1)

(a)One Beraisa rules that if one Shechts a Chatas and finds inside it a live fourth-month baby, it may only be eaten by male Kohanim - in the Azarah and for one day.

(b)The Tana refers specifically to a fourth-month baby - because a fifth month baby (which is equivalent to a ninth-month human baby, will not be permitted with the Shechitah of the mother, according to Rebbi Meir.

(c)According to a second Beraisa - the animal is permitted to Zarim, and may be eaten anywhere (except for in the Azarah), and at any time.

2)

(a)We initially establish both Beraisos by a Chatas whose pregnancy preceded the Hekdesh, and the basis of the Machlokes is - whether Kedushah Chalah al ha'Ubrin immediately (the first Beraisa), like Rebbi Yochanan; or Ein Kedushah Chalah al ha'Ubrin (until it is born [the second Beraisa]), like bar Pada.

(b)We refute this suggestion however, by establishing both Beraisos by a Chatas which became pregnant only after the Hekdesh, and the basis of their Machlokes is - whether it becomes Kadosh immediately or only when it is born.

(c)Alternatively, we reconcile the two Beraisos even according to one Tana - by establishing the first Beraisa by a Chatas that was already pregnant at the time of Hekdesh (in which case, the Kedushah takes effect immediately [like Rebbi Yochanan]) and the second Beraisa by a Chatas that became pregnant only afterwards, which becomes Kadosh only when it is born (even according to him).

3)

(a)Rebbi Eliezer in a Beraisa, says 'Kil'ayim, T'reifah, Yotzei Dofen, Tumtum and Androginus Lo Kedoshin ve'Lo Makdishin'. Shmuel explains ...

1. ... Lo Kedoshin to mean that - they cannot be declared a Temurah (and certainly not Hekdesh).

2. ... Lo Makdishin that- if they did become Hekdesh, they cannot make a Temurah.

(b)The problem Rebbi has with the latter ruling is that - having just said that these animals cannot become Hekdesh, what does he mean by 'if they did'?

(c)He therefore explains that - the Tana Kama's second statement is referring to an animal that became a T'reifah after it was declared Hekdesh, or an Ubar that was born a Yotzei Dofen after it was declared Hekdesh.

4)

(a)The problem Rebbi creates for bar Pada is - that he holds that an Ubar is subject to Kedushah, whereas bar Pada holds that it is not ...

(b)... which bar Pada solves - by restricting his own ruling to an Ubar that is inside a Beheimah Ba'al-Mum ...

(c)... because since the mother is not fit to become Kadosh, neither is the fetus, but where the mother is a Tam, there is no reason for the fetus not to become Kadosh.

(d)Whereas Rebbi Yochanan holds that - since the fetus is an independent entity (as we explained), it can become Hekdesh, even if the mother is a Ba'al-Mum.

5)

(a)In the second Lashon, we establish the case of Kil'ayim, Tumtum and Androginus - by a Hekdesh animal that became pregnant.

(b)Based on that premise, we prove that the author of the Beraisa must be Rebbi Yehudah, who holds 'ha'Velad Osah Temurah" - because of the case of Yotzei Dofen, which would have been Kadosh had it not been born a Yotzei Dofen.

(c)Abaye establishes the Beraisa, according to bar Pada, who holds that an Ubar is not subject to Kedushah - by a Tam whose mother is a Tam, whereas he (bar Pada) is speaking about a Tam whose mother is a Ba'al Mum (as we explained in the first Lashon.

(d)Rebbi Yochanan holds that - either way, the fetus is Kadosh, since he holds 'Ubar Yerech Imo', as we explained earlier.

6)

(a)The Pasuk in Bechukosai writes "Kol asher Yitein Mimenu la'Hashem Yih'yeh Kodesh". Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah in a Beraisa learn from ...

1. ... "Mimenu" that - if someone declares the leg of an animal an Olah - the whole animal does not become an Olah.

2. ... "Yih'yeh Kodesh" that - the leg itself does.

(b)Rebbi Yossi and Rebbi Shimon interpret the Pasuk to mean that - the Kedushah of one limb spreads to the remainder of the animal.

