When Rav Nachman ... Amar Rav says 'Eid Zomem Meshalem l'fi Chelko', why can he not mean to say that each of the false witnesses must pay a half?
(b)
The word 'Meshalshin' (in the Mishnah later) might mean that Beis-Din become a third party to divide the sum equally among the Eidim Zom'min. What else might it mean.
(c)
What objection do we raise against the suggestion that what Rav Nachman means is ...
1.
... that, in matters concerning Mamon, each witness must pay half?
2.
... that if one of the witnesses becomes a Zomem, he is obligated to pay his half?
(d)
Why can we not then establish the case where he ...
1.
... he confesses that he testified falsely (and that Reuven does not really owe Shimon the money at all), like Rava?
2.
... admits that they both testified in another Beis-Din and were declared Zom'min?
(e)
In the above-mentioned case where one of the witnesses confesses that he testified falsely (and that Reuven does not really owe Shimon the money at all), why would he be Chayav to pay anyway? What does Rav Nachman then refer to the witness as 'Eis Zomem?
1)
(a)
When Rav Nachman ... Amar Rav says 'Eid Zomem Meshalem l'fi Chelko', he cannot mean to say that each of the false witnesses must pay a half - because we already know that from a Mishnah later in the Perek 'Meshalshin be'Mamon ... '.
(b)
The word 'Meshalshin' there means either that Beis-Din become a third party to divide the sum equally among the Eidim Zom'min, or - that they divide equally (irrespective of how many people are involved).
(c)
We object to the suggestion that what Rav Nachman means is ...
1.
... that, in matters concerning Mamon, each witness must pay half - because we already learned "Meshalshin be'Mamon ... '.
2.
... that if only one of the witnesses becomes a Zomem, he is obligated to pay his half - because one witness cannot become an Eid Zomem (as we learn in a Beraisa).
(d)
Neither can we establish the case where he ...
1.
... confesses that he testified falsely (and that Reuven does not really owe Shimon the money at all), like Rava - due to the principle 'Keivan she'Higid, Shuv Eino Chozer u'Magid' (once a witness has testified, he cannot retract).
2.
... admits that they both testified in another Beis-Din and were declared Zom'min - because that would not conform to the opinion of Rebbi Akiva, who holds that Eidim Zom'min is a K'nas (as we learned above), and the witnesses cannot therefore obligate themselves to pay.
(e)
In the above-mentioned case where one of the witnesses confesses that he testified falsely (and that Reuven does not really owe Shimon the money at all), he would be Chayav to pay - because of Diyna de'Garmi (directly causing the defendant a loss). It would not really be a case of Eidim Zom'min at all - and Rav Nachman would then merely be using a borrowed term.
2)
(a)
How do we finally amend the last suggestion, to establish Rav Nachman ... Amar Rav's case?
(b)
What is the Chidush?
2)
(a)
To establish Rav Nachman ... Amar Rav's case, we adopt the last suggestion - but where the witness added 've'Chuyavnu Mamon' (Beeis-Din obligated them to pay), turning the K'nas into Mamon.
(b)
And the Chidush is that, even though the witness cannot implicate his colleague, he can implicate himself.
3)
(a)
Our Mishnah discusses a case where two witnesses claimed that Reuven had divorced his wife, and were then proven to be Zom'min. What monetary loss are they now obligated to pay for?
(b)
What problem do we have with assessing it?
(c)
So how do we assess it?
3)
(a)
Our Mishnah discusses a case where two witnesses claimed that Reuven had divorced his wife, and were then proven to be Zom'min. The monetary loss they are now obligated to pay for is - the Kesubah (which they tried to cause Reuven to lose).
(b)
The problem we have with assessing it is that - the loss will prove to be absolute only in the event that Reuven's wife dies before he does; should Reuven die first, or decide to divorce his wife, he will have to pay her Kesubah anyway, in which case the witnesses will not have caused him a loss at all (So how do we assess the loss?)
(c)
We assess it - by evaluating its saleable value (how much a potential buyer would be willing to pay for it, bearing in mind the risk factor that we just described.
4)
(a)
Besides the fact that a husband is currently Muchzak in his wife's Kesubah, on what grounds are his stakes in his wife's Kesubah higher than hers?
(b)
Why can we not extrapolate from the Tana, who says 'she'Im Nis'arm'lah ... ', that the Eidim Zom'min must pay the equivalent of the woman's stakes in the Kesubah?
(c)
So what is 'Z'chus S'feikah', to which the Tana seems to be referring (and which Rav Nasan bar Oshaya actually learns)?
