Explanation: This refers to a Kaparah through man (i.e. Galus).

Implied question: [Killing] through ascent is more lenient than through descent, like is proven in Makos (9a) regarding a Ger Toshav who is exiled due to [killing] a Ger Toshav!

Note: Killing through ascent is considered close to Ones. The murderer is not exiled, and the Go'el ha'Dam may not kill him. Rava says so there. It seems that Rav Chisda and Abaye disagree, but the Sugya favors Rava, and in any case we may ask according to Rava.

Answer: Whenever our Sugya mentions severe [Misos], this means only that there is no Kaparah for Shogeg.

Proof: The Gemara is not concerned that Skilah and Sereifah are more severe than the sword and choking.

Explanation: This is R. Chananel's text. We learn from Lo Yihyeh Ason only when he blinded his eye and killed him through this (blow), just like there, that with one blow he killed the woman and also the fetuses;

However, if he blinded his eye and killed him through another (blow) at the same time, no (rather, he pays money). Therefore, we need "Kol Cherem" to exempt him.

Question (Rashba): R. Yishmael the son of R. Yochanan ben Brokah does not expound the verse for this [answer of Rami bar Chama], that we do not take money from him and kill him;

Rather, he expounds that we do not take money from him and exempt him [from death]! (His Hava Amina was that Kofer applies to Misas Beis Din, just like it applies to Misah b'Yedei Shamayim.)

Answer #1: Perhaps [in the Beraisa, R. Yishmael] says "had the Torah not said [Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah's Hekesh, equating ascent and descent, we would have learned from "Kol Cherem" that we do not take money from him and exempt him from death.] (Shitah Mekubetzes DH v'Rashi)

Note: The three Drashos from v'Lo Sikchu Chofer, "Cherem" and "Kol Cherem" would teach this for murder through ascent, murder through descent, and light Misos that have Kaparah through Korban. We would say that he pays and is killed when these liabilities are due to separate actions done at the same time. However, now that we have the Hekesh, we do not need separate Drashos for ascent and descent, so a Drashah is free to teach that we do not take money and kill him.

Support: We find like this (he teaches "had the Torah not said...") in Sanhedrin (43a) and several places.

Answer #2 (Rashba): Here [Rami bar Chama] concludes according to Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah. However, R. Yishmael surely disagrees with Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah. (Therefore, he needs separate Drashos for ascent and descent.)

Observation: It says in Sanhedrin (84b) "this is fine for the opinion that holds like Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah. However, according to the opinion that does not hold like him, what does he learn from the Hekesh [of striking an animal and striking a person]?"

The Tana who argues with d'Vei Chizkiyah is R. Yishmael.

Observation: Below, we say that according to Rabah, who says that a fine is a Chidush (and even one who is executed pays it), he holds like the first Tana of R. Chananya ben Akavya (37b, who says that the verse teaches that there is no Erech for one sentenced to die);

We could have said that he holds like R. Yishmael [unlike Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah].

Explanation: We do not learn from the same Drashah. That Drashah (equating striking an animal and striking a person) has no relevance at all to blinding his eye and killing him through another action!

Rather, we infer that just like we expound "and not an eye and a life for an eye", similarly we expound "a life for a life, and not an eye and a life for a life."

If he blinded his eye and killed him through another action, this is not considered an eye and a life. Rather, it is merely a life;

Blinding his eye at the time he killed him has no significance, for in any case he will die. He merely killed him through great pain.

Question: Also this we learn from Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah above! Just like one who strikes an animal, we do not distinguish whether or not he blinded its eye and killed it through this, or killed it through another action...

Answer: "One who strikes a person and one who strikes an animal" connotes one blow.

Question: If he blinded his eye and killed him through another action, we should know that he is exempt from paying for the eye, even if he did not kill him, for at the time he blinded him, he was a Rodef, and one could kill him to stop him!

Answer: The case is, one could have stopped him through maiming one of his limbs, so there was no Heter to kill him.

