1)

(a)Others cite Rav Yehudah Amar Rav, Abaye and Rami bar Chama in connection with the following Beraisa, which rules that if ...

1. ... the house (or room) that Reuven rented to Shimon became stricken with Tzara'as, the Kohen declared it Tamei and Shimon demands a replacement - he can say to Shimon 'Harei she'Lecha Lefanecha' (Here's your house; take it or leave it').

2. ... in the same case, but where the Kohen actually demolished the house - he is obligated to provide him with another house to comply with the terms of the rental.

(b)Reuven cannot claim that the fact that this occurred during the rental period is proof that it was caused by Shimon's Mazel, who must therefore withdraw his claim - because Tzara'as occurs on account of the house's owner sins, either because of Gezel or because of Tzarus Ayin (as we learned in the third Perek), and has nothing to do with the hirer.

(c)We reject the text 'Hikdisho ha'Dar bo, Ma'aleh S'char le'Hekdesh' based on the Pasuk "ve'Ish ki Yakdish es Beiso Kodesh", from which we learn - that only the owner can declare his property Hekdesh ('Mah Beiso she'Lo' [see Bava Kama 68b]).

(d)We therefore amend the text to read - 'Hikdisho Maskir (i.e. the owner), ha'Dar bo Ma'aleh S'char le'Hekdesh'.

2)

(a)Besides the fact that Shimon is prohibited from residing in the house and is guilty of Me'ilah if he does, we also have a problem with the ruling that he pays the rental to Hekdesh - since we have a principle that, with the exception of animals and K'lei Shareis, once a person has been Mo'el, the article goes out to Chulin.

(b)And the problem with the answer, establishing the case where Reuven declared, not the house, but the rental, Hekdesh, when it would fall due is - that, since the rental is not yet there, it clashes with the principle 'Ein Adam Makdish Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam'.

(c)Rav Yehudah Amar Rav resolves this problem - by establishing the Beraisa like Rebbi Meir, who holds 'Adam Makdish Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam'.

(d)Others present the final statement in the for of a dialogue between Rav Papa (or Rami bar Chama) - who asked Abaye whether the author is Rebbi Meir, and Abaye (or Rav Chisda) who replied 'Who else?'

3)

(a)Our Mishnah rules 'Chayvei Erchin Memashk'nin', which means - that if the Noder refuses to pay once the payment is due, Beis-Din will confiscate his belongings, which they will sell, and claim their debt from the proceeds.

(b)And the same applies to Chayvei Olos and Shelamim - but not to Chayvei Chata'os and Ashamos ...

(c)... which people generally want to bring in order to attain a Kaparah (rendering the case of someone who refuses rare).

(d)We query this from the fact that Olos too atone for - Mitzvos Asei and La'avin ha'Nitakin la'Asei, yet Beis-Din take a Mashkon from Ba'alei Olos (as we just learned).

(e)In fact, there is no Kashya from Olos - because they are not obligatory (and are not taken as seriously as Chata'os).

4)

(a)If someone refuses to comply (by declaring 'Rotzeh Ani') - Beis-Din will beat him until he does.

(b)We reconcile this with the Pasuk "li'Retzono", implying that he must bring the Korban voluntarily and not by force - seeing as he does eventually say 'Rotzeh Ani (and we assume his ultimate acceptance to be genuine).

(c)The other area of Halachah by which physical force is used is that of - Gitin (where a man refuses to conform to the court-order obligating him to give his wife a Get).

5)

(a)Rav Papa l rules Memashk'nin - by a Chatas Nazir.

(b)And this is based on the fact that, following the termination of his Nezirus, a Nazir requires three Korbanos - Chatas, Olah and Shelamim.

(c)He is permitted to drink wine however - after bringing only one of them.

(d)Mar said - that any of the above three will suffice, rendering the Chatas less crucial than usual (thereby explaining Rav Papa's ruling).

6)

(a)Rav Papa also refers to one exception to 'Chayvei Olos Memashk'nin Osan'. We initially suggest that this refers to Olas Yoledes, where the Torah places the Olah bird-offering before that of the Chatas. Rava however stated - that this is confined to the reading of the Pesukim, but has no bearing on the Halachah, which requires the Chatas to precede the Olah (dismissing this suggestion).

(b)We therefore establish Rav Papa by Olas Metzora, following a statement by Rebbi Yishmael b'no shel Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah. A Metzora too, has to bring three Korbanos when he becomes Tahor (Chatas, Asham and Olah).

(c)Rebbi Yishmael b'no shel Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah ... rules there - that the Olah delays the Taharah of the Metzora, no less than the Chatas and the Asham (in which case he will be sure to bring it, just like a regular Chatas and Asham) and therefore it is not necessary to confiscate his belongings to force him to do so.

