1) THE RIGHT OF THE FIRST ALIYAH
QUESTION: The Mishnah states that a Kohen is called to the Torah before a Levi, and a Levi before a Yisrael, only when they are of equal stature in scholarship. If they are not equal, then the honor of a Talmid Chacham, even if he is a Mamzer, takes precedence over the honor of a Kohen who is an Am ha'Aretz.
The Gemara in Gitin (59b) relates that Rav Huna received the first Aliyah instead of the Kohanim who were present, because Rav Huna was the greatest Torah authority of his time. This implies that in the case of any other Talmid Chacham (who is not the greatest Torah authority of his time) who is more learned than the Kohanim who are present, the Talmid Chacham does not precede the Kohen. Rather, the Kohen is given the honor of the first Aliyah even though the other person is more learned. How are these Gemaras to be reconciled?
ANSWERS:
(a) The RAMBAM (in Perush ha'Mishnayos, Gitin 5:8) writes that the accepted custom to give the first Aliyah to the Kohen, regardless of his stature in scholarship, "has no source in the Torah at all." The Rambam writes that the Halachah is that the Kohen is given precedence only when all present are of equal levels of scholarship, as expressed by the Gemara here in Horayos. The statement of the Mishnah in Gitin (59a), that a Kohen is given the first Aliyah, applies only when there is no greater Talmid Chacham present; if there is a greater Talmid Chacham present, then that Talmid Chacham should be given the first Aliyah and not the Kohen.
The Rambam explains that one cannot infer from the case of Rav Huna in Gitin that an ordinary Talmid Chacham (who is not the greatest Torah authority of his time) does not take precedence over a less-learned Kohen. The Gemara there is merely emphasizing the greatness of Rav Huna and pointing out that he was greater even than Rav Ami and Rav Asi, who were the greatest Kohanim of the time and were present at that Minyan, and thus only a Talmid Chacham who was greater than they (like Rav Huna) could receive the Aliyah before them.
However, the Rambam's opinion is problematic. The Gemara in Gitin quotes a Beraisa that states that when one recites the blessing for bread and has in mind to include in his blessing others who are present, the one who recites the blessing is supposed to dip his slice of bread first, before the others. If, however, his teacher is present and he wants to give honor to his teacher, he may let his teacher dip first. This applies even to a Kohen who wants to give honor to his teacher, and it implies that the Kohen is given precedence even when his teacher (who certainly is more learned than he) is present! This seems to contradict the Rambam's view that honoring a Talmid Chacham takes precedence over honoring a Kohen.
The PRI CHADASH (OC 135:4) answers that the rule that one who recites the blessing dips his bread first applies even if he is not a Kohen and not a Talmid Chacham; it is unrelated to giving honor. Accordingly, that Beraisa does not imply that the honor of a Kohen precedes the honor of a Talmid Chacham; he has the right to dip before the Talmid Chacham not because he is a Kohen, but because he is the one who recited the blessing over the bread.
(b) The TUR (OC 135) quotes RAV AMRAM GA'ON and RAV NATRUNA'I GA'ON who say that when there is a Kohen in the Minyan, he receives the first Aliyah even if he is ignorant, and even if there is a great Torah scholar present. The BEIS YOSEF explains that the Mishnah here in Horayos, which says that a Talmid Chacham has precedence over a Kohen, applies only to other Mitzvos (such as giving Tzedakah to one before the other when both are poor). The reading of the Torah is an exception to this rule, because the Chachamim wanted to prevent arguments about who gets the first Aliyah, and therefore they instituted that the Kohen always reads first, even when he is less learned than the others.
This explanation is valid for the ruling of the Tur and the Ge'onim quoted above. However, the BARTENURA in Gitin (5:8) applies the Mishnah here to the Mishnah in Gitin regarding the reading of the Torah, and he says that the Halachah should be that a Mamzer Talmid Chacham should take precedence over a Kohen Am ha'Aretz. He concludes that the prevalent custom is that a Kohen always reads first. How does he justify the custom?
The TOSFOS YOM TOV in Gitin answers that although the Mishnah here is discussing the order of being called to the Torah, the enactment that a Kohen should not give the honor of the first Aliyah to someone else was made in order to prevent arguments about who gets the first Aliyah. Today's custom, which indeed differs from the Halachah that emerges from the Mishnayos, uses the logic of that enactment. Since today it is much more difficult to determine who is a greater scholar, and, on the contrary, any attempt to determine who is a greater Talmid Chacham would itself lead to arguments, we therefore preserve the peace and give the first Aliyah to the Kohen.
(c) The RITVA in Gitin (59b) has a third opinion. He writes that the Kohen receives the first Aliyah even when there are others present who are more learned than he, but only when the Kohen is not an Am ha'Aretz. When the Kohen is an Am ha'Aretz, the Talmid Chacham precedes him.
