Implied question: We say in Pesachim (33b) that also liquids are absorbed in fruits, even though they are not forbidden due to Nolad, [and they are permitted] if we do not decree lest one squeeze!

Answer #1: Water in clouds is absorbed more, and it is not recognized at all, the way liquids [are recognized] in fruits.

Answer #2: Even if liquids were not recognized in fruits at all, they are not considered Nolad, since also initially they were a food. They are [considered] a food that separated.

Question: He should say that it is R. Shimon, who does not forbid Muktzah or Nolad, like it says in Beitzah (2a)!

Answer: In such a case of Nolad, something new that had not come to the world at all, R. Shimon agrees.

Support: Also regarding ashes in an oven ignited on Yom Tov, it seems that R. Shimon agrees that one may not cover [the blood of a slaughtered bird or Chayah], unless it is [still hot and] proper to roast an egg with it (then, it is still like wood, which is prepared for cooking), like it says in Beitzah (8b).

Explanation #1 (Rashi): This is even if they are of an individual.

Source: It seems that he deduced this, for if it is only of the Rabim, why does it say rivers? Even gathered water, we say above that it is like the feet of the one who drew it, i.e. "like everyone's feet"/ that it says here, like I explained above (45b DH b'Yom), that this is all the same.

Proof: It is proven like this in Beitzah (39a) that we discuss of an individual. It asks from here against the Mishnah there, which teaches "an individual's pit is like the individual's feet."

Disclaimer: However, there Rashi did not explain "like the feet of the one who drew it" and "like everyone's feet" to be the same.

Explanation #2 (R. Tam): Even if it is [only] of the Rabim, it is a proper inference. Only because they move, they do not acquire Shevisah, but contained water, which acquires Shevisah, has 2000 Amos in every direction, like R. Yochanan ben Nuri.

Implied question: He should have said that he needed to say that the Halachah follows the lenient opinion everywhere [in Eruvin]!

Answer: He prefers to say that even for this matter itself it is needed.

Explanation: Regarding a person, the Halachah follows R. Yochanan ben Nuri, that he acquires Shevisah. Regarding Kelim, the Halachah follows Rabanan, that they do not acquire Shevisah. They are like everyone's feet.

Implied question: This is like two contradictory leniencies!

Answer: (It is not.) We hold like Rabanan, who say that Hefker items do not acquire Shevisah;

The reason for a sleeping person is since an awake person acquires Shevisah, also a sleeping person, like Rashi explained.

Remark: Even if R. Yehoshua ben Levi would have taught only "the Halachah follows the lenient opinion regarding Eruv", his words would connotes that the Halachah follows both of them to be lenient.

Explanation (Rashi): It was a famine year, and there is a loss of Taharos.

Rebuttal: One cannot say so. In such pressed circumstances, even Rabanan agree, like it says in Nidah (9b) "you cannot bring a proof from pressed circumstances", and it explains there that "pressed circumstances" was a famine year, and some say that they made much Taharos!

Pesak: Even an individual against a Rabim, it seems that the Halachah follows the lenient opinion in Aveilus.

"Except for this" does not exclude other laws of Aveilus, like it says "Rabanan were lenient about Aveilus."

Support: It is proven explicitly like this in Mo'ed Katan (19b) regarding Aba Sha'ul and Rabanan, regarding one who buries his relative three days before the festival, and regarding one who came from a close place, regarding the argument of R. Shimon and Rabanan (Mo'ed Katan 22a).

Question: Since Shmuel said that the Halachah follows the lenient opinion, even an individual against a Rabim, in Aveilus, why did Shmuel need to rule in Mo'ed Katan (24a) like R. Gamliel, who says that Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kipur are like festivals?

Answer: He teaches that [we follow the lenient opinion] even an individual against a Rabim, like it says above (that R. Yehoshua ben Levi ruled like R. Yochanan ben Nuri to teach so regarding Eruv).

Pesak: Even on the first day of Aveilus, which is mid'Oraisa, like Bahag says, we follow the lenient opinion in Aveilus, like we find that we follow the lenient opinion in Eruv, which connotes that even if it is mid'Oraisa, the Halachah follows the lenient opinion;

Source #1: It says "how is this - Eruvin is mid'Rabanan! What is the difference whether an individual argues with [Rabim]...?" This connotes that if it were mid'Oraisa, it is fine that we need [to teach that we are lenient even like an individual against a Rabim].

Source #2: In Bechoros (49a), regarding the argument of R. Akiva and Rabanan. Rav Ashi said that all agree that regarding Aveilus, day 30 is like before it, for Shmuel taught that we follow the lenient opinion in Aveilus, and [one who heard on day 30] does not conduct even the first day of Aveilus.

Citation (Bahag): When a Mes died on Yom Tov Rishon, Yom Tov Sheni, Chol ha'Mo'ed or the first day of the final Yom Tov, he does not conduct Aveilus until all the days of Yom Tov end;

However, the last day is mid'Rabanan. It counts towards Shiv'ah (the seven days of Aveilus), but Aveilus does not apply on it at all.

