Implied Question: It is impossible to ask from the Gemara earlier (80a, on Chanan). The Gemara says that if someone goes down to his friend's field and plants his field without permission, his work is evaluated like that of a sharecropper and he must be paid. The same law applies if he rebuilds his friend's ruin. The owner must pay him for the benefit. [Accordingly, why doesn't Chanan say that the person who supported his friend's wife should be paid by his friend the amount that he benefited him by supporting his wife?]

Answer: In those cases the improvement is physical (a planted field or a built house), and it therefore makes sense that he should receive the benefit. However, here the person who supported his wife did not give him any tangible benefit. He merely saved him from the collection of someone to whom he owed money. This is like someone who chases a lion away from the property of his friend. Even though there is some benefit that his friend received by this action, he is not obligated to pay (as it not tangible benefit) as the Gemara concludes in Nedarim (33b).

Question #1: The Gemara in Bava Metzia (93b) says that a Shomer Chinam that should have chased away the lion by gathering other shepherds and with sticks.

The Gemara explains that a Shomer Chinam is only obligated to gather other shepherds and sticks for free, while a Shomer Sachar must even pay other shepherds to come. The Gemara concludes that he can collect the money that he used to pay the other shepherds from the owner. This implies that a Shomer Chinam could also pay other shepherds to come and receive his money back from the owner. Why? [According to our Gemara and the aforementioned Gemara in Nedarim (33b)] He is only someone who chased away a lion (and the owner can claim that he did not derive tangible benefit)!

Question #2: Similarly, the Gemara in Bava Metzia (31b) states that if someone was not working at his job which regularly pays him a Sela and instead was working on returning someone's lost object, he cannot tell the owner of the lost object to pay his salary of a Sela. Rather, he tells him to pay him like a worker who is getting paid for his specific job without having to do the actual work.

Rashi explains that this means that if he usually did difficult labor and gets paid good wages, we evaluate how much he would agree should be taken off of his wages and he could instead do an easy job like returning a lost object. This is what he should get paid. However, why should he get paid at all? Isn't this also like the case of chasing away a lion from his friend's property?

Opinion (Rabeinu Tam): According to the opinion of Rabeinu Tam that only someone who supported his friend's wife does not get his money back according to Chanan, as his wife could have minimized her expenses and gotten by anyway, there is no question. [Rabeinu Tam holds that even Chanan agrees that if someone pays back his friend's creditor, his friend must pay him back.]

Opinion (Rebbi): Rebbi says that according to the letter of the law he would certainly not have to pay, as implied. The sages merely decreed regarding retrieving a lost object that he should be paid to retrieve it, and that a Shomer Chinam should hire shepherds and get sticks in order to ward off the lion, and be compensated by the owner. This is even if the amount he has to pay is equivalent to the value of the animal, as the owner would rather have his trained animal (who listens to him than buy a new animal at the same price).

However, when someone merely pays the loan of his friend or supports his friend's wife, there is no reason for us to make a decree that they should be compensated by the creditor/husband.

For the same reason, the Gemara in Gitin (58b) states that if a Nochri takes away a field from a Jew due to money that he claims is owed to him by the Jew, or he simply is able to steal the Jew's land, there is no law of "Sikrikon" - " bandits." This means that if the land was in the Nochri's hands for twelve months and the original owner would like to get it back from the Jew who bought it from the Nochri, the Jew does not have to give one quarter of it back to the owner (as he would if it was stolen by Sikrikon). Rather, he must return the entire property.

Rebbi explains that this does not mean that he returns it for free, but rather that the original owner pays the Jew who bought the property from the Nochri whatever he paid the Nochri to buy it from him.

Rabeinu Gershon rules similarly in his responses. He explains that even though this is similar to a regular case of chasing away a lion, the original owner must pay the person who bought the field. The obligation is similar to that of the owner of a lost object paying someone to retrieve it, and an owner paying a Shomer Chinam to chase away a lion. Otherwise, nobody would save his friends field from the hands of Nochrim (who stole it from them). [This is the reason for the decree.]

