QUESTION: The Mishnah teaches that the prohibition of "Me'ilah," deriving personal benefit from consecrated property, applies to the Chelev of a Korban. RASHI (DH Mo'alin) explains that this is because the Chelev of a Korban is an item of Kodshim that is entirely for Hash-m (as it is burned on the Mizbe'ach), and it is not given to the Kohanim.

The Gemara quotes Rebbi Yanai who explains that the source that Me'ilah applies to Chelev is the verse (Vayikra 4:10) that teaches that just as the Chelev must be removed from the ox brought as a Korban Shelamim, it must be removed from the cow brought by the Kohen Gadol as a Korban Chatas ("Par Kohen Mashi'ach"). This teaches that just as Me'ilah applies to the cow of the Kohen Gadol, it applies to the ox brought as a Korban Shelamim.

RASHI (DH Mena Hani Mili) explains that Rebbi Yanai is teaching that Me'ilah applies even to the Chelev of Kodshim Kalim such as Shelamim. Even though there is no Me'ilah for Kodshim Kalim when the animal is alive (because it is still the property of its owner and not of the Beis ha'Mikdash, as Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili says in Bava Kama 12b), once the animal has been slaughtered and the blood has been sprinkled on the Mizbe'ach, the Isur Me'ilah takes effect.

Rebbi Yanai's statement here seems to contradict his statement in Me'ilah (15a). Rebbi Yanai there says that one is liable for Me'ilah only for using Kodshim of Bedek ha'Bayis (Kodshim that are the property of the Beis ha'Mikdash but that do not have the type of Kedushah that enables them to be offered on the Mizbe'ach), and for using a Korban Olah. Rebbi Yanai derives this from the verse, "Nefesh Ki Sim'ol Ma'al v'Chat'ah..." -- "A person who commits Me'ilah and sins unintentionally against the Kodshim of Hash-m" (Vayikra 5:15), which teaches that Me'ilah applies only to Kodshim that are exclusively Hash-m's. Kodshim of the Mizbe'ach that are shared in part by the Kohanim and in part by the owners are not subject to Me'ilah.

Rebbi Yanai in Me'ilah is saying that Me'ilah does not apply whenever the owner has a share in the Kodshim, but here he says that Me'ilah applies even for Kodshim Kalim (part of which the owner is entitled to keep). How are these two statements of Rebbi Yanai to be reconciled?

(a) TOSFOS (DH Amar Rebbi Yanai) writes that Rebbi Yanai here is saying that Me'ilah applies only mid'Rabanan. Mid'Oraisa, Me'ilah applies only to Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis and Korban Olah.

(b) The TIFERES YAKOV answers that there are two different sages named Rebbi Yanai. Rebbi Yanai in Me'ilah is "Rebbi Yanai me'Chavarta," Rebbi Yanai from the city of Chavarta.

(This is in contrast to the explanation of RASHI in Me'ilah (15a, DH Amar Rebbi Yanai), who explains that the word is not "me'Chavarta" ("from the city of Chavarta") but rather "Mechavarta," which means that "it is clearly correct." Rebbi Yanai is saying that it is clear that Me'ilah applies only to Kodshim of Bedek ha'Bayis and Korban Olah.)

The Tiferes Yakov adds that Rebbi Yanai mentioned in Me'ilah is not the same Rebbi Yanai who is quoted in Temurah (32b) as saying, "There is no Me'ilah stated explicitly in the Torah other than Me'ilah of the Korban Olah." Rebbi Yanai there agrees that Me'ilah applies to other types of Kodshim; he merely says that those forms of Me'ilah are not written in the Torah explicitly, but they are derived from Derashos. According to Rebbi Yanai in Temurah, Me'ilah does apply to Kodshim Kalim, while according to Rebbi Yanai in Me'ilah, Me'ilah does not apply to Kodshim Kalim but only to Bedek ha'Bayis and Korban Olah. (D. BLOOM)

QUESTIONS: The Gemara records the dispute about the principle of "Shnei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Ein Melamdin" -- when the Torah expresses a certain law in two different areas of Halachah, we do not learn from there to all other subjects. Rather, we say that the Halachah is limited to those two subjects alone.

