Question: This is difficult. What is the Gemara's question? Being that she does not yet have the field, this condition should indeed be valid just as a prospective husband can state when his wife is still betrothed that he will not have anything to do with her property (see Gemara 83a and Rashi there DH "b'Kosev Lah")!

Answer: I say that the Gemara's question is valid, as it is akin to him writing this when she is married to him (not only betrothed).

This is not like a case where the woman is only betrothed at all. A woman who is betrothed can still sell her properties, and her sale is valid. In this case he cannot sell the property, as without her withdrawal she always has a right to seize the property whenever she wants.

Implied Question: Regarding a married woman, Rav Yosef stated earlier (83a) that even if a husband makes a Kinyan on the statement that he will not have anything to do with her property the Kinyan is useless. [Why, then, is our Gemara saying that a Kinyan on this phrase is effective?]

Answer: The case there was of a married woman, where the husband and wife's possession is linked far more than a purchaser and a woman (thought they are also somewhat linked in our Mishnah, as apparent from the previous Tosfos).

Implied Question: One cannot answer that the case is where he bought the field from the woman first. This would mean the transaction is valid, as stated at the end of this Mishnah (Gitin 55b) that if he buys from the woman and then from her husband the sale is valid.

Answer: This is because our Mishnah clearly implies that she only write this after her husband sold the field. This is evident from the Mishnah's terminology "and he sold the field and she wrote etc."

Explanation: The opinion that we do not say that a woman can claim she was merely making her husband happy is Rebbi Meir's opinion.

Rebbi's Opinion: Rebbi explained to us that we must say that when the Beraisa stated "she wrote to the first one and she did not sign," it is including another teaching.

One could have suggested that when the woman signed for the second person, it wasn't that she was admitting to the sale but just making her husband happy. This would be further suggested by the fact that she didn't sign for the first person.

2. We still say that she loses her Kesuvah. This would be certainly so if she signed the document in general for one buyer (without her first writing and then not signing for someone else).

Question: This is difficult to me. Rav Ashi concludes later that both Mishnayos are according to Rebbi Meir. Rebbi Meir only said his law by two purchasers. [This is because it is clear she was not interested in making her husband happy, as she did not sign for the first person.]

Why did Rav Ashi move away from the original logic that there is more reason to say she loses her Kesuvah when there is only one buyer than when there is two buyers (as we stated above in the name of Rebbi)?

He should have said that both Mishnayos are in accordance with the opinion of Rebbi Yehuda. Both cases would be talking about two purchasers where she can say it is apparent she was only trying to make her husband happy. In a case where there is one purchaser Rebbi Yehuda would agree that this claim is invalid. [In this way, the Gemara's assumed logic can stay the same and Rav Ashi can give a similar answer that the Mishnayos are both according to Rebbi Yehuda.]

Tosfos' Opinion: It therefore seems to me that the Gemara originally held that logically the claim that she was just trying to make her husband happy was more solid in a case of one purchaser than in a case of two purchasers. However, the Gemara did not understand that Rebbi Meir held of this logic. [This was the novelty of Rav Ashi's answer that Rebbi Meir indeed held of this logic.] Despite the fact that Rebbi Meir introduces the Beraisa with a case specifically about two buyers, it was merely the way the Beraisa presented the case in order to tell us the novel teaching in the logic of Rebbi Yehuda.

Question: Some people ask a question on our Gemara from the Gemara in Gitin (58a). The Mishnah there states that if he bought the field from the man and then from the woman that the sale is invalid. The Gemara (58b) quotes Rav as understanding that the sale is invalid only if the woman would say "go take hold of the land and acquire it." If the woman would actually write a sale document it would be valid. [Why, then, does our Beraisa indicate that her sale document would not necessarily make the sale valid?]

First Answer: Rebbi answered that the Gemara there was talking about a case where she wrote him a separate document (aside from that of the husband). Being that he could use her sale document even without that of her husband we cannot say she was merely making her husband happy.

The Gemara here is talking about a case where she merely signed her husband's sale document. Being that the buyer cannot take out a sale document that came solely from her without taking out that of her husband (as they are on the same document) she can certainly claim that she was only making her husband happy.

Second Answer: Rebbi also told us (another answer) that both Gemaros may even be discussing the document of the husband. The difference may be (that the Gemara in Gitin is talking about a case) where she herself wrote that she is selling the field to purchasers.

However, our Gemara that states that "she signed for him" implies that she merely waived the lien that she had on the land. This is essentially implied by "she signed for him," meaning that she merely approved the sale and did not protest.