This is unlike the explanation of Rashi in the Gemara in Gitin (ibid.) that the person must indeed return the field to the original owner (when it is not a case of Sikrikon) without receiving anything in return.

Question: The Mishnah in Bava Kama (115b) discusses a case where a river floods, causing both his donkey and his friend's donkey to be swept away. His donkey is worth one hundred and his friend's donkey is worth two hundred. Instead of saving his own donkey worth one hundred, he saved his friend's donkey worth two hundred. He only receives the amount he deserves for his saving. Why? Shouldn't the owner of the donkey have to pay him for giving up his own donkey and instead saving his donkey (i.e. the value of his donkey)?

Answer: Rebbi wanted to answer that in this case he does not receive the value of his donkey because the owner of the other donkey was present. The Chachamim only decreed that he should receive compensation when the owner was not there, not when he is there.

Question: This is difficult. If so, he should not even receive compensation for retrieving the lost object at all! The Mishnah in Bava Kama (58a) says that if someone's animal falls into a garden and subsequently has benefit from the garden, the owner must pay whatever benefit he derived from the fact that his animal was in someone's garden. The Gemara there quotes Rav as explaining that this is even true if the animal benefited while falling. One might think that the owner of the field is considered chasing away a lion from his friend's property (in this case cushioning the fall of his friend's animal with his field). Rav therefore teaches that the owner of the field has to pay whatever benefit he received from the field.

The Gemara there asks, perhaps we should indeed say the owner of the animal does not have to pay? The Gemara answers, there is a difference between a person who chases away a lion from his friend's property with his friend's knowledge (and he therefore does not get paid), and someone who does so without his friend's knowledge. Alternatively, a person who chases away a lion does not lose anything, as opposed to the owner of this field who is not in the same category because he lost some of what was growing in his field (the part that acted as a cushion for the animal).

The implication of the first answer is that if one chases away a lion from his friend's property with his friend's knowledge, even if he suffers a loss, his friend still does not have to compensate him. This is not possible, as implied by the Gemaros in Bava Metzia (31b, 93b quoted above).

This is what the Gemara actually means. If someone chases away a lion from his friend's property with his friend's knowledge and does not incur any expenses he does not get paid. If he does so without his friend's knowledge, and does not incur any expense there is clearly no reason that he should pay. Obviously, if the animal fell and did not ruin any fruit there is no reason for the owner of the animal to pay the field owner anything! Therefore, when the Gemara says that he is chasing away the lion without his friend's knowledge, it means that he is doing so because he has to, not because of his friend.

If someone is pressed to chase away a lion from the border of his friend's property, even if he does not incur any expense he must be paid for his efforts.

In the case in Bava Kama (115b, see above), if we will explain that the owner of the retrieved donkey does not have to pay the value of his rescuer's donkey because they were together, that means that the case is as if there is no loss. This means that the rescuer should not even receive his payment, being that he rescued the other person's donkey knowingly and he did not incur a loss.

Answer: It therefore seems to Rebbi that the reason that he does not pay for the rescuer's donkey is because the Chachamim simply did not institute that he should have to pay more than he benefited him. He only benefited him the amount of his wages for the rescue, as he could have found someone else to save his donkey for the same amount of money.

The Gemara must mean that he could indeed have save his donkey himself although it would be difficult, in order to prevent people from taking it as Hefker (see Tosfos ha'Rosh).

In Nedarim (33b), the Gemara establishes that the case is when they have both prohibited each other from having benefit from their possessions. This is why the benefit must go to Hekdesh, as the person returning the object cannot take the wages and the owner of the lost object cannot stop him (the one who returned the object) from taking the wages.

The Gemara (ibid.) states that the case can also be if the possessions of the one who returned the lost object are forbidden to the owner of the lost object, and not the other way around.

If the person returning the lost object does not want to accept payment, the owner of the lost object cannot stop him, and the benefit should go to Hekdesh.

Opinion #1 (Rashi): Rashi explains that this is even referring to money that is never collected in the end.

Question (#1): This is difficult to Rebbi. First of all, according to this definition the Mishnah should have merely said, "and whatever is supposed to be collected in the future," and nothing else, as this would include lost donations and donations that have not yet reached the Beis Hamikdash.

