Rashi's Opinion: This that Rashi explained that the Gemara is talking about a messenger, implies that it means even a regular messenger.

First Question: Rabeinu Tam has difficulty with this approach. Previously, Rav Nachman stated that if a messenger makes a mistake the sender can say that "I sent you to help me (not to hinder me)."

Second Question: He additionally asked that in Kidushin (42b) Rav Nachman states that if brothers split an estate they are considered as purchasing from each other. If the division is less than one sixth off, the purchase is valid.

Rava says that less than one sixth of a discrepancy means that the division is still valid only if there was no messenger made at the time to take care of the division. However, if a messenger was made to do the division (and he came out on the losing end of less than one sixth of market value), the division is invalid. This is because the brother can claim "I sent you to help me not to hinder me." This clearly implies that a messenger's mistake, even when less than one sixth, makes the deal invalid.

Answer: Rabeinu Shmuel pushes the question aside by saying that the Gemara there was only stating what Rava himself thought. Rav Nachman does not actually hold this way.

Rabeinu Tam's Opinion: Rabeinu Tam explains that our Gemara is talking about a messenger of Beis Din, who has much more strength (than a regular messenger). His sale is valid unless he makes a mistake of one sixth.

Tosfos' Opinion: It appears to me that our Gemara is discussing a regular messenger. When Rav Nachman said earlier that the sender can say "I sent you to help me," he was discussing a case where the messenger made a mistake of more than one sixth.

The Gemara in Kidushin can be understood in the following manner. This that less than a sixth means that the sale is still valid and the amount overcharged does not have to be given back, is only if a messenger was not made.

However, if a person makes a messenger he can claim "I sent you to help me" and the amount overcharged must be returned. The sale is still valid.

When Rav Nachman states that a messenger is like judges, he means that the sale is still valid. However, the amount overcharged must be returned. Judges also must return this amount, as Beis Din indeed has no more power in this regard than a regular messenger.

The Gemara is asking that this implies that when a messenger makes a mistake, we say his action is still valid. Here too we should have said that when he makes a mistake of less than one sixth his action is valid.

Implied Question: She did have a Beis Din of regular people evaluate it, as is apparent from the Gemara in Bava Metzia (32a).

Answer: However, they are considered like one person.

Observation: The following text in the Gemara in Kidushin (42b) is a comment on Rav Nachman's statement. When we say that overcharging more than one sixth negates the deal, this is only if the brothers did not say "let us split our possessions with an estimate from Beis Din."

However, if they said "let us split our possessions with an estimate from Beis Din," the deal stands. This is apparent from the Mishnah that states that if judges estimate possessions for a sale and they undercharge or overcharge one sixth, their sale is invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says their sale is valid. The Gemara's text (ibid.) quotes Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel as a proof to this statement.

First Question: Rabeinu Tam has difficulty with this text. Our Gemara says that Rav Nachman says the Halachah follows the opinion of the Chachamim!

Second Question: Additionally, the Gemara concludes later that when it said that if a person overcharges exactly one sixth the deal is valid and he must simply return the amount overcharged, that was only regarding a sale of possessions. However, in a sale of land this is inapplicable, as there is no Ona'ah in a sale of property. This implies that there is no Ona'ah when one overcharges exactly one sixth when selling property, but there is Ona'ah when overcharging more than one sixth in a sale of property.

Earlier I proved from the Gemara in Bava Metzia (108a) and from a Yerushalmi that there is no Ona'ah in a sale of property even when overcharging more than one sixth, until double the amount.

Rabeinu Tam's Opinion: It therefore appears to Rabeinu Tam that the correct text is that of Rabeinu Chananel, the Halachos Gedolos, and the Rif (as follows). This that you said that overcharging by one sixth of the value means that the deal is valid but the amount overcharged must be given back, is only if one of the brothers did not say that they are splitting the estate based on an evaluation of Beis Din.

