QUESTION: The Gemara concludes that according to Papuna'i, a woman's exemption from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama is derived from the verse which compares all of the Mitzvos in the Torah to the Mitzvah of Tefilin. Just as a woman is exempt from the Mitzvah of Tefilin, she is exempt from all Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama.

This Hekesh teaches only that a woman is exempt from Mitzvos which depend on a certain time. What is the source that a woman is obligated in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama? The Gemara explains that the source for her obligation is logical: if the Torah exempts a woman from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama, it obviously obligates her in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama.

The Gemara's assumption apparently contradicts the words of the Gemara earlier (34b). The Gemara there first cites a source for a woman's exemption from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama (a Binyan Av from Tefilin), and it then seeks a different source for a woman's obligation in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama. The Gemara there clearly implies that a woman's obligation in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama cannot be inferred from her exemption from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama, and that it is possible that a woman may be exempt from both. How are these two Gemaras to be reconciled?

(a) Apparently, the Gemara earlier does not deduce from the Binyan Av (which teaches that a woman is exempt from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama) that a woman is obligated in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama because of the following reason. Even if a woman is exempt from all Mitzvos, the verse still needs to exempt her from Tefilin. One might have thought that a woman is obligated in the Mitzvah of Tefilin since it is written together with the Mitzvah of Mezuzah, which she certainly is obligated to fulfill (as the Gemara says on 35b). Therefore, a special source is needed to exempt a woman from Tefilin, even if she is already exempt from all other Mitzvos.

In contrast, the Hekesh of Papuna'i explicitly compares Tefilin to all other Mitzvos in the Torah. It is clear that the verse does not exempt a woman only from Tefilin, but it exempts a woman from all Mitzvos which are comparable to Tefilin (i.e. Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama). If a woman would be exempt from all Mitzvos (even those which are not comparable to Tefilin), the verse would not need to compare Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama to Tefilin.

TOSFOS (DH Michlal), however, points out that this approach does not fully answer the question. Perhaps a woman indeed is exempt from Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama as well, and the reason why the verse needs to teach that a woman is also exempt from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama is that one might have thought that she is obligated in such Mitzvos (and, Kal va'Chomer, in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama) due to a Binyan Av from the Mitzvos of Matzah and Hakhel (since the Gemara at this point maintains that "Shnei Kesuvim ha'Ba'im k'Echad Melamdin"). The verse therefore teaches that a woman is exempt from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama, and that no obligation can be derived from the Mitzvos of Matzah and Hakhel. Consequently, there is no source that teaches that a woman is obligated in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama, and perhaps the Hekesh exempts her from all Mitzvos Aseh.

(b) TOSFOS (DH Michlal) and other Rishonim answer that the Gemara understands that a woman is obligated in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama because of the following logic. If the Torah intended to exempt a woman even from Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama, it should have compared that type of Mitzvah to the other Mitzvos. It should not have compared Tefilin, which is a Mitzvas Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama, to the other Mitzvos. The fact that the Torah chose to compare Tefilin to all other Mitzvos shows that the Torah exempts a woman only from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama.

(c) The SHITAH LO NODA L'MI cites the RA'AVAD who explains that the Gemara here disagrees with the logic of the Gemara earlier (34b). The Gemara earlier suggests that perhaps a woman is exempt even from Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama, just as she is exempt from the Mitzvos of Talmud Torah and Pidyon ha'Ben (which are Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama). However, as TOSFOS (DH v'Neilaf) and other Rishonim ask, the Gemara's suggestion seems to be based on flawed logic. A woman is obligated in some Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama (such as "Mora Av v'Em") and she is exempt from others (Talmud Torah and Pidyon ha'Ben). In such a case, a Binyan Av is applied l'Chumra to teach that a woman is obligated in all Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama, and not l'Kula to teach that she is exempt.

The Rishonim (34b) offer various answers to this question. The Ra'avad suggests that the Gemara here disagrees with those answers and maintains that there is no reason to exempt a woman from Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama in the first place. If there is no verse that explicitly exempts her from such Mitzvos, she is presumed to be obligated in them (because the Limud applies l'Chumra).

QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that had the verse not taught that a woman is obligated in the Mitzvah of "Mora Av v'Em" (the fear of one's parents), one would have thought that a woman is exempt because, when married, she does not have the wherewithal to fulfill that Mitzvah ("Lo Sipek b'Yadah La'asos"). RASHI explains that one would have assumed that since she is not obligated when she is married, the Torah exempts her from the Mitzvah of "Mora Av v'Em" even when she is not married. Therefore, a verse is necessary to teach that she is obligated.

