QUESTION: The Beraisa quotes the opinion of Acherim who maintain that if one slaughters the Korban Pesach for Mulim (circumcised men) and for Arelim (uncircumcised men), the status of the Korban depends on which group of people he mentions first. If he says "for Mulim" first, the Korban is valid. If he says "for Arelim" first, the Korban is invalid.

The Gemara gives three different ways to explain this Beraisa. However, there is a much simpler explanation that the Gemara could give. Why does the Gemara not suggest simply that "Acherim" in the Beraisa is Rebbi Meir (as the Gemara eventually concludes), and Rebbi Meir is the one who always maintains that we follow the first part of a person's statement ("Tefos Lashon Rishon")?

ANSWER: TOSFOS (DH Leima) explains that "Tefos Lashon Rishon" does not apply here, because the two statements of "for Mulim" and "for Arelim" are not mutually exclusive. It is possible for one to slaughter the Korban for a number of people, some of whom are Mulim and some of whom are Arelim. Therefore, even Rebbi Meir agrees that in this case the principle of "Tefos Lashon Rishon" does not apply.

This case differs from a case in which one makes a Korban into a Temurah by saying that half of it should be a Temuras Olah and half of it should be a Temuras Shelamim. In that case, Rebbi Meir applies the principle of "Tefos Lashon Rishon," because the two statements contradict each other. As a result of his first statement, the first half of the animal becomes an Olah, and consequently the Kedushas Olah spreads throughout the entire animal and leaves no room for any part of it to become a Shelamim. It is as if his first statement was that the whole animal should be an Olah. In the case of the Beraisa here, however, the thought that some Arelim will eat from the Korban does not make the Korban exclusively designated for the consumption of Arelim. Certainly, Mulim may eat from it if he had them in mind.

However, this answer does not seem to suffice according to the explanation of RASHI. Rashi writes that if one slaughters a Korban with intention to eat one k'Zayis after its allotted time (Chutz li'Zemano) and another k'Zayis outside of its proper place (Chutz li'Mekomo), "Tefos Lashon Rishon" applies and the Korban is considered Pigul. Rashi implies that even when the two Machshavos do not contradict each other, the rule of "Tefos Lashon Rishon" applies.

Apparently, Rashi maintains that even in a case in which one slaughters the Korban with intention to eat one k'Zayis outside of its allotted time, that Machshavah is considered to "spread throughout" the entire act of Shechitah, and it is considered as though the entire act was done with a Machshavah of Chutz li'Zemano. This is not the case when one slaughters the Korban for Mulim and for Arelim, since many people can eat from a single Korban. In the case of the Beraisa here, the two Machshavos do not contradict at all, and thus "Tefos Lashon Rishon" does not apply.

QUESTION: The Beraisa quotes the opinion of Acherim who maintain that if one slaughters the Korban Pesach for Mulim (circumcised men) and for Arelim (uncircumcised men), the status of the Korban depends on which group of people he mentions first. If he says "for Mulim" first, the Korban is valid. If he says "for Arelim" first, the Korban is invalid.

The Gemara gives three different ways to explain this Beraisa. Rabah explains that the person intended to slaughter the Korban Pesach for Mulim and for Arelim, but he only managed to say "for Arelim" before the Shechitah was completed. The Korban is invalid because Rebbi Meir maintains that one's speech does not have to be consistent with his thoughts ("Lo Ba'inan Piv v'Libo Shavin"). We follow his words ("for Arelim"), even though he had in mind something else ("for Arelim and for Mulim").

The Gemara quotes the Mishnah in Terumos (3:8) to disprove Rabah's assertion that Rebbi Meir does not require "Piv v'Libo Shavin." The Mishnah states that if a person intends to separate fruit as Terumah and he inadvertently says that the fruit is Ma'aser, the fruit does not become Terumah ("Lo Amar Klum"), because his speech and his thoughts are not consistent. It is evident from the Mishnah there that Rebbi Meir requires one's speech and thoughts to be consistent.

Rabah's reasoning is difficult to understand. The Gemara explains that when a person slaughters a Korban for Arelim, the Korban is invalid due to the Machshavah, the thought, of the Shochet (see 60a, "Mechashvin me'Avodah l'Avodah," and 61b, "Machsheves Ochlin and Machsheves Arelim b'Zerikah"; see also the verse with regard to Pigul, "Lo Yechashev," Vayikra 7:18). Since the status of the Korban depends on the person's thoughts and not on what he expresses verbally, what difference does it make if he says "for Arelim"? How does his speech affect the Korban if his thoughts were proper?

Similarly, Terumah may be separated by Machshavah, thought, and it is not necessary to verbally declare that one is separating Terumah (Shevuos 26b, Bechoros 59a). Accordingly, when a person has in mind to say "these fruits are Terumah" and he accidentally says that they are Ma'aser, we should disregard his speech and the fruits should be Terumah. Why does the Mishnah in Terumos state that his words are meaningless?

(a) The RASH (Terumos 3:8) and TOSFOS (Erchin 5a, DH Adam, in his second answer) explain that Machshavah works for Terumah only when the person's thoughts are not contradicted by his speech. If his speech contradicts what he has in his mind, his speech overrides his thoughts and his thoughts are disregarded.