Question (#2): Additionally, the Mishnah in Shekalim (3b) quoted in Bava Metzia (58a) discusses a case where people of a city gave their Shekalim, which were subsequently stolen or lost from their messengers (to take the Shekalim to the Beis Hamikdash). The Mishnah states that if the Terumas ha'Lishkah was not yet taken before the case came to Beis Din, the messengers swear to the people of the city (that they were not negligent) and the people of the city must bring other Shekalim instead. However, if the Terumah had already been taken (when they came to Beis Din) the responsibility lies with Hekdesh (and the people do not have to pay again).

If the explanation is like Rashi, that even Shekalim that are not eventually collected are considered part of the Terumas ha'Lishkah, why do the people of the city have to replace the lost or stolen Shekalim? If it is just a Mitzvah to do so (but not obligatory), then the Halachah should be the same if the Terumas ha'Lishkah was already taken.

Question #3: Additionally, Rashi explained regarding the case of "Avud" that it is referring to someone who sent his money that was lost, and the case of "Gavuy" is where the money has been collected but has not yet arrived in the Beis Hamikdash.

This is (also) difficult, as if the Terumah works for someone whose donation is lost, it will certainly work for someone whose Shekel was collected and is merely awaiting transport to Yerushalayim! [Why would the Mishnah bother to state a case that is obviously included due to the case that it already mentioned?]

Opinion #2 (Tosfos): Rather it seems that the explanation of "Avud" is that reached the hands of the caretaker and then it was lost, and "Gavuy" is that the messenger had it and lost it after the Terumas ha'Lishkah was taken. If it was lost before the Terumas ha'Lishkah was taken, the owners must still take responsibility. The case of "future collection" refers to Shekalim that will actually be collected eventually.

This that the Gemara says here that a person who cannot give benefit to someone else can still pay his mandatory donation to the Beis Hamikdash, is only in a case where the person's shekel was originally lost or collected, and he therefore is not really obligated to pay.

Implied Question: [The Mishnah states that if someone is forbidden to benefit from someone else, that person can still pay his debt. When asked how this is possible, as he is giving benefit to someone who is forbidden to benefit from him, our Gemara said that the author of this statement must be Chanan. Chanan says in our Mishnah that someone whose wife was supported by another person while he was gone does not have to pay that person when he gets back. Why does this answer our question? Isn't this still a forbidden benefit whether we hold like Chanan or not?] Being that the person whose debt was paid off cannot be forced to pay his benefactor, even though this gives him benefit because he does not have to pay off the loan, it is not prohibited. This is because it is merely an indirect benefit through someone else paying his creditor.

This is comparable to the Mishnah in Nedarim (43a) that if someone cannot have benefit from his friend and he is starving, his friend can go to his usual storekeeper etc.[He tells him that his friend is starving and he cannot directly benefit him, and he doesn't know what to do. He then can give the storekeeper money, and the storekeeper can give goods to the starving man.] This is despite the fact that the starving man is clearly benefiting from his food. It is permitted in a similar manner to our case, as it is only an indirect benefit.

Implied Question: This is unlike someone who does work for someone who he is not allowed to benefit, even though he cannot demand the payment from the person he is working for.

Answer: In that case he is directly benefiting the person he is forbidden to give benefit (and it is therefore forbidden). However, in our case it is merely indirect benefit.

Implied Question: Rabeinu Tam explains that Chanan's ruling in our Mishnah is specifically discussing a case where a person supported someone else's wife. The reason Chanan holds he is exempt from paying back that person is because it is unclear that the person was obligated to give his wife so much support. He could have gotten out of paying so much money if his wife would have only spent what she needed, instead of finding someone who would give her whatever money she wanted. This is true, Rabeinu Tam says, even though Beis Din stated how much money she should receive.

If it were not for Beis Din setting an amount that she deserves, everyone would agree that he does not have to pay back his wife's benefactor. Even to his wife herself he would not have to obligate himself to give her a certain amount of money (for expenses and support) without a ruling from Beis Din. Even so (that she did receive this ruling of support), she would have minimized her expenses in order that people should not call her a "hungry woman."

