Question: The Ri has difficulty with this. In Kesuvos (102a) Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue regarding someone who writes the phrase, "I am obligated to pay ploni a Manah" in a document. The Gemara there says that their argument is actually an argument among the Tanaim regarding our case (collection from a guarantor who signed after the document was signed).

Rashi there explains that their argument is whether or not writing this in a document is considered a real admission. This implies that similarly, the guarantor is being obligated because he admits that he made himself a guarantor (as if he had done so) when the money was given. This must be the comparison between the two cases (according to Rashi). However, our Gemara implies that the signing of the guarantor is making a new obligation to pay from now (not as if he had done so when the money was given).

This is not a question on Rabeinu Tam, who did not explain the case of the guarantor as admittance.

Answer: Ben Nanas and Rebbi Yishmael (who the Gemara in Kesuvos ibid. quote as arguing about the case of the guarantor) argue regarding two points. They argue in a case where the guarantor writes in the document "and I admit that I am a guarantor," and in a case where he writes "and I am a guarantor from now."

The first part of the Beraisa that discusses a guarantor who signed after the document was signed implies that they argue regarding admittance, as it did not simply say that a guarantor who signs when the money is not given is obligated to pay. Being that the second part of the Beraisa states, "If someone was choking his friend etc." the implication is that they also argue in a case where the person was strangling someone. (Note: The case is where a person who sees this scene says, "Let him go and I will pay you the money (that he owes you).) This is the aspect our Gemara is focusing on, as the guarantor indebted himself even though he did not owe the money (which was already owed).

According to Rashi that they argue about admittance, even though the Mishnah says that if one takes out a document that has someone's handwritten admittance he can collect with it, the case in the Mishnah is where he wrote and signed underneath. The case they are arguing about is where there was no signature. Similarly, the case of the guarantor they are arguing about is where the guarantor merely wrote "I am a guarantor" and he gave him the document in front of witnesses.

Explanation: We require the slave to be tied and sleeping, as the Gemara implies later (78a). The Gemara there says that if he instructed to write a Get for his wife, and it was placed in the hand of her sleeping slave that she is watching, it is a valid Get. If he is awake, it is not a Get, as the slave is considered a courtyard that is watched, but not by her. The Gemara asks, why is the Get valid if he is sleeping? He is a walking courtyard! If you will say that if he is asleep the law is different, didn't Rava say that if something is walking and therefore would not effect a Kinyan, it also does not effect a Kinyan when it is standing in one place or sitting? The Gemara concludes that the case is when the slave is tied up.

Rashi explains that Rava meant that if the servant is tied up and awake the Get is invalid. This is also the ruling of the Bahag, that the slave must be both tied up and sleeping for the Get to be valid.

You cannot say that the Gemara there means that if the slave is tied up he is not considered a moving courtyard, as he is not like someone who can stand up or sit. Accordingly, once we say that when he is tied up he has this law, even if he is simply sleeping he has this law. This would mean that Rava (when he said the law quoted above) never meant that this applies (only) to a tied up person (servant).

If so, why did Rava say that if the servant is awake the Get is invalid because the courtyard is considered to be guarded without her knowledge? Even if it would be guarded because of her knowledge, as in a case where his hands are tied with a rope (and he cannot move) and she is holding it in her hand, it is not a valid Get. This is because he is a walking courtyard, and it is comparable to the case of (a Get being thrown into) a basket (that she wears on her head while walking) in Bava Metzia (9b). If the Gemara there would not say that the basket itself is stationary and she is merely moving underneath it, the Gemara implies that we would rule that a Get thrown into the basket would not be valid, even though it is guarded because of her knowledge. Rather, Rava clearly holds that the case is where the servant is tied up (and sleeping).

If the Gemara did not know that he was discussing a case where the servant was tied up, it could have asked why when the servant is awake the Get is invalid because the courtyard is guarded without her knowledge. Even if it would be guarded with her knowledge it should be invalid as it is a walking courtyard! Rather (we could say that the reason the Gemara would not have asked this question even if it did not know that Rava was referring to a tied up servant), it asked a better question.

Question: Wouldn't we derive from the law regarding a slave that we have no reason to decree the Get should be invalid because of a case where she only acquired the courtyard later? (Note: What is the difference between her acquisition of a slave or a courtyard?)

