Question: This is difficult. The Gemara in Gitin (36a) does not make this deduction when Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that they made a "great decree" that the witnesses should explicitly state their names in a Get etc. Similarly, in Bava Kama (103b), Rebbi Eliezer bar Tzadok says that they made a "great decree" that if the expense was more than the principle etc. (In neither of these cases does the Gemara ask, "A great decree implies that there are small decrees!" Why does it ask this in our Gemara?)

Answer: They are called "great decrees" in these Gemaros because they were very necessary. Our Gemara makes this deduction because he says, "(Great decrees) were taught here" (implying that great decrees were taught here, as opposed to other places where small decrees were taught).

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that one who denies owing any money at all is exempt from taking an oath (according to Torah law), as a Shevuas Heses was only instituted to be taken in the times of Rav Nachman. (How, then, can the Mishnah be explained by saying that the oath was taken away from the employer? Why would he have to swear before the institution of Shevuas Heses?)

Answer: Even so, it is more appropriate for the employer to swear (as the money is being claimed from him, see also Tosfos Ha'Rosh and Rashash.)

Answer: Additionally, even the oath of partial admission was placed on the worker (when that should be placed on the employer according to Torah law).

Explanation#1: The sages did not differentiate (as is common when they made decrees) between a person who has one worker or many workers.

Explanation#2: The Yerushalmi states that an employer (usually) has many business dealings (and therefore he may be too busy to remember accurately whether or not he paid his worker).

Question: The claim made by the employer that he is certain should not be worse than his saying that he doesn't know! This is understandable according to the opinion in Bava Metzia (97b) that having a certain claim is better. However, according to the opinion that having a certain claim is not better, why should this be?

Answer: It is possible to answer that this is like a case where a person claims a Manah, and the defendant says that he is unsure whether or not he returned it to the claimant. In such a case he is liable to pay according to everyone, as is apparent in Bava Kama (118a).

Question: Even so, why should we award him the money without his having to take an oath? Is it impossible that his (the employer's) certain claim should be better? Sometimes he will be correct! This is apparent from the fact that Rebbi Yehudah only says that one is only liable (to pay if the employee swears) when there is partial admittance (by the employer).

Answer: While it is true that Rebbi Yehudah does not consider a certain claim to be as bad as a claim that the person does not know, the Rabbanan hold that it indeed is considered as if he certainly forgot.

Explanation: In this case where he is standing and screaming that he paid, it is understandable that there should be a decree to have the employee take an oath to pacify him. However, in Bava Kama (118a) where he says he does not know if he paid back the money, there is no reason to institute such a decree.

Question: Isn't this like a person saying that he does not know if someone stole from him? In that case, Rav Nachman and Rebbi Yochanan say in Bava Kama (118a) and Bava Metzia (97b) that he is exempt from paying back!

Answer: In that case, he has not admitted anything. However, here that he partially admits, it is like a case where a person claims a Manah and the other person says he only certainly owes fifty, while he is unsure about the other fifty. In that case we say that because he cannot swear, he must pay.

Explanation: The Gemara doesn't say that whoever wants to take money from his friend must supply the proof, and if he does not he loses. Rather, the customer should swear (that he only was supposed to pay one) and the worker loses, as is stated later.

Question: Why doesn't he answer that the case is where he hired him without witnesses? He should therefore be believed because he could have said he never hired him at all, as stated later.

Answer#1: This case is different, as a person who is partially admitting could not have been so brazen as to say that he never owed the worker anything.

Answer#2: Alternatively, later we say the (second) case is where he hired him with witnesses, similar to the first case. (This case therefore must be where there are witnesses.)

Implied Question: The Gemara asks its question despite the fact that one cannot use the logic, "if you will say this is understandable etc." (There are two possible reasons why a worker is believed. One is that he needs his salary to eat, and another is that the employer is busy with other workers. The Tosfos Ha'Rosh and others understand the Gemara was asking an informed question. "This is understandable" if the reason is that a worker needs to eat. He is therefore only believed if he demands his money right away. However, according to the reason that an employer is busy, he should even be believed when his money is past due! Tosfos argues on the Tosfos Ha'Rosh, and says the Gemara is not asking an informed question, but rather a "what is the difference" type of question. Tosfos explains why he holds this way later in this Tosfos. The implied question here is, does the Gemara really deem it appropriate to ask a "what is the difference" type of question?)