However, regarding paying back someone else's loan in general, even Chanan admits that the person who paid back the loan does not lose his money. This is because it is a complete benefit, since he would be unable to pay his loan back in any other way. [Accordingly, what is the answer of our Gemara that paying back someone's loan when he is not allowed to benefit from the person paying back is permitted according to Chanan? Chanan agrees that paying back such a loan is a real benefit!]

Answer: This is the explanation of our Gemara when it says, "Who is the Mishnah like? Chanan." This means that the Mishnah in Nedarim (33b) that discusses paying someone else's loan is regarding the same type of loan that Chanan is discussing, namely money given to support someone's wife when that person went overseas. This is the opinion of Chanan (who says that such monies do not have to be paid back).

This is also what Rabeinu Chananel explained. He explains that Rav Oshiya answered that the Mishnah that mentions the case of paying off someone else's loan is referring to supporting his wife, according to Chanan.

Question: The Riva brought a proof from the Yerushalmi that Chanan holds that the law is the same (as supporting a wife) regarding paying other debts. The Gemara's text there states that Aba bar Mamal said that paying someone else's debt without him knowing is dependent on the argument between Chanan and the sons of the Kohanim Gedolim.

Rav Asi says that the reason that the sons of the Kohanim Gedolim said there (that she is not believed) is because the husband never thought his wife would die from starvation. However, here the borrower thinks that he can placate his creditor and he will forgo the loan. For example, if the creditor had collateral from him he would placate his creditor and he would give him back his collateral.

This can be true regarding a creditor who does not press the borrower to pay back. What can be said regarding a creditor who is pressing for collection?

We can deduce this from the Mishnah that someone who is forbidden from benefiting from another person can have that other person give his donation for him to the Beis Hamikdash. If he would not pay the required donation, he would be forced to pay with collateral. This shows that the law is even by a creditor who insists on collection (and will not forgo the loan). This Yerushalmi clearly implies that the argument of Chanan is regarding creditors just as it is regarding paying the support of someone's wife (unlike the position of Rabeinu Tam).

Answer: Rabeinu Tam says that indeed, it must be that the Yerushalmi argues on our Gemara. This is evident from the Yerushalmi's understanding that the case above regarding paying his donation to the Beis Hamikdash is in accordance with the opinion of the sons of the Kohanim Gedolim. This is despite the fact that collateral is taken from someone who will not give the required donation to the Beis Hamikdash (meaning that the benefit is direct, and according to Rabeinu Tam's view therefore forbidden).

(Rabeinu Tam continues that) Rav Oshiya, in our Gemara, understands that the Mishnah above (regarding paying his required donation) is like Chanan, who totally argues on the logic mentioned by the Yerushalmi above. He explains that the case of the Mishnah is referring to paying back the support given to one's wife, as we explained above (see (e) and (f) above).

Additionally, it must be that the Yerushalmi is unlike our Gemara. According to Rava, it must be that the case of paying his donation (mentioned above) is if his donation was lost or was already collected. Otherwise, how could he pay his donation for him? It is a direct benefit!

The Yerushalmi implies that the case of "paying his donation" is not when his donation was lost (but rather is in any case), as it deduced from there that one could even pay back his regular creditor.

Implied Question: The Gemara later states a rule that wherever Rabban Gamliel says that he sees the (logic of the) words of Admon the law follows his opinion. The Gemara later even asks a question from this rule, showing that it is a main rule in determining Halachah. [Accordingly, how could Rabeinu Tam take the position that the law is unlike Admon (see below)?]

Answer: Even so, Rabeinu Tam says that the Halachah does not follow Admon in this case.

This is because the Gemara does not agree with Admon. The Gemara earlier (43a) quotes Rav Asi in the name of Rebbi Yochanan as saying that they made a widow who is supposed to be supported from an estate along with her daughter (who inherits) like a daughter who is with sons when there is only a small amount of possessions for them to split. [The daughter receives the possessions and the sons must beg.] This implies that the Halachah is like the Rabbanan.

