Text#1: Rashi has the text, "like the words of Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah." He does not have the text, "these are the words of (Rebbi Yehudah etc.)." This is because the Mishnah says he is exempt, and according to Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah he is liable, as the Mishnah says later.

Text#2: The Riva understands that one can uphold the former text. This is because Rebbi Yehudah admits that when someone swears not to eat Neveilah and he eats it anyway he is exempt, because one Issur does not take effect on another Issur.

Proof: Earlier (23b), the Gemara also asks regarding Neveilah that one is already sworn from Har Sinai not to do so! This implies that nobody argues (that one is exempt in this situation).

Observation: Only if one swears to fulfill a Mitzvah, such as sitting in the Sukah or eating Matzah, does Rebbi Yehudah say he is liable for transgressing this oath. The reason is as stated in Nedarim (8a), "How do we know that one may swear to fulfill a Mitzvah? The Pasuk states, "I have sworn and I have upheld my oath (to guard Your righteous laws)." Accordingly, one is also liable to bring a Korban if he transgresses this oath.

Observation(cont.): The Yerushalmi indeed states that if someone swears not to eat Neveilah and he does, Rebbi Yehudah agrees that he is exempt. If you will say he is liable, it should say the following. "No. If you will tell me that in an oath regarding regular matters that no is like yes and yes is like no, you cannot tell me that this is the case regarding matters of Mitzvos!" "Yes is like no" (in this case) means that one can eat Neveilah just as easily as he can choose not to eat Neveilah. Being that this is not true, Rebbi Yehudah clearly holds one is exempt if he transgressed such a Shevuah.

Text#2(cont.): Now we can indeed have the text, "these are the words of Rebbi Yehudah." This is because all of these words are indeed the opinion of Rebbi Yehudah. When it says, "if one swears to fulfill a Mitzvah he is exempt" it means he says that he will not eat Neveilah. Sometimes he indeed is liable, for example if he swore to sit in a Sukah. These are the words of Rebbi Yehudah ben Beseirah.

Question: For this reason as well, why do we say that one Issur cannot take effect on another Issur? If it is because we derive from the Pasuk, "And they will die from it because they made it mundane" that this excludes Terumah that was already made impure, and we derive from here that an impure Kohen who ate Terumah that was impure is exempt, how can we make a Kal v'Chomer? We should say that the fact that one prohibition does not take effect when another prohibition is already present should prove that one is not liable for such an oath!

Explanation: This derivation is not according to Rebbi Akiva. He said earlier (26a) that we derive using "Including and excluding." What do we exclude? We exclude a matter involving a Mitzvah. (In other words, he derives laws from this Pasuk differently than does our Gemara.)

Explanation: This means that one does not nullify a Mitzvah by doing so. This how the Gemara later explains this term.

Implied Question: This entire segment is unnecessary. (Why is it stated in the Beraisa?)

Answer: Rather, it is to teach that a person can injure himself. This is debated in Bava Kama (91b).

Implied Question: This case is also unnecessary. (Why is it said?)

Answer: It is said due to the second half of this case, as it wanted to include a case where he would do good to others.

Explanation: This means that it is even true regarding a Mitzvah. However, one should not explain that it might only apply to a Mitzvah.

Proof: This is evident from the Gemara later that asks that if it is discussing a Mitzvah, what does this exclude? The Gemara seemingly should have said it excludes a mundane matter. Rather, it is obvious to the Gemara that "to do bad or good" is stated by a mundane matter, as this implies doing something bad or good to one's body (i.e. not eating, drinking, etc.).

Explanation: An example of the Pasuk "to do bad" would be "I will not eat Matzah," as this is total evil, and is both bad for his body and his soul. An example of "To do good" is "I will eat Matzah," as this is totally good, both for his body and for his soul.

Question: This is difficult. By a mundane matter, we easily find bad similar to good, and good similar to bad. Just like good refers to not nullifying a Mitzvah and it is a permitted action, as otherwise it would not be good, also bad means that is permitted to be done. For example, saying "I will not eat this loaf" is permitted (but makes him refrain from eating).

Question(cont.): Additionally, just as evil means a Mitzvah is not fulfilled and there is no obligation to fulfill the Mitzvah, so too good can be when there is no obligation. For example, if someone swears to eat a certain loaf. Why should we have to compare them to an extreme until we should ask that the good is bad and the bad is good (as does our Gemara), being that we can equate them?

Question: This is difficult. If so, why do the Rabbanan have to say in the Mishnah that we cannot say this by a Shevuah involving a Mitzvah, as there is positive and negative action possible? They should derive that "to do bad" is not talking about a Mitzvah, being that "Oh" was required to include an oath regarding doing good to others. (If it was talking about a Mitzvah, we would not need to include doing good to others.) We require that doing good should be like doing bad regarding a regular matter (not a matter of Mitzvah). (It therefore is obvious without their logical question that the Pasuk is only talking about a regular matter, not about a Mitzvah.)

