Observation: Reish Lakish clearly did this before he repented, as he probably would not have denigrated himself to such an extent (after he had repented).

Observation: They would normally lie on their stomachs, as is stated in Zevachim (5a) that Reish Lakish was lying on his stomach and asked a question. (Note: See the Keren Orah in Zevachim (ibid.) who gives a deeper explanation to this Gemara.)

Explanation: This is Rashi's text. We give him a fine that he has to go and buy fruits. However, we do not fine him to the extent that he has to buy from him in order to separate Terumos and Ma'aseros.

Question: Rabeinu Tam has difficulty with this. In our Gemara we bring proof from this law that a Nochri can acquire part of Eretz Yisrael. The Mishnah implies that this was only instituted because of "Tikun ha'Olam," not because he has an actual Torah obligation.

How does he know this? Perhaps "Tikun ha'Olam" is referring to the fact that they obligated him to buy it (not the level of obligation the fruit of the field actually have regarding Bikurim)?

Opinion: Rabeinu Tam says that in most Sefarim the text is not "And he brings" with a Vav ("And"). The Mishnah means that whoever buys from him must bring Bikurim, whether it is the person who sold him the land or someone else.

Rabeinu Chananel has the text, "The buyer brings." This is also the text of the Yerushalmi.

Implied Question: The Beraisa earlier (43b) states that even though a Jew can take the field as collateral when the Nochri has not paid back by a certain date, it is exempt from Ma'aser. This clearly implies that a Nochri does have a Kinyan in Eretz Yisrael to make the part he owns exempt from Terumos u'Ma'aseros. (Note: How can Rabah say otherwise?)

Answer: It is possible to establish that this field mentioned earlier (43b) was in Surya, not Eretz Yisrael. The Gemara gives a similar answer (to a similar question) later (47a)

Implied Question: The Gemara in Bava Metzia (101a) states that if someone accepts to work a field that use to belong to his father, and now belongs to a Nochri, he takes off Ma'aser from all of the produce in the field, and gives the Nochri his portion. (Note: This means that even though the Nochri wants a full half of the produce from the field, and he only receives half, he must take off Ma'aser according to all of the produce, and absorb the "loss" of the Terumos and Ma'aseros from his half.) The Gemara there pushes this aside, and says that really a Nochri does have a Kinyan in Eretz Yisrael (ibid. at length). (Note:

Answer: Even though the Gemara's answer when it pushes this aside is in fact correct, as the Gemara there later deduces from a separate case where the Nochri takes the land by force, it is not a clear proof that this is the case of the Beraisa. Rabah can certainly say that the Beraisa holds that there is no Kinyan for a Nochri in Eretz Yisrael (which is my Terumos and Ma'aseros must be taken).

Observation: However, we find that Rebbi Meir in Avodah Zarah (21a) holds that a Nochri does have a Kinyan in Eretz Yisrael. He says there that we do not rent fields to them because this causes them to be exempt from Ma'aseros. As long as it belongs to a Yisrael, anyone who plants the field is obligated to give Ma'aser. When he sells it to a Nochri, one who plants it is exempt from Terumos u'Ma'aseros, as a Nochri has a Kinyan etc. If he would not have a Kinyan, it would not be considered exempting the field from Terumos and Ma'aseros just because the Nochri himself does not take Terumos and Ma'aseros.

(Note: This is apparent from the following question and answer in the Gemara (ibid.).) The Gemara there asks that selling a house to a Nochri (anywhere) takes it away from having the Mitzvah of Mezuzah on that house. The Gemara answers that a Mezuzah is an obligation of the one living in the house, and therefore this is not considered taking the house away from the Mitzvah of Mezuzah.

Implied Question: Rebbi Meir says in Menachos (66b) that one can take Terumah from a Nochri's produce to exempt the produce of a Yisrael. (Note: This implies that he holds that a Nochri does not have a Kinyan!)

Answer: The case there is when the produce grew in the possession of a Jew. They therefore established their argument in a case where the Nochri gathered the produce together (a final step in making it obligated in Ma'aser) but not regarding whether or not a Nochri has a Kinyan in Eretz Yisrael.