Answer: We certainly do not make such a decree regarding a slave, as we are discussing a tied up slave which is an uncommon case, and the Rabbanan do not make decrees in uncommon cases.

Question: In Bava Metzia (10b) we say that acquisition through a courtyard is included within the law of acquiring with one's hand, and it is not worse than acquiring through a messenger. This is why a person can acquire a lost object even if he is not standing on the side of his courtyard, though this is unlike the mechanics of a hand that cannot acquire in this fashion. He acquires as a messenger, as we say that a person can acquire things for someone else when the other person is not present, as long as it is meritorious for that person to acquire those things. (Note: This is why the courtyard can acquire the lost object for him even when he is not present.)

If so, in our case where he wrote a document that he is giving her the courtyard as a present, even though it is unlike the mechanics of aquiring with a hand because one cannot give a present against one's will, she should still be divorced because of the courtyard acting as a messenger!

Answer: We only say that the acquisition of a courtyard is not worse than acquiring through a messenger regarding acquiring something which it is meritorious for the owner to acquire when he is not present. However, in other situations we indeed say that the acquisition must follow the mechanics of acquiring through her hand. Otherwise, why wouldn't she be able to acquire through a walking courtyard, as the courtyard should not be worse than a walking messenger, even though the acquisition could not be done with the mechanics of acquiring through one's hand?

Question: What did Rav Simi find difficult? Did he not know that her acquisition using the mechanics of a messenger is included from the verse, "And he will send her away?" After all, it is a Beraisa in Kidushin (41a), and everyone agrees it is correct!

Answer: Rav Simi holds that being that we find that she is divorced using a messenger without having the Get actually reach her hand (using a Sheliach l'Kabalah), even though this cannot be done against her will, it makes sense that the acquisition of her Get through a courtyard which works like her hand should not have to be exactly like her hand (that only works if she wants it to work). Abaye's reply is that one cannot bring proof from the acquisition of a messenger to acquisition through a courtyard, as they are derived from two different sources. Acquiring through a messenger is derived from "and he will send," while acquiring through a courtyard is included based on the fact that it is like her hand.

Explanation: The Gemara seems to be saying that even if acquiring through a messenger is included from "her hand" there is no question. Being that we find the concept of acquiring a Get through a messenger against her will (if she is a minor), even though other such messengers can only be with her consent, it is considered to fulfill the criteria of "her hand."

Question: This is difficult. If a courtyard is a gift then our case should also be valid (using the same logic as stated above regarding a messenger). Even though acquiring through a courtyard generally cannot work against her will, it should be like her hand. This is because we find a case of her courtyard acquiring against her will, as in the case of a courtyard that she owned before the divorce. The Mishnah later (77a) explicitly states that (if he throws the Get into her courtyard against her will) she is divorced. (Note: Accordingly, if an exceptional case of a messenger acquiring against her will allows her to acquire when the messenger otherwise should require her will to be comparable to "her hand," certainly a standard case of her courtyard acquiring against her will should make all courtyard acquisitions fit "her hand," even if they are against her will.)

Answer: Rabeinu Yitzchak says that the acquisition of a courtyard that she owned before the divorce is not considered against her will as much as the acceptance of the father. This is because she had the ability to make her courtyard ownerless and thereby avoid being divorced through its acquisition of her Get. However, the fact that a father can make himself a messenger to receive his daughter's Get (who is a minor) against her will is something that his daughter has no way of stopping. However, this is only a way to push aside the question (not a great answer).

Explanation: Even against the will of her father she can be divorced when the husband gives the Get to her father against his will, as is apparent from the Gemara in Kidushin (44a). The Gemara there says that Kidushin which is done with consent, only her father can accept it, not her. Divorce can be done forcibly, and therefore both her and her father can accept the Get. This means that because she can be divorced against the will of her father, she can also accept a Get just like he can. This is indeed how Rashi explains the Gemara there.

We additionally ask in Kidushin (ibid.), can a Na'arah become a messenger to accept her Get from her husband? Is she like the hand of her father, or like her father's courtyard? This implies that she is divorced through her father's courtyard even without her father's consent, just as she can accept the Get against her father's will, even if she is like the courtyard of her father.