Question: This implies that if he killed him and tore his (the victim's) silk, he is obligated. We cannot exempt him due to Lo Yihyeh Ason, and not due to Nefesh Tachas Nafesh, for this is money and a life in place of money and a life!

Above (30b), Abaye exempted a Zar who ate his own Terumah and tore another's silk!

Answer: Really, we learn all of them from Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah. The Gemara means "also this we learn from the other Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah." (Maharsha - one pays for an animal, whether he blinded it and killed it, or killed it and tore silk. Likewise, one who hit a person is exempt, whether he blinded him and killed him, or killed him and tore silk. The Tartzan wanted to say that Kol Cherem teaches about one who blinded... We asked that this cannot be, for in any case we learn this from the other Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah.)

I.e. you are forced to say that we do not need "Kol Cherem" for this. Rather, all of it we learn from Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah, that he is exempt;

If we needed the verse to exempt him, even without Kol Cherem we would exempt him from the other [Drashah of] Tana d'Vei Chizkiyah.

Question: Why didn't he answer that we need Kol Cherem for one who killed another and tore silk? (He should grant the Makshan's assumption that we cannot learn from the Hekesh, rather, from Nefesh Tachas Nafesh (like Tosfos said in DH Ha), and say that it is needed to teach about silk - Maharsha.)

Answer: "Kol Cherem Lo Yipadeh" connotes money due to the blow that caused his death.

Implied question: In our Mishnah, we bring the verse Lo Yihyeh Ason, and here we learn a fine from Kol Cherem!

Answer #1: This is because our Mishnah encompasses all Chayavei Misos (and exempts them from all payments, not only Kenas). It teaches "everyone who is liable to die [does not pay Mamon]."

Answer #2: Our Mishnah is like the first Tana of R. Chananya ben Akavya.

Explanation: We would not exclude a Be'ulah, like it connotes below.

[In this suggestion] R. Akiva would expound a Gezeirah Shavah from a verse needed l'Gufei (for the law itself), i.e. the first mention of Besulah, i.e. of Ones and of Mefateh;

However, ha'Besulos he expounds for Kesuvah for Besulos. It cannot be expounded for the Gezeirah Shavah or any inclusion;

Na'ar Na'arah ha'Na'arah are extra, and the Hei in ha'Besulos. We expound one for Chayavei Aseh, one for Chayavei Lavin and Kerisus, and there are three inclusions - the Hei in ha'Besulos, and Na'ar Na'arah ha'Na'arah. (Above (29b), Tosfos concluded like Rashi, that we expound an extra "Na'arah", and the prefix Hei. It would be better if the text here said "Na'arah Na'arah ha'Na'arah.")

One teaches Abaye's law (if she died before the rapist was brought to trial, he is exempt), one is for Chayavei Aseh, and one is for Chayavei Lavin and Kerisus,

If R. Akiva held that one [Besulah] is l'Gufei without the Gezeirah Shavah, we would exclude Be'ulah from the one that is l'Gufei!

Implied question: Regarding Ones, there is only one Besulah, which is l'Gufei! (In truth, how does he know to exclude a Be'ulah regarding Ones?)

Answer: From the Gezeirah Shavah to Mefateh we learn Besulah, and not Be'ulah, just like we learn Mefateh from Ones regarding Na'arah, which is not written regarding Mefateh.

Question: He should ask that R. Akiva should say that both of them are l'Gufei, and not for the Gezeirah Shavah!

Answer: The Gemara knew that one of them is for the Gezeirah Shavah, since the verses do not specify regarding Shekalim and 50. (Without a Gezeirah Shavah, we would not know the size of the fine. Regarding Mefateh, there is a Drashah for Shekalim, but not for how many. Regarding Ones it says 50, but not of which coin);

Therefore, he asks that he should say oppositely (learn the Gezeirah Shavah from Besulah, and not from Asher Lo Orasah), and does not suggest that both are l'Gufei .

Support: We find like this in Sanhedrin (16a). It says "and a false prophet [is judged] only in the [Great] Sanhedrin of 71. What is the source of this?"

Citation (16a): R. Yosi bar Chanina says, we learn from [a Gezeirah Shavah] "Hazadah-Hazadah" from Zaken Mamrei.