7)

(a)The Beraisa learns from the Pasuk in Vayikra (in connection with an Olas Nedavah) "Yakriv oso" - that Beis-Din are permitted to force the Noder to fulfill his Neder.

(b)We reconcile this with our Mishnah, which teaches us that "li'Retzono" requires a Korban to be brought with the consent of the owner - by establishing that, although Beis-Din use physical force, they do not bring his Korban until the Noder actually declares 'Rotzeh Ani' (as we explained in the Mishnah).

(c)Bearing in mind the Mishnah's D'rashah from "li'Retzono", when Shmuel says that an Olah requires the knowledge of the Noder, he is coming to teach us - that this even applies to a case where Reuven designates his own animal and brings it on behalf of Shimon, who is Chayav an Olah.

(d)We might otherwise have thought - that whereas one's own Korban requires one's consent ('Rotzeh Ani'), this is not necessary by somebody else's (since there is no logical reason for him to object).

(e)Shmuel nevertheless rules that it is - because sometimes, the Noder specifically wants the atonement to take place through the auspices of his own animal, and not through somebody else's.

8)

(a)We query Shmuel however, from a Beraisa - which rules that if Reuven undertakes to bring Shimon's Chatas or Asham - he requires his consent, whereas if he undertakes to bring his Olah or Shelamim - he does not.

(b)Shmuel will answer by differentiating between the Kaparah - which no longer requires the owner's express consent (the Beraisa) and the Hafrashah (the designation) - which does (himself).

(c)Ula disagrees with Shmuel. He draws exactly the opposite distinction. According to him therefore - it is the Kaparah that requires the owner's consent and the Hafrashah (which is what the Beraisa is referring to) that does not.

(d)Another Beraisa states (with regard to Reuven bringing Shimon's Chatas, Asham, Olah or Shelamim) 'le'Da'as Yatza, she'Lo le'Da'as Lo Yatza'. Shmuel will establish it - by the Hafrashah, and Ula, by the Kaparah.

9)

(a)Rav Papa states categorically that ...

1. ... the two Beraisos - do not argue.

2. ... Shmuel and Ula - do.

(b)The two Beraisos agree, according to ...

1. ... Shmuel - in that the first one is talking about the Kaparah, and the second, the Hafrashah.

2. ... Ula - in that the first one is talking about the Hafrashah, and the second, the Kaparah.

(c)It is not so obvious that the Amora'im argue. If not for Rav Papa's statement that they do, we might have interpreted Shmuel's statement, establishing the second Beraisa by the time of designation as 'Af be'Hafrashah', in which case, the Hafrashah as well as the Kaparah, require the Noder's consent (in which Shmuel will at least agree with part of Ula's statement).

(d)The problem would then be from the first Beraisa - which does not require his consent by an Olah (and with which Shmuel can therefore not be resolved).

(e)Shmuel may well have established it by the Kaparah - however, if not for Rav Papa's statement, he would have had to retract from that answer and accept that the first Beraisa is a problem.

10)

(a)Rav Sheishes rules that if someone makes a Moda'a on a Get - meaning that he informs two witnesses that he is negating retroactively the Get that he is about to hand to his wife, it (the Moda'a) is valid (and the Get is not).

(b)We might otherwise have thought - that in a case where he is subsequently coerced into giving the Get (and does so without mentioning the Moda'a), his acceptance of Beis-Din's ruling overrides the Moda'a, and the Get is Kasher.

(c)We extrapolate that this is not the case from our Mishnah 'ad she'Yomar Rotzeh Ani' (in connection with Get) - where the Tana could have written 'ad she'Yiten', but added 'she'Yomar', to indicate that Beis-Din will also force him to verbally negate any Moda'a that he may have made, so that it should not negate the Get.

11)

(a)When our Mishnah rules 'Shum ha'Yesomim Sheloshim Yom', it means - that Beis-Din announce the Yesomim's property that needs to be sold for thirty days, to attract lucrative customers.

(b)The equivalent time period allowed for Shum Hekdesh is - sixty days.

(c)Beis-Din announce the property for sale - twice a day, morning (when the laborers go down to the field) and evening (when they return).

(d)They announce it in the morning - to give the laborers a chance to check out the property in the course of the day, and again in the evening - to remind the employer to ask the employees for their assessment.

12)

(a)The Beraisa that supports Rav's previous explanation also describes the announcement in detail. After defining the property, they announce 'Kach hi Yafeh ve'Kach hi Shuma', meaning - 'This is how much the field produces, and this is its assessed value'.

(b)And after inviting potential purchasers to come and buy, they would add 'in order to pay a wife's Kesuvah' or 'in order to pay a creditor'. Some people will prefer to purchase the property for the proceeds to be used to pay off ...

1. ... a Kesuvah - because the seller will then accept smaller installments

2. ... a creditor - because then the seller will accept inferior quality coins (as is customary among merchants).