Implied question: You are forced to say that the end of the verse "Im Ason Yihyeh" refers to the law of Ason (execution), like it says "v'Nasata Nefesh [Tachas Nafesh]"!

Answer #1: In any case, Lo Yihyeh Ason connotes to him an actual fatality.

Answer #2: He suggests that also "Im Ason Yihyeh" refers to an actual fatality. He expounds "v'Nasata Nefesh...", i.e. money.

Question: We say in Sanhedrin (79b) that Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah is unlike Rebbi and unlike Rabanan. This shows that Tana'im argue with Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah! (Why can't we say that also R. Yochanan argues with him?)

Answer: Regarding other money, all agree to the Hekesh of Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah. They argue with him only about what he taught "whether he intends or does not intend";

This connotes whether he intends to kill the woman, or only to kill the man he fights with, but killed her. In every case he is exempt from the woman's value;

Regarding other money, he already taught that we do not distinguish between Shogeg and Mezid. Regarding this he argues with Rebbi and Rabanan;

According to Rebbi, if he intended to kill one person, and killed another, he pays money. According to Rabanan, he is killed. Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah exempts from Misah and money.

Question (R. Yitzchak): In Sanhedrin (84b), we say "this is fine for the opinion that holds like Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah. However, the opinion that disagrees..."

Inference: There is a Tana who argues!

Answer (R. Yitzchak): The opposing Tana is R. Chaga mi'Daroma, who brought a Beraisa, like we say in Bava Kama (42a);

It says that if two men intended for each other, even though the woman dies, they pay for the fetuses.

Inference: He does not hold like the Hekesh equating Shogeg to Mezid.

Implied question: Why does it say "does anyone [argue with Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah]"?!

Answer #1: This is because Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah is primary. He used to learn Beraisos of R. Chiya, who was his father, like is clear from Yevamos 65b;

Those Beraisos are primary. One may refute [an Amora from them, but not from a Stam Beraisa, for perhaps it is mistaken].

Answer #2 (Rashba): We ask from Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah because R. Yochanan establishes our Mishnah above (32b) when they did not warn him, and the Seifa says that Chayavei Misos are exempt;

Inference: Our Mishnah holds that Chayavei Misos Shogegin are exempt.

Suggestion: Perhaps the Seifa discusses when they warned him!

Rejection: If so, we should distinguish in Chayavei Malkiyos themselves [between whether or not he was warned. Why does the Seifa discuss Chayavei Misah?]

Implied question: We could have asked from our Mishnah!

Answer: We could have asked only from an inference. Therefore, we asked from Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah and relied on our Mishnah.

Based on this, we can say that [Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah] is totally unlike Rebbi and Rabanan.

Answer #3 (Rashba): R. Yishmael, son of R. Yochanan ben Brokah below (37b) is the Tana who argues with Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah. (In Tosfos 38a DH Aval, the Rashba explains that R. Yishmael holds that if one blinded someone and killed him through a different blow, he pays and is killed.)

Explanation #1: We must say that according to Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah, Lo Yihyeh Ason refers literally to a fatality. The verse Im Ason Yihyeh refers to Din Ason, e.g. when he intended for the woman;

If he did not intend for her, he is exempt from Misah and money according to Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah.

Explanation #2: The verse of Ason does not refer to the woman, rather, to the other man he intended to kill. The verse does not discuss when intended to kill this one, and killed someone else.

Implied question: In Sanhedrin (79b), we infer how R. Shimon, who exempts one who intended to kill this one, and killed someone else, explains the verses. We could have said like I explained!

Answer: There it infers according to R. Elazar, who holds that the verse discusses one who intended to kill this one, and killed someone else.

Assertion: [We need all of the following:] the verse Lo Yihyeh Ason, which teaches that he does not pay Demei Vlados together with Misah (execution);

The Drashah in Bava Kama (26a) "Alav" (a man whose ox killed pays Kofer, but not) a person [who killed], which teaches that we do not take money from a person and execute him for murder alone;

The verse "Lo Sikchu [Kofer]", from which we expound that we do not take money from him and exempt him. All of these are needed.

