Explanation: Do not think that the reason for this law is that he would not sin by making the blessing on the Tefilin, which is a blessing in vain. We see that women make blessings on Sukah, Lulav, Shofar, and many other Mitzvos (that have a set time, even though they are exempt from them and do not have to perform them). (Note: Similarly, a slave who has the same laws as a woman would be allowed to make the blessing.)

Rather, this is because slaves do not usually wear Tefilin. If he would not have freed him, he would not have put Tefilin on him.

Opinion#1: He cannot marry a regular Jewess nor a Kenani maidservant, as Rashi explained earlier.

Implied Question: This does not seem correct. The Gemara earlier (38a) says that if a slave runs away from prison etc...moreover, we force his master to free him. Why does the Gemara have to say this? It is obvious that we force him to free him, as he is forbidden to marry a Kenani maidservant and a free woman, just like a half servant and half-free man (is forbidden to marry either).

The Yerushalmi states that where he commanded (before he died) that his slave should be freed, we force the inheritors to free him because it is a Mitzvah to uphold the word of the dying. Why don't we simply derive that this is because he is now forbidden to a Kenani maidservant and a regular Jewess?

In Kerisus (24b), we say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that if someone makes his slave ownerless, he goes free and he requires a Get Shichrur. Someone who does not yet have a Get Shichrur can eat Terumah. It is logical to say that if he can eat Terumah (as he is still considered in the possession of his master who is a Kohen), he is also permitted to marry a Kenani maidservant.

Opinion#2: It therefore seems that the Gemara means he cannot marry a regular Jewess, but he is allowed to marry a Kenani maidservant.

Question: This is difficult. Rav Ashi should have asked a question from a different statement of Rebbi Yochanan (38a) that "if a slave runs away from a prison etc...moreover, we force his master to free him." This implies that his situation can be helped.

Question: This is difficult. Earlier, the Gemara asked on Rebbi Yochanan, "If so, someone who declares his slave to be ownerless and then he dies should also be considered to be freed with requiring a document, as his slave is like his wife?" Our Gemara implies that Rebbi Yochanan would require a Get in this case (as it is clearly implying that death alone is not enough).

Answer#1: Perhaps the Gemara earlier was according to Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yehudah here (who argues on Rav Dimi's understanding of Rebbi Yochanan).

Answer#2: Alternatively, here a Get is required according to Rabbinic law, in order that nobody should tell him "You are my servant," as stated later according to one Tana who says that he goes free when his limbs are cut off by the master (but still requires a Get according to Rabbinic law for this reason).

Opinion#1: Rabeinu Shmuel does not think that Rashi's explanation, that we write a Get Shichrur in the name of the minor, is correct.

Implied Question: The action of a minor is not significant enough to permit this slave to marry a regular Jewess. This is similar to the law that while a minor can acquire a Yevamah according to Torah law, he cannot give her a Get until he gets older (becomes an adult).

Even though young children who are six or seven can effect a valid sale of movable objects (see 59a), this is only regarding money as whatever Beis Din declares ownerless is indeed ownerless.

Opinion#2: Rather, Rabeinu Shmuel understands that he writes a Get in the name of the guardian.

Even though we generally say that a guardian cannot set a slave free, being that the partner in the slave did an incorrect thing by giving his half of the slave to his son who is a minor, Beis Din declares the slave ownerless and gives him to the caretaker in order to set him free.

This is similar to the law that a guardian can take off Terumos and Ma'aseros in order to eat, even though we derive from the Pasuk regarding Terumah, "You," and not caretakers. Beis Din declare the grain to be ownerless using the principle that whatever they declare to be ownerless is indeed ownerless. They make the child's grain ownerless and give it to the caretaker in order that he can take off Terumah, and he will not eat untithed grain.

Without giving the child some money, Beis Din did not want to declare the slave ownerless in order that the caretaker should free him. This is because it is not appropriate to go against the mindset of the child (without doing so).

Explanation: Rabeinu Tam explains that here it is not a fine, as it does not say the phrase, "He did something improper, therefore we will do something improper to him," as stated in Yevamos (110a). However, "As he did so will be done with him" is a law, as stated in Bava Metzia (101b).