(a) What exactly does this rule mean? Does it mean that an entirely new source is needed to teach that the law applies to other areas, or does it mean that the law certainly does not apply to other areas?

(b) What is the logic behind this principle?

(a) The NODA B'YEHUDAH (EH 1:78) explains that RASHI and TOSFOS in Kidushin (35a, DH Ela) disagree about the meaning of "Shnei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Ein Melamdin."

1. RASHI maintains that when a law is expressed in two places in the Torah, we cannot learn that law to any other subject through a Binyan Av. Rather, an entirely new source is necessary to teach that law.

2. TOSFOS explains that the rule of "Shnei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad" proves that the law mentioned in the two places does not apply anywhere other than the two instances in which it is mentioned. We cannot apply the Halachah of these verses to any other subject, even with a Hekesh or other Limud.

(b) RASHI in Kidushin (24a, DH Ein Melamdin) explains the logic behind the opinion that "Shnei Chesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Ein Melamdin" as follows. When two verses express the same Halachah for two different subjects, we cannot apply the Halachah elsewhere through a Binyan Av, because the fact that the Torah repeats the law the second time shows that the Halachah is not meant to be applied in all situations.

However, not everyone agrees with the rule of "Shnei Chesuvim... Ein Melamdin." There is an opinion that maintains that we do apply a Halachah to all other subjects when the Torah teaches it with regard to two subjects (see Insights to Kidushin 34:2). What is the logic for the opinion that we do apply the Halachah to all situations when the Torah teaches it in two places?

The SEFER KERISUS 5:1:1 (cited by HALICHOS OLAM 4:4:2) explains that the Gemara teaches that when a law is derived through a Kal va'Chomer, the verse still goes out of its way to write it explicitly ("Milsa d'Asya b'Kal va'Chomer, Tarach v'Chasav Lah Kra"; for the logic behind this, see Insights to Bava Metzia 94:3). Similarly, when a law is derived through a Binyan Av, the verse still goes out of its way to write it (TOSFOS to Shabbos 131b, DH Iy; RAN to Nedarim 3a, DH Lindor). Therefore, when the Torah writes the Halachah a second occasion even though we can learn it from a Binyan Av from the first occasion, it is because "Tarach v'Chasav Lah Kra," and thus we still can learn from the first place in which it is written that it applies to all other situations. If, however, the Torah writes it a third time, then everyone agrees that "Ein Melamdin," we cannot learn from it to all other situations, because the verse would not go out of its way to repeat the Halachah twice when it could be learned from a Binyan Av.

QUESTION: The new chapter (ha'Or veha'Rotev) discusses the laws of Tum'as Ochlin. What do these laws have to do with the rest of Chulin, which discusses what foods may or may not be eaten? This chapter seemingly belongs in Taharos, not in Chulin.

(a) TOSFOS (DH ha'Or) explains that after the Mishnah (77a) in the fourth chapter teaches that a Shilyah is not Metamei as a Neveilah, it continues to teach other laws of Tum'ah and Taharah here in the ninth chapter. Tosfos explains that the reason why this chapter does not follow immediately after the fourth is that once the Tana teaches the laws of Oso v'Es Beno (74a), the Tana continues with the rest of the laws of Oso v'Es Beno. Included in the laws of Oso v'Es Beno is the concept of Shechitah she'Einah Re'uyah, a topic that is relevant to the laws of Kisuy ha'Dam. Since the laws of Kisuy ha'Dam apply to birds and wild animals, the Tana teaches the laws of Gid ha'Nasheh which apply to an animal but not to a bird. Once the Tana discusses the prohibition of eating a Gid ha'Nasheh that was cooked together with other foods, the Tana continues, in the eighth chapter, with the laws of mixtures of foods. Finally, the Mishnah returns to the theme of Tum'ah and Taharah in the ninth chapter.

(b) The ME'IRI lists this chapter as the eleventh chapter of Chulin, preceding the twelfth chapter, Perek Shilu'ach ha'Ken. He explains that it was supposed to be the twelfth and last chapter of Chulin, since it is not really related to the other laws of Chulin. However, in order to end the Masechta with the positive teaching of "v'Ha'arachta Yamim," the Tana concludes with Perek Shilu'ach ha'Ken. (Z. Wainstein)