Opinion#1: The Ri says that this Gemara argues on Chizkiyah who says in Bava Basra (162b) that if a Get was filled (i.e. the blank lines for extra signatures) with witnesses who are relatives it is still valid. This implies that only relatives are valid to fill these types of lines in a Get.

An incident came before Rabeinu Meshulam where a person wrote a Get for his wife and had two kosher witnesses sign it. After awhile, he had a third person sign it. Rabeinu Meshulam said the Get was valid based on the following logic.

When we say that the witnesses of a Get never sign without each other, this is when there are two witnesses, or a person invited three people to be witnesses together. This means that the Get could not be valid without any of these witnesses. In such a case, they will only sign the Get in each other's presence. However, when the Get was already made valid with two witnesses and he did not intend to have other people sign it, when he went back and had another person sign it does not make it invalid, being that it was already made valid through the first witnesses.

Proof: Rabeinu Tam brought proof from here that the Get is valid. The term, "Go out and complete it with a servant from the marketplace" implies that the other witnesses already signed, and he only needed to complete the signatures. This shows that being that the Get was already made valid through the first witnesses, it does not become invalid when the others complete it by signing when they are not in each other's presence.

Opinion#2: However, Rashi explains that the scribe and witnesses are in front of us and the Get was not yet given. This implies that he holds that we do require them to sign in front of each other.

Rashi's explains that, "it wasn't given to her yet" refers to the fact that the witnesses had not yet signed. This is why the Get wasn't given to her, and they all can sign in front of each other.

Implied Question: However, Rashi's explanation that the scribe is still there seems to be for naught, as why should we care if the scribe left? (Note: Why did Rashi write this?)

Opinion: Rabeinu Elchanan also explained that it would appear that such a Get (where a witness signed without being in the presence of the other witnesses) would be invalid. Being that he wants to have a third sign, he has revealed that the Get should only be valid when the third signs. The third signature is invalid being that it was not done in the presence of the other witnesses. (Note: This is why the Get is invalid.)

Opinion: Rashi explains that it must be that he had the same amount of witnesses as the amount of ties on the Get. We therefore suspect that he asked an entire group of people to sign as witnesses, and one of them did not sign (leaving a bald spot on the Get, which is why it is called a "bald Get").

Question: This is difficult. Being that we invalidate a "bald Get" due to the fact that we suspect that all of them had to sign, for the same reason we should invalidate a relative's signature on such a Get. This is as previously stated (18b) that if the husband says, "all of you (should sign)," according to the opinion that they are all considered mandatory witnesses, if one of them is considered a relative or unfit the Get is invalid.

Answer: It is possible to differentiate that in our Gemara where there are three witnesses on the tied Get, they allowed one to be a relative. I have discussed this at length previously (18b, DH "Amri Lah").

Opinion#1: It seems that only when there is a condition that she should not get married do they agree that this is not considered leaving something. This is because she is technically permitted to be with him in a promiscuous fashion. However, if the condition is that she should not have relations or marry, it is considered that she left something aside, just like saying "besides (a certain person)."

This is why the Beraisa later merely states, "on condition that you will not marry." If the condition would be, "on condition that you will not marry or have relations" Rebbi Eliezer would agree that leaving this option (relations) out is like saying "besides (a certain person)."

Proof#1: This is also somewhat implied from the Gemara later. The Gemara asks a question on Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili who says, "Where do we find a case where a person is forbidden to one person and permitted to another?" The Gemara asks, what is the case? If it is when someone divorced a woman on condition (that she would not marry a certain man), she can still have relations with him in a promiscuous fashion. Rather, the case must be where he said, "besides him."

If in the case, "on condition that you will not marry or have relations" Rebbi Eliezer says that this is not considered leaving something out, why would the Gemara say that she is permitted to be with him in a promiscuous fashion?

Proof#2: Additionally, according to our establishing the case as "besides," instead of Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili asking a question on Rebbi Eliezer from a case of "besides," he should ask a question on the Rabbanan. The Rabbanan agree that in a case of "on condition that you will not marry or have relations" because she was not permitted in have promiscuous relations with him.

Opinion#2: However, it seems to the Ri that even regarding, "on condition that you will not marry or have relations" the Rabbanan agree that this is not considered leaving something out. Being that he only forbids her using a condition, it is as if he permits her to everyone. This is why Rebbi Yosi ha'Glili did not ask anything on the Rabbanan. (Note: Therefore, (c) above is not conclusive proof.)

Implied Question: When the Gemara says that if the case is "on condition" she is permitted to him through promiscuity, it could have asked that even if she was not permitted to him through promiscuity, as in a case of "on condition that you will not marry or have relations," she is divorced. This is because she is permitted to everyone, as he only forbade her through a condition (as stated above in (d). (Note: Why didn't the Gemara ask this seemingly better question if (d) is correct?)

Answer: Rather, it stated a simple case, "on condition that you will not marry" like the one stated in the Beraisa. Otherwise, instead of the Gemara making a distinction between "on condition" and "besides," it should make a difference between different types of "on condition."