Similarly, in the case of one who slaughters the Korban with intention that it is for both Arelim and Mulim, his speech at the time of the Shechitah was only "for Arelim." Even though his Machshavah was proper (for Arelim and for Mulim), his speech at the moment of Shechitah overrides his thoughts. (See also KEREN ORAH to Nedarim 2a, who also gives this answer.)

The reason why one's thoughts do not take effect when they are contradicted by one's speech can be understood based on the Gemara in Shevuos (26b), as explained by the TUREI EVEN (in Avnei Shoham to Chagigah 10a). The Gemara there explains that even something that can take effect through Machshavah takes effect only when the person specifically intends for it to take effect through Machshavah. If he decides to cause it to take effect through a verbal expression of his intention, then it does not take effect through Machshavah but rather through speech.

The SHACH (YD 258) understands that when a person decides to verbally express his intentions, he also decides that he does not want his thoughts to take effect until he says them aloud. Accordingly, when he decides to verbally express that "these fruits are Terumah," he intends that his thoughts not take effect until he expresses them verbally. However, since he said "Ma'aser" instead of "Terumah" when he spoke, the fruits do not become Terumah because he did not want his thoughts to take effect independently, but only through speech, and he never expressed verbally that the fruits should be Terumah.

Similarly, in the case of the Beraisa here, since the person wanted to verbalize his thoughts and say "for Arelim and for Mulim," his thoughts do not take effect unless he verbally expresses them.

(b) TOSFOS (Erchin 5a, DH Adam, in his first answer) explains that when the Gemara here says that the person's words are meaningless, it means that only the words "these fruits are Ma'aser" are meaningless. The fruits, however, are Terumah, because he intended to make them Terumah, and Terumah takes effect through thought alone.

This answer, however, addresses only the case of Terumah. It does not address the case of the Korban slaughtered "for Arelim and for Mulim." If one's thoughts take effect even when his speech contradicts them, the Korban should be valid, because he had in mind to slaughter it for both Arelim and for Mulim. Why is the Korban invalid?

Tosfos here answers this question by positing that whenever the Mishnah or Gemara discusses a Machshavah that invalidates or validates a Korban, it means a thought that is expressed through speech. It is not possible for thought alone to invalidate a Korban. Consequently, in the case of the Gemara here, the person's Machshavah is meaningless, because Machshavah alone never invalidates or validates a Korban. Since he said only that he was slaughtering it "for Arelim," the Korban is invalid.

(c) RASHI (Gitin 31a and elsewhere) consistently explains that when the Gemara says that one may separate Terumah with Machshavah, it means that one may separate Terumah without a physical action, and that speech alone suffices. The Gemara does not mean that thought alone makes fruit into Terumah. (See also Rashi to Shevuos 26b, DH Terumah, and Tosfos to Gitin 31a, DH v'Nechshav.)

Accordingly, since one must verbally declare his intention to make fruit become Terumah, when he accidentally says that the fruit is Ma'aser, the fruit does not become Terumah.

However, this does not explain why we do not follow one's Machshavah when he intends to slaughter the Korban for Mulim as well as for Arelim.

Rashi here (DH v'Hacha) answers this question by explaining, as Tosfos does, that with regard to Kodshim as well, a Machshavah alone is ineffective and cannot invalidate or validate a Korban.

One question remains. The Mishnah in Terumos (3:8) says that if a person intends to say "l'Olah" and he accidentally says "l'Shelamim," his speech is ineffective and it is as if he said nothing. That case is a case of Kodshim, and with regard to making an animal Kodesh even Rashi (Shevuos 26b) agrees that Machshavah alone is effective!

Perhaps Rashi understands that the Mishnah in Terumos refers only to making a Temurah of an Olah or Shelamim; a Temurah can be made only through speech. (M. KORNFELD)

QUESTION: Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish argue about whether one is liable when he slaughters the Korban Pesach while he has Chametz in his possession in his home but not nearby in the Azarah. The Gemara suggests that their dispute is based on whether Hasra'as Safek is considered a valid Hasra'ah (warning) or not.

RASHI (DH b'Hasra'as Safek) explains that if witnesses do not know whether the person who slaughters the Korban Pesach has Chametz in his home or not, their Hasra'ah is only a Hasra'as Safek. Consequently, even if he does have Chametz in his home, he is not punished with Malkus because the witnesses did not know about it at the time of the Hasra'ah.

What difference does it make if the witnesses do not know about the Chametz? As long as the person who is being warned knows that he has Chametz in his home, and he nevertheless transgresses even after he is warned, he cannot be called "Shogeg." He has willfully committed a sin and he should be punished with Malkus. Why is the Hasra'ah in this case considered Hasra'as Safek?

ANSWER: TOSFOS (DH Hasra'as Safek) explains that Rashi does not mean that when the witnesses do not know, their Hasra'ah is a Hasra'as Safek and the transgression is considered an inadvertent one. Rather, Rashi means that since the person who slaughters the Korban Pesach is able to claim that he does not know whether he has Chametz in his home, he cannot be held accountable when the witnesses also do not know if he has Chametz. He can claim that he did not know at the time of the Shechitah that he actually had Chametz in his home. When the witnesses know for certain that he has Chametz in his home, when they warn him that he has Chametz in his home and he nevertheless proceeds and slaughters the Korban, his act is clearly a deliberate, intentional sin, for which he is punished with Malkus. (The RITVA in Shevuos (37a) gives a similar explanation for the words of Rashi there, as pointed out by Rav Mordechai Rabin.)