Question: Even if the Gemara would have said that he is not sold, the Gemara could ask, "Is there such a thing as a servant who is not sold for his fine, but he can be completely sold?" (Note: Why can't he be sold for his fine and completely sold?)

Answer#1: The case is where nobody would buy him totally, even if they would not have to support him using the claim, "Work for me but I will not support you." Even so, people would refrain from buying him in order that he should not be accustomed to be with them. However, if he could be sold solely for his fine, people would possibly buy him.

Answer#2: Alternatively, the case is that even if he would be totally sold he is not actually sold, as he is not worth anything. It is clear the sale is only for his fine, and the sale is not valid when it is only for the fine.

Implied Question: Regarding the Kidushin of a woman, the Gemara could have asked, "If you will say that if someone says to a woman that half of her should be Mekudeshes to him it is not a valid Kidushin." It also could have asked the other question the opposite way (that if you will say that if someone is Mekadesh half of a woman it is not a valid Kidushin). (Note: Why didn't it ask the question in the opposite manner?)

Answer: It asked the question according to the true law, as this is how we conclude in Kidushin (7a). (Note: The Gemara concludes there that if he says, "be Mekudeshes to half of me," the Kidushin is valid. We also conclude that if he is Mekadesh half of a woman the Kidushin is invalid. This is the explanation of Tosfos according to the Tosfos Ha'Rosh and many Acharonim (unlike the Maharsha).)

Question: This is difficult. Why does the Gemara make inheritance dependent on Kidushin? A person's son that he has from an unmarried girl inherits him if he dies. This is evident from the Gemara in Yevamos (100b) that discusses a case where one out of a group of ten Kohanim went and had relations with a woman. This child is a Shetuki, meaning (in this context) that we quiet his claim from his father's estate, as he really does not know the identity of his father.

Even if his son is a Mamzer from one of the Arayos with whom he cannot have Kidushin, the Mishnah states in Yevamos (22a) that he is his son for everything, meaning even to inherit from him. In our Gemara, if the Kidushin is effective it is worse, as the half of him that is a slave is having relations with a married woman, as stated in Yevamos (45a).

Answer: The Gemara understands that if he would not be able to effect Kidushin, his son is not halachically considered his son. This is unlike Arayos, as those are people who normally could have Kidushin (just not with this specific relative). However, being that this person does not have the ability to do Kidushin with anyone at all, his son is not halachically considered his son.

Question: Why does it make a difference if she is considered the wife of two dead men? We say in Yevamos (31b) that Zikah (connection mandating Yibum or Chalitzah) from two men is a Rabbinic prohibition, lest people will say that two Yevamos who were married to one man can both have Yibum. Here, that decree does not apply (as she was only Mekudeshes to one of them, and Shimon only had one wife)!

Answer: There, regarding Ma'amar (Kidushin to a Yevamah) which is only Rabbinic in nature, the Zikah from two Yevamos is a Rabbinic prohibition. Usually, it is a Torah prohibition. (Note: The Maharam explains that Tosfos means that it is otherwise possible that both of their Kidushin's were valid in a certain sense, and therefore there is Zikah from two dead men according to Torah law (see Maharam at length).)

Explanation#1: Rashi explains that because of the earlier argument among the Amoraim (43a) we are uncertain whose Kidushin (Reuven or Shimon) was valid.

Question: This is difficult, as Rav Chisda himself obviously holds that the Kidushin of Reuven was valid! Rabah bar Rav Huna retracted his opinion based on Rav Chisda's statement.

Explanation#2: It appears that the Gemara's doubt is whether the first person's Kidushin was finished, or it went away automatically after she was freed (as now he has not been Mekadesh all of her, see 43a).

Implied Question: The Gemara in Kidushin (7a) discusses a case regarding an animal belonging to two partners. One was Makdish his half, and he then bought the other half from his partner and was Makdish that half. In that case, if he would not have been Makdish the second half, the Gemara implies that it would not have been Hekdesh. (Note: Why doesn't the Gemara present this as an option regarding her Kidushin? Why isn't it possible that she is simply half Mekudeshes?)

Answer: The case there is different, as it is possible that the animal will graze and simply have half of its value be Hekdesh and half Chulin. However, here it is impossible for her to be half Mekudeshes, as the Pasuk says, "When a man will take a woman," implying that he cannot take half a woman. It therefore is logical to say that the Kidushin is either automatically finished or it goes away totally.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Kidushin (7a) compares the case of being Makdish an animal to being Mekadesh half a woman. (Note: How can it make this comparison if this basic difference applies?)

Answer#1: This is not difficult, as the Gemara there compares the case of the animal to Kidushin in order to show that when there is another person who is allowing the acquisition (as there is by Kidushin), it does not spread throughout the entire entity.

Answer#2: Alternatively, it is possible to answer that regarding the animal belonging to partners, the buyer leftover part of what he could acquire, as half of the animal he bought belonged to Hekdesh. This is why his acquisition of his half did not automatically finish the Hekdesh. However, here the half maidservant wasn't someone who was deemed fit for Kidushin until she was freed.

Question: Ameimar said earlier (40a) that someone who declares his slave ownerless cannot fix the slave's situation. He cannot give the slave the portion of "prohibition" (meaning his halachic status of being a slave) which he owns. Our Gemara implies that he does have the ability to fix this by giving him a freedom document!

It must be that he does not free him until he flees. If he effectively frees him immediately, how can he sell him and give him to a Nochri to use as a slave?

Answer: This is unlike a case of someone declaring his slave ownerless. The Nochri is only acquiring him for the benefit of his work. The Jew still owns him regarding any resulting fines (one would pay for killing him) and any children he would have. The Chachamim did not take these rights away from him until he writes a Get Shichrur.

Explanation#1: Rashi explains regarding a slave, the owner set a time where if he will not be redeemed he will be totally given to the Nochri, who is now starting to enslave him. Being that the owner is denigrating a Rabbinic decree, they fined him that even if the time has not yet come, he is set free.

Regarding a field, the case is where the (Nochri) borrower set a time with the lender that if he does not pay the loan by a certain time, the lender can eat the fruit from the field until he pays him back. Therefore, even when the deadline is reached, he can only take the fruit from the field.

Question#1: Being that until the deadline he does not receive any fruit, why would the Beraisa bother to say that the field is exempt from Ma'aser during this time? (Note: The fruit and field belong to a Nochri!)

Question#2: Additionally, the Gemara should have answered that both cases are whether or not the deadline was reached. The fact that the Gemara established the case as when the deadline was not reached implies that the case of (being exempt from) Ma'aser is indeed when the deadline has not yet been reached.

Explanation#2: It seems that the explanation of "one is for the body and one for the fruit" is as if it says "here is the body and here is the fruit."

Regarding a slave, even though the time has not been reached, the slave's body is in the house of the Nochri and this makes it difficult for him to keep the Mitzvos. This is why he (the Rabbanan instituted) goes free. However, regarding a field the Jewish lender only receives the fruit. The field belongs to the Nochri, which is why it is exempt from Ma'aser.