Explanation: It appears that even if he is at the end of a Shemitah cycle it is considered a year, as he mentioned the term "Shavuah" -- "a Shemitah cycle."

Question: Why don't we say that, "v'Nasan" -- "And he will give" is a Klal (general term) and "b'Yadah" -- "in her hand" is a Perat (specific term), and we should revert to the rule that the general can only include what is included in the specific term?

Answer#1: The word, "v'Shilchah" -- "And he will send her" goes back and adds another Klal, and we therefore judge the general rule to be similar to (but more inclusive than) the Perat.

Observation: We can similarly say nearby that when the Pasuk states "Himatzei Timatzei" which appears to be a Klal u'Perat, that the word "Yado" is inserted in between these two words (even though it appears afterwards in the Pasuk) and turns it into a Klal u'Perat u'Klal.

Question: How can the Gemara ask in Bava Kama (64b) on the Gemara's suggestion to place the word "Chamor" between "Himatzei Timatzei," that we require this for the Beraisa's teaching, "We only know his hand etc?" What is the question, as just as we place the word "Yado" in between Himatzei Timatzei to learn a Klal u'Perat u'Klal, so too we can do this with the word "Chamor!"

Answer: Being that we place the word "Yado" in between them, which is talking about general possession and is more similar to the words "Himatzei Timatzei," we should not say that we should insert the word "Chamor" which is a stolen object.

Question: The husband still has fruits (even where he separates himself from her possessions), as is stated in Kesuvos (83a) that the husband can still eat the fruits during her lifetime!

Answer: He writes to her, "I have no claim on your possessions and their fruits." In such a case he indeed has no claim, as stated in Kesuvos there.

According to Rabeinu Tam, who explains nearby that this is not dependent on his ability to eat the fruits of her possessions, this is understandable, as I will explain later.

Implied Question: The Gemara could have answered that the case is where he wrote to her using a good term that works, or that the husband gave her a present. This is as we say in Bava Basra (51b) that she acquires and the husband does not eat the fruits in this case. (Note: Why didn't the Gemara give this answer?)

Answer: Rather, being that the Gemara had to give this answer (that it gives here) in Kesuvos (83a), it also gave this answer here.

Implied Question: The Gemara is not bringing direct proof (to the house of Rebbi Yanai's answer) from Rav Kahana. Being that the inheritor did not yet acquire the possessions, he can say he has no part of them even by using a term that is weak. The cases here that are quoted (in Rav Kahana's case) do not involve the phrase "Din u'Devarim etc."

Additionally, the phrase, "I don't want" that is being used in Rav Kahana's case is a better phrase than "Din u'Devarim," as implied in Kerisus (24b). (Note: Why is the Gemara bringing Rav Kahana's statement into our discussion regarding "Din u'Devarim?")

Answer#1: Rather, the Gemara quotes Rav Kahana in order that one should not ask how a condition can be made that he should not inherit her being that the inheritance is not yet in the world, just as one cannot make a condition on his future inheritance from his father.

Implied Question: Even according to Rebbi Meir who says that if a man says, "On condition that I am not obligated to provide you with food support, clothing, and marital relations," his condition is invalid, it is only because this is a condition against something stated in the Torah. This implies that if his condition is only against a Rabbinic law his condition is valid. (Note: Accordingly, why would we ask that the condition should not be valid because it goes against the Rabbinic institution that a husband inherits his wife? A person can make a condition against a Rabbinic institution!)

Answer: The case there (condition against a Rabbinic law) is different because he is making a real condition. However, here he is not making a real condition.

Answer#2: Additionally, we say in Bava Metzia (66a) that we require the one who needs the condition to make the condition. Here, the husband is making the condition though he does not need the condition. The Gemara therefore brings a good proof from Rav Kahana that a person can make a condition that he should not inherit her. (Note: In other words, in the case of Rebbi Meir, the man is making the condition in order that he should not have to give what he would otherwise have to give (food support etc.). However, in this case it is the woman who should be making the condition, as she has the possessions that he would inherit. She should stipulate that she is marrying him on condition that he will not inherit her. Accordingly, there can be no proof from a case where the regular person who should be making the condition is making the condition. Rav Kahana's case is proof, as he is referring to a case where the person is taking himself away from a potential inheritance, just as the husband here is taking himself away from her inheritance. In both cases, the "wrong" person is making the condition (which is actually more accurately defined as "Siluk" -- "removal").)

Implied Question: You might ask, why is this different than the inheritance of his father where this condition does not help? (Note: Rav Kahana said this only works regarding Rabbinic inheritance.)

Answer: The two cases are incomparable. Here there is a Rabbinic decree, as is apparent from Rava's statement that if someone says that he does not want this type of Rabbinic decree, we listen to him. This is because Chazal only established such a decree for his benefit (i.e. so that he should inherit the money). He therefore has a right to forfeit that benefit. (Note: This is as opposed to the Torah law, which is absolute, and cannot be said to be stated only when he wants it to apply.)

Implied Question: Rav holds in Kesuvos (83a) that this condition even works regarding inheritance that is his through Torah law. (Note: Why doesn't our Gemara bring this up?)

Answer: Our Gemara does not hold this way.

