OPINIONS: Rav Papa says that one who bakes a Minchah as Chametz is liable for two sets of Malkus: one for arranging the loaves (Arichah) and one for baking (Afiyah). RASHI explains that this is because baking is the final stage of arranging the loaves. TOSFOS explains that this is because some arranging is inevitably done at the time of baking.

The Gemara asks that the Beraisa (55b) seems to contradict Rav Papa's statement when it calls Afiyah a "Ma'aseh Yechidi," implying that one is liable for Afiyah by itself. The Gemara answers that one case refers to when one person does both the Arichah and Afiyah, and the other case refers to when one person does the Arichah and another person does the Afiyah.

RASHI explains that Rav Papa's case is the one in which two different people arranged and baked the loaves (in which case the one who baked the loaves is liable for two sets of Malkus for the Afiyah). The Beraisa refers to a case in which one person does both actions (in which case he is not liable for two sets of Malkus for baking, since he already is liable for Malkus for the Arichah that he does before the Afiyah, and the Arichah that he does during the Afiyah is merely a continuation of his earlier act of Arichah).

TOSFOS disagrees and explains that Rav Papa's case is the one in which one person both bakes the loaves and arranges them a bit (in which case he is liable for two sets of Malkus). The Beraisa refers to a case in which the person who bakes the loaves does not arrange them at all (in which case the one who bakes them is liable only for baking).

According to both explanations, one is liable for a second act of Arichah after one act of Arichah was already done. The Arichah that is done during the Afiyah is actually the second Arichah that is done to the Minchah. The first Arichah is the rolling of the dough and original shaping of its form. Consequently, Rav Papa is teaching a Chidush that one who does a second Arichah after a first Arichah was done is liable for the second Arichah. Is this true for the other Avodos of the Minchah as well? For example, if one kneads a dough of Chametz that was already kneaded, is he liable for that second act of kneading?

(a) The CHAZON ISH (OC 58:5) asserts that this does not apply to the other Avodos of the Minchah. The Beraisa earlier (54b) says that one is liable for any "Ma'aseh Yechidi." Rashi explains that "Ma'aseh Yechidi" means a "Ma'aseh Chashuv Bifnei Atzmo," an essential act in itself. That is, one is liable only for performing a Ma'aseh that is important in itself. It is clear from there that if two people perform Lishah consecutively, the second one is exempt since he did not do any essential preparation of the Minchah. The Chiyuv is not for merely doing an act of kneading, but rather for doing an act that brings the Minchah one step closer to its final state. If it was already kneaded by someone else, an additional act of kneading does not bring the Minchah closer to its final state.

However, according to this explanation, why should one be liable for performing Arichah after the loaves were already arranged?

The Chazon Ish explains that the Arichah performed during (or, according to Tosfos, immediately before) the baking process is a new, essential step in the preparation of the Minchah. If the person who performs the Arichah with the baking is not the one who performed the original Arichah (or, even if he is the same person, he did not receive a separate Hasra'ah for the second Arichah), he is liable for this act of Arichah. Only when he also performed the first Arichah (without a separate Hasra'ah before performing the second Arichah) is he exempt for the new Arichah, since it is considered a continuation of the first act of Arichah. (In this respect, he is similar to a person who eats two k'Zeisim of Chelev without receiving Hasra'ah between them.) In contrast, one who performs a second act of Lishah (kneading) to the Minchah is not liable for that act, because that Lishah is not a new, essential step in the preparation of the Minchah. While it might enhance the first Lishah, it is not an essential step in itself.

The Chazon Ish adds that the same criteria for determining how many transgressions a person committed when he repeats a prohibited act applies to the laws of Shabbos as well. He cites the SEFER HA'TERUMOS who rules that when a person adds water on Shabbos to a dough that was kneaded before Shabbos and he kneads it again, he is exempt. Although he is doing an act of Lishah, his act of Lishah on Shabbos is not a new, essential step in the preparation of the dough, since the dough was already kneaded.

The Chazon Ish uses this approach to answer a question posed by the CHAFETZ CHAYIM in the BI'UR HALACHAH (OC 321, DH Ein Megavlin). The Bi'ur Halachah cites Rishonim who express the same view as the Sefer ha'Terumos. The Bi'ur Halachah questions their view from the Yerushalmi in Shabbos that says that one who performs Arichah or Kituf on Shabbos after the dough was already kneaded is Chayav. In the laws of Shabbos, the acts of Arichah and Kituf are included in the Melachah of Lishah, kneading, as the Yerushalmi teaches. Accordingly, the Yerushalmi is saying that one is Chayav for any act that enhances the original Lishah. The Bi'ur Halachah understands from there that just as one is Chayav for enhancing the Lishah by doing Arichah after the Lishah, one also should be Chayav for enhancing the Lishah by doing another Lishah on Shabbos. This is a difficulty on the view of the Sefer ha'Terumos.

The Chazon Ish answers that in order for one to be Chayav, one must do an act which is a "Melachah Chashuvah Bifnei Atzmo," an essential act that is important in itself. Although one is Chayav for Arichah and Kituf on Shabbos because of Lishah, those acts are nevertheless new stages in the process of kneading the dough. Similarly, regarding a Minchah of Chametz, the Arichah at the time of the Afiyah is a new step, since its place is necessarily with the baking of the loaves (or as a preparatory step for the baking, as Tosfos says), and therefore one will be Chayav Malkus for it.

In contrast, one will not be Chayav for doing Lishah after Lishah. Although it enhances the original Lishah, it is not a new step to obligate the person to bring a Korban Chatas for Shabbos desecration, or to be punished with Malkus for making a Minchah of Chametz.