Implied question: Why couldn't we learn from the Hekesh of Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah?

Answer: Rashi explained below (38a) that we could not learn from "Makeh Behemah" to exempt from money. Just the contrary! We should learn from there to obligate money, for one who strikes an animal is liable [to pay]!

Therefore, the Torah needed to write all of them.

Explanation: We learn as follows. One who hits an animal, we do not distinguish what is written about him, i.e. liability [to pay]. He is liable in every case;

Also one who strikes a person, all matters of exemption from money that are written about him, we do not distinguish between Shogeg or Mezid, [damage while] ascending or descending, [between with intent or without intent];

"Between Shogeg and Mezid" refers to other money together with Misah. "Whether ascending or descending", in every case we do not take money from him and exempt him, like we say below;

"Whether with intent or without intent" refers to paying the woman's value.

Question: Here, Rava does not have the Gezeirah Shavah "Rasha-Rasha", and also R. Yochanan [does not];

Also below (37a), we require one verse for Misah and money, and one for lashes and money. We do not learn lashes and money from Misah and money through a Gezeirah Shavah "Rasha-Rasha";

The Stam Gemara in Makos (5b), regarding that Edim Zomemim are not killed until there is a final verdict based on them (their testimony) asks "what is the source for Chayavei Malkiyos?", and says that we learn from "Rasha-Rasha"!

There is also a Beraisa in Sanhedrin (33b) regarding capital cases, we return [to reconsider] for Zechus, but not for Chov (to vindicate one who was convicted, but not vice-versa). We ask "what is the source for Chayavei Malkiyos?", and say that we learn from "Rasha-Rasha", and a Beraisa supports this.

Also R. Yehudah expounds in Bava Kama (86b) regarding "and so R. Yehudah exempted", i.e. he exempts a blind person from exile, lashes and Misas Beis Din;

He learns there Chayavei Misos Beis Din from "Rotze'ach-Rotze'ach", and Chayavei Malkiyos from Rasha-Rasha;

Rabanan argue with him, but not because they do not learn Rasha-Rasha. Rather, they obligate [a blind person], like Chayavei Misos Beis Din.

Answer: Everywhere, Rava and R. Yochanan have the Gezeirah Shavah Rasha-Rasha regarding a matter that pertains to the lashes themselves;

However, here, regarding the Petur of money that is with the lashes, and also below, we do not learn Rasha-Rasha.

Explanation: This is because clearly, the verse says Rasha regarding lashes - "Im Bin Hakos ha'Rasha."

Implied question: Why does [Rava] expound Makeh-Makeh?

Answer: It is because it is written regarding payment - "Makeh Behemah Yeshalmenah."

Answer (cont.): Abaye has the Gezeirah Shavah everywhere. The Sugya below is like Rava, unlike Abaye.

Abaye establishes the verse to discuss Misah and lashes, like R. Meir. He does not need a verse for lashes and money, for he learns from Rasha-Rasha.

Question: Why doesn't R. Yochanan expound Makeh-Makeh? This is a Beraisa in Bava Kama (83b)!

Answer: He holds like the other Tana'im there, who do not expound Makeh-Makeh. Rather, they learn from other verses that we do not literally punish an eye for an eye.

Alternate text: Some texts say "and adjacent to this it says..." We do not learn from a Gezeirah Shavah, rather, from Semichus (adjacency).

Support: He abandoned the verse "Makeh Behemah Yeshalmenah", and used a different verse.

Retraction: However, we ask in Bava Kama (83b) 'why do you learn from "Makeh Behemah"? Learn from "Makeh Adam"!' This connotes that it is a Gezeirah Shavah.

Implied question: If so, why did we retract from the first verse?