Implied Question: When the Gemara here asks a question on Rebbi Elazar's opinion, he could have answered that he holds like Rebbi Meir. (Note: Why didn't the Gemara give this answer?)

Answer: The Gemara gave a better answer.

Opinion: Rashi implies that one is dependent on the other. According to Rabah who says there is no Kinyan (for a Nochri) in Eretz Yisrael, and he derives "your gathering of grain - and not the gathering of Nochrim," the gathering of the produce by a Nochri exempts the produce from Ma'aser. Rebbi Elazar who holds there is a Kinyan (for a Nochri) in Eretz Yisrael, and he derives "your grain - and not the grain of Nochrim," the gathering of the produce by a Nochri does not exempt the produce from Ma'aser.

Question#1: This is difficult. Many Tanaim argue regarding the gathering done by a Nochri. If so, all of those Tanaim also argue regarding whether or not there is a Kinyan for a Nochri in Eretz Yisrael. It is difficult to suggest that Rabah and Rebbi Elazar argue regarding an argument that is essentially a widespread argument among the Tanaim.

Question#2: Additionally, the Gemara in Menachos (67a) implies that all of the Tanaim derive "your grain - and not the gathering of grain of Nochrim." Even one who obligates the gathering of Nochrim in Ma'aseros does so because he derives a Miut after another Miut of the word "Diganecha" -- "your grain" (read "Diguncha" in the Derasha, as explained above).

Answer: It therefore seems that Rabah and Rebbi Elazar can each hold like everyone. Rebbi Elazar also derives "Digunecha," and not the gathering of Nochrim. This is because the Torah states the word "Diguncha" instead of the normal word for produce, which is Tevuah. If it would say, "Tevuasecha," we would clearly derive that this is only applies to a Yisrael's produce, and not that of Nochrim. Even so, he still derives "Diguncha," and not the grain of Nochrim, as the Pasuk does not clearly state the word as "Digunecha."

Question: Just as we derive "Digunecha" according to the opinion that the gathering of a Nochri makes the produce liable for the taking of Ma'aser, as (it says this twice and) an exclusive word after another exclusive word implies that we should include, why doesn't Rebbi Elazar similar derive this regarding grain of Nochrim? (Note: He should learn that while "Diguncha" would teach me that the grain of Nochrim is exempt, the fact that it says it twice indicates that we should include, and should teach that grain of Nochrim requires the taking of Ma'aseros.)

Answer: It is not rational to say that this rule of two exclusions should apply to everything.

Implied Question: Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue in the Yerushalmi in Pei'ah (ch. 6) regarding someone who declared something ownerless for Jews and not for Nochrim. Rebbi Yochanan said that it is indeed ownerless. (Note: Our Gemara implies that it is not really ownerless. How can we reconcile our Gemara with the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan?)

Answer: This (Rebbi Yochanan's statement) is only when a Jew takes it. However, (our Gemara which discusses) when a Nochri takes it, it is considered as having been made ownerless based on a mistaken assumption, and is not considered ownerless.

Opinion#1: Rashi says that there is no kernel of wheat that is not half Tevel and half Chulin. Ma'aser has to be taken from this produce alone on the rest of this produce, and cannot be taken to exempt regular Tevel. Similarly, Ma'aser cannot be taken from regular Tevel to exempt this produce. This is because he is separating from obligated grain on exempt grain, and from exempt grain on obligated grain.

However, when he separates Ma'aser from the produce itself, he is separating from the obligated half on the obligated half, and from the exempt half on the exempt half. Even if they divided the grains, they are still in a doubtful situation (after the division and the Jew also owns grains that are half Tevel and half exempt), as we do not hold of Breirah.

Question#1: The Gemara says later that if acquiring the fruit is not considered acquiring the body (i.e. a tree or land), and brothers who divide an estate are considered like buyers, we would not find a case where one must bring Bikurim unless there is an only son who inherited the land from his father who was also an only son.

