1)

(a)If, as Rav explains, it is the first master who set free the Eved whom he made an Aputiki, then when the Tana adds 'Ela Mipnei Tikun ha'Olam Kofin Es Rabo v'Oseh Oso ben-Chorin' he means the second master. We force him to write a second Shtar Shichrur because we are afraid that he might later meet the Eved in the street and, claiming that he is his Eved, force him to return with him.

(b)According to the Tana Kama, the Eved is obligated to write a Shtar of debt, with which the second master can later claim from him. Raban Shimon ben Gamliel says that it is the first master (who set him free) who must write the Shtar Chov ...

(c)... because he holds that one is obligated to pay for damaging someone else's Shi'abud; whereas the Tana Kama holds that one is not.

2)

(a)According to Ula, it is the second master (to whom the Eved is Meshu'bad) who set the Eved free. When the Tana says 'Shuras ha'Din Ein ha'Eved Chayav Klum', he means that the Eved does not become Chayav to observe the Mitzvos from which a woman is exempt, since the second master had not acquired him in the first place.

(b)The Tikun ha'Olam on the basis of which the Chachamim now obligate him to keep all the Mitzvos is the fact that people began to speak of him as a ben-Chorin (and he will subsequently acquire a bad name when they see that he is not behaving like one).

(c)According to Raban Shimon ben Gamliel, it is the second master (who set him free), who writes the Shtar Chov (that he owes the first one). The basis of their Machlokes is whether 'Hezek she'Eino Nikar (an inherent damage that is not discernable to the eye) is considered damage (Raban Shimon ben Gamliel) or not (the Tana Kama).

(d)The reason that ...

1. ... Ula declines to learn like Rav is because he does consider the second man to be a master (which, according to Rav's interpretation of our Mishnah, the Tana does).

2. ... Rav declines to learn like Ula is because he would not refer to the second one as a 'Meshachrer' (which according to Ula, our Tana does), seeing as his Shichrur is Halachically invalid (as we explained).

3)

(a)According to Ami Shapir Na'eh Amar Rebbi Yochanan, if a river swamps a field that the debtor designated as an Aputiki, the creditor may no longer claim his debt. Shmuel's father holds that he may still claim his debt from other property.

(b)Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak was not impressed with Ami Shapir Na'eh's statement. He commented that it was not for a person with a name like that (Ami the good-looking) to make statements that are not nice (since there is not the least reason for the creditor to lose his debt).

(c)He therefore qualified Ami Shapir Na'eh statement by confining it to an Aputiki Mefurash (where the debtor declared 'Lo Yehei Lach Pera'on Ela mi'Zu', restricting the payment to that field alone. And even there, Shmuel's father holds that the creditor may claim from other property, should the Aputiki become flooded).

(d)The Beraisa which supports Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak draws a distinction between whether the debtor designated a field as an Aputiki Stam (in which case the creditor may claim from other property in the event that the Aputiki became flooded), or as an Aputiki Mefurash (in which case he loses his claim).

4)

(a)Another Beraisa speaks of someone who designated a field as an Aputiki for a debtor or for a woman's Kesuvah. When he says 'Govin mi'Sha'ar Nechasim', he means that the debtor is permitted to sell the Aputiki, and pay him with other fields.

(b)Raban Shimon ben Gamliel draws a distinction between Kesuvas Ishah and other debtors in this regard inasmuch it is not the way of a woman to take all the purchasers to Beis-Din to ascertain which field is Meshubad and which is not. Consequently, she married him on the understanding that the field that he designated for her Kesuvah is the only one from which she will claim (as if it was an Aputiki Mefurash), and he is not permitted to sell it.

5)

(a)The two possible cases of a Chatzi Eved v'Chatzi ben-Chorin are two partners who purchased an Eved jointly, or two brothers who inherited an Eved from their father (see Sugya at foot of page).

(b)Beis Shamai object to Beis Hillel, who maintain that an Eved who is half free serves his master and himself on alternate days on the grounds that that is fine from the point of view of the master, who enjoys he benefits of his slave, but how about the poor slave, who may not 'marry' either a Shifchah (on account of the half of him that is free), or a bas Yisrael (on account of the half of him that is a slave.

(c)Despite the fact that an Eved (like a woman) is Patur from the Mitzvah of 'Peru u'Rvu', his inability to marry creates a problem inasmuch as the world was created to be populated, and everyone is obligated to participate, a free man by fulfilling the Mitzvah of "Peru u'R'vu", and an Eved, by fulfilling the Mitzvah (mi'Divrei Nevi'im) of "Lo Sohu Bera'ah, Lasheves Yetzarah".

(d)We rule like Beis Shamai because Beis Hillel conceded to Beis Shamai.

6)

(a)If someone sets half his Eved free, Rebbi validates the Shichrur. The Rabanan regard such a Shichrur as invalid.