Explanation: This is specifically referring to an olive leaf and similar things that keep well. This as the Beraisa in the Tosefta states that it (a Get) can be written on the leaf of an olive, carob, gourd, or anything else that preserves well, and it is kosher. However, on the leaf of leeks, onions, rose petals, vegetable leaves, or anything else that does not last, the Get is invalid.

Explanation: Rabeinu Shmuel explains that only regarding animals or something connected to the ground, where the person has to uproot something from where it grew, do we say that something is lacking being cut.

This is indicated by the argument between Rava and Abaye regarding a Get that was written on the leaf of a potted plant that had a hole in it. Rava decreed the Get is invalid, as a person might come to cut off the leaf. However, when it does not have a hole, the implication is that even if a person would cut off the leaf the Get would be kosher. This is also how Rebbi Shmayah explained this in his commentary.

Observation: If a Get was written on a large piece of parchment and afterwards it was cut, according to the above logic it should remain kosher.

Opinion#1: There was an incident like this in the days of Rebbi Yitzchak b'Rebbi Menachem, and he ruled it was invalid.

Opinion#2: The greatest men of the generation argued on his conclusion.

However, the Bahag rules that it was invalid. Rabeinu Tam was also stringent. He deduced this from the Gemara later which states that if a Get was written on the earthenware of a potted plant it is valid, as he can take it and give it to her.

Rava does not argue on this because there is no reason to decree that it should be invalid lest the potted plant break, as it is not normal to break potted plants. This is similar to the fact that there is no decree that a Get should be invalid if it is written on the horn of a cow because it might be cut off, as it is abnormal for the horn to be cut off. We only make this type of decree, that it should be invalid before it is cut off as it might be cut off, regarding a leaf.

This decree is not specifically regarding the leaf of a potted plant with a hole. The decree is also if the potted plant did not have a hole. However, because of Abaye's position the Gemara stated that even when it has a hole it is kosher.

Opinion: Additionally, the Ri states, that it is understandable that a woman does not acquire a Get written on the leaf of a potted plant with a hole in it just because she pulls the potted plant or picks it up, as long as the leaf is still being nurtured from the plant. This is as we say later (22a), that if the owner of the seeds sold them to the owner of the potted plant, there is no acquisition until the owner of the plant holds the seeds. However, merely pulling the plant will not cause him to acquire it, as they are still considered connected to the ground when he is pulling the potted plant.

Abaye only says that such a Get is kosher because he can take the potted plant and give it to her, meaning that he can put it in a place where the plant will no longer be considered to be growing from the ground. This shows a more novel thought, that Abaye is saying that a Get in a potted plant is kosher, and we do not decree that it should be unkosher lest it be mixed up with a case where he gives her the plant with first disrupting its connection with the ground. He also teaches us that even though he must disrupt the connection, it is not deemed to lack cutting (which our Gemara states would make it invalid).

Proof: The Ri brings proof to Rabeinu Tam's position from the Gemara in Chulin (89a). The Gemara there says that the earth of an Ir ha'Nidachas lacks being uprooted, gathered, and burned. A Get that is part of a big parchment is more connected to the parchment than the dirt of an Ir ha'Nidachas is connected to the ground.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Sanhedrin (46b) does not consider a beam that is stuck into the ground as lacking uprooting. (Note: Why not?)

Answer: This is because it is not considered very connected to the ground.

Opinion: According to Rabeinu Tam, being cut from one big parchment is considered lacking having been cut. However, if someone cut a little piece off of the Get, as people do to beautify it, that is not considered lacking being cut. This is as the Gemara previously discussed a case where someone cut the date out of the Get and gave it to her etc., and what is the law if he did so (said certain parts of the Get are his, such as) between lines and words etc. All of these cases imply that a small cut would not deem the Get as lacking being cut.

Question: Why don't we say that "v'Kasav" -- "and he wrote" is a Klal (rule), "Sefer -- "scroll" is a Perat (exception), and the rule is guided by the exception?

Answer: The word "v'Nasan" -- "and he gave" afterwards goes back and makes this more inclusive. (Note: It makes it into a Klal u'Perat u'Klal, which is more inclusive than a Klal u'Perat.)

Implied Question: This is correct, despite the fact that the Gemara only quotes the first word "v'Kasav" -- "and he wrote."