However, if one of them said that we should split based on an evaluation of Beis Din, the sale is invalid. This is as it states in the Mishnah that if the judges evaluate and undercharge one sixth of the value etc., the sale is invalid. The proof is from the Rabbanan (not Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (as stated originally by Tosfos).

This that it says that overcharging more than one sixth invalidates a sale is only regarding a sale of movable objects. However, regarding a sale of land there is no Ona'ah, even when the amount overcharged is between more than one sixth until double the value.

Implied Question: If Rav Nachman would not have ruled that the Halachah is like the Chachamim there would not be any question from the fact that Rav Nachman said that a messenger is like a widow, even if we were talking about a messenger of Beis Din.

This is because it is not so applicable to say regarding a messenger the claim, "What is Beis Din's strength?" like it is possible to say regarding a guardian.

Rebbi's Explanation: Rebbi used to explain that the terminology of "choosing" indicates that they would do so without using a lottery.

If they used a lottery, how can "choosing" apply? Whatever lot he would get, that is what would be!

Based on this he would say that even something which can have the ruling of "you buy (my portion) or I will buy (your portion)," for example if both portions are necessary for either person, we can split amongst them if it is deemed correct in their eyes.

We see that a guardian was set up for orphans in order to divide their properties without an evaluation of Beis Din and without a lottery. Each guardian takes for his orphan a portion that he thinks is just in his eyes.

First Question: This does not seem correct to Rabeinu Tam. Is it difficult to cast a lottery?

Second Question: Additionally, the Gemara says afterwards "What can they protest? They can protest directions (location)." It should have said instead that they can protest regarding something where the ruling would normally be "you buy or I will buy."

Implied Question: This that Rebbi deduced from the terminology of "choosing" is incorrect, as by a lottery it is also possible to use a terminology of "choosing," that they should not divide the lots in a bad manner by giving one person two fields that are far away from each other.

Answer: Rebbi says that it is not difficult that the Gemara did not establish the case where they can protest when the choice presented was "you buy or I will buy."

Here, too, it would have been possible to say that they can protest when a mistake was made by less than one sixth. The Gemara merely wanted to include that they can even protest regarding the location of the field.

Observation: The Gemara in Bava Basra (106b) says that if two brothers split an estate and a brother then comes from overseas, Rav says the division is nullified and Shmuel says that it is shortened.

Rabeinu Shmuel explains that "shortening" means that each brother gives one third of his portion to this other brother who was left out of the original division.

The Gemara then asks on Rav who says that the division is canceled, if two out of three brothers/partners divide the partnership without the knowledge of the third partner, here too the division should be invalid.

Rashbam's Opinion: Rabeinu Shmuel explained that the Gemara's question is that their division cannot be declared invalid. This is apparent from Rebbi Aba's comment in Bava Metzia (31b) to Rav Safra, who divided his partnership with Issar without Issar's knowledge. He said to him, "go bring the three who you split it in front of." Alternatively, "bring two out of three (of the witnesses)."

First Question: This does not seem correct to Rebbi. How can Shmuel say that they should "shorten" their portions, implying that each brother should give whatever he wants from his portion? They took through a lottery, but he should be forced to take without a lottery whatever the other brothers want to give him?

Second Question: Additionally, this that it says that two of them go and split, according to Rabeinu Tam who says that "choosing" refers to a lottery, how is their division effective without the input of the third person?

Our Gemara implies that this only helps regarding orphans, as the power of Beis Din is strong in this regard.

One could attempt to make a distinction that this is only because these are orphans who are minors and none of them is trying to divide the estate. However, if one of them would specifically demand to divide the estate without the power of Beis Din, it is possible they would divide the estate.

It does not seem, however, that this is correct.

His proof from the story of Issar and Rav Safra is incomparable as that was talking about movable objects. However, concerning land where people might want land in a different location, there is no proof.

Rebbi's Opinion: Rebbi understands that "shortening" here means that if, for example, they had three fields. The brothers each took one whole field, and they split the third field using a lottery. When their brother arrives, they should make another lottery for all of the fields, and whichever field the brother draws that is what he should receive.