Additionally, the Gemara earlier (103a) says that if orphans that sold possessions from their estate that only had a small amount of possessions (in order to avoid giving it to their sister/s), whatever they sold is valid. Additionally, the Gemara in Bava Basra (139b) implies that it rules like the Rabbanan (and unlike Admon).

Explanation: Rabeinu Tam states that the point of Admon's reasoning is not to actually argue on the Chachamim, but merely to ask a question on them.

1. Hence, when Rabban Gamliel says that "he sees the (logic of the) words of Admon," he is not ruling like Admon, but rather saying that Admon is asking a good question.

Question: What exactly is Rava asking? It does make sense that someone who learns Torah has more reason to receive the monies, as the Gemara earlier (49a) stated, "it is a Mitzvah to support one's daughters and certainly one's sons who learn Torah!"

Answer #1 (Rabeinu Tam): Rabeinu Tam says that the two Gemaros are not similar. The Gemara earlier is discussing who is it more of a Mitzvah to support, and says that it is more of a Mitzvah to support the sons more than the daughters. However, the Gemara here is a discussion of the Torah law regarding inheritance. This is why Rava asks on Admon, how can it be that the Torah law of inheritance should be affected by whether or not someone learns Torah, that if he learns Torah he inherits and if he doesn't he will not?

Answer #2: Some say that the Gemara here is discussing adult children. This is why Rava asks why there should be a difference between someone who learns Torah and someone who doesn't. The Gemara earlier is referring to the Mitzvah to support young sons. Being that they are all learning Torah when they are young, the Gemara earlier made a Kal v'Chomer from daughters to sons.

This is why the Gemara does not ask there that for a son who does learn this makes sense (but not for one who does not learn), as they are all supposed to be learning.

Question: This is difficult. How can the Gemara ask on Rav Nachman from the Rabbanan? Rav Nachman can simply hold like Admon!

If you will say that it is understandable as the Rabbanan are the majority and the Halachah should follow them, in this case the opposite is true, as the Halachah should be like Admon (see Tosfos #1, (a) above).

Answer: Rebbi says that the question is from everyone (Admon as well). The Gemara understands that Admon agrees that if someone agrees that he owes either wheat or barley that he is exempt. This is why the Mishnah merely says a case of pitchers (versus barrels), as the different kinds of vessels are like a pomegranate in its peel (not two different things like wheat and barley), as Rav Simi bar Ashi tried to explain later. He forwarded this explanation because he was unsure why the Mishnah made this a case of different vessels instead of different content.

However, after the Gemara realized that the argument could be whether or not the terminology used includes barrels, the Gemara reversed its question and asked that this should be a strong question on Rav Chiya bar Abba. Even so, the Gemara was still able to answer that the case here is like claiming a pomegranate in its peel.

Question: This is difficult. What is bothering the Gemara when it asks for Admon's reason? We find that Rabban Gamliel indeed holds this way, as he states that if a person claimed his friend owed him wheat and he admitted owing him barley instead he is deemed a Modeh b'Miktzas, as stated in the Mishnah in Shevuos (38b)! [Accordingly, why can't Admon hold this way as well?]

Answer: The Gemara's question is how can we understand Admon's opinion in a way that he will hold of Rav Nachman's law as well? We want Admon to be according to Rav Nachman, as we rule like Rav Nachman. Rav Nachman himself only holds that if the claim was made that he owed both wheat and barley and he admitted to owing one of them, he is considered a Modeh b'Miktzas. However, if he claimed wheat and the defendant claimed he only owed barley, Rav Nachman himself says he is exempt (from an oath of Modeh b'Miktzas).

Implied Question: [What exactly is the case of someone who sets an amount of money for his son-in-law?] The Yerushalmi establishes that the case is when the potential father-in-law said how much he would provide his potential son-in-law when the potential bride was present. However, if she was not present, even the Rabbanan agree that she has a good claim.

It is therefore understandable when the Gemara asks, who should we force? If we should force the father, the Mishnah should say since the father set an amount in front of her, the condition he set in front of his mature daughter is valid while the condition he made in front of a minor daughter is invalid.

The Gemara concludes that we force the husband to give a Get to the minor because her condition is invalid. However, when the father makes a condition in front of his mature daughter, it is like she herself made the condition.