(d)
Which opinion is therefore the more stringent, that of Rav Chisda, who holds 'Shamin be'Ba'al' or that of Rav Nasan bar Oshaya, who says 'Shamin ba'Ishah'.
4)
(a)
Besides the fact that a husband is currently Muchzak in his wife's Kesubah, his stakes in his wife's Kesubah are higher than hers - because he may eat the Peiros of the Karka that he has designated for her (whilst, other than being able to sell it, which he can too) she gains nothing out of it as long as she is married to him).
(b)
We cannot extrapolate from the Tana, who says 'she'Im Nis'arm'lah ... ', that the Eidim Zom'min must pay the equivalent of the woman's stakes in the Kesubah - because it is the husband whom they are causing a loss and not the wife.
(c)
'Z'chus S'feikah', to which the Tana seems to be referring (and which Rav Nasan bar Oshaya actually learns) is - the stakes that she has in the Kesubah (regarding its sale), deducted from the total value of the Kesubah.
(d)
The opinion that is the more stringent is that of Rav Nasan bar Oshaya, who says ' Shamin ba'Ishah' - because the amount involved is minimal, and, when deducted from the Kesubah's full value (as we just explained), amounts to far more than 'Z'chus S'feiko'.
5)
(a)
What does Rav Papa mean when he adds 'ba'Ishah u'vi'Kesuvasah'? What is he coming to preclude?
(b)
Why is that?
(c)
How else might we interpret ...
1.
... 'be'Ba'al'?
2.
... 'be'Ishah u'vi'Kesuvasah'?
(d)
We reject this explanation however for three reason; a. because it is not the woman whom the witnesses caused a loss but the husband (as we explained earlier [see Hagahos ha'Bach); b. then Rav Chisda ought to have said 'be'Nechsei ha'Ba'al' (rather than 'be'Ba'al'). What is the third reason?
5)
(a)
When Rav Papa adds 'ba'Ishah u'vi'Kesuvasah', he comes to preclude - the woman's Nechsei Milug (whose Peiros her husband has a right to eat) ...
(b)
... because the witnesses can say that they were coming to make the husband lose the Kesubah, and not his rights in his wife's Nechsei Milug, which they did not know existed.
(c)
We might also interpret ...
1.
... 'be'Ba'al' to mean that - we assess the woman's Tovas Hana'ah of her husband's property whatever it is, Idis, Beinonis or Ziburis.
2.
... 'be'Ishah u'vi'Kesuvasah' to mean that - if he designated a certain field for his wife's Kesubah, then we assess that field alone.
(d)
We reject this explanation however, a. because it is not the woman whom the witnesses caused a loss but the husband (as we explained earlier [see Hagahos ha'Bach); b. then Rav Chisda ought to have said 'be'Nechsei ha'Ba'al' (rather than 'be'Ba'al') - and c. Why does Rav Chisda then argue in the case where Reuven designated a field for his wife's Kesubah?
6)
(a)
What does our Mishnah say about witnesses who testify that Reuven owes Shimon a thousand Zuz to be paid within thirty days, should they become Zom'min, where Reuven admits to the loan, but claims that he has ten years in which to pay?
6)
(a)
If witnesses testify that Reuven owes Shimon a thousand Zuz to be paid within thirty days, and they became Zom'min, then, assuming that Reuven admits to the loan, but claims that he has ten years in which to pay, our Mishnah rules that - we assess how much a borrower who had thirty days would be willing to pay to have the time extended to ten years.
3b----------------------------------------3b
7)
(a)
Why is a debt that is not yet due, not subject to release in the Sh'mitah?
(b)
What does Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rule regarding a ten-year loan, which is not yet payable at the termination of the Sh'mitah?
(c)
What problem does Rav Kahana have with this from our Mishnah?
(d)
Rava answers by establishing our Mishnah like the Mishnah in Shevi'is. What does the Tana there say with regard to someone who lends money against a security or who hands his documents to the Beis-Din (Hillel's P'ruzbul)?
7)
(a)
A debt that is not yet due is not subject to release in the Sh'mitah - because the Torah writes in Re'ei "Lo Yigos" ('Do not claim the debt'), indicating that all Sh'mitah does is to cancel the right to claim, nothing more.
(b)
Regarding a ten-year loan, which is not yet payable at the termination of the Sh'mitah - Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules that Sh'mitah nevertheless cancels the loan, since "Lo Yigos" is not determined by its current situation, but in the long term. Consequently, since "Lo Yigos" will apply when the time falls due, it falls under the category of "Lo Yigos" and is canceled by the Sh'mitah.
