Question: Now that the Gemara is not differentiating between whether the payment is in front of him or not, and is saying that in any event giving him money against his will should not work, if so, why did he (the one who bought the house) used to originally hide? (Note: He should merely say he doesn't accept the money!)

Answer#1: In front of the redeemer, the lender (i.e. buyer) could not be so brazen as to not accept the money in order that he should be able to keep the house.

Answer#2: Additionally, if he was present, Beis Din would force him to accept the money.

Question: Regarding Batei Arei Chomah (houses in a walled city from the time Bnei Yisrael inherited Eretz Yisrael), where it is like the payment of a debt which the purchaser must take back, it is obvious that this is a valid payment (even against his will)! This is as we state that if he lent money to someone in a city, the borrower cannot return the money in a desert. This implies that in the city he can return the money to him against his will.

Similarly, the Gemara in Bava Metzia (49a) states that when he says, "Take your money," he is no longer even a Shomer Chinam. What, then, did Hillel have to institute? (Note: This was already the law!)

Answer: Only in a regular case of payment from a borrower is it obvious that he can validly give the money against the lender's will. This is because the lender is not losing by having to take the money. However, here that the lender (i.e. buyer) has to return this house due to this payment, or (in the second case) that the Get will become valid if he takes it, it is understandable that giving against his will should not be valid (without Hillel instituting that it is).

Question: Regarding Get, it is obvious that giving the money to him against his will should not be valid. Why do we have to derive this from Hillel's decree? Do we think that if a person gives his friend a present he should be forced to accept it?

Answer: The Ri answers that being that he said to her, "This is your Get on condition that you will give me two hundred Zuz," he made it (the validity of the Get) up to her. We therefore might think that he must accept the money, as in a case of Batei Arei Chomah. This therefore teaches us that even so, the giving is not valid against his will.

Opinion: Rashi explains that Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Chanina only argue regarding the requirement of a double condition (positive/negative). This is as Rebbi Chanina says there that the reason there had to be a double condition (regarding Bnei Gad) is because without it the implication is that they would otherwise not even inherit in Eretz Yisrael.

Question: This is difficult. In Bava Metzia (94a), the Gemara clearly implies that the Rabbanan argue on Rebbi Meir regarding when an action is stated before the condition. The Gemara implies this while discussing the fact that a Shomer Chinam (person who watches for free) can make a condition that he will have the law of a Sho'el (borrower).

Question: It is understandable that a double condition, having the condition before the action, and having the positive before the negative can be derived from the condition of Bnei Gad and Bnei Reuven. Being that they were written in this fashion here, it must be that this is how one must make such conditions.

However, how can we learn from there the laws stated in Kesuvos (74a) that there cannot be a condition against the Torah and that something must be able to be fulfilled through a messenger? Perhaps without this a condition would be valid, and this is merely how it happened? (Note: In other words, these laws are learned from the context of the incident, not the words chosen to be stated by the Torah. Accordingly, how can we extrapolate from there that these are general requirements? For example, it just so happened that Moshe was able to make Yehoshua a messenger to give Bnei Gad their portion. Why does this have to be the case regarding other dealings such as Chalitzah (as stated by the Gemara there)?)

Answer: Being that all of the conditions written by the Torah discussed in Kidushin (61a) are written in this fashion (as explained by the Gemara there), we see that we require all dealings to be this way as well. Similarly, the Pesukim, "v'Im b'Chukosai Teileichu" and "v'Im Tovu u'Shimatem" indicate that most Mitzvos are done through a messenger. (Note: The Acharonim discuss the meaning of Tosfos' last statement at length.)

Opinion: It appears that the law follows Rebbi Meir that we require a double condition etc., as Shmuel and Rava who are quoted nearby (in the Gemara) hold like him.

All of the cases of the Mishnayos also are regarding a double condition, even if this is not explicitly stated in the Mishnah. We see that we establish that a certain Beraisa is referring to a case where the conditon was doubled, even though it is not explicitly stated in the Beraisa. Additionally, every "on condition" stated in the Gemara, like that stated in Sukah (41b), "on condition that you return it (my Esrog) to me" regarding an Esrog require a double condition.

In every case we require a double condition. However, only by drunk people and those who grow their hair (this refers to Kohanim who do Avodah when drunk or their hair is overgrown) which are prohibitions, as stated in Shevuos (36b), do we say that a double condition is unnecessary.

Implied Question: We require a double condition by Sotah. (Note: If we do not require it by matters of prohibition, why do we require it regarding a Sotah?)

Answer: This is because it is a prohibition that also entails monetary dealings, as food support, clothing, marital relations, and her Kesuvah depend on this.