Answer: We find a similar thing in Kidushin (21b). The Torah says "awl." The Gemara asks, we only know that an awl can be used (to make an Eved Ivri into a Nirtza). How do we know that a sharp piece of wood and other things are included? The Pasuk says, "And you will take," implying that anything that is taken in one's hand can be used.

We do not find the Beraisa quotes the second inclusive word in the Pasuk. Yet the Gemara there clearly implies that we derive this using a Klal u'Perat u'Klal, and that the second part of the Pasuk "And you will put in his ear" is the second Klal.

Implied Question: The Gemara does not want to say that just as a Sefer (parchment) comes from an animal etc., excluding a leaf, tablet, or notebook that does not come from a live animal. (Note: Why not?)

This is despite the fact that in Kidushin (17a), regarding the present given to a departing Eved Ivri, the Gemara indeed says that if the Torah only would have stated "sheep" we would think that only animals (are given), not things that grow from the ground.

Answer#1: Perhaps saying that something must come from an animal is not as generally important of a criteria as the fact that something must be an animal (like we find in Kidushin 17a).

Answer#2: Additionally, these types of teaching are according to the understanding of the Chachamim in each topic they deal with. (Note: Accordingly, they determine whether it is logical that something is a criteria in a certain law.)

For example, in Eiruvin (27b), Chazal determine that Ma'aser Sheini money must be spent on something that is a "fruit that comes from a fruit" (i.e. fruits and vegetables which come from their seeds and the like) and something which grows from the ground. In Sukah (11b), the Gemara states that Chazal determine that just as a Chagigah is something that does not accept impurity and grows from the ground etc. (Note: In each case, Chazal determine what are the important qualities that should be derived as criteria or a certain law, or from one law to another. Of course, their determination is based on the Pesukim and the sum total of the rest of their Torah knowledge.)

Explanation: There are two separate Pesukim of "v'Kasav Lah" -- "and he will write for her." One is used to teach that the Get has to be written with specific intent for the woman he is going to divorce. The other "v'Kasav" teaches that she is divorced with writing, and the "Lah" teaches that the divorce must only be written for her, not for her and her friend.

Explanation: This teaching is according to Rava (and is quoted in his name in Kidushin 5a). However, Abaye there derives that she is not divorced using money from sheer logic, as otherwise people will say that money enters her into a marriage etc. (and causes her exit from a marriage, does it make sense that a defending lawyer becomes a prosecutor?!).

Even so, Abaye also requires the Pasuk "v'Kasav" to exclude Chalitzah.

The Gemara there also excludes Chalitzah from the teaching "Sefer Korsah" -- "the scroll cuts her off," which is a teaching authored by Rebbi Yosi Ha'Glili. The reason the Gemara there stated this teaching is because it was the simplest derivation from the Pasuk. This is the Gemara's habit in many places (to quote the simplest teaching from a Pasuk, although there may be a more correct teaching which is not as directly related to the simple understanding of the Pasuk).

Question: If her father dies or if he sells his house, it is no longer considered her father's house. This is as the Mishnah states in Nedarim (46a) that if someone says "Konam to your house that I will not enter (it), or your house that I will not buy," if the owner dies or sells the house/field to someone else, it is now permitted for the person who made the vow to buy the house/field. (Note: This means that the condition is finite, and it therefore should be a valid condition just as if he said she shouldn't go for thirty days (the second case in the Beraisa).)

Answer: All of his descendants are called "his father's house," even if their father dies. This is as the Pasuk states "Sit as a widow in your father's house" (Bereishis 38:11) regarding Tamar, when her father (Shem, see Tosfos in Eiruvin 15b DH "Al Menas" who spells this out) had already died, as is clear from various Pesukim.

Question: Rabeinu Tam has difficulty with this, as later (83b) the Gemara states regarding the Rabbanan who argue on Rebbi Eliezer ben Azarah that they do not derive "Kares" separately from the word "Kerisus." Rebbi Yosi Ha'Glili is included in the opinion of the Rabbanan in that Gemara.

Answer: The Gemara there means that he does not derive "Kares" separately from "Kerisus" regarding the teaching there (83b), not that he does not derive "Kares" from the word "Kerisus" as a separate word for Derashah at all.