Citation (cont.) Question: Hazadah is written regarding death. A Sanhedrin of 23 suffices to kill him!

Citation (cont.) Answer (Reish Lakish): Rather, we learn from [a Gezeirah Shavah] "Davar-Davar" from his (a Zaken Mamrei's) rebellion.

Question: How did R. Yosi b'Ribi Chanina want to learn from "Hazadah-Hazadah"?

Answer: We must say that he knew that there is a Gezeirah Shavah, but he did not know from which words, and he said from reasoning that we learn from "Hazadah-Hazadah."

Explanation: The inference "but if she was engaged" is false.

Question: In Yevamos (70a), we learn that an Arel may not eat Terumah from a Gezeirah Shavah of Toshav v'Sachir from Pesach;

"Toshav v'Sachir Lo Yochal Bo" is written regarding Pesach for the Gezeirah Shavah, even though it is not true!

Toshav v'Sachir (an Eved Ivri acquired for six years, or until Yovel) eats Korban Pesach, like it says there, for his master does not own his body (he is a proper Yisrael).

Summation of question: There we uproot the verse from its simple meaning more than here! (There, the simple meaning is false. Here, the inference is false. Why do we question this here, but not there?)

Answer (R. Tam): That Toshav v'Sachir refers to Arelim (Nochrim). Therefore, they do not eat.

It is clear that it does not refer to a Toshav Yisrael, for a [Yisrael's] master does not own his body (so surely, he eats Pesach).

Rather, surely he is an Arel. It was written to be free [for the Gezeirah Shavah. Another verse explicitly forbids an Arel.]

Question: What is his question? Now, we do not uproot the verse from its simple meaning!

If he does not need it l'Gufei, all the more so this is even better, for the Gezeirah Shavah is free.

Answer (Ri): The Gemara means that an Arusah is Chayav Skilah. Since we do not need it for anything, only for the Gezeirah Shavah, it should have explicitly written 'Asher Lo Arusah';

Why did it change, and write Asher Lo Orasah? We could err, and infer that if she was engaged [and then divorced], the fine is hers!

Granted, if there were any Chidush in an Arusah, it would be fine that the Torah changed the word. We would say that it changed and wrote Orasah to expound the Gezeirah Shavah, and the simple meaning is for the Chidush;

However, now [that we say that there is no Chidush] why [did it change]?!

Question: Below (45b), regarding [a Na'arah Me'orasah who] was Mezanah and later became a Bogeres, who is stoned, we expound "the Na'arah - that she was already" (even though now she is a Bogeres. We should similarly expound Avi ha'Na'arah - that he was already, even though now he is Avi Mesah!)

Answer: There, we expound from the verse's context, and also here from the verse's context;

There, surely the verse comes to obligate. If it came to exempt her, it should not say anything, and I would know that she is not stoned, for she is not a Na'arah;

Here, regarding the obligation to pay a fine, we do not need a verse. From reasoning, he is liable based on [her status] at the time of the Bi'ah, and we cannot exempt him without paying anything.

Therefore, the verse comes to exempt him.

Question #1: How can we say that she bequeaths a fine to her son? One does not bequeath a fine to his son, like we say below (42b)!

Question #2: Also below (in our Sugya), it says Yesh Beger b'Kever, and the father (his right to collect) is uprooted;

If one bequeaths a fine, even if Yesh Beger b'Kever, the father is not uprooted, and he has due to inheritance (he inherits his daughter)!

Answer (to Question #2): We could dispel this. The question [whether Yesh Beger b'Kever] pertains if she owed others;

If Yesh Beger b'Kever, the father is uprooted, even though one bequeaths a fine, and the creditors collect;

However, if Ein Beger b'Kever, the creditors do not collect anything, for the father is not uprooted, and the fine is his, and not hers.

Answer #1 (to both questions): Here we could have asked "one does not bequeath a fine to his son!" Rather, we asked a better question.

Answer #2: Ri establishes the question here to discuss Boshes and Pegam, which are Mamon, and he can bequeath them.