Answer: This is not a question, as even though the Pasuk does not discuss fulfilling a Mitzvah, we should still derive this from a Kal v'Chomer. (Rebbi Yehudah tried to prove that a Kal v'Chomer should be used to include a Mitzvah even though the Pasuk did not discuss it. This is why the Rabbanan had to nullify the Kal v'Chomer.)

Explanation: Rebbi Yoshiyah understands that the reason that the Torah had to say "Yachdav" regarding a person who plows with an ox and donkey together is in order that one should not be liable if they are not tied together.

Proof: This is as the Yerushalmi states that "Yachdav" is required to exclude tying them to the back of the wagon. Similarly, regarding wearing wool and linen together, the Pasuk had to say Yachdav to teach that there is no Torah prohibition if they are not sown together. This would be a case where there are two articles of clothing, one of wool and one of linen.

Question: Perhaps it excludes one who changes what is known, or something that is not in his control according to Shmuel, or something that is not possible to be both positive or negative according to Rav?

Answer#1: It is possible to answer that all of these are equal possibilities, as I explained earlier. If one is included the other is included.

Answer#2: Additionally, if so, it should state, "to do or not to do" and not use the terminology "to do bad or good."

Text#1: This is the text of Rashi. He deduces this from the fact that the Mishnah stated three times that I will not eat, I will not eat it, and I will not eat it.

Question: This does not seem correct. In Nedarim (17a), the Mishnah says that if someone swears not to eat twice, he is only liable once if he eats. The Mishnah there does not say that he said this three times. Even so, Rava deduces there (18a) from the Mishnah that being that it did not say he is liable for one or only one, and it instead says, he is only liable for one, this implies that he does not have space (between the oaths). If he would permit one of these vows, the other would still be valid.

Text#2: It therefore seems that we do not have the text "I will not eat" three times in our Mishnah. We also do not have the text, "Why do we need this extra statement?"

Text#2(cont.): Rather, we have the text, "There is no liability etc." The deduction is because the Mishnah says, "he is only liable for one" as deduced by the Gemara in Nedarim.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the Mishnah here cannot state, "only one" as we need the Mishnah to say he is liable in order to teach that if he says, "I will not eat it" and then "I will not eat" he is liable twice.

Answer: Even so, there is still a deduction from the fact that the Mishnah does not say he is liable for one.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Nedarim (18a) does not push aside the proof in the same manner as our Gemara, but rather says that the case there is when he accepted upon himself two periods of Nezirus at the same time. (Why does our Gemara push aside the proof differently?)

Answer: The Gemara there originally thought that the case was where a person said, "I am a Nazir today, I am a Nazir today." The Gemara holds like Rav Huna, who says earlier that Nezirus cannot take effect on another Nezirus. The Gemara brings a good proof that this is similar to a case of Shevuos. The Gemara pushes this aside by saying that the case is where he accepted two periods of Nezirus at once.

Answer(cont.): This is therefore not similar to oaths, as regarding Nezirus both periods take effect. He must count one after the other, even if he does not ask about the first Nezirus.

Answer(cont.): However, our Gemara tries to prove that even if we say that the second Nezirus takes effect on the first Nezirus, or he accepted two periods of Nezirus at once, being that he counted the first Nezirus for his first Nezirus, how can it count as the second Nezirus (if he permits the first)? It must be because we say that if the second Nezirus is found it takes effect. The same applies to Shevuos.

Answer(cont.): The Gemara answers that the cases are incomparable. In the case of Nezirus the second Nezirus takes effect because when the first one leaves the second takes effect. However, here there is no Shevuah!

Implied Question: The Gemara there asks its question on Rav Huna who says that Nezirus does not take effect on another Nezirus, from the Tosefta regarding one who pledged two periods of Nezirus. It answers that the case is when he accepted two periods of Nezirus at once. The Gemara could have answered that even though Nezirus does not take effect on Nezirus, if it would find space to take effect it would, as per the law of Rava.

Answer: Rather, the Gemara answers based on the fact that the one asking the question did not contemplate Rava's law (and how it affects his question).

Question: The Rivam asks that if someone accepted two periods of Nezirus at once and asked to permit one of them, why shouldn't we say that the second one (i.e. both of them) is also permitted? Why is this different from the Mishnah in Nedarim (66a), "Konam that I will not benefit from all of you" which concludes that if he is permitted to one of them he is permitted to all of them?

Answer: It appears that one can differentiate that here, being that he concluded that he is accepting two periods of Nezirus, it is as if he accepted each one separately (as opposed to saying "all of them" regarding a bunch of people).

Observation: It appears that when he only leaves less than a Kzayis he is liable, even though he said, "I will not eat it." (This is according to the Gemara's conclusion, see Maharsha.) When he swears regarding a loaf, his mindset is not that he will not leave less than a Kzayis.

Proof: A person does not eat a whole loaf without having some crumbs fall off of it. If he is exempt unless he literally eats that less than a Kzayis that falls off the loaf, why do we say later that they are not considered important enough to ask about them (to permit his oath)? Why is this different from an oath that "I will not even eat a little bit" where it is obvious that he can permit this oath?