(c)
The problem Rav Kahana has with this is - from the case in our Mishnah, where the Eidim Zom'min pay for the extension of the loan from thirty days to ten years. Seeing as the debt extends beyond the Sh'mitah, why are they not then obligated to pay for the entire loan, which their testimony would have canceled?
(d)
Rava answers by establishing our Mishnah like the Mishnah in Shevi'is, which rules that if someone lends money against a security or who hands his documents to Beis-Din (Hillel's P'ruzbul) - the Sh'mitah does not cancel it.
8)
(a)
What does the second Lashon of Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel hold?
(b)
How does ...
1.
... Rav Kahana now try to prove this from our Mishnah?
2.
... Rava refute Rav Kahana's proof?
8)
(a)
In the second Lashon, Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel holds that - Sh'mitah does not cancel a ten-year loan (because "Lo Yigos" is determined by the current situation).
(b)
And ...
1.
... Rav Kahana now tries to prove this from our Mishnah - using the same argument that he just used to query Rav Yehudah's first Lashon.
2.
... Rava refutes Rav Kahana's proof - by establishing our Mishnah like the Mishnah in Shevi'is (where the defendant borrowed against a security or where the creditor handed his Sh'tar to Beis-Din) just like he did in the first Lashon, to answer Rav Kahana's Kashya.
9)
(a)
Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules 'ha'Omer la'Chavero al-M'nas she'Lo Tashmiteni Shevi'is, Shevi'is Meshametes'. What does this mean?
(b)
On which principle do we initially base this ruling?
9)
(a)
Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules 'ha'Omer la'Chavero al-M'nas she'Lo Tashmiteni Shevi'is, Shevi'is Meshametes', which means that - if Reuven lends Shimon money on condition that the Sh'mitah-year will not cancel the debt, it nevertheless cancels it.
(b)
Initially, we base this ruling on the principle 'ha'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah, Tena'o Bateil' (If someone issues a condition that contravenes what the Torah says, his condition is invalid).
10)
(a)
We query this blanket statement however, from another ruling of Shmuel, concerning a case where Reuven sells Shimon an object 'al-M'nas she'Ein l'cha alai Ona'ah', where Rav rules 'Ein lo alav Ana'ah'. What does this mean?
(b)
On which principle is Rav's ruling based?
(c)
What does Shmuel say? What is now the problem?
(d)
To resolve the discrepancy, we cite Rav Anan, to whom Shmuel explained his rulings. What distinction does Shmuel draw between a case where one says ...
1.
... 'al-M'nas she'Ein l'cha alai Ona'ah' and where he says 'Ein bo Ona'ah'?
2.
... 'al-M'nas she'Lo Tashmiteni ba'Shevi'is' and where he says 'al-M'nas she'Lo Tashmiteni Shevi'is'?
(e)
On what basis are 'al-M'nas she'Ein l'cha alai Ona'ah' and 'al-M'nas she'Lo Tashmiteni ba'Shevi'is' permitted (see Tosfos)?
10)
(a)
We query this blanket statement however, from another ruling of Shmuel, concerning a case where Reuven sells Shimon an object 'al-M'nas she'Ein l'cha Alai Ona'ah', where Rav rules 'Ein lo alav Ona'ah' - meaning that if, when selling him an object, he stipulates that the sale is not subject to the Din of Ona'ah, it nevertheless is subject to Ona'ah ...
(b)
... because he holds 'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah, Tena'o Bateil'.
(c)
Shmuel however rules that - it is not subject to Ona'ah, implying that he holds 'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah, Tena'o Kayam'.
(d)
To resolve the discrepancy, we cite Rav Anan, to whom Shmuel explained his rulings. Shmuel draws a distinction between a case where he says ...
1.
... 'al-M'nas she'Ein l'cha alai Ona'ah' - where his condition is valid, and where he says 'Ein bo Ona'ah' - where it is not, and consequently between where he says ...
2.
... 'al-M'nas she'Lo Tashmiteni ba'Shevi'is' - where his condition is valid, and where he says 'al-M'nas she'Lo Tashmiteni Shevi'is' - where it is not.
(e)
'al-M'nas she'Ein l'cha alai Ona'ah' and 'al-M'nas she'Lo Tashmiteni ba'Shevi'is' are permitted - because (as opposed to 'al-M'nas she'Ein bo Ona'ah ... ', which contravenes Torah-law), the borrower and the purchaser are Mochel the Ona'ah and the cancellation of Sh'mitah (respectively [Tosfos]), which does not (since the Torah allows Mechilah in money-matters).