The Ritva seems to understand that the nature of the enactment that a Kohen must be given the first Aliyah applies only when the Kohen possesses qualities for which he deserves to be honored, besides the fact that he is a Kohen. In such a case, the Kohen may not relinquish his honor to others. Accordingly, the Ritva maintains that when both the Kohen and a Yisrael are Talmidei Chachamim, even if the Yisrael is a greater Talmid Chacham than the Kohen, the Kohen receives the first Aliyah (as implied by the Gemara in Gitin; see the Rambam's opinion above). However, if the Kohen is an Am ha'Aretz, then the Talmid Chacham has precedence (as implied by the Gemara here); there was no enactment that such a Kohen precedes a Talmid Chacham.
HALACHAH: The practice today follows the opinion of the Ge'onim, who say that a Kohen always receives the first Aliyah for the sake of preserving the peace. The BI'UR HALACHAH (OC 135:3) quotes the CHAYEI ADAM who rules that when there is an eminent Talmid Chacham present and there is also a Kohen who is learned, as well as a Kohen who is not learned, it is preferable to give the first Aliyah to the Kohen who is a Talmid Chacham and not to the one who is an Am ha'Aretz. (Nevertheless, one still must be careful with this preference and avoid causing a Machlokes.) (Y. MONTROSE)
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2) STANDING FOR THE "NASI"
QUESTION: The Beraisa states that when the Nasi enters, everyone must stand and remain standing until the Nasi says, "Sit." This law seems to contradict the Gemara in Kidushin (33b) which quotes Rebbi Avdimi who says that one should stand for a Nasi upon seeing him and one must remain standing until the Nasi himself sits down. He proves this from the verse, "And they looked after Moshe, until he came to the tent" (Shemos 33:8). The Gemara does not question Rebbi Avdimi's ruling from the Beraisa here in Horayos. This implies that these statements are not in disagreement. How are these two statements to be reconciled?
ANSWERS:
(a) The RAN in Kidushin (33b) answers in the name of RABEINU TAM that the Beraisa is not stating a general Halachah, but rather it is teaching that there was a custom that was accepted during the time when Raban Shimon ben Gamliel was the Nasi. This is stated explicitly by Rebbi Yochanan later in the Gemara. The BE'ER SHEVA comments that this means that this practice was accepted only during that time, and not before or after. The statement of Rebbi Avdimi, on the other hand, is the Halachah in practice.
(b) The ROSH in Kidushin answers that the Beraisa here refers to when the Nasi enters a Beis Midrash where people are sitting together. Rebbi Avdimi, on the other hand, refers to a case in which the Nasi is passing through the marketplace or street, similar to the verse which mentions the people watching Moshe Rabeinu.
The KESEF MISHNEH (Hilchos Talmud Torah 6:6) and the KORBAN NESANEL point out that this explanation is supported by the different wording used in the two statements. The Beraisa here discusses when the Nasi "enters," and Rebbi Avdimi discusses when he "passes."
This also appears to be the opinion of the RIF and the RAMBAM. The Rif (in Kidushin) and the Rambam (Hilchos Talmud Torah 6:6) record both statements as the Halachah. The BI'UR HA'GRA (YD 244:19) says that this shows that they understood, as did the Rosh, that both statements apply, albeit in different situations.
The BE'EROS HA'MAYIM maintains that the Rambam does not agree with the Rosh. The Be'eros ha'Mayim questions the explanation of the Rosh. Rebbi Avdimi states that the people do not sit until the Nasi "sits in his place," as he proves from the verse regarding Moshe Rabeinu. According to the Rosh, who says that Rebbi Avdimi's statement refers to when the Nasi is passing by in a public area, what is the meaning of the statement that they should not sit until the Nasi "sits in his place"? What "place" does a Nasi have in a public area?
Perhaps the Rosh and other Rishonim rely on a similar statement of Rebbi Avdimi in the Yerushalmi in Bikurim (3:3). His statement there reads that one must stand for a Kohen Gadol "from when he sees him until he is covered from view." This ruling is also derived from the verse regarding Moshe Rabeinu. The PNEI MOSHE explains that since Moshe Rabeinu had both the status of a Kohen Gadol and that of a Nasi, the Yerushalmi applies this verse to a Kohen Gadol as well. The Yerushalmi's usage of the phrase, "until he is covered from view," shows that the main point of Rebbi Avdimi's statement is that one may sit down when the Nasi happens to find a place to sit or when he becomes covered from view. Indeed, the ME'IRI in Kidushin, who rules like the Rosh, adds the words, "or until he becomes covered from view."
(c) The MEROMEI SADEH explains that the statements of the Beraisa and Rebbi Avdimi are applicable in the same case. Rebbi Avdimi's statement applies when the Nasi communicates nothing until after he sits down. In such a case, everyone may sit even before the Nasi speaks, as long as he has been seated. The Beraisa teaches an additional Halachah, similar to that of the Gemara in Kidushin (32b), that a Nasi may forgo his honor. The Beraisa teaches this by saying that when the Nasi says that everyone may sit, everyone is allowed to sit even though the Nasi is still standing. The Meromei Sadeh maintains that this is also the view of the Rambam. (Y. MONTROSE)