Answer #1: Because we needed to retract from "Makeh Adam" (the end of the verse "Makeh Behemah..." and bring "Ki Yiten Mum ba'Amiso", we retract also from "Makeh Behemah Yeshalmenah" and bring "Makeh Nefesh Behemah", which is next to [Ki Yiten Mum].

Answer #2: We need the first verse ("Makeh Behemah Yeshalmenah") like Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah's Beraisa below;

Even the one who argues [with Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah] needs the verse to teach that just like one who wounds an animal for Refu'ah is exempt, like one who wounds a man [for Refu'ah], like we say in Sanhedrin (84b).

Question: We need this, for from here we learn that one who wounds another pays, in Bava Kama (83b)!

Answer: This Sugya is like the other Tana'im there, who learn from another verse that one who wounds another, pays.

Question: If so, why do we need the Hekesh?

Answer: It teaches that we equate descending and ascending. We cannot distinguish these regarding Shabbos.

Question: Also on a weekday, we can say that while hitting the animal, he killed a person and they did not warn him for the person!

And even on Shabbos, we can say that they warned him for the animal, but not for Shabbos!

Answer #1: In any case we learn properly. Just like one who strikes an animal, we do not distinguish whether he hit b'Shogeg or b'Mezid, also [one who strikes] a person, we do not distinguish whether he hit b'Mezid or b'Shogeg.

Answer #2: Since one who strikes a person discusses when he was warned, also one who strikes an animal discusses every case in which he was warned. Therefore, we cannot establish it on Shabbos, or when he killed a person along with the animal.

Question #1: Rav Papa can ask this against himself, for he holds above (34b) like Rabah! He said that if a thief stole a cow [before Shabbos and slaughtered it on Shabbos, he pays the fine]!

Question #2: He could answer like Ula (32a! Our Mishnah obligates a fine for Achoso Na'arah. He is lashed for Achoso Bogeres.)

Answer #1 (to Question #2 - Rashi): If he held like Reish Lakish, that Chayavei Malkiyos Shogegin are exempt, all the more so he argues with Ula [who obligates even Chayavei Kerisos when they are not lashed].

Rejection: This is unreasonable. Perhaps regarding other money he holds like Reish Lakish, but regarding that matter itself he pays money, and he is exempt from lashes, from the Gezeirah Shavah Tachas-Tachas!

Answer (to both questions): Even if Rav Papa holds like Reish Lakish, he could answer like Ula, like I explained;

However, he asked properly against Abaye, who holds unlike Ula, for [Abaye] establishes Tachas for a different Drashah.

Therefore, it is difficult for him (Abaye). If he holds like Reish Lakish, like whom does he establish our Mishnah?

Explanation: We cannot say that Mamzeres and Achoso are difficult, for you are forced to say that he (R. Nechunya) holds like R. Meir, since he said that Yom Kipur is like Shabbos;

[If he held that lashes exempt from money,] he should have said that Yom Tov is like Shabbos, and all the more so Yom Kipur!

Rather, surely he holds either like R. Meir, who says that one is lashed and pays, or like R. Yitzchak, who says that there are no lashes for Chayavei Kerisos.

Therefore, he did not mention Yom Tov, for we would not learn Yom Kipur from it, which has no lashes.

Since it is not like Rabanan, we do not establish it like R. Yitzchak, rather, like R. Meir, and you cannot ask from Mamzeres.

Explanation: He did not need to say "if he holds like Rabanan...", for [obviously] according to them, Mamzeres and Achoso are difficult.

Suggestion: Perhaps he can say that our Mishnah is like R. Akiva who holds that Edim Zomemim is a fine. He holds that Lokeh u'Meshalem, but not Mes u'Meshalem!

Rejection: According to R. Akiva we can say that he does not learn Edim Zomemim from Motzi Shem Ra, even though it is a fine from a fine, like I explained above (32a), and he properly holds like Rabanan that he is lashed and does not pay.

