Citation (Shevi'is 7:1): A Mishnah in Shevi'is (7:1) says "a great general rule - any human food or animal food or dye that does not remain in the land, i.e. it is finished (no longer available) for Chayos, Shevi'is applies to it and to Damav (what is exchanged for it). Bi'ur applies to it and to Damav (what is exchanged for it).

Citation (Shevi'is 7:2): They said another general rule - anything that is not a human food or animal food... and remains in the land, Shevi'is applies to it and to Damav. Bi'ur does not apply to it and not to Damav.

Explanation: The first general rule is great, because Bi'ur applies, but it does not apply to the latter rule.

Implied question: It taught another clause there "a great general rule was taught about Shevi'is", and no other general rule was taught after it!

Answer: Since a small general rule was taught before it, it is appropriate to teach after it "a great general rule."

Question: Why should it teach that the first general rule is great, since it is not greater than the second? This requires investigation. (Tosfos ha'Rosh says the first is "Gadol" because it gives more conditions to be obligated. Rashash says that the Gemara asks that the latter Klal is greater, for it has two clauses.)

Implied question: Rava holds in Mo'ed Katan (2b) that the Torah forbade Avos in Shevi'is, but not Toldos! (If so, why does it say "Klal Gadol" regarding Shevi'is?)

Answer: In any case, mid'Rabanan Shevi'is has Avos and Toldos.

Implied question: Also regarding Ma'aser there are Avos and Toldos! The Torah obligates only grain, wine and oil, and mid'Rabanan everything is obligated!

Answer: It is relevant to discuss Avos and Toldos only in a matter in which there is an Isur of Melachos.

Question: For this reason, also the other Klal of Shabbos and Shevi'is should be called "Klal Gadol"!

Answer: There was no need to teach this, for [the latter Klal] refers to the first Klal Gadol. [The latter Mishnah] means "they said another Klal Gadol..."

Explanation #1 (Rashi): "Detached" means that it was detached before Shabbos or before Shevi'is.

Inference: He explains "Shevi'is applies [only] to what is attached" to mean what was attached in Erev Shevi'is and detached in Shevi'is, and we discuss the Isur of eating Peros Shevi'is.

Objection (Ri): According to his Perush, the Gemara should have said rather "the punishment of Shabbos and Shevi'is is greater than that of Ma'aser, for [Shabbos and Shevi'is] apply to animal foods, but Ma'aser does not";

Why does it say "the punishment of Shabbos is greater than that of Shevi'is"?

Explanation #2 (Ri): You must say that for [laws of] eating, which do not apply to Shabbos, it is not relevant to say that Shabbos is greater than Shevi'is or Ma'aser. This is why it does not say that Shabbos and Shevi'is are greater than Ma'aser;

Rather, it says that Shabbos is greater than Shevi'is, for the Isur Melachah [of Shabbos] applies both to what is detached and attached, whereas the Isur Melachah of Shevi'is applies only to what is attached, but not to what is detached.

Support: The Yerushalmi teaches that Shabbos applies to everything, but Shevi'is applies only to working the land.

Assertion (Rashba): Others did not teach at all a Klal Gadol for Ma'aser, because it is greater than Pe'ah only mid'Rabanan. However, the Klal Gadol of Shabbos is greater than Shevi'is mid'Oraisa, and similarly [the Klal Gadol] of Shevi'is is greater than Ma'aser [mid'Oraisa].

Implied question: Not only figs are exempt from Pe'ah. Most trees are not harvested at once. Only eight [species] of trees listed in Pe'ah (1:5) are obligated in Pe'ah!

Answer: It mentioned figs because they are picked several times, like it says (Bava Basra 28b) he ate three Peros (harvested three times) in one day, e.g. a fig tree.

Pesak (R. Tam): Mid'Oraisa, only grain, wine and oil are obligated in Pe'ah, for Stam Katzir (harvest) is written regarding Pe'ah, and this is grain, and it says "Ki Sachvot Zeisecha [Lo Sefa'er Acharecha...;] Ki Sivtzor Karmecha [Lo Se'olel Acharecha...]"

Implied question - Citation (Toras Kohanim): Perhaps I include gourds and pumpkins that they are obligated in Pe'ah! It says "uv'Kutzrechem Es Ketzir Artzechem" - just like Katzir (harvest) is food and it lasts... (This connotes that every food that lasts is obligated in Pe'ah!)