Answer: Additionally, the Gemara says that perhaps "only" means "on condition" etc." Even though "only" forbids marriage and having relations, it is still not considered leaving anything over. This is despite the fact that Rebbi Eliezer agrees that if he says, "besides" the Get is invalid. (Note: The Rashash points out that "Modu" should read "Modeh.")

Later, when the Gemara says that the Mishnah is discussing a case of "besides," the Gemara asks for Rebbi Eliezer's reason (that she should be permitted). However, according to the Rabbanan, even "on condition that you should not marry nor have relations" is understandable, being that it is like all conditions.

Implied Question: The fact that the Mishnah says in Zevachim (2a) that all Korbanos that are sacrificed with intent that they are a different sacrifice are valid, but they have not fulfilled the owner's requirement to bring the specific Korban he pledged (or needed) to bring, is not adequate proof. (Note: Why not?)

Answer: In that Mishnah it is impossible to apply "on condition" or "besides." The term "Ela" used there can only mean "only" or "but."

Explanation: This implies that he even allows her to remarry in the lifetime of the person to whom she is forbidden.

Question#1: Rabeinu Shmuel asks, why aren't we worried that she will not fulfill her condition? This is as we say earlier (74a) regarding a case where a man says, "This is your Get on condition that you will give me two hundred Zuz," that she should not get remarried until she gives the money.

Question#2: Rabeinu Yitzchak brings another proof (that we should suspect she will not fulfill her condition) from the Beraisa later (84a) that says that if a Get is given, "on condition that you will not have relations to my father or your father," we do not suspect she will have relations with them. However, this implies that if the condition was she should not have relations with a regular person (unlike his or her father), we would suspect that she would have relations with them (and would not fulfill her condition).

Answer: Rabeinu Elchanan answers that the case of two hundred Zuz is different, as there is reason to suspect that she will lose her money and she will be unable to fulfill her condition. Similarly, when she has a condition that she should not have relations with another man, we suspect that maybe he will force her to have relations with her. However, in a case of "on condition that you will not marry" there is no suspicion that he will marry her against her will, as there is no such thing as halachic marriage without her consent.

Question: It is clear that the prohibition against (a divorcee) marrying a Kohen is different. If she would only have been divorced from her husband and was not permitted to anyone else, even according to Rebbi Eliezer the Get would not be valid in general! If he would die, she would be permitted to have Yibum done to her, even though she is unfit to marry a Kohen otherwise. (Note: Accordingly, how can this be Rebbi Eliezer's reasoning regarding all Gitin?)

Answer: Rebbi Eliezer's reasoning is as follows. Being that if she only got divorced from her husband she would be unfit to marry a Kohen, it follows that if she only excluded one person the Get should be valid. If it would not be valid, we should also seemingly say that if she was only divorced from her husband there is not even a smell of a Get, and the Pasuk should not forbid her to Kohanim.

Question: According to Rebbi Eliezer who does not consider "on condition" leaving over anything, and according to the Tana of our Mishnah that the Rabbanan also admit that this is not considered leaving over anything, why doesn't the first Mishnah in Yevamos state that sixteen women exempt their co-wives? It should count another case (the sixteenth) as a married woman who makes her co-wife exempt (from Yibum and Chalitzah) in the following case.

If her husband divorced her on condition that she does not marry Ploni, and the brother of Ploni proceeded to marry her. He then died without sons.

If the condition was merely that she should not marry Ploni, she would permitted to be with him in a promiscuous fashion. If the condition was she simply cannot have relations with him, she could be Mekudeshes to him. There is no question from both of these cases, as it is unlike a sister of a wife who is forbidden even in a promiscuous fashion and cannot receive a valid Kidushin (from her sister's husband). However, from a case where he says, "on condition that you will neither marry nor have relations with Ploni," this is difficult. (Note: Why isn't this case listed in Yevamos?)

Answer: The Mishnah did not say this case because it is not similar to the sister of one's wife. In that case she is still his wife's sister when she falls to Yibum before him. However, in our case when she falls to Yibum she is no longer a married woman until she has relations with the Yavam and transgresses the condition of her first divorce. (Note: She therefore has no present status that should exempt her or her co-wives, unlike the other people listed in the Mishnah.)

Even if she is considered as if she is a married woman now, being that her future status as a married woman makes it forbidden for her to have relations with him (because of her first husband), it still could not have said this case in the Mishnah. This is because if she will have relations with him, she never had a valid Kidushin with his brother and was never his brother's wife. (Note: Being that her original husband's Get becomes invalid and she remains married to him, this causes all subsequent Kidushin that she accepted, including that of his brother, to be invalid.) This is therefore unlike the case of a wife's sister (where the Yibum would be effective if she were not forbidden to him, as opposed to this case where the Yibum itself is impossible), and is why she does not cause her co-wives to be exempt.

However, these differences are only according to the opinion that these Arayos are similar to a wife's sister.