Answer: There is no reason to worry, as no reason has been given for the law. (Therefore, the Gemara will have to delve into the reason, and very possibly will find a good question.)

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that Rav Nachman stated (45a) that a possible reason for this law is because he needs the money to eat. (Accordingly, this would seem to be an informed question, as all of the necessary logic to ask such a question has already been presented to us. Why, then, does Tosfos say this is not an informed question?)

Answer: While Rav Nachman did say this is a reason, it is not clear that he said his reasoning in order to differentiate between whether or not his wages are past due. (See notes from Mossad Harav Kook on the Tosfos Ha'Rosh here, along with the Maharsha.)

Question#1: They should always wait until tomorrow, and if they don't remember the worker will have to bring proof!

Question#2: Additionally, why did the Rabbanan take away the oath from the employer? If he will have to take an oath, he will make sure to remember how much he owes!

Answer#1: Once he starts to deny, he will never admit. He will not even try to remember accurately, less he now be given the status of a liar.

Answer#2: It is also possible to say that the assumption that a person does not transgress "Do not leave (i.e. avoid paying wages) overnight" is only valid when there is another assumption along with it, namely that a worker does not leave his wages until they are past due. When the worker claims his wages in Beis Din and they make him wait until the next day, the worker did not delay.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that this assumption is also said regarding the employer. (Why, then, is it considered an advantage in favor of the employee?)

Answer#1: One negative prohibition is considered as stringent as two negative prohibitions. (In other words, both indeed have the prohibition against stealing at stake. The fact that the employer has two prohibitions ("Do not leave etc.") and the employee has one is considered to be even, as people consider one negative prohibition as stringent as two.)

Answer#2: In any event, the Gemara gives a good answer.

Question: Why should it make a difference that the employee does not want to transgress the prohibition against stealing? Even so, being that the employer makes sure to remember there are two claims that are both certain, meaning that the employer should be exempt, as he is denying owing anything!

Answer: It is possible to answer that the assumption that the employer will remember is not as strong as the assumption that a worker will not leave his money. Accordingly, when the Gemara says that the employer has two assumptions, it does not mean that he therefore has more credibility than the worker, but rather that this makes him equal to the worker.

Question: Why should a Migu help in this case? A Migu only helps to prove that we should not suspect him of lying on purpose. In our case, we already believe that he honestly thinks he paid. However, we think that he forgot because he is busy with his workers. A Migu is not going to help him remember! Therefore, a Migu should be irrelevant in this case.

Question(cont.): This is also implied in Yevamos (114b). A woman is not believed to say her husband died in war because they could have said he died in their bed. This is because she thinks that it must be that he died just as everyone else died in this war. Just because she thinks she is telling the truth, we cannot believe her opinion (not considered fact) regarding what happened just because she could have outright lied.

Question(cont.): This is despite the fact that in this same Gemara in Yevamos (ibid.) the question is raised that if the only way we know there is a war in that region is because she says so, do we say a Migu that she could have said there was peace in the region. (This indicates that we would use a Migu to believe her!)

Question(cont.): The only question is in that case, being that she is careful to say that there is a war there (even though others do not know about this). (We remain with our question, why should a Migu help in this case?)

Answer: In this case, being that his claim is certain, and he is saying that he certainly did not forget, we have no reason to consider him a liar being that he has a Migu. However, if he does not have a Migu he is not believed, as perhaps he indeed forgot because he is busy with his workers. Being that he thinks he paid he claims that he is certain, even though he really is unsure. [See also Tosfos in Kesuvos 87b, DH "d'Mifra."]