Answer: That is a mere Asmachta, for also there it expounds Ma'aser of Yerek from a verse, even though it is mid'Rabanan (Yoma 83b).

Implied question: Why didn't [Chachamim] enact Pe'ah for Yerek and figs, just like they enacted Ma'aser from them?

Answer (R. Tam): It is because they are not picked at once, so the Pe'ah [on what was picked now] is a small amount, and there is more loss for Aniyim than profit, for they are Batel (from more profitable uses of their time), for they do not know when it is picked;

Also something that does not last, it is not important, and [Aniyim who would come to collect it would] lose more than they would profit elsewhere.

Implied question: Why didn't it say Stam "to exclude something that is not a food"? Why did it say specifically these?

Answer (Ri): It is include they are somewhat proper to eat. [The Mishnah] teaches that even so, Pe'ah does not apply to them. The Rashbam found that also Rashi said so in a Teshuvah.

Implied question: Why did it mention Sefichim (what grows by itself)?

Answer #1: Perhaps safflower and woad themselves (i.e. from what is planted intentionally) is not proper for people to eat at all, and it is no Chidush [to exempt them].

Answer #2: Perhaps [regular safflower and woad] are proper food, and we do not exclude them.

Explanation: He converted in front of three, and they did not inform him about the Mitzvah of Shabbos;

If he converted by himself, he is not a convert, like it says in Yevamos (47b)!

Question (Ri): What is his source to infer this? I can say that also if he did not forget, he is not liable for every Melachah, rather, for every Shabbos, just like when he knew and later forgot!

The Tana taught when he knew and later forgot, and all the more so this (when he did not forget)!

Answer #1 (Rashi): He infers that he is liable for every Melachah, since it did not teach together "one who knows the essence of Shabbos and forgot it, and one who knows the essence of Shabbos, is liable for every Shabbos."

Objection (Ri): If so, how do we ask above "let it teach when he knew and later forgot, and all the more so this (when he did not forget)!" It connotes that there was no need to teach this;

[According to Rashi,] we need to learn also this, that he is not liable for every Melachah!

Answer #2 (Ri): Above, it says "let it teach when he knew and later forgot, and all the more so this (when he did not forget)!" It does not mean that the Mishnah would not teach it at all;

Rather, it means as follows. Since it taught that he is liable for every Shabbos, and did not teach "he is liable only for every Shabbos", which would imply not for every Melachah, this connotes that our Mishnah primarily teaches liability for every Shabbos, and not exemption, that he is not liable for every Melachah;

If so, it should teach when he knew and later forgot, which is a bigger Chidush, and all the more so this (when he did not forget), that he is liable for every Shabbos, and it would not be needed to teach it in this clause;

Rather, it should have taught afterwards in another clause "one who knows the essence of Shabbos is liable only for every Shabbos", to teach that he is not liable for every Melachah.

Support: Now, it is a proper inference "but if he did not forget, what is the law? He is liable for every Melachah", since it did not teach a separate clause "he is liable only for every Shabbos."

Question (Ri): Rabah says in Kerisus (16b) that for Zadon Shabbos and Shigegas Melachos, one is not liable for every Shabbos;

He infers from our Mishnah here. It did not teach that he is liable for every Av Melachah of every Shabbos.

Summation of question: According to [Rabah], how can [the Gemara] ask here "[why does it say 'if he knows that the day is Shabbos, and did many Melachos on many Shabbosos, he is liable for every Av Melachah'?] It should teach "one who knows the essence of Shabbos [and forgot that the day is Shabbos is liable for every Av Melachah", and all the more so this case]!

The Mishnah could not teach so, for if so, this would connote that one who knows the essence of Shabbos (but forgot that the day is Shabbos) is not liable for every Shabbos!

Answer #1 (Ri): It asks as follows. It should teach "one who knows the essence of Shabbos is liable for every Av Melachah of every Shabbos."

Answer #2 (Rashba): Had it taught explicitly "one who knows the essence of Shabbos is liable for every Av Melachah", we could not infer that he is not liable for every Shabbos, from the fact that it did not teach "he is liable for every Av Melachah of every Shabbos";

[We could not infer this, for] there was no need to teach this, for we learn it from the Reisha, which teaches if he knew [the essence of Shabbos] and later forgot [it], he is liable for every Shabbos", and all the more so one who knows the essence of Shabbos [and forgot that the day is Shabbos]!

