1) MAY THE COURT GIVE PRECEDENCE TO A TALMID CHACHAM'S CASE?
QUESTION: The Gemara relates an incident in which Rav Anan referred a court case to Rav Nachman because he was concerned that he would not be able to judge it impartially. In the message he sent to Rav Nachman, Rav Anan asked, "Please preside over this case because I, Anan, am disqualified from being a judge for this case." Rav Nachman mistakenly understood that Rav Anan meant that the plaintiff in the case was a relative of his, and therefore Rav Nachman postponed a case which involved orphans and presided over Rav Anan's case first in order to give honor to the Torah. When the plaintiff's opponent saw the honor which Rav Nachman gave to the plaintiff, he became befuddled and forgot his arguments, and the plaintiff won the case. As punishment for the error which Rav Anan caused, Eliyahu stopped visiting him.
The Gemara here seems to contradict the Gemara in Shevuos (30a) which relates that Rav Yosef sent a message to Rav Nachman in which he told him that Ula was a Talmid Chacham, so that Rav Nachman would preside over his case first. Why was Rav Yosef not concerned that Ula's opponent would forget his arguments upon seeing the honor afforded to Ula? (RITVA)
ANSWERS:
(a) The RITVA answers that in the case in Shevuos, Ula's opponent knew that Ula was a great Talmid Chacham worthy of honor, and he would understand why his case would be given top priority. He would not mistakenly assume that it is because the Beis Din is siding with Ula. In contrast, in the case of the Gemara here, the plaintiff was not a Talmid Chacham (and not even a relative of a Talmid Chacham), and thus his opponent did not understand why Beis Din gave precedence to his case if not because his plaintiff had some influence with Beis Din, and he forgot his arguments.
(b) The LECHEM MISHNEH (Hilchos Sanhedrin 21:6) explains that the misdeed which Rav Anan caused was that the Beis Din of Rav Nachman presided over the case of a Talmid Chacham before that of an orphan. An orphan's case has precedence because of the verse, "Judge the orphan, argue for the widow" (Yeshayah 1:17). When the opponent in the case which Rav Anan sent to Rav Nachman saw that his plaintiff's case was given precedence even over the case of an orphan, he assumed that it was because the plaintiff had considerable influence with the Beis Din, and thus he forgot his arguments. In the case in Shevuos, however, Ula's case was given precedence over that of an Am ha'Aretz, and thus it was clear to everyone that the case was given precedence because of the honor of the Torah. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)

106b----------------------------------------106b

2) WITH WHAT MONEY MAY "KLEI SHARES" BE PURCHASED?
QUESTION: Rav Huna asked Rav whether the Klei Shares are purchased with money of Bedek ha'Bayis, funds allocated for the upkeep of the Beis ha'Mikdash, or with money of the Terumas ha'Lishkah. Perhaps the Klei Shares are purchased with money of Bedek ha'Bayis because they are used for the Mizbe'ach, which is made of stone and is considered part of the Beis ha'Mikdash. On the other hand, perhaps they are purchased with money of the Terumas ha'Lishkah, since they are used for Korbanos.
Rav answered that the Klei Shares are purchased only with the money of the Terumas ha'Lishkah. Rav Huna questioned Rav's ruling (according to the SHITAH MEKUBETZES) from the verse in Divrei ha'Yamim II (24:14) which discusses the collection of funds for Bedek ha'Bayis and how the leftover money was used. The verse says that the leftover money was used for the purchase of Klei Shares. Rav responded with a different verse which states that money of Bedek ha'Bayis may not be used for the purchase of Klei Shares (Melachim II 12:14-15). The Gemara addresses the apparent contradiction in the verses and says that money of Bedek ha'Bayis may be used for Klei Shares only when that money is leftover and is not needed for any other purpose of Bedek ha'Bayis, because "Lev Beis Din Masneh Aleihen."
If Rav Huna knew that the verse in Divrei ha'Yamim states that Klei Shares may be purchased with money leftover from the funds of Bedek ha'Bayis, why did he ask Rav in the first place whether Klei Shares may be purchased from such money? (TALMID HA'RASHBA cited by the SHITAH MEKUBETZES)
ANSWERS:
(a) The TALMID HA'RASHBA answers that Rav Huna knew that money leftover from the funds of Bedek ha'Bayis may be used for the purchase of Klei Shares. His question was whether Klei Shares may be made directly from material donated to Bedek ha'Bayis. Rav answered that Klei Shares may never come from Bedek ha'Bayis; they may not be purchased from funds of Bedek ha'Bayis or crafted from material donated to Bedek ha'Bayis. Rav Huna questioned Rav's ruling from the verse which says that at least the leftover money of Bedek ha'Bayis may be used for the purchase of Klei Shares. Rav defended his ruling from the verse in Melachim, which he interpreted to mean that money of Bedek ha'Bayis may never be used to purchase Klei Shares.
When the Gemara reconciles the two verses and distinguishes between ordinary money of Bedek ha'Bayis and leftover money of Bedek ha'Bayis, it is explaining the verses only according to Rav Huna. Rav maintains that even leftover money from Bedek ha'Bayis may not be used to purchase Klei Shares.
How, then, does Rav reconcile the apparent contradiction in the verses? How does he understand the verse in Divrei ha'Yamim?
The SHITAH MEKUBETZES answers that Rav follows the view of Tana d'Vei Rebbi Yishmael (later on 106b) who interprets the verse in Divrei ha'Yamim as a reference to the funds of the Terumas ha'Lishkah and not as a reference to the funds of Bedek ha'Bayis. The word "u'She'ar" in the verse does not mean "the remaining money," but rather it refers to the Terumas ha'Lishkah which is called "u'She'ar" since it has Shirayim. Accordingly, Rav ruled that the Klei Shares may be purchased only from funds of the Terumas ha'Lishkah.
(b) The SHITAH MEKUBETZES writes that RASHI has a different approach. Rashi understands that Rav does distinguish between ordinary money of Bedek ha'Bayis and leftover money of Bedek ha'Bayis. According to Rashi, when the Gemara questions Rav's ruling from the verse in Divrei ha'Yamim, it is not Rav Huna speaking, because if Rav Huna would have known that the verse states that Klei Shares may be purchased from the leftover funds of Bedek ha'Bayis he would not have asked Rav his question. Rather, Rav Huna was unsure how to interpret that verse. Rav answered that under normal circumstances money of Bedek ha'Bayis may not be used to purchase Klei Shares. However, leftover money from Bedek ha'Bayis may be used to purchase Klei Shares, as the Gemara proceeds to explain. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)