However, if a Mes died on the second day of the last Yom Tov, since the primary Aveilus of the first day applies, it counts towards Shiv'ah;

Chachamim brought a support that the primary Aveilus is the first day, for it says "v'Achalti Chatas ha'Yom" (Aharon explained why he could not eat Kodshei Doros on the day that Nadav and Avihu died) - today is forbidden, and tomorrow is permitted. It says also "va'Acharisah k'Yom Mar";

Since the first day of Aveilus is mid'Oraisa, and the last day [of Yom Tov] Isur mid'Rabanan a Safek mid'Rabanan, the Vadai Aseh mid'Oraisa of an individual takes effect on the Safek Aseh mid'Rabanan of the Rabim.

Implied question: It says in Kesuvos (4a) that [if the food for Seudas Nisu'in was all prepared, and the Chasan's father or the Kalah's mother died,] we enter the Mes into a room, (they have Nisu'in) and conduct the seven days of Mishteh, and afterwards the seven days of Aveilus;

Inference: The first day of Aveilus does not override a Mo'ed (the seven days of Mishteh) mid'Rabanan!

Answer: Perhaps the Mo'ed of a Chasan is different.

Question: How is it proven from here that Eruvei Techumim are stringent? The reason is not due to stringency, rather, because v'Ein Chavin l'Adam she'Lo Befanav!

Answer: In a case, it is properly proven that they are more stringent, for even if we know regarding Eruvei Techumim that he intends to go in that direction, even so, since there is a little Chov, that he loses ability to go to the other side if he will want, it is not an Eruv;

Regarding Eruvei Chatzeros, even though there is also Chovah, that they are Me'arev with his bread without his Da'as (consent), like it says below (80a) that if a member of the Mavuy normally joins in the Shituf (Eruv for the Mavuy), people come and take his Shituf Bal Korcho (against his will), and he must pardon to them his bread if they want;

This is like it says below (68a) "since if they want from me, I would not give, the Shituf is Batel." (I.e. if he could refuse to pardon, the Shituf would be invalid.)

[Consent is needed for Eruvei Techumim] because they are more stringent.

Explanation #1 (Rashi here): The primary Eruv is in Techumim.

Explanation #2: This Mishnah is below (80b), and there Rashi explained differently. They said to be Me'arev in the Chatzeros after (i.e. even if they were already) they made Shituf [in the Mavuy], only lest children forget the law of Eruvei Chatzeros in future generations. Therefore, we are lenient about remnants of an Eruv.

Support: A Beraisa below (71b) connotes like this. We are Me'arev in the Chatzeros and make Shituf in the Mavuy, lest children forget the law of Eruvei.

Rebuttal (Ri): Explanation #1 is primary. The Mishnah below (80b) does not discuss Eruvei Chatzeros at all. Rather, it refers to Shituf Mavo'os;

The Reisha teaches "how do we do Shituf?... Why did they say to be Me'arev in Chatzeros?", i.e. Shituf Mavo'os. In several places, Shituf Mavo'os is called Eruvei Chatzeros.

Note: Perhaps it says "to be Me'arev in Chatzeros" because we place the Shituf in a Chatzer in the Mavuy. They did not say to put it in a house (like we do for Eruvei Chatzeros), for then children in other houses will not see it. However, they should have enacted to alternate in which Chatzer it is placed, so all children of the Mavuy will see it sometimes! Maharsha asks that Eruvei Chatzeros and Eruvei Techumim are totally different, and asks why we do not prove from this Mishnah that Eruvei Techumim are primary. He explains the Mishnah to mean that Chachamim obligated a Shi'ur for Eruvei Chatzeros l'Chatchilah, lest children forget that there is a Shi'ur even for remnants of Eruvei Techumim.

Implied question: Below (47a), R. Yochanan said that the Halachah follows R. Yosi, and we infer that an individual argues with him!

Answer: That is like R. Yakov bar Idi. (He taught that the Halachah follows R. Yosi against R. Yehudah, and all the more so against R. Meir. If he held that the Halachah follows R. Yosi even against a Rabim, he should have said so!)

Explanation #1 (Rashi): [It is the Halachah,] and we expound so in the Shi'ur;

The one who says "we lean" means that we rule like this, but we do not expound so in the Shi'ur. The one who says "it seems" means that if one ruled like this, we do not retract, but we do not rule like this [l'Chatchilah].

Objection: Even if it was not said "it seems", we would not retract the ruling, since there was no ruling about the Halachah like this opinion or the other!

Explanation #2: "Halachah" means that if one ruled like the other opinion, we retract it. "We lean" means that we also rule like this, and if one comes to rule like the other opinion, we protest against him. However, if he did, we do not retract it;

"It seems" means that if one comes to rule like the other opinion, we do not protest against him.

Support: It connotes like this in Kesuvos (84a) regarding "judges ruled like R. Tarfon."

Question: Just the contrary, in Bava Basra (124b) it connotes that according to the opinion that we lean, this means that b'Di'eved we lean like these Tana'im, but l'Chatchilah, we rule like the other opinion!

Regarding "a Bechor receives a double portion in Shevach that the father's property increased after he died", Rava said that it is forbidden to rule like Rebbi, but if he did, it stands. [We infer that] he holds that it was said [in the general rule] that we lean!

Answer: There, "we lean" refers to his colleagues. Rabanan argue with him;

One opinion holds that the Halachah follows Rebbi against his colleague, but not against his colleagues. It was said that the Halachah follows his colleagues. Rava holds that we lean like his colleagues, but it was not said that the Halachah follows his colleagues.