Implied Question: The caretaker could technically (within normal law) free the slave through a sale, as we say that caretakers are allowed to sell the slaves of the minors to others. According to Rebbi, the slave could simply give the caretaker the money and he can go free without even having the child see any offer of money. (Note: Why isn't this done, instead of having the caretaker free the slave which is not normally permitted?)

Answer: This is because it looks like a farce, as the child is standing and screaming that he is against this sale, as his father probably taught him to do. People will say that what was done was wrong. However, when we offer him money he will not worry about what his father said. The slave also does not need a Get Shichrur, as money works without needing a Get Shichrur.

Only when a slave is freed because a limb of his was cut off do we say that a Get Shichrur is needed because the Pasuk says, "He should be sent" as is stated in Kidushin (24b). However, because this is done against the will of the father, the Rabbanan mandated a Get Shichrur, in order that he shouldn't later say, "You are my slave."

Explanation: The word "Chayshinan" here means that we are certain in our suspicion. "Chayshinan" is used earlier (19a) in this context as well, when the Gemara said, "We suspect it was written with water in which were soaked crushed gall-nuts."

Implied Question: The Gemara does not say that the person giving should be believed (like one hundred witnesses). (Note: Why not?)

Answer: Sometimes the giver thinks that the person receiving the present has taken it, and he did not really accept the present.

Implied Question: The Gemara asks, "Who eats the fruit?" (Note: Why ask the question? Isn't this obvious?)

Answer: This is just a way to explain, as we conclude that indeed there is no argument.

Explanation: Rashi explains that specifically Kedushas ha'Guf (physical holiness) takes away from a lien, not Kedushas Damim (monetary holiness), as implied in Erchin (23b).

In Kesuvos (59b) we also say that Konamos are different, as they are Kedushas ha'Guf, as per the statement of Rava etc. This implies that only Kedushas ha'Guf takes away from a lien.

Question: Rabeinu Tam has a difficulty with this. If something (an Apotiki, see the Mishnah) is considered in the possession of the borrower as long as the loan is not due, even Kedushas Damim should be able to take away the lien. If it is not in the possession of the borrower, even Kedushas ha'Guf should not be able to take the lien away. This is as the Pasuk states, "When he will dedicate his house." We derive from there that just as one's house is in his possession, so too anything that is in his possession he may dedicate (as opposed to things that are not deemed to be in his possession).

Answer: Rava is basing himself on his opinion in Pesachim (31a) that when a creditor collects on an Apotiki for his loan, it is only considered his from now on, not from the original inception of the loan (when the collateral was marked as payment in lieu of cash). This means that the item is considered in the possession of the borrower the entire time.

Only Kedushas ha'Guf, which cannot be redeemed, is something which takes away a lien. For example, this would occur if a Shor Tam (who damaged) was dedicated as a Korban or Konamos mentioned in Kesuvos (59b). The same law is relevant to a cloak spread over a dead person, as discussed in Yevamos (66b). Once it has taken effect as the clothing of a dead person for a short time, it no longer is taken off, as a lien is not better than giving money. The same is true for Chametz and freeing slaves.

The Yerushalmi explains that we do not find that a slave can ever be freed and then be enslaved. This is as we have explained, that once Kedushas ha'Guf has taken effect, it cannot be taken away. However, Kedushas Damim is not stronger than the power of the one making the dedication, being that it can always be redeemed and is therefore ready to have the Kedushah taken off. This is as we find regarding a Sdeh Mikneh. When the buyer is Makdish the field, it goes back to the original owner during Yovel. (Note: This is because the power of Hekdesh is not more than the ownership of the person who was Makdish. Just as it would have to go back to the original owner during Yovel before the buyer was Makdish it, it also must go back even if he was Makdish it.)

Implied Question: Rava does not include in his list a dead person, as discussed in Yevamos (ibid.) regarding the cloak. He also does not discuss Avodah Zarah. For example, if a person made his house an Apotiki and he then bowed down to it, it would take away the lien to the house (and make the house forbidden from benefit).

Answer: This is because these things are included in his listing of Hekdesh (which he does list).

Implied Question: Rava does not include a sale, for example when he made his ox an Apotiki and then sold it. The Gemara in Bava Kama (11b) indeed states that in such a case the creditor cannot collect from the ox.