Implied Question: The Yerushalmi states in chapter Ha'Omer in Kidushin that Rebbi Yosi says that Rebbi Meir always holds that from a negative we understand the positive (meaning that we do not require a double condition regarding money matters). Why doesn't he hold this way here (regarding prohibitions)? (Note: We have just said that the opposite is true, that Rebbi Meir holds a double condition is required regarding money, but not prohibitions!)

Answer: Rav Elchanan understands that the correct text is that Rebbi Meir always does not hold that from a negative we understand the positive (regarding money), but here (regarding prohibition) he does hold that from a negative we understand the positive.

Rebbi Chanina (in the Yerushalmi) answers that this is a stringency regarding matters of forbidden relations. This means that even though he did not make a double condition, and therefore according to the letter of the law the condition is invalid and the action is valid. Due to the stringency of forbidden relations, the Get and Kidushin are invalid. If she received Kidushin from someone else, she would require a Get from both people. This is what the Yerushalmi is referring to earlier.

Question: Rabeinu Elchanan asks that requiring a double condition seems difficult from a Gemara in Bava Metzia (66a). The Gemara states that if a woman told her Shechiv Meira husband (who had written her a Get), "If you get better, I am yours," it is just to make him feel better (and is not valid). This implies that if he made his Get on the condition of her statement, it would indeed help. Why should this be? He did not make a double condition!

Answer: Rabeinu Yitzchak answers that the reason why the Gemara there says that this is merely to make him feel better is because it does not even help according to the Rabbanan who argue on Rebbi Meir (that a double condition is not necessary).

There are three types of cases. There are some cases where a real condition is required, and according to Rebbi Meir in those case a double condition is required. There are some cases where it is only necessary to reveal one's mindset. There are some cases where even this is not necessary. This is all explained in (Tosfos) Kidushin (49b, DH "Devarim").

Implied Question#1: This is not because Rava does not agree with the principle that whenever someone says "on condition" it is like he is saying "from now." This cannot be, as this principle is indeed the law (and we do not want to say that Rava is not according to the Halachah). (Note: Why, then, does Rava say that the condition must be before the action? If he would agree with the aforementioned principle, it would seem that should be good enough (see Maharam Shif)!))

Implied Question#2: Additionally, Rava openly said that if someone says, "Take this esrog on condition that you give it back to me," if the person gives it back he has fulfilled the Mitzvah (on the first day of Sukos when one must own the esrog). If saying "on condition" is unlike saying "from now," how did the person fulfill the Mitzvah? The present only became valid when the esrog was returned, and at that point it was no longer his! (Note: Rava must hold that "on condition" is like saying "from now.")

It does not appear that the case there is where he explicitly stated, "from now," as if this would be the case it should have been stated clearly.

Even though we never see explicit double conditions either, this is because the Mishnah does not bother to state double conditions. However, if the case is when he says "from now," it should have stated this explicitly in the case.

Answer: Rather, Rava wants to answer this Beraisa even according to the Rabbanan who argue on Rebbi (and say that saying "on condition" is not like saying "from now"). (Note: The explanation is based on the Rashash's statement that Tosfos should read "k'Rabbanan d'Rebbi," not "k'Rabbanan v'Rebbi.") However, according to Rebbi there is no question, as Rav Ashi concludes (on 75b, that this is like Rebbi who says that saying "on condition" is like saying "from now").

Observation: Abaye also implies later that he holds like Rebbi. This is as Abaye states later (76b-77a) that everyone agrees that if someone says, "on condition that the sun goes out of its sheath," that it is like he is saying "from now," like the position of Rebbi.

However, there is no proof that Abaye really hold this way, as Abaye could not have said that the opposite is true. He could not have said that everyone agrees that "on condition" is unlike saying "from now," as they are arguing regarding a case of "if the sun will go (out of its sheath)." If they argue regarding that case, they certainly would at least argue regarding "on condition" which is clearly more likely to be a Get. (Note: The Maharsha explains Tosfos' intent. Just because Abaye said everyone holds "on condition" means "from now" does not mean that he actually holds this way. He was merely setting the background of other cases in order to get to the case of "if the sun will go out." He could not have stated everyone holds the opposite, as if they argue regarding "if the sun will go out," they would at least argue regarding "on condition." Accordingly, this off the cuff remark by him is not proof he actually holds this way.)

Explanation: The condition contradicts the action. This is because the Get only can become valid after the condition is upheld, at which point she no longer has the Get.

Implied Question: However, when someone says, "Take this Get as a present on condition that you give it back to me," the condition and action are not in one thing.

Answer: This is because he holds that "on condition" is like saying "from now." The present therefore is valid right away, and he fulfills the Mitzvah immediately when he gets it.

Opinion#1: Rashi explains that the case is if the son dies within two years. This implies that he wants to say that if she did not nurse or serve him at all, the Get would be invalid.

This is also implied in his explanation in the Gemara regarding the question, "This is understandable according to Rava etc. but according to Rav Ashi etc." (Note: See Rashi on the top of 76b.)