This logic may be the basis for the AVUDRAHAM's explanation of the Gemara's distinction between a woman's obligation in Mitzvos Aseh she'Ein ha'Zeman Gerama and her exemption from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama. The Torah exempts a woman from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama so that she will be free to fulfill her other responsibilities towards her family and not be busy with Mitzvos which are limited to a certain time period. Similarly, an Eved Kena'ani is exempt from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama because he is subjugated to his master. The Torah exempts him from Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama so that he will be free to fulfill his responsibilities towards his master.

According to the Avudraham, why are the Mitzvos of Tefilin and Tzitzis considered Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama simply because they do not apply at night (or, in the case of Tefilin, on Shabbos)? When the Torah exempts a person from wearing Tefilin and Tzitzis at night, it does not limit the Mitzvah to a specific time period and thereby make it more difficult to fulfill. On the contrary, the Torah makes these Mitzvos easier to fulfill by exempting a person from the obligation to wear Tefilin and Tzitzis at night! The fact that these Mitzvos do not apply at night should not be a reason to exempt a woman from these Mitzvos. Why is a woman's exemption from Tefilin the source for a woman's exemption from all Mitzvos Aseh sheha'Zeman Gerama?

Moreover, in the case of Tzitzis no action is required of the woman at the time she fulfills the Mitzvah. She simply dons her shirt or cloak as usual (with Tzitzis tied to its corners). Why should her familial obligations prevent her from fulfilling this Mitzvah?

ANSWER: Perhaps the Mitzvah of Tefilin is comprised of two elements. The first element of the Mitzvah is that a person who wears Tefilin fulfills the Mitzvah, but he does not transgress a Mitzvah if he does not wear them (such as when he did not prepare himself by cleansing his body property, a prerequisite for wearing Tefilin; see TOSFOS to Rosh Hashanah 17a, DH Karkafta). This element of the Mitzvah of Tefilin is not affected by the fact that a woman has responsibilities towards her family, since her fulfillment of those responsibilities does not cause her to transgress the Mitzvah of Tefilin (because one who does not wear Tefilin transgresses no Mitzvah).

The second element of the Mitzvah of Tefilin is that a person must wear Tefilin at least once in his lifetime, and if he fails to do so he transgresses a Mitzvah (see RIF, Rosh Hashanah 17a). If the Mitzvah of Tefilin would apply on Shabbos and at night, a person could fulfill the Torah's Mitzvah to don Tefilin by wearing Tefilin a single time in his lifetime. If the Mitzvah of Tefilin does not apply on Shabbos or at night, Shabbos (or nighttime) divides each week (and each day) into a separate time period, such that each week (and day) has its own independent Mitzvah to wear Tefilin (see Beitzah 30b, "d'Mafseki Leilos"). Consequently, one fulfills the Mitzvah of Tefilin only by wearing them at least once each day. This explains why the Torah exempts women from this Mitzvah; since nighttime is not the time for the Mitzvah of Tefilin, it causes the Mitzvah to become limited to once a day and it is no longer a Mitzvah which can be fulfilled at any time.

Alternatively, the Torah exempts a woman even from the first part of the Mitzvah of Tefilin (that one fulfills a Mitzvah whenever he wears them) for the following reason. Perhaps the Torah exempts a woman not because she would be "overtaxed" if required to fulfill the Mitzvah, but rather because the Torah does not deem it necessary to obligate her in a Mitzvah which, practically, she cannot be expected to fulfill (because of her obligations to her family). A woman cannot be expected to fulfill the Mitzvah of Tefilin and all of her other responsibilities. Therefore, the Torah does not obligate a woman in the Mitzvah of Tefilin in the first place.

This approach, however, does not explain why a woman's responsibilities towards her family affect her obligation in the Mitzvah of Tzitzis. There is no Mitzvah to wear a four-cornered garment in order to wear Tzitzis. Moreover, wearing a garment with Tzitzis requires no more time or effort than wearing the same garment without Tzitzis. To fulfill the Mitzvah of Tzitzis, one simply dresses the way he normally dresses, but with a garment with Tzitzis tied to its corners. Although one must put forth effort into tying the Tzitzis to the garment in the first place, Tzitzis certainly may be tied at night even if nighttime is not the time to fulfill the Mitzvah of Tzitzis. A woman can tie Tzitzis onto her garment at any free time she has, at any time of day, when she is not fulfilling her other responsibilities. Since she does not have to do any extra action during the day in order to fulfill the Mitzvah of Tzitzis, why is she exempt?

Perhaps the answer is that a person does not think about his obligation to wear Tzitzis, or to do any other Mitzvah, except during the time in which he is obligated to do the Mitzvah. Therefore, the Torah does not expect a woman to think about tying the Tzitzis during the night if there is no obligation to wear them at night. (M. Kornfeld)