Answer#1: The reason for that case is a Rabbinic decree, as the buyers will lose out because it does not become known (that the ox became the subject of an Apotiki, and therefore buyers would have no idea to be wary from such oxen). When a person makes his slave an Apotiki and then sells him, the creditor can collect the slave because people find out about the slave being the subject of an Apotiki, and are therefore careful (not to buy him).

Answer#2: Additionally, it is possible that Rava only included in his rule cases that were based on Mishnayos or Beraisos. Shichrur we know from our Mishnah. Chametz we know from a Mishnah in Pesachim (31a). Konamos (Hekdesh) we know from Kesuvos (59b). However, he did not include the case of a dead person, Avodah Zarah, and a sale that we do not know from a Mishnah or Beraisa.

Implied Question: In Bava Kama (33b), the Gemara says that if someone was Makdish a Shor Tam (that damaged) it is indeed considered Hekdesh because of Rebbi Avahu's law. (Note: His law is that we decree it should be Hekdesh, lest someone think that one can take back something from Hekdesh without paying any money for redemption.) However, this clearly implies that it is not considered to be Hekdesh according to the letter of the law.

Answer: We can explain that the case is even if the animal could indeed be a Korban (it has no blemishes). Even so, Hekdesh does not take away the lien of the one who was damaged. Being that the one who damaged cannot force the one who was damaged to accept money even according to Rebbi Yishmael, as explained there (ibid.), Rava admits that in such a case it is considered as if the collection of the damages was done retroactively (at the time of the damage).

Question: If Konamos take away a lien just like Hekdesh, every borrower will take away his possessions from the lender, as he will forbid his possessions to the lender through Konamos (which can be used to forbidden someone to benefit from one's possessions)!

Answer: The Rabbanan made the lien of a creditor strong enough, similar to the statement in Kesuvos (59b) that the Rabbanan made the lien of the husband strong.

It clearly does not specifically mean the husband. Later in Kesuvos (70a), the Gemara asks that if he is already obligated to her, certainly he cannot take away her lien on him! This implies that they also made the lien of the wife very strong (that even Konamos cannot take away his obligation).

Implied Question: The Gemara says in Yevamos (66b) that the dead person already "acquired" the cloak, and takes it away from the lien of the woman. (Note: Why isn't her lien strong enough to defend from the dead person making it forbidden from benefit?)

Answer: It is possible to differentiate that we only say that Chazal made the ownership strong by Konamos that only forbid the creditor from having benefit. It is permitted to the creditor to benefit from these possessions, because the whole reason that he was forbidden from benefiting from them was so that the borrower could avoid paying back the loan. However, if the borrower would indeed forbid everyone from benefiting from his possessions, similar to the case of the dead person and Hekdesh of Kedushas ha'Guf, the lender's lien would not be strong enough to overcome such a Konam.

Question: According to Abaye who says in Pesachim (31a) that the Apotiki is deemed collected retroactively, how can we explain our Mishnah? We cannot say that the Mishnah is according to Rava, as Abaye argues on Rava's law that these things take away a lien, being that Abaye holds that the collection is retroactive.

He also cannot say the Mishnah is according to Ula who says that this slave is not actually commanded in Mitzvos (like a regular Jewish male, but only those of an Eved Kenani, which is like the obligations of a Jewish woman). According to Abaye who says that he collects the Apotiki retroactively, we indeed say that his Hekdesh and sale were effective. Even if the slave was worth more than the debt, at least his portion was freed.

Answer: Abaye explains the Mishnah like Ula. The case is where the borrower wants to pay off the creditor with money.

Question: Why does the dead person "acquire" the cloak spread over him? The inheritors cannot remove the woman with money, as she is correct (she had a lien on the cloak because of her unpaid Kesuvah). If so, Rava admits that in this case she should collect retroactively, as in Pesachim (31a) the Gemara explains that Rava's reason is that if he had money he would take the creditor away with money. This is why the lender is only deemed by Rava to acquire the item (the Apotiki) now.

Answer: Even so, being that they use the cloak for whatever they need, and if they had sold it she would not be able to take it away from the buyer, and there is the additional possibility that they can remove her claim by paying her money, we say that she only collects the cloak from the time of collection. (Note: This is why it can become forbidden to her beforehand.)