Question: This does seem correct. If the father died when she served him for one day, it is obvious that the Get is valid, being that she served him until he died. What else would she have to do for him?

One cannot say that it is teaching us that even if he died beforehand the Get is valid, as he does not require that she serve him her entire life.

This is certainly not necessary. If we would say she would still have to serve him in some capacity, the Get would be invalid as it would not be called "Kerisus" (loosely translated as a complete cutting off between them). This is as stated later (83b) that if he makes a condition that applies "all the days of your life," the Get is invalid.

Opinion#2: Rather, it appears to Rabeinu Yitzchak to explain that the case is where he died before she could nurse or serve him at all. The Get is still valid, as he only intended to benefit, not to pain her. Being that he no longer requires this benefit, the Get is valid.

Implied Question: Rav Yosef said earlier (74b) that the worker should not get paid if he did not do the work. (Note: Why is this different than our case?)

Answer: One can differentiate that here, if he would have known in advance that his father or son would die, he would not have been stringent to make this condition. However, in the case earlier the opposite is true. If he would have known that it was going to rain, he would not have hired the worker at all! (Note: Accordingly, there the condition must be upheld, while here it does not have to be fulfilled if not necessary.)

Question#1: Rabeinu Elchanan asks that if so, why did Rava say earlier that giving against his will is invalid, and a payment made against his will to fulfill the condition in the Get is invalid? The thing holding back the Get is not her fault (rather he does not want to accept the payment), and the law follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in our Mishnah!

Question#2: Additionally, what is the difference between a case where the father or son died and a case where he says to her that he forgoes the money that she was supposed to pay him in order for the condition to be fulfilled (and the Get to be valid)? The Gemara earlier (74b) attempts to say there that even according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel she is not divorced. (Note: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says (ibid.) that if a man says, "Here is your Get on condition that you give me my coat" and she loses it and instead gives him the value of the coat, the condition is fulfilled and she is divorced.)

Answer: Here it is clear that he is making this condition just to gain a benefit. Being that his son or father died and he no longer requires this benefit, it is as if the condition has been fulfilled. However, there where he says that she should give him two hundred Zuz, he wants to receive that money. In the end, when he says he does not want to receive the money, the condition has not been fulfilled.

Implied Question: The Gemara earlier had a doubt regarding this case where the husband says he forgoes the money. The Gemara entertained that even according to the Rabbanan the Get was valid, even though in our case the Get is not valid. (Note: How could it be that the Get there would be valid while in our case it is invalid?)

Answer: This is because there he himself said she does not have to pay. However, here he did not willingly say she does not have to pay (she merely no longer has an obligation to fulfill due to the death of the father or son).

Implied Question: One should not ask according to Rashi, who explains that when the Mishna says "if the father or son die" it is referring to after she started nursing him, why doesn't the Gemara establish the Beraisa as discussing a case where he died after she served/nursed him for one day. (Note: Why not?)

Answer: If this would be the case, it should have explicitly said, "And he died."

Implied Question: One should not answer that if so, why does the Beraisa say one day, as one hour would be good enough. (Note: Why not?)

Answer: Rashi explains nearby (76a) regarding the question of what is the difference between the first case and second case according to Rav Ashi that one day does not necessarily mean one day. It could even mean one hour. If it meant one day, there would be no question there.

Explanation: He (Rabban Shimon) says regarding the case of the cloak (74b) that she can give him the value of the cloak, as his intent is merely to benefit. Our Mishnah is also a case where he intends to benefit that his son/father will be nursed/served as much as necessary.

The Beraisa is the Rabbanan who say that he intends to pain her. Being that he pained her for one day, this is enough, as his intention is not for the benefit.

According to this opinion, if he died before she nursed or served him at all, the Get is not a Get, as he did not pain her.

Alternatively, here he did not intend to pain her for nothing. He only did so for the purpose of his son and father. If his son/father dies, it is not necessary. However, regarding the cloak, he always needs the cloak, not (in particular) its value. Therefore, when she loses the cloak, he can say, "I am not interested in the value of the cloak." This is also how we must explained nearby (in the Gemara) the fact that the Mishnah is established as being according to the Rabbanan.

Explanation: A little bit of benefit suffices. However, regarding the Rabbanan who are stringent, we can say that they require that the entire need be fulfilled.

Explanation: The Beraisa is referring to a case when he explicitly said "for one day." The Beraisa is teaching us that this is specifically if she nursed or served him for one day. However, if he died and she did not nurse or serve him at all, the Get is not a Get.

One might have thought that being that he was so lenient with her, and only required one day of service from her, even though he explicitly said this was required, perhaps if he dies and she did not nurse or serve him at all the Get should be valid. The Beraisa therefore teaches that we do not say this.