11)
(a)
We learned in a Beraisa that if Reuven lends Shimon money S'tam, he may not claim the money before thirty days. Rabah bar bar Chanah confines this ruling to a Milveh bi'Shtar. What is then the reason behind it?
(b)
What did Rav, quoting his uncle, retort?
(c)
Who was Rav's uncle?
11)
(a)
We learned in a Beraisa that if Reuven lends Shimon money S'tam, he may not claim the money before thirty days. Rabah bar bar Chanah confines this ruling to a Milveh bi'Shtar - because one does not tend to write a Sh'tar for a lesser period.
(b)
Rav, however, quoted his uncle, who specifically stated - that there is no difference.
(c)
Rav's uncle was Rebbi Chiya.
12)
(a)
Shmuel instructed Rav Masna to find the reason for the Tana's ruling. What did he add to those instructions?
(b)
How did Rav Masna extrapolate the reason from the words "Sh'nas ha'Shemitah" (in the Pasuk in Re'ei "Karvah Sh'nas ha'Sheva, Sh'nas ha'Shemitah")?
(c)
Why specifically thirty days? Which principle (upon which Rav Masna's findings were based) did Mar derive from the Pasuk?
12)
(a)
Shmuel instructed Rav Masna to find the reason for the Tana's ruling, adding - that he was not to sit down until he had the answer.
(b)
Rav Masna extrapolated the reason from the words "Sh'nas ha'Shemitah" (in the Pasuk in Re'ei "Karvah Sh'nas ha'Sheva Sh'nas ha'Shemitah") which are superfluous, and which hint at another 'Sh'mitah' (period that one cannot claim), namely, the first thirty days following the loan ...
(c)
... specifically thirty days, because, based on the principle of Mar 'Sheloshim Yom ba'Shanah Chashuv Shanah' ('Shanah' sometimes comprises thirty days'), that is what the word "Sh'nas" implies.
13)
(a)
What did Rav Yehudah Amar Rav say about creating an opening for the neck in a shirt on Shabbos?
(b)
What will the Din be with regard to opening the lid of a barrel that has been cemented to the barrel, on Shabbos?
(c)
What did Rava reply, when Rav Kahana asked why the difference?
(d)
What do all the Sugyos on the Amud, most of which are not connected to our Mishnah, have in common?
13)
(a)
Rav Yehudah Amar Rav also ruled that someone who creates an opening for the neck in a shirt on Shabbos - is Chayav Chatas.
(b)
Opening the lid of a barrel that has been cemented to the barrel, on the other hand - is permitted.
(c)
When Rav Kahana asked why the difference - Rava replied that whereas the former is considered joined, the latter is not (since it is made of two pieces, and is initially meant to be boken.
(d)
What all the Sugyos on the Amud have in common (even though most of them are not connected to our Mishnah) is - the fact that they cite Rav Yehudah (quoting either Rav or Shmuel), Rav Kahana's query on the ruling and Rava's answer.
14)
(a)
What does Rav Yehudah Amar Rav say about three Lugin of water into which a Kortov (a small measure) of wine fell, that then falls into a Mikvah?
(b)
On what condition does this depend? When will it render the Mikvah Pasul?
(c)
What does Rebbi Yossi, in the Mishnah in Mikva'os, say about three Lugin of colored water that falls into a Mikvah?
(d)
What did Rava reply when Rav Kahana asked him to explain the difference?
(e)
And how did Rava reconcile Rav with the Beraisa quoted by Rebbi Chiya, which rules that the Mikvah is Pasul?
14)
(a)
Rav Yehudah Amar Rav rules that if three Lugin of water into which a Kortov (a small measure) of wine fell, then falls into a Mikvah - the Mikvah remains Kasher ...
(b)
... provided the three Lugin of water look like wine; if they look like water, they will render the Mikvah Pasul.
(c)
Rebbi Yossi, in the Mishnah in Mikva'os, rules that if three Lugin of colored water falls into a Mikvah - the Mikvah is Pasul.
(d)
When Rav Kahana asked Rava to explain the difference he replied that - whereas the former is called 'wine' (which does not invalidate a Mikvah), the latter is merely called 'colored water' (which does).
(e)
Rava reconciled Rav with the Beraisa quoted by Rebbi Chiya, which rules that the Mikvah is Pasul - by establishing the latter like the Rabbanan, and Rav like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri(which we will now proceed to explain).