(b) It is important to note that the Chafetz Chayim himself in ZEVACH TODAH disagrees with the Chazon Ish. The Chafetz Chayim writes that one who does Arichah after Arichah is Chayav because he enhanced the Minchah. The Chafetz Chayim maintains that it is not necessary to perform a new, essential step in the production of the Minchah in order to be Chayav. This is consistent with his own view in the Bi'ur Halachah, where he does not answer his question the way that the Chazon Ish answers it. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)

QUESTION: The Gemara teaches that one is liable for causing a Minchah offering to become Chametz after it has already become Chametz. This means, as RASHI explains, that one is considered to have transgressed the Isur of making a Minchah become Chametz when he performs Arichah with a Minchah that is Chametz, or one who bakes a Minchah after it already became Chametz. Rashi explains that this must be what the Gemara means, since it is otherwise impossible to make something become Chametz when it is already Chametz.

The Gemara derives this from the verses, "Lo Se'aseh Chametz" (Vayikra 2:11), and "Lo Se'afeh Chametz" (Vayikra 6:10). These verses teach that one is liable for each act of making the Minchah become Chametz.

Why does the Gemara consider Arichah or Afiyah with a Minchah that is Chametz an act of causing it to become Chametz? Those acts do not add in any way to the process of becoming Chametz. Why is one who does those acts liable for "Mechametz"?

ANSWERS: The answer apparently depends on the two ways of understanding the prohibition against making a Minchah become Chametz ("Lo Se'aseh Chametz").

(a) RASHI here (DH ha'Mechametz) explains that this prohibition involves "any act that assists in the Chametz process." Similarly, Rashi later (57a, DH v'Chazar v'Chimtzah) writes that this prohibition involves "finishing the process of becoming Chametz by baking it." Rashi prefaces his comments in both places with the word "Kelomar" to denote that the words of the Gemara are not intended to be understood literally, as saying that it is possible to cause something that is already Chametz to become Chametz. Rather, the Gemara is saying that any act that adds to the preparation of the Minchah is considered to be instrumental in causing it to become Chametz. This is because the prohibition is accomplished by causing the Minchah to become completed in the form of Chametz. Until all of the preparations of the Minchah have been performed, the Minchah itself is not considered to be complete, even though the Chametz process itself is completed. Any act that adds to the completion of the Minchah is considered an act that helps in making a Minchah that is Chametz.

(Rashi's understanding of the Gemara is reflected in the wording of the verses which read, "Lo Se'aseh Chametz" and "Lo Se'afeh Chametz," instead of, "Lo Sechametz." The verses imply, "Do not make it (the completed Minchah) Chametz," teaching that every step that contributes to making a completed Minchah of Chametz is forbidden.

Based on this understanding of the Gemara, the CHAFETZ CHAYIM in ZEVACH TODAH (DH ha'Mechametz) rules that even if a Minchah was already Chametz, one who causes the Chametz process to continue -- such as by adding more leavening agent to the dough until the entire Minchah becomes sourdough (Si'ur, a very heavily fermented dough) which is a new level of Chametz (called "Chimutzo Kasheh") -- is Chayav. This is similar to the Halachah that the Gemara mentions next when it says that one is Chayav for any addition to the process of making an animal sterile.

(b) A second way to understand the prohibition of "Lo Se'aseh Chametz" may be inferred from the words of TOSFOS (DH Hini'ach). The Gemara later says that one who places Se'or on top of the dough of a Minchah, which causes the Minchah to become Chametz, is Chayav. Tosfos asks that the Torah says "Lo Se'aseh Chametz," but in this case, one does no action ("Asiyah") that makes the dough become Chametz. It becomes Chametz only as a result of a different action that the person does (placing the Se'or on the dough). Tosfos answers that putting Se'or on the dough is also considered an action ("Asiyah") that is included in the prohibition of "Lo Se'aseh Chametz."

What was Tosfos' original understanding when he asked the question, and what changed in his understanding in his answer?

The YASHAR V'TOV explains that Tosfos was bothered with why one should be Chayav for the act of causing the Minchah to become Chametz altogether. The Torah expresses its prohibition in terms of forming (or making -- "Asiyah") a Minchah that is Chametz; that is, it is forbidden to do any action that helps to complete a Minchah that is Chametz. The Torah does not explicitly state that it is forbidden to cause the dough of a Minchah to become Chametz. Causing the dough to become Chametz is not part of making the Minchah!

Tosfos answers that causing the dough to become Chametz indeed is part of making the Minchah. Even though it is the wrong way of making the Minchah, it still constitutes part of the process of making the Minchah. Therefore, one is Chayav for making the Minchah become Chametz.

From the words of Tosfos it seems that the prohibition is not the process of causing the dough to become Chametz. Rather, the prohibition is the formation of a Minchah which is Chametz, as the verses in the Torah imply. The Gemara calls the Isur "Mechametz" merely because the acts that are done to form the Minchah bring about a Minchah that is Chametz. The prohibition, though, is comprised of the acts that form the Minchah, and not the actual Chametz process.

The YOSEF DA'AS understands that if the prohibition is not, "Do not cause the Minchah to become Chametz," then one who causes the Minchah to turn into a new type of Chametz (Si'ur, as described above) will not be Chayav. The Torah forbids forming and preparing a Minchah that is Chametz. It is Chametz whether or not it is Si'ur, and thus making it into Si'ur is not included in the Isur. Only the initial act that makes it Chametz, or any act that helps to form the Minchah itself, is included in the Torah's prohibition.

The Chafetz Chayim, as mentioned earlier, rules that one who makes the Minchah turn from Chametz into Si'ur is Chayav. He apparently maintains that the prohibition is, "Do not cause the Minchah to become Chametz," and, therefore, any additional Chametz process is included in the Isur. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)