Question: This is difficult. According to Rashi who explains in Bava Kama (107a) regarding a deposit that being that the guardian could be brazen he is even liable to swear if he denies liability, he should also be liable to swear if he denies ever taking the article! (Accordingly, how can the Gemara ask he should be believed by saying he doesn't know what the depositor is talking about because he could have said he was a victim of forced circumstances? We believe him, and the law in this case is that he must take an oath!)

Question(cont.): According to Rabeinu Tam who does not say one is liable to swear if he denies or said he was a victim of forced circumstances, and that he is only liable if he partially admits, this is also difficult. Rebbi Chiya bar Abba and Rami bar Chama do not say one is liable to swear if he partially admits and says the rest was forced circumstances without involving any denial. However, they agree that if there is partial admittance and denial on the rest without involving forced circumstances he is liable to swear.

Question(cont.): The Mishnayos above do not even mention forced circumstances regarding the deposit. We derive the laws regarding loan claims such as denials and admittance (regarding when the borrower is liable to swear) from the laws of deposits, even though there is no claim of forced circumstances by loans. (The borrower has to pay no matter what happened to the money after he took the loan.)

Question(cont.): If he has to swear when he partially admits owing money, when he denies ever owing money when in fact it was forced circumstances he will be liable to swear, and there is no Migu. (This gives us a case where a Shomer will have to swear.)

Question(cont.): One cannot say that the question is that if he admits he should be believed on the part that he says was forced circumstances, being that he could have said on the part that he admitted that he never owed it. If so, you should ask that every partial admittance should be believed based on a Migu that he could have denied the entire claim! Rather, the reason why this is incorrect is because a person cannot be brazen enough to deny everything.

Observation: According to the Riva who says that claiming forced circumstances by a deposit makes one liable, our Gemara is understandable. The Gemara asks, being that he could have denied ever receiving anything and he would be exempt as there is no admission, if he says it was forced circumstances he should be exempt.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that this does not seem to be a good Migu, being that a person does not brazenly deny everything. Forced circumstances, on the other hand, is an easy claim to make, as the depositor has no way of knowing that he is lying. It is therefore easy for the guardian to claim forced circumstances. (Accordingly, how can the Gemara suggest that he should be believed that it was forced circumstances because he could have denied the entire incident? He would be too embarrassed to deny the entire incident!)

Answer: Even so, the Gemara is asking a good question according to Shmuel who holds that such a Migu is valid. He would rather say (i.e. lie) that he gave the worker his wages, in order that the worker should not think he is purposely lying because he is busy with his workers. It is therefore understandable why this question is on Shmuel and not on the general concept of Migu in the Torah.

Question: This is difficult. We say in Bava Basra (29a) that we find a Chazakah for three years in a case where two people come and say we rented from him (the person claiming to have a Chazakah), and lived there for three years. The Gemara asks, they are partial to their testimony! If they did not say this, we would tell them that they owe rent to the real owner! Why is this difficult? Being that paying back with witnesses is not necessary, we should believe their testimony, as if the other person was the real owner they could have stated that they had already paid him!

Answer#1: They would not have said this, as they are scared that the real owner will win the case, and they will need to pay him again.

Answer#2: The Ri says that after the Rabbanan's institution of Shevuas Heses they are not believed to say they paid, as stated explicitly in Kidushin (43b).

Question: This is difficult. Let him be believed with an oath that he could have said he was a victim of forced circumstances. This is as is apparent from the Gemara in Bava Basra (70a) where Rav Amram asked Rav Chisda that if someone deposited something with his friend and recorded this in a document, and the guardian then claimed he returned it, what is the law? The Gemara concludes he is believed with an oath. Rava himself holds this way, as he rules there that the law follows the judges of the exile.

Answer#1: Rabeinu Tam answers that this is what the Gemara means. He must return the object with witnesses if he wants to be exempt without having to take an oath.

Answer#2: The Riva explains that here he must return the item with witnesses because of the (depositor's) claim, why is your document in my hand? However, in that case where the deal is half loan, it is possible to say that he wanted the document itself for its own value (even after the loan was paid off, and therefore the lender has less of a claim).