Third Answer: Another answer given by Rebbi is that when the Gemara there says that this is only if she says "go and take the field and acquire it," but if she writes a sale document the sale is valid, it means that she both said "go and take etc." and she wrote a document. [In our Gemara, she did not do both.]

Question: This answer does not sit well with me. The Gemara there asks a question on Rav from the Beraisa that states that if someone buys the property from the man and then the woman, the sale is invalid until she writes that the sale includes Achrayus. This implies that not just a document, but also Achrayus is necessary (like the position of Shmuel there, unlike Rav)! The Gemara therefore suggests that this Beraisa shows that Rav is incorrect. [The Gemara answers that the Beraisa means a document must be written.]

Why would the Gemara think that the Beraisa shows Rav is incorrect? If Rebbi's last answer is true, the Gemara could have answered that the Beraisa that states that Achrayus is required is when he does not say "go and take etc." Rav only said that a document helps in conjunction with "go and take etc."

According to the first answer of Rebbi, this question is not so difficult.

Different Text: (The following is an old text of the Gemara.) "Our Mishnah is discussing a case where she wrote (signed) for someone else." This means that she only signed for a second purchaser.

This implies that the husband sold to the first person (a different field - this insertion is taken out by the Maharshal), and she did not sign the document.

Proof: The Gemara is using the terminology of the Mishnah (that it depends on her "writing"). If the "someone else" referred to in our Mishnah is talking about the first purchaser (see Rashi DH "bidi'Kasav") and we have the text "and (or when) he wrote," it should have more accurately said "when he sold it someone else."

Rashi's Opinion: Rashi's explanation is that this entire statement is made by Rava.

Question: This is not clear to Rabeinu Tam. If this were the case, the Gemara should have said "rather there he causes himself to lose.

Rabeinu Tam's Opinion: It must be that the Gemara answers Rava's proof by saying that in Rava's case the creditor caused himself to lose money, as he knew that the law was that he must pay.

This is different than the case involving the Kesuvah of a woman where it does not seem as fitting to say that she made herself lose money. At the time that she signed over the field for her Kesuvah, it was not clear that she would ever really collect it, as a woman does not collect a Kesuvah when her husband is alive (unless she gets divorced).

Rabeinu Chananel's Opinion: This was also the explanation given by Rabeinu Chananel.

Implied Question and Answer: There are many places in the Gemara where the Gemara only bothers to answer the second question (or one out of two questions, see Tosfos in Shabbos 10a DH "Terichusa"). [Tosfos addresses this because while according to Rashi the Gemara has no loose ends, according to Rabeinu Tam the Gemara seems to ignore the first proof of Rava. Tosfos therefore says that this is part of the Gemara's style, and is not a reason to disprove Rabeinu Tam's explanation.]

Additionally, the first question of Rava wasn't that difficult anyway, as according to Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak the word "Ibdah" - "she lost" doesn't imply that she lost her Kesuvah totally, but rather only from the second buyer. [Rav Nachman simply argues on Rava that his first question is incorrect.]

Question: This seems difficult. We should simply leave it in the hands of the buyer in the first place. Why should we rule that things should be done that are opposite the resulting Halachah? Why should we bother ruling that the husband can take it away from the buyer, the second person (in-line after the wife) can take it from the husband, and the buyer should then take it from the second person?

Rebbi's Answer: Rebbi answered that the difference is when the husband will take the field away from the buyer first, and then he will reach a compromise with the second person (where the second person will never own the property). In such a case, the buyer will lose.

Question: This does not seem correct. The Gemara asks, what is the difference between Abaye's law and the case of our Mishnah where each could technically keep collecting from each other forever? The Gemara answered that there each had a loss, but in this case only the buyer has a loss.

What did the sages help with this decree (that the buyer should keep the field the second time around)? Being that the husband and second person can make a compromise avoiding the buyer, the buyer will end up losing anyway!

Tosfos' Answer: It appears to me that Abaye does not really mean that the ruling in this case is that the husband should first seize the field from the buyer etc. Rather Abaye is saying that being that if the husband would seize the field from the buyer the second person would be able to seize it from him and the buyer could then seize it from him, we originally decree that the buyer simply keeps the field.

The reasoning behind this decree was because the buyer is losing money, and (the sages therefore decided that) the husband is not considered able to seize the field from him (as he is deemed like an inheritor, see Tosfos in Bava Basra 139a, DH "Hasam").

Question: This is apparently difficult. Why does the Mishnah (according to the interpretation of the Beraisa) have to say all of these possible cases?