(b)According to Rabah, they argue in a case of a Shtar. Both Tana'im learn from the Pasuk "v'Hafdei Lo Nifdasah" (which, in their opinion, refers to a Shifchah half of whom has been set free) that it is possible to set half an Eved free with Kesef.

(c)Rebbi learns from the Hekesh "Ve'Hafdei Lo Nifdasah (Kesef) O Chufshah Lo Nitan Lah (Shtar)" that just as one can set half an Eved free with Kesef, so too, can one set half of him free with a Shtar. The Rabanan argue with him on the basis of the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Lah" "Lah" from Ishah, which teaches that half an Eved, like half a woman, cannot be set free by means of a Shtar.

7)

(a)They appear to argue over whether a 'Hekesh' takes precedence over a 'Gezeirah-Shavah' or vice-versa. We conclude however, that both Tana'im agree that the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' takes precedence either because the word itself is Mufneh (redundant), in which case the Torah inserted it for the Derashah, or if it is not (and there is no Kashya on the 'Gezeirah-Shavah'), then it is because it was handed to Moshe on Har Sinai. The words of the Hekesh on the other hand, are neither redundant nor were they handed to Moshe at Sinai.

(b)Rebbi nevertheless follows the Hekesh because an Eved (regarding separation) has an advantage over a woman, in that he goes free with Kesef, whereas a woman does not. Consequently, it is more logical in this case, to Darshen the Hekesh.

8)

(a)According to Rav Yosef, they argue over setting the Eved free with Kesef (and not Shtar). Rebbi learns from "v'Hafdei Lo Nifdasah". The Rabanan disagree with Rebbi, who learns it from "v'Hafdei Lo Nifdasah" because they hold "Dibrah Torah Ki'Leshon Bnei Adam" (in which case the Torah is actually speaking about a full Shifchah, and not one who has been half set-free).

(b)According to Rav Yosef, they both agree that an Eved cannot be set half free by means of a Shtar.

(c)We prove Rav Yosef however, from a Beraisa, where, according to the Tana Kama the Tana'im argue by Shtar.

9)

(a)We propose that the Tana'im argue by Shtar exclusively, but that they agree by Kesef in which case, Rav Yosef (who maintains that they argue by Kesef) will be disproved on two scores.

(b)But we conclude that, according to Rav Yosef, the Tana'im argue by Kesef as well as by Shtar and that Rebbi only presented the Machlokes by Shtar in order to stress the extent of Rebbi's opinion (that he validates Shtar, even though one could learn "Lah" "Lah" from Ishah that half a Shichrur is not valid).

(c)The reason that he does not rather present it by Kesef, to teach us the extent of the Rabanan's opinion (i.e.. that they forbid Kesef even though one could learn from "v'Hafdei Lo Nifdasah" that half a Shichrur is valid) is on account of the principle 'Ko'ach d'Heteira Adif' (a Limud Heter is more powerful than a Limud Isur, inasmuch as one only permits something when one is absolutely certain that it is permitted, unlike an Isur, where one goes l'Chumra even when one is uncertain).

10)

(a)The Beraisa learns from "v'Hafdei Lo Nifdasah" that the Pasuk exempts a Shifchah Charufah who is betrothed, from Sekilah (through Kesef or Shaveh Kesef). He then learn from "O Chufshah Lo Nitan Lah" that the Parshah incorporates a Shifchah who has not been set free by means of a Shtar, from which we derive that an Eved can be set free with a Shtar.

(b)The Tana knows that this refers to Shtar, from a 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "O Chufshah Lo Nitan Lah" from "v'Kasav Lah Sefer Kerisus".

(c)And he subsequently includes a Shifchah who has been half set free by means of a Shtar (and one who has been set froo by means of Kesef) from the Hekesh to Kesef (from the two phrases currently being discussed).

11)

(a)This Beraisa is ...

1. ... ideal according to Rav Yosef because, according to his amended opinion after being proved wrong, the author of the entire Beraisa is Rebbi.

2. ... problematic according to Rabah because the Reisha is unanimous, whilst the Seifa goes according to Rebbi (though it is unclear why we cannot simply say that the entire Beraisa goes like Rebbi, which Rav Ashi will indeed say shortly).

(b)Rabah will answer that this is no problem, 'Reisha Divrei ha'Kol, v'Seifa Rebbi'.

12)

(a)When Rav Ashi says with regard to the previous Beraisa 'Rebbi Hi' he means that the author of the entire Beraisa is Rebbi (with whom the Rabanan in the Reisha happen to concur).

(b)Our Mishnah talks about a case of 'Mi she'Chetzyo Eved v'Chetzyo ben Chorin'. In view of the current Sugya, Rabah will establish the Mishnah when the master set his Eved free with 'Kesef', in which case even the Rabanan will agree with Rebbi.

(c)This does not mean that Rav Yosef is forced to establish the author of our Mishnah as Rebbi because, as Ravina explains, the Tana is referring to a case of an Eved who had two masters, one of whom set him free (as we explained in our Mishnah). In that case, the Mishnah is unanimous, according to him, too.