1) CHOOSING A KOHEN TO OFFER ONE'S KORBAN
QUESTION: The Mishnah states that when a person declares that his animal, which is sanctified as an Olah, should become Kadosh with Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis, he must pay the value of the Korban to Bedek ha'Bayis.
RASHI (DH Hekdesh Iluy) explains that this value depends on whether his Korban Olah was a Neder or Nedavah. If it was a Neder (for which the owner has Achrayus and must replace the animal if anything happens to it before it is offered), then the owner must pay the full value of the animal to Bedek ha'Bayis. This is because the designated animal is still considered his monetary possession, since he can fulfill his obligation with another animal.
In contrast, if the animal was designated as a Nedavah, he has no obligation to bring any other animal in the event that something happens to this one; he is obligated only to bring this animal. Therefore, he does not pay the full value of the animal to Bedek ha'Bayis, since the animal does not really belong to him, but to Hekdesh. Rashi explains that the monetary value of such an animal is the amount that a Yisrael would pay the owner to give the animal to his daughter's son, who is a Kohen, who will keep the hide after he offers the Korban. The amount of money that the relative of this Kohen would pay the owner in order for it to be given to this Kohen (and receive the hide) is the value that the owner must pay to Hekdesh when he sanctifies the value of the Korban to Bedek ha'Bayis.
The MINCHAS CHINUCH (#115) asks that Rashi's words seem to contradict a statement of the MISHNEH L'MELECH (Hilchos Temidin 2:9) regarding the way an individual brings a Korban. The Mishneh l'Melech states that a Yisrael cannot choose a specific Kohen to bring his Korban. Rather, he merely gives the Korban to the Mishmar presently serving in the Beis ha'Mikdash, and the first Kohen of that Mishmar who wants to offer the Korban does so. Rashi, however, implies that the owner has the right to give the Korban to the Kohen of his choice.
How are the words of the Mishneh l'Melech to be reconciled with the view of Rashi?
ANSWERS:
(a) The OLAS SHLOMO answers that it is clear that Rashi does not mean that the owner of the Korban can give the animal (and, therefore, its hide) to the Kohen of his choice. Rashi himself in Pesachim (57a, DH Oros Kodshim) clearly states that the hides of Korbanos are divided equally among all of the Kohanim in the Mishmar. It must be that Rashi here means that there is a benefit to the Kohen to have the Olah brought during his Mishmar's shift, since there will be one more Korban Olah of which he will share the hide. Rashi does not mean that the Kohen relative will bring the Korban and receive the hide himself.
(b) The TOSFOS CHADASHIM (Yoma 2:7) maintains that the simple reading of Rashi is correct. Rashi maintains that a person may give his Korban to a specific Kohen to offer on his behalf. Moreover, the Tosfos Chadashim asserts that this is the prevalent opinion among the Rishonim. It is unclear, though, how he explains the apparent contradiction between Rashi here and Rashi in Pesachim. (Y. MONTROSE)
32b----------------------------------------32b
2) DEDICATING TO "CHERMEI KOHANIM" AN ANIMAL THAT IS ALREADY "KADOSH"
QUESTION: The Gemara earlier (32a) quotes Rav Huna's statement that when a person dedicates his animal -- which was already designated to be a Korban -- to be the property of Kohanim ("Chermei Kohanim"), his words have no effect. Rav Huna derives this from the verse, "Every Cherem is Kodesh Kodashim to Hash-m" (Vayikra 27:28). Rav Huna understands that the verse means that "every Cherem of Kodesh Kodashim" is to Hash-m; that is, Hekdesh is solely to Hash-m, and it cannot be dedicated to be given to the Kohanim.
The Gemara rejects Rav Huna's statement based on a Beraisa that discusses the exact case and rules that "what he has done is done," clearly implying that the person's words are effective. How does the Gemara understand the proof from the verse that Rav Huna cites? Ula answers that the fact that the verse adds the word "every" ("Kol") teaches that even when the animal was already Kadosh as Kodshei Mizbe'ach, the value of the animal must be given to the Kohanim (see RASHI DH Amar Ula).
The Gemara continues and asks that a different statement of Ula implies that he rules otherwise. Ula states that when one declares that his animal -- which was already dedicated to be a Korban -- is now dedicated as Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis, the owner is not required to give money to Bedek ha'Bayis (according to the understanding of Rashi in DH Gizbarin, in contrast to TOSFOS to 32a, DH v'Ha Amar). Rashi explains that it is clear that if no money is given to Bedek ha'Bayis as a result of such a declaration of Hekdesh, then certainly a declaration of Hekdesh to Chermei Kohanim would not require that money be given to the Kohanim.
The Gemara answers that Ula maintains that one indeed must give the money to the Kohanim in such a case, but the obligation is only mid'Rabanan. Even though Ula quotes the verse of "Kol Cherem" to teach this requirement, the verse is merely an Asmachta.
The MISHNEH L'MELECH (Hilchos Erchin 6:10) and other Acharonim question the Gemara's explanation of Ula's opinion. If such an obligation can be only mid'Rabanan, then why does the Gemara not give this answer for Rav Huna as well? The Gemara should have answered its question on Rav Huna by saying that when the Beraisa says that "what he has done is done," it refers to the obligation mid'Rabanan to give the money to the Kohanim, while Rav Huna's statement refers to the law mid'Oraisa (that the money does not need to be given to the Kohanim)!
ANSWER: The OLAS SHLOMO, SEFAS EMES, and others answer that the Gemara could not have given this answer for Rav Huna due to a principle expressed by the TAZ (OC 588:5). The Taz writes that when the Torah explicitly states that an action is permitted, the Chachamim do not have the power to forbid that action. He says that this applies even when it is only a Derashah that permits the action in question.
The Olas Shlomo proves from various sources that this principle also applies to monetary obligations. When the Torah says that one does not owe money to Hekdesh, the Chachamim cannot obligate that person to pay.
Accordingly, Rav Huna understands that the verse is clearly stating that the value of Kodshei Mizbe'ach is only for Hash-m. Since the Torah states this explicitly, the Chachamim cannot enact an obligation for the person to pay. Ula, however, understands that the verse does not explicitly exempt the person from having to give money to the Kohanim, and that it does not read as Rav Huna says it does. Ula adds that the word "Kol" might even teach that in this case one must give money to the Kohanim as well. Accordingly, Ula perhaps maintains that the Chachamim enacted an obligation to give money to the Kohanim because of such a declaration regarding Kodshei Mizbe'ach. Even though he quotes the verse of "Kol Cherem" to teach this, the verse is merely an Asmachta. (Y. MONTROSE)