Answer: These cases are necessary. If we would try to derive this first case from the Mishnah, I would think that the first wife can take the field from the second wife because the second wife is not really losing, as she can collect from her husband. The first wife can therefore collect because her lien is first, and she had the right to take the field. However, a case involving a creditor and a buyer would not involve similar logic, and we therefore might think the Halachah should be different.

If the Mishnah would have merely stated a case of a creditor taking from a buyer, this might have been in order that the door should not be shut in the face of borrowers (as potential lenders will be deterred from lending if they cannot collect in this fashion). However, a woman who is a creditor collecting from a buyer does not involve similar logic. This is why both cases are necessary (see Maharsha and Maharshal for a more in-depth explanation of the logic employed by Tosfos).

Observation: The correct text is without a Vav (in front of the word "Ma'aseh").

Proof: If the text would read "u'Ma'aseh Yadeha Shelahen" with a Vav, how could the Gemara ask if the correct text beforehand is "Nizones" - "is supported" or "ha'Nizones" - "that is supported?" The text would have to be "Nizones" as the Mishnah states "u'Ma'aseh Yadeha Shelahen" (which makes no sense if the word would be "ha'Nizones"). [The Gemara's question entertaining both possibilities proves that the word is "Ma'aseh" not "u'Ma'aseh."]

Question: Tosfos asks that this seems obvious. Even her husband is not obligated to bury her in a case where he does not inherit her Kesuvah (i.e. if she sold it to someone else), as we rule that her burial is in place of her Kesuvah.

Answer: The lesson that a woman's burial is in place of her Kesuvah is exactly the lesson that the Mishnah is teaching, being that it was never stated in any other Mishnah.

Question: However, it is difficult why the Mishnah did not say "and they are not obligated to redeem her (from captivity)." [This is a similar Halachah (redemption in exchange for fruits of her possessions) that is not stated in a Mishnah.]

If it is because the Mishnah wants to specifically say that the inheritors of the Kesuvah are obligated in her burial, this is also obvious, as who else is supposed to bury her?

One might say that the Mishnah wants to teach us (a special Halachah only concerning burial) that the inheritors of the Kesuvah of a Yevamah are obligated to bury her and not the people who inherit her Nichsei Milug. [This is a case where the logic directly above (1) would not apply, as there are two parties benefiting from her inheritance. Which one is obligated to bury her? The Mishnah would be teaching us that it is specifically those who inherit her Kesuvah.]

If this is the case, why does the Gemara earlier have to deduce this from our Mishnah's statement "her inheritors the inheritors of a Kesuvah?" The Gemara there deduces that the Mishnah is talking about a widow with two sets of inheritors.

The Gemara should merely learn that this is true since the Mishnah states that the inheritors have to bury her altogether! [This is unnecessary, and would be reason enough to deduce that when she has two sets of inheritors those who inherit the Kesuvah must bury her. The Mishnah did not have to make it so obvious by saying "her inheritors, the inheritors of her Kesuvah."]

Answer: It was necessary to say the case of the inheritors to teach us that even when the widow did not get a Kesuvah, for example if the estate only has movable objects, they are not obligated to bury her.

This is despite the fact that it is like they are inheriting her Kesuvah, as they do not have to pay her Kesuvah.

Observation: The Gemara's question is not regarding the Mishnah's position on this argument, in order to find out the correct Halachah. This is something that is argued by Rav and Shmuel earlier (54a).

Additionally, how can our Gemara later deduce our Mishnah's position from Shmuel? Shmuel ruled like the Anshei Galil (54a). [Accordingly (see Tosfos Ha'Rosh), how is it possible that the proof from Shmuel results in the Mishnah being interpreted like the Anshei Yehudah?]

It seems to me that this is the explanation of our Gemara. Does our Mishnah say "Nizones" like the Anshei Galil, which would mean that she is given food from the estate against the will of the orphans, and therefore they keep her Masei Yadayim?

However, according to the Anshei Yehudah that she receives food because the orphans give her food of their own free will, and they can stop doing so if they choose, perhaps her Masei Yadayim does not go to her?

Or does the Mishnah state "ha'Nizones" like the Anshei Yehudah? This would mean that even according to the Anshei Yehudah that hold that it is optional for the orphans to give her food, they would still receive her Masei Yadayim. [Accordingly, the entire question in the Gemara is whether the Anshei Yehudah would say that the orphans receive her Masei Yadayim even if they do not give her food, based on the wording of the Mishnah.]