Implied question: A Mishnah (below 41b) says that if she did not stand in judgment until the father died, she receives them. This refers also to Boshes and Pegam, for it says "them".

Inference: [Since they do not go to his sons, this implies that] one cannot bequeath Boshes and Pegam!

Answer (Ri): Regarding this, surely Boshes and Pegam are equated to Kenas, for it says "Tachas Asher Inah", which connotes that there is [also] Boshes and Pegam. The one who receives this (Kenas) receives this (Boshes and Pegam);

However, for other matters they are not equated. One pays Boshes and Pegam through his own admission, but he does not pay Kenas through his admission.

Question (Rivam): We say in Bava Kama (71b) "the Torah said to pay five cattle [for one that he stole, and slaughtered or sold], and not five half-cattle" (e.g. if a partner stole from partners and sold it, and admitted to one of them, which exempts him from half the fine);

Citation (71b - Question - Mishnah): If he stole from his father and slaughtered or sold, then his father died, he pays four and five.

Citation (cont.): When the father dies, he inherits his share [and is exempt for his share], yet he pays four and five [for his brothers' share]!

Citation (cont.) Answer: The case is, he stood in judgment. (After Beis Din obligated him, his father died.)

Inference: If not that we expound "five cattle, and not five half-cattle", the Mishnah would be fine. We would not need to establish it when he stood in judgment. This shows that one bequeaths a fine to his sons!

Answer: We can reject this. We could have said "[also] according to you, [who hold that one pays five half-cattle, the Mishnah is difficult]"!

Question: We conclude there that in the morning, (Rav Nachman retracted and said that) he pays five cattle, and [sometimes] even five half-cattle.

Citation (72a - Question): What is the difference between the Reisha and the Seifa?

Explanation: It says that if he stole from his father, and his father died, and afterwards he slaughtered or sold, he is exempt.

Citation (cont.) Answer: In the Reisha, we apply "and he slaughtered it" totally b'Isur. In the Seifa, we do not apply "and he slaughtered it" totally b'Isur (for he inherited part).

Inference: If we would say that he slaughtered it totally b'Isur, he would be liable, even though he did not stand in judgment, for one bequeaths a fine to his sons!

If he stood in judgment, he would not be liable a fine, for he slaughters or sells his own [animal]!

Answer #1 (Ri): The case is, he stood in judgment, and they said "you are obligated to give to him." If he slaughters afterwards he is liable, like it says in Bava Kama (106b).

Answer #2 (Ri ha'Lavan): The case below (42b) discusses Korban Shevu'ah;

The Sugya there means "I agree to you regarding Korban Shevu'ah that the Torah exempted him due to "v'Chichesh ba'Amiso b'Fikadon." I said that it is money, i.e. that one bequeaths it to his sons;

If they would claim from him after their father died a fine that he owed to their father, i.e. they he took him to judgment and he was obligated, and he denied and admitted...

Since when it fell to the heirs it was already Mamon, since he already stood in judgment, and he could not admit and exempt himself...

If so, this is like a deposit of the verse, and he is liable Korban Shevu'ah.

The Gemara asked from [the Mishnah, in which] R. Shimon says [that if she did not collect until the father died, she keeps the payments]. It belongs to the brothers!

Explanation: If it did not belong to the brothers, how is one who denies liable Korban Shevu'ah due to their claim? They have no claim against them!

Rather, this shows that it belongs to the brothers. We conclude that Rabah said that it is Mamon to bequeath it to his sons regarding other fines [but not Ones u'Mefateh, which R. Shimon discusses], regarding liability for Korban Shevu'ah.

We conclude that we need "v'Chichesh..." for when she stood in judgment and became a Bogeres, and afterwards she died. He (her father) inherits from her;

In any case, it is primarily called a fine regarding her and him. It is unlike other fines, which one bequeaths to his sons. Regarding his sons, it was not a fine at all;

Question: However, the words "to bequeath it to his sons" connote unlike this Perush (see Tosfos Bava Kama 72a DH Seifa).