(c)According to Rebbi Meir and Rebbi Yehudah, a Chulin animal whose leg is Kadosh - must be sold as an Olah, minus the leg which is already Kadosh, which cannot be sold.

(d)The problem with this ruling is that - seeing as the purchaser can only bring the animal minus the leg, it transpires that he has not fulfilled his obligation (of bringing the entire animal).

7)

(a)Rava answers by establishing the Beraisa - where the purchaser had declared that he would bring all the limbs on which the animal's life depends, as an Olah.

(b)The Yerushalmi answers that - it is speaking where he undertook to bring a Zuz-worth of this animal on the Mizbe'ach.

8)

(a)According to Rav Chisda, Rebbi Yehudah concedes that, if someone declares a limb that would render the animal a T'reifah - such as one whose leg has been severed above the knee, the Kedushah spreads to the entire animal

(b)Rava holds that it must be a limb that renders it a Neveilah, and Rebbi Sheishes - one that renders it dead.

(c)The basis of the Machlokes between Rav Chisda and Rava is - whether a T'reifah can live (Rava) or not (Rav Chisda).

(d)The basis of the Machlokes between Rava and Rav Sheishes is - whether an animal whose thigh and Chalal are missing is considered a Neveilah (like Rebbi Elazar [Rava]), or not (Rav Sheishes, who holds that it is only a T'reifah).

9)

(a)Rebbi stated that - the Halachah would appear to be like Rebbi Yehudah regarding a limb upon which the animal's life does not depend, and like Rebbi Yossi regarding one upon which it does ...

(b)... implying that Rebbi Yehudah argues with Rebbi Yossi in this point (posing a Kashya on all three opinions).

(c)We therefore amend Rebbi's statement 'Nir'in Divrei Rebbi Yossi be'Davar she'Haneshamah Teluyah bo' to read - 'Nir'in Divrei Rebbi Yossi le'Rebbi Yehudah ... ', which means that Rebbi Yehudah concedes to Rebbi Yossi in this point (as we explained).

10)

(a)Rava asks what the Din will be according to Rebbi Yossi, if someone declares the leg of his pigeon or young dove Hekdesh (see Hagahah at the foot of Rashi). Based in the source-Pasuk "Kol asher Yiten Mimenu ... ", a bird might be different than an animal in this regard - because the Torah inserts the word "Beheimah", seemingly to preclude a bird from the ruling.

(b)On the other hand, it might not - since the Torah also inserts the word "Korban", which incorporates a bird.

(c)Rava also asks whether, if, according to Rebbi Yossi, one declares a limb of his male animal Kedushas Damim, Kedushas ha'Guf will take effect on the entire animal. He mentions specifically a male animal - because he happens to be talking about an Olah, which can only be a male.

11)

(a)Rava himself rules that an animal whose owner declared it Kedushas Damim - adopts Kedushas ha'Guf

(b)And the reason that it might not spread from one limb to the entire body as well - is because Rava is uncertain whether we apply two Migus or not.

(c)The outcome of both of Rava's She'eilos is - Teiku.

12)

(a)Abaye asked Rabah whether, the owner is permitted to shear the wool of a sheep of an animal of which he declared one limb Hekdesh. He did not ask about working with it - which is certainly forbidden, since it automatically weakens the Hekdesh limb, as we already learned.

(b)We Darshen from the the word "Tzonecha" (in the Pasuk in Re'ei "Lo Sagoz bi'Vechor Tzonecha") - that one is permitted to shear a firstborn sheep in which a Nochri has a share.

(c)We refute the proof from there that, since one is permitted to shear the wool of a sheep that is shared with someone who is Patur from Bechorah, so too in our case, it should be permitted, since Hekdesh, who owns the limb, is partner in the lamb - because whereas there, the animal does not become Kadosh at all, here, at least the limb is Kadosh (according to Rebbi Yehudah) or because the Kedushah even spreads to the entire animal (according to Rebbi Yossi).

(d)Alternatively, our case is different - because unlike the case where the Nochri has a share in the animal (where the owner is unable to declare the entire animal Hekdesh without permission), in our case, he is.

13)

(a)