In this way the division would possibly not be nullified. If the third field would be the third brother's pick in the lottery, the first two brothers keep their original (whole) fields that they took.

Similarly, in the case where two brothers/partners split without the third, the case is where each took one field and they left the third for the third partner.

It is obvious that when the third person comes and they will cast a lot on all of the fields, if the third field is picked by the third person everyone else keeps what they originally chose.

Explanation: He was the grandson of Rebbi Parta the Great. Parta, the father of Rebbi Elazar, was his grandfather. [Tosfos seems to be saying that one should not read this all as one sentence, which would make the Parta of our Gemara the grandson of the grandson of Rebbi Parta the Great (see Maharsha).]

Explanation: The Gemara in Bava Metzia (20a) uses the expression "Igeres Shum" - "a letter of evaluation" and "Igeres Mazon" - "a letter of food support."

Rabeinu Tam used to say that since it does not use the word "Shtar" - "document" and instead uses "Igeres," even though we see that "Shtar" is commonly used as in "Shtar Chalitzah/Mi'unin/Beirurin," is because something is called an Igeres if it is sent from one Beis Din to another. This is the case when a letter is sent recording an evaluation or food support.

Implied Question: However, here that cannot be the explanation for why the term "Igeres" is used. [Why indeed is it used?]

Earlier, we find that a "letter of rebellion" is written regarding a woman who is betrothed (and rebels). [See Tosfos Yom Tov who explains that this is called an "Igeres Bikores" because a letter is sent in order that it should be read and hence publicized. A person might not want to buy something that is not being sold by its owner. This is therefore called an "Igeres," as one of its purposes is that everyone should know that Beis Din supports this sale.]

We can establish that the possessions and documents in question are, for example, dealing with a case where he set them aside for his wife's Kesuvah.

Alternatively, the case is where they were taken while her husband was still alive. Otherwise, both a woman (widow/divorcee) and a creditor would not be able to collect.

Observation: One should not deduce from here that this implies that she needs a Get, as is explained earlier (72b).

Observation: Don't say that a Shniyah (woman whom the Rabban forbade to marry) doesn't get food support after her husband dies, but is entitled to food support as long as they are married.

A widow who married a Kohen Gadol receives food support after he dies, but not when he is alive, in order that she should not be encouraged to stay married to him, as stated in Yevamos (85a). Certainly this Shniyah who does not receive food support when her husband dies does not receive it when he is alive!

Observation: One also shouldn't say that this Shniyah does not receive food support when her husband is alive, but she does receive it when he is dead, just like a widow who marries a Kohen Gadol (who then dies).

The Gemara in Yevamos (ibid.) explicitly states that a widow who marries a Kohen Gadol receives food support (after her husband dies), but a Shniyah does not.

Even when the Gemara in Yevamos (ibid.) states the widow receives food support, it must mean after her husband dies. Therefore, when Shniyah is contrasted as not having food support, it must mean after her husband dies (and certainly before her husband dies, as proven above).

Rashi's Explanation: In one place Rashi explains that this means what is left from her worn clothes.

First Question: Rebbi says that if this would be true, it should have said "her worn out clothes that are extant," as it said earlier (63b).

Second Question: Additionally, this must mean (the value of) the previous usage of her clothes and not the worn clothes that are left. This is evident from the Gemara later (101a). The Gemara says regarding a girl who does Mi'un that if the clothes are extant she can take both Nichsei Milug (the clothes themselves she takes out of the marriage) and Nichsei Tzoan Barzel (the value of the clothes when she brought them into the marriage, see Gemara in depth).

Explanation: Rav is understanding that this is part of the Mishnah (see Maharsha).

Implied Question: There is an opinion in Yevamos (34b) that Shmuel indeed made a decree regarding the promiscuity of a minor (that she must wait three months before she marries) as she can be confused with a mature girl. [According to this opinion, why shouldn't this apply here as well?]

Answer: Our case is different, as the fact that she does Mi'un shows everyone that she is a minor.