Implied suggestion: We ask that the Mishnah should not teach at all [one who knew that it is Shabbos and did many Melachos].

Rejection: If so (the Mishnah would not teach it), one might have thought that he is liable also for every Shabbos. This is not true according to Rabah in Kerisus (16b)!

Rather, [we asked that] it should have taught another clause "one who knows that it is Shabbos is not liable for every Shabbos."

Explanation #1 (Rashi): This is why the Mishnah did not teach when he forgot from the beginning, i.e. a baby who was captured, lest we say that if he knew and later forgot, he is liable for every Shabbos.

Question (Ri): In any case, it should have taught this, and teach afterwards if he knew and later forgot, he is liable only once!

The Gemara asked like this above - it should teach "one who knew [the essence of Shabbos] and later forgot [it]", and all the more so this case [when he forgot that the day is Shabbos], like I explained (above, DH Aval)!

Explanation #2 (Ri): Surely, had it taught that he is Chayav Chatas, that it comes to teach liability, it would be appropriate to ask that it should teach a baby who was captured, which would be a bigger Chidush;

However, now that it taught that he is Chayav only one, that it comes to teach exemption, it mentioned when he knew and later forgot, which is a bigger Chidush (than a baby who was captured).

Question (Ri): Still, it should teach a baby who was captured, lest we err to think that he is exempt, like R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and afterwards teach when he knew and later forgot!

Explanation #1 (Rashi): They hold that Omer Mutar (if one mistakenly thinks that it is permitted), this is Ones.

Objection (and Explanation #2): Their reason is like Munvaz, like it says below, and below we say that Munvaz learns from a verse!

Citation (Makos 7b): Regarding Galus (for one who killed b'Shogeg, a Beraisa says that) "bi'Shgagah" excludes Mezid, and Rava explained that it excludes Omer Mutar, and Abaye asked that Omer Mutar is Ones.

Explanation: "Ones" is not precise. Everywhere, we obligate [Omer Mutar]. Only regarding Galus, Rava excludes Omer Mutar, because "bi'Shgagah" is written many times there;

Source: Below (72b) we obligate Omer Mutar regarding idolatry and Chelev, even though "bi'Shgagah" is written regarding them.

Abaye challenged [Rava] that Omer Mutar is Ones, and the Beraisa should not teach '"bi'Shgagah" to exclude Mezid', rather, 'to exclude Ones', for Omer Mutar resembles and is closer to Ones than to Mezid.

Implied question: Obviously, for all the blood that a person ate, he is liable only once, since there is no distinction in the Isur of blood like there is distinction of Melachos in Shabbos;

Also every person, without [being] a baby who was captured, if he ate blood and [again ate] blood, he is liable only once!

Answer (Ri): We discuss even when he ate in several plates. According to R. Yehoshua (71a), one person is liable for each plate, even in one Helam, but a baby who was captured is liable only once.

Question (Rashba): Why did the Mishnah need to further teach "and for Chelev he is liable [only] one"? (Pnei Yehoshua - one might have thought that he brings one Korban for all the Aveiros, for it was like one Helam. Further, one might have thought that he is exempt, for Omer Mutar is Ones.)

Explanation: This is like Rashi explained, that even in this case he obligates, and he obligates also when there was no knowledge at the time of the action (Aveirah).

Source #1: R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish hold like Munvaz, and they obligate when he knew and later forgot.

Source #2: Also, a Beraisa below (69a) teaches that if he was Shogeg about both (the Lav and the Kares), this is the Shogeg that the Torah discussed, and we establish it like Munvaz.

Explanation: The reason is because it is logical that Shogeg is not equated to Mezid to uproot it from the meaning of Shegagah. Just the contrary, Shogeg connotes that there was no knowledge at the time of the action!

The Hekesh comes only to obligate also when there was knowledge at the time of the action.

Question (Ri): Based on the Hekesh, [R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish] exempt a baby who was captured. From this reason, they should exempt also when he knew and later forgot! (Tosfos ha'Rosh - it is reasonable to exempt only a baby who was captured, who never knew.)