that she is divorced immediately upon his receipt of the Get.

2. ... the Shali'ach, he would have ruled that she is divorced only when she receives it.

(c)We cannot say, in the former case, that having informed the husband that the woman had asked him to become a Shali'ach l'Holachah, the Shali'ach clearly declined to be a Shali'ach l'Kabalah, like we just explained in the case of Rav (in which case, she ought not to be divorced at all) because it is easier to be a Shali'ach l'Kabalah than a Shali'ach l'Holachah (as we explained earlier), so it makes no sense to say that someone who is willing to be a Shali'ach l'Holachah would decline to be a Shali'ach l'Kabalah.

6)

(a)Although we have explained 've'Hit'u Zeh es Zeh' in many ways, we finally explain it, based on the Beraisa 'ha'Socher es ha'Umnin ve'Hit'u es Ba'al ha'Bayis ... ', Ein Lahem Ela Tar'umos' to mean that if an employer or a laborer retracts, the other has nothing more on him than complaints, because this Tana refers to retracting as 'Hit'u'.

(b)Should he retract ...

1. ... the employer will tell the laborer to go and find work elsewhere.

2. ... the laborer will tell the employer to find himself other laborers.

(c)The Tana qualifies this latter ruling however by confining it to where the employer retracts before the laborer went down to the field to begin work. But if, for example, a donkey-driver went down to the field where he found no produce for his donkey to transport, or the laborer to work in the field, and the conditions were too wet for him to do so, then the employer is obligated to pay him for a full day's work.

(d)When the Tana says 'Aval Eino Domeh ha'Ba Ta'un le'Ba Reikan, Oseh Melachah le'Yoshev Batel', he means that since the donkey-driver did not transport anything, and the laborer did not do any work, he will only get paid like a Po'el Batel (and not a full wage as if he would have worked).

7)

(a)The Beraisa then switches to the Din of a contractor who retracts after having begun to work. If a laborer who was hired to reap a field of corn or to weave a garment for two Sela'im, retracts half way, assuming the laborer who replaces him ...

1. ... also asks the same price he (obviously) receives one Sela.

2. ... asks six Dinarim (one and a half Sela'im) for the second half of the work he still receives one Sela, because the Tana Kama doesn't hold of the principle 'Kol ha'Chozer bo, Yado al ha'Tachtonah'.

(b)Rebbi Dosa disagrees with the latter ruling because he is the proponent of the principle 'Kol ha'Chozer bo, Yado al ha'Tachtonah'. Consequently, the laborer will only receive a Shekel (the difference between what the first laborer was due to receive and what the second laborer is now asking for the second half of the job).

8)

(a)In a case where their retraction causes the employer a loss the Tana rules 'Socher Aleihen O Mata'an'.

(b)'Mata'an' means that he promises the retracting laborer an increase in wage if he completes the job, which, in the end, he does not give him.

(c)The employer is permitted to employ new laborers at the expense of the retracting ones up to forty or fifty Zuz.

(d)The case where the employer does not have anything more than complaints against laborers who retract, even if their retraction causes a loss is there where other laborers are readily available to complete the work.

9)

(a)The Beraisa-expert explained the above-mentioned Beraisa ('Aval Halchu Chamarim ve'Lo Matz'u Tevu'ah ... , Nosen lahen S'charan mi'Shalem') literally.

(b)Rav commented on this that in his opinion, he ought only to receive like a Po'el Batel, and no more. And besides, the Tana explicitly says so.

(c)The Beraisa-expert ignored the continuation of the Beraisa, which supports Rav's opinion because that part of the Beraisa had been omitted from what he had been taught.

10)

(a)In the second Lashon, the Beraisa-expert did cite the continuation of the Beraisa, and Rav commented that, in his opinion, the retractor ought not to receive anything at all.

(b)We reconcile Rav with the Beraisa by establishing his ruling where the laborers inspected the field on the previous day, and saw for themselves, either that it was already waterlogged, or that should it rain overnight, it will become waterlogged. Consequently, they should have realized themselves that there would be no work for them that day.

(c)Rava stated that if someone hires laborers to dig in his field, and then it rains heavily the laborers bear the loss if they inspected the field on the previous day, whereas the employer pays them like a Po'el Batel if they did not (because then the onus is on the employer to inform the laborers about the nature of his field).