Note: It seems to me that Rabah could establish our Mishnah like R. Akiva, and say that R. Akiva holds that Lokeh u'Meshalem. Our Gemara answered differently, for it did not want to imply that we know that R. Akiva says so.

Question: According to Reish Lakish, R. Meir explicitly argues with R. Nechunya, for he establishes our Mishnah like R. Meir, and the Mishnah says that there is a fine for Chayavei Kerisos!

Answer: He (Rav Masnah, the Makshan) knew that [according to Reish Lakish,] R. Meir argues with him (R. Nechunya). However, it was difficult, for we cannot say that Rabanan (who say that Ein Lokeh u'Meshalem) argue with him;

However, according to R. Yochanan it is fine. (We can say that Rabanan argue with R. Nechunya.)

Alternate text: Some say that the text says "and not Ones", for also Pituy (enticement) is a fine.

Defense (of our text - Ri): The text ["Kenas"] is fine. It is proper to call Ones a fine more than Pituy, for Ones is forced to marry her (if she wants, and never divorce her).

Explanation #1 (Rashi): This is because she has Chezkas Be'ulah.

Objection (Ri): If so, how do we infer below that a regular minor has a fine? Perhaps the Beraisa teaches that a Mema'enes has no fine if he had Bi'ah with her when she was a Na'arah;

We infer [only] that a regular Na'arah has a fine!

Suggestion: We can also ask [against Rashi], why did it mention Mema'enes? It should have mentioned any woman who was married and divorced (she has Chezkas Be'ulah)!

Rejection: There is an opinion below (38a) that even if she became Mekudeshes and was divorced, she has no fine. (Had our Tana taught one who was married and divorced, we would not know that this is due to Chezkas Be'ulah. Perhaps he says that there is no fine even from Eirusin, even if she has Chezkas Besulah!)

Explanation #2 (Ri): The Beraisa means that she has no Kenas or Pituy if her husband raped or enticed her while she was married to him, before Mi'un, even though when she did Mi'un, it is revealed that she was not his wife.

Note: At the time she was his wife, and it was a Mitzvah to have Bi'ah with her. What is the Hava Amina to pay Kenas? (Also, who would marry a minor, if she can do Mi'un after Bi'ah and collect a Kenas?) Shirei Korban says that the Bi'ah was during Eirusin, before it was proper to have Bi'ah with her.

Support: Now, the inference below is proper, that a regular minor has a fine.

Question (Ri): It says below (36a) "perhaps the entire Beraisa is R. Meir. Regarding Mema'enes, he holds like R. Yehudah;

Since we discuss when her husband had Bi'ah with her when she is a Na'arah, she cannot do Mi'un. R. Yehudah (who sometimes permits a Na'arah to do Mi'un) agrees [that she cannot] if he had Bi'ah [with her in adulthood, which can make Torah Kidushin], like it says in Nidah (52a)!

Answer #1 (Ri): We discuss when he explicitly said that he has Bi'ah not for the sake of Kidushin (before every Bi'ah in adulthood. She can still do Mi'un afterwards, since there is no concern for Kidushin mid'Oraisa.)

Answer #2: Also, Pituy and Ones are not for the sake of Kidushin. R. Yehudah does not agree [that she cannot do Mi'un] after such a Bi'ah.

Question (Rashba): Why does it mention Pituy, based on how we establish it below to discuss a Na'arah? Every Na'arah Mefutah has no fine, for she pardoned it, even a Na'arah who does not do Mi'un!

Note: There is a fine for a Na'arah in her father's Reshus. R. Meir holds that the fines are only for Na'aros! However, a Mema'enes was already orphaned, or left her father's Reshus, before she married.

Answer: It mentioned that she has no Pituy, since it mentioned this regarding the others.

Note: The Hafla'ah says that this needed to be taught. Before Mi'un, Kenas did not apply, so it is as if she pardoned Davar she'Lo Ba l'Olam, which is invalid.