Question: Rabeinu Yitzchak has another difficulty with this. We can find a case with the co-wife of a co-wife (of a married woman). For example, if a person was Mekadesh this woman besides for Reuven and Shimon his brother, and then Reuven came and was Mekadesh her besides for Shimon, his Kidushin forbids her on her first "husband." If Reuven now dies without having had children, and he has another wife who Shimon does Yibum to, and Shimon proceeds to die without children, the two wives fall before Levi. In such a case, the co-wife's co-wife should make her exempt from Chalitzah and Yibum. (Note: Being that Levi was never permitted to marry the original wife who was permitted to Reuven and Shimon, the other wife of Reuven who Shimon did Yibum to now falls before Levi, along with Shimon's original wife. Shimon's original wife is a co-wife of a co-wife (Reuven's widow) with our original woman who is forbidden to Levi as a married woman. Why isn't this case mentioned in Yevamos?)

Answer: Being that she was forbidden to this Yavam as a married woman before his brother was Mekadesh her (as the first Kidushin she accepted forbade her on the whole world besides for Reuven and Shimon), she is not considered his brother's wife to him. (Note: She is considered primarily a married woman due to her first Kidushin.)

Implied Question: However, if a woman who is "the wife of two men" is considered a Torah prohibition (against doing Yibum to such a woman) as implied later in our Gemara, we can find a case of a sixteenth Tzarah (co-wife) and a Tzaras Tzarah. The case is if Reuven was Mekadesh a woman besides for Shimon and Levi his brothers. Shimon was then Mekadesh her besides for Levi. Shimon's Kidushin now makes it that Reuven is forbidden from being with her. Reuven and Shimon then die. Levi then does Yibum to the women who was never forbidden to him by either Reuven or Shimon, who is technically the co-wife of Reuven and Shimon's wives. Levi then dies, and he has another wife. They both fall to Yibum before Yehudah. Levi's original wife would be considered exempt from Yibum and Chalitzah because of the other wife who is considered to have been a wife of two brothers for Yehudah (who was never permitted to this wife at a time when both Reuven and Shimon had a partial Kidushin with her). (Note: Why isn't this case listed in the Mishnah in Yevamos?)

Answer: However, it is possible to answer that the Mishnah in Yevamos is not interested in listing a case that is rooted in argument (whether or not we say that the wife of two dead people is a Torah reason not to do Yibum).

The Rabbanan argue on Rebbi Eliezer regarding Kidushin just like they argue on him regarding divorce, as we conclude that they compare "And she went out (Gitin)...and she was (Kidushin)." According to them, there is no such thing as "the wife of two dead people."

Even according to Levi who does understand that the Mishnah would discuss a case that is argued, as evident in Yevamos (9a), he only discusses a case where there is an argument if the Tana shares his opinion.

Proof: This is clearly true, as Levi does not include Arayos that are prohibited because of regular negative prohibitions (that are punished with lashes). This is despite the fact that Rebbi Akiva holds that such Arayos cannot have Chalitzah or Yibum, just like Arayos that are punished with Kares.

Observation: However, according to the original understanding of Rebbi Aba that the Rabbanan agree regarding Kidushin, it could have said sixteen.

Observation: In the Yerushalmi here, the Gemara asks why the Mishnah does not say sixteen women according to Rebbi Eliezer. The Yerushalmi answers that there the Torah forbade her to him, as opposed to here where he forbade her. This means that all of the fifteen women that the Torah forbade one to perform Yibum with are women who are automatically forbidden without any condition being made. However, here he made her forbidden through his condition.

Alternatively, it is possible to say that there the Torah forbade her and she has no way to permit Yibum. Her prohibition is not dependent on anyone. Rather, it comes from the Torah that forbade Yibum in this situation. However, regarding this married woman, the prohibition depends on the one divorcing her. If he wants, he can permit her to the Yavam before his brother who married her dies. (Note: The Maharam Shif explains that when he divorced her on condition that she does not marry or have relations with Ploni the potential Yavam, he can take this condition away (seemingly while she is married to the potential Yavam's brother) by giving her a new Get without any conditions. (However, after she would fall to Ploni it would be too late).)

Observation: Our Gemara implies that the prohibition against doing Yibum to someone who is considered "the wife of two dead people" (see Tosfos above at length) is a Torah prohibition.

Question: This is difficult considering two Gemaros in Yevamos (31b and 10b).

Answer: We have explained this there (see Tosfos in Yevamos 10a, DH "l'Olam" and "mid'Rabbanan").

Question: Rabeinu Yitzchak has difficulty with this. When Shimon came and was Mekadesh her without conditions, why wasn't Reuven's Kidushin negated? How is this different from a case where a person says, "You are permitted to all men besides Ploni," and she then marries someone else who dies? In such a case it is clear that the first husband's marriage has already been negated, and she is now permitted to Ploni to whom she had been originally forbidden (from her first husband)!

It is illogical to differentiate that in that case there was only a small condition that was left over (being forbidden to one person) which is negated after her second husband dies.

Answer: It is possible to say that regarding divorce, being that he started to detach her from him through her being married to someone else, he lets her go completely. However, here that he is trying to be Mekadesh her, the fact that someone else is Mekadesh her does not negate his Kidushin.

Observation: This entire query can also be established as being according to the opinion of the Rabbanan.