Additionally, the Gemara's conclusion there is that this is incorrect.

Explanation: All of these terms do not work, as saying that one is removing themselves from "Din u'Devarim" or from "Dealing with his hands and feet" only removes them from that, not from the field itself, as stated in Kerisus (24b).

Implied Question: Regarding freeing a slave, it is effective to say, "I have no more dealings with you." (Note: Why should this be a valid way of freeing a slave?)

Answer#1: The correct answer is not the answer of Rabeinu Tam that Heaven acquires the slave.

Question: If so, how can we bring proof later (85a) that the phrase, "You are to yourself" helps regarding a woman, as this is a Kal v'Chomer from a slave where this is effective?

Answer#2: Rather, the reason is because, "I have no more dealings with you" implies that you should be to yourself, which does not apply to a field.

Question: He also did not acquire the courtyard itself. Rather, he only acquired the benefits of the yard!

Answer#1: Being that he acquired the yard's benefits, it is as if he acquired the yard itself. However, his benefit of her work is just a benefit (without acquiring an object).

Answer#2: Additionally, he acquires the yard against the will of the woman. However, he does not acquire the rights to her work against her will, as she can claim that she will not be supported by him, and will also not give him the benefits of her work.

Explanation: Rashi explains that he cannot pick up the Get to give it to her (as it is Mukztah).

Implied Question: The Tosefta says that one cannot divorce his wife on Shabbos. (Note: How, then, can they get divorced at all?)

Answer: They were lenient for a person on his deathbed, in order that she should not fall to the Yavam. This is why in Beitzah (37b) the Beraisa states, "One cannot marry" and it does not state "One cannot divorce" as stated in the Tosefta. This is because a person on his deathbed is allowed to divorce on Shabbos.

Implied Question: This is not like a case of, "Take your Get from the ground." (Note: Why in that case is the Get invalid and here it is valid?)

Answer: Being that the Get is coming from the possession of the husband into her domain, it is as if he gave it to her.

Question: Don't we say in Bava Basra (51b) that if she receives a present she acquires it, and the husband does not even benefit from the fruits of that present?

Answer: The Ri answers that here the case is where she borrowed the item. Borrowing is not as strong as receiving a present. Only regarding a present do we say that she acquires it and the husband does not even benefit from the fruits of the present.

Answer: Rabeinu Tam explains that even though when she receives a present (from her husband) the husband does not receive the benefits, being that if she sold it or gave it the transaction is invalid, as stated in Bava Basra (ibid.), it is considered as if it belongs to the husband. She therefore cannot acquire through it what is inside of it, and this is not dependent on who eats the fruits.

You should know that this is true, as earlier the Gemara answered that the case is when he wrote for her that he has nothing to do with her possessions. This is despite the fact that the husband still eats the benefits of her possessions, as stated in Kesuvos (83a). Rather, being that if she sells or gives the courtyard away it is valid, as stated in Kesuvos (83a), it is considered her yard. (Note: The Maharsha addresses the seeming contradiction that if the husband gives her a gift he cannot have benefits and she cannot sell, but yet if she has possessions that he removes himself from, he can have benefits but she can sell.)

Implied Question: The Ri says that there is no proof, as it is possible to establish that the case is where he writes that he has nothing to do with her possessions or their fruits, as explained earlier.

This also must be said in Bava Basra (49a) regarding a person not having a Chazakah in the possessions of his wife. The case must be where he wrote, "And in their fruits." Even though the Gemara does not explicitly state this, the same applies earlier.

Additionally, the Yerushalmi clearly implies that this is dependent on having benefit from the fruits. The Yerushalmi asks there that the right to use her roof and yard are not given to anyone. (Note: Why can't she acquire her Get through them?) Rebbi Yochanan answers in the name of Rebbi Yanai that this is only true if he writes to her that he has nothing to do with her possessions and their benefits.

Explanation: In Bava Metzia (11b) we say that only regarding a Get where it is detrimental to her do we require that she stand on the side of her house, not regarding (acquiring) a lost object.

Question: The Ri has difficulty with this. In Shabbos (80a) and Bava Basra (56a), regarding someone who takes something out from one public domain to another, Rabah says that he is only liable if there is a domain between them (i.e. a private domain) which would make a person liable to bring a Chatas if he carries to that domain (from the public domain). However, if the domain between them is a Karmelis, he is not liable if he brings something from one public domain, through the Karmelis, into another public domain. Abaye says, he is even liable if there is a Karmelis between these two domains. However, he is not liable if there is a small platform between them. Rava says that he is even liable if there is a small platform there. Rava is according to his reasoning, as Rava says that the domain of Shabbos is like the domain of Gitin.

This means that a platform is considered its own domain regarding Gitin, as stated in our Gemara. This platform is considered a Karmelis as it is not ten Tefachim tall, but it is three Tefachim tall, as otherwise it would be considered Lavud. It is also probably four Tefachim wide, otherwise it would not be considered to have its own importance. If so, why does Abaye say that a platform does not count to separate these domains? (Note: If a small platform is a Karmelis, how can Abaye differentiate between them? They have the exact same status!)

Answer: It is possible to differentiate between a complete Karmelis and a Karmelis that can be carried.