Even according to the opinion that holds one cannot retroactively determine a status, he definitely has a portion in the land and is obligated to bring Bikurim. The rest that is Chulin he can be Makdish, as stated in Bava Basra (81b). (Note: How can the Gemara ask that he would not bring Bikurim according to Rashi's explanation here that the grain remains half Tevel and half exempt?)

It is difficult to say that the Gemara means that we will not find anyone who can bring Bikurim without having to be Makdish fruit. The Gemara's question implies that nobody would be able to bring (besides the only son of an only son etc.) at all!

Question#2: Additionally, in Bechoros (48b) the Gemara says that one pays five Selaim and not five halves. (Note: The case is where the Kohen wants to collect money from a Pidyon ha'Ben when the father died after his firstborn sons (one was the firstborn, it is not clear who) became thirty days old. The father only left a total of five Sela'im.Rebbi Meir holds that the Kohen would collect all five Sela'im, while Rebbi Yehuda holds he would collect five halves, as the half that is considered purchased cannot be collected from (see Gemara there at length).)

The Gemara there says that everyone agrees to the opinion of Rav Asi that brothers who split the estate of their father are considered to be half inheritors and half purchasers. This implies that if they were purchasers, they would even be exempt according to the opinion that in this case he can collect all of the five Sela'im. He would not even collect half of five Sela'im in such a case! (Note: According to Rashi that even after the grain is divided it has a status of half Tevel and half exempt, the case in Bechoros should remain as an argument even if they are like buyers. However, the Gemara implies otherwise.)

Opinion#2: It therefore seems that there is no rectifying the status of Tevel of this grain. Being that there is no establishing of a status retroactively, perhaps the Jew received the entire portion of the Nochri's grain, or half of it. We really don't know how much he received. If he took off Ma'aser from these grains themselves on the rest of this grain, perhaps he is taking off grain from his portion, and the rest belongs to a Nochri (and is exempt). Or perhaps he is doing the opposite, or he is redeeming partial amounts. (Note: Being that it is impossible to know, it does not work.)

However, he can rectify the grain by separating Ma'aser on it from somewhere else, and he will separate Ma'aser on the Ma'aser from a third place. The last grain that he takes the Ma'aseros from have a forbidden status, and this continues until he only has a small amount. All of these Ma'aseros and Terumos should be given to the Kohen and Levi. (Note: See Maharam Shif who asks that the first Ma'aseros taken off should not have to go to the Kohen or Levi, as he can claim that they were not necessarily needed, as they might have been separated for a field that did not require the taking of Terumos and Ma'aseros.)

Question: According to Torah law, a husband does not have any fruit from the possessions of his wife. It is merely a Rabbinical decree (that he may benefit from the fruit). If so, this must be a special Torah derivation regarding Bikurim (and not a general law)!

Answer: It is normal for women to give fruit to their husbands. The Pasuk is talking about such a scenario (not when the husband seizes his wife's fruit).

We say a similar thing in Kidushin (4a). The Gemara (ibid.) says that if the Torah had written that the benefit of her work (i.e. wages) goes to her father, we would have though that this is because he pays for her food. Even though according to Torah law one is not obligated to feed his daughter, it is normal that he feeds her. (Note: This is why the Torah will factor it into the law, even though it is not obligated by Torah law.)

Question: What is the question? Rebbi Yochanan can say that he holds like the opinion of the Tana who derived that a person brings the Bikurim of his wife from the Pasuk of "u'li'Veisecha," as this Tana clearly argues on this Beraisa.

Answer: It is possible to say that the Beraisa of "u'li'Veisecha" also is talking about a wife who died, just as this Beraisa is talking about such a case. (Note: Rebbi Yochanan would therefore not have a Tana who clearly agrees with him.)

Question: Why don't we answer that the case of the Beraisa is when the woman died and did not previously give the fruit to the husband?

Answer#1: The Beraisa was stated even after the Rabbanan instituted that the husband could eat the fruit (of his wife's possessions).

Answer#2: Additionally, he is like someone who buys fruit in the marketplace and afterwards buys a field (when his wife died he acquired the field). He does not read the reading for when one brings Bikurim, as stated in Bikurim (the Maharav Mei'Ranshburg says this is referring to the Yerushalmi in the first chapter of Bikurim). However, according to Reish Lakish that he had the fruit originally, it is understandable that when she dies he can bring Bikurim and read the reading of Bikurim, since he was originally tied to the fruit of the land.

Explanation: Rabeinu Shmuel explains in Bava Basra (81b) that the case is where the husband harvested them and sent them with a messenger. If the messenger harvested them and brought them to Yerushalayim, the messenger certainly cannot read the reading of Bikurim, as stated in Bikurim (1:5). However, the owners can read, as they can say, "Behold I have brought etc." as a person's messenger is like himself.

Question: Rabeinu Tam has difficulty with this explanation. If harvesting is equivalent to taking, why should the case be that the messenger died? It should have said either that he harvested and sent it with a messenger, or that his messenger harvested and he brought the Bikurim! (Note: The Maharam explains that Rabeinu Tam's question is in fact based on Rabeinu Shmuel's text in the Gemara in Bava Basra (81b) of "the husband harvested them and sent them with a messenger, or the messenger died." Rabeinu Shmuel seems to be saying that harvesting is deemed "taking" and sending them is called "bringing." The other case is that the messenger died on the road after harvesting them himself. If the main point is the "bringing," why involve a case where the messenger died?)

Answer: The Gemara is telling us an additional fact that even though the messenger died and the owners finished the bringing, meaning that there was a "taking" and partial "bringing" done by the owner, even so he cannot read the reading of Bikurim. This is because the entire taking and bringing must be done with one person. (Note: This is not an answer for the Rashbam, but rather saying that one could say a similar explanation to that of the Rashbam (see Maharam).)

Answer#2: If the text is "or he died" this is also understandable, as it would be saying, "not only in this case, but also in this case (he cannot read)."

Opinion: Rabeinu Tam explains that harvesting is not "taking." Harvesting is only mentioned because it is normal for owners to harvest Bikurim in order to give a generous amount of Bikurim to the Beis Hamikdash, as there is no limit to how much Bikurim one can give. "Taking" means taking from the house. The Gemara in Bava Basra (81b) is actually saying one case. The case is that if the owner harvested (not called "taking") and sent them with a messenger and the messenger died on the road. It is normal that someone else will bring them the rest of the way, meaning that the taking and bringing will end up being done by two different people.

Question: Why don't we say they should rot? This would be similar to what we say in Makos (18b) that if someone separated Bikurim before Sukos and Sukos passed, they should be left to rot. This is because they were able to be brought and have the reading of Bikurim read, and now they cannot (as one does not read after Sukos). The rule is "Kol she'Aino Ra'uy l'Bilah, Bilah Me'akeves Bo." (Note: Loosely translated, this means that a Mitzvah that is not currently fit to have one of the steps of a Mitzvah done to it, even if that step is normally not required to fulfil the Mitzvah, it renders the performance of that Mitzvah invalid.) Applying this to our case, we should similarly say that being that when he harvested them they were able to have the reading of Bikurim said on them, and when he sent them they were pushed aside, he should no longer fulfil his Mitzvah with them at all, and he should leave them to rot!

Answer: The Yerushalmi in Bikurim says that Rebbi Asi says in the name of Reish Lakish in the name of Rebbi Oshiya that the case is where he harvested the Bikurim with intent that he was going to send them with a messenger. However, if he harvested them in order to bring them himself, he indeed should not send them with a messenger. This is because any Bikurim that are supposed to have the reading of Bikurim read when they are brought are only permitted when the reading of Bikurim are read.

The Yerushalmi says there that our Mishnah in Bikurim (1:7) seems to argue on Rebbi Asi's principle. In a case where he separated Bikurim and then sold his field he brings the Bikurim, but does not read the reading of Bikurim. We can establish that the case (in the Mishna ibid.) is when he had in mind to sell the field originally.

Accordingly, if he separated Bikurim before Sukos in order to bring them after Sukos, they should not rot. After Sukos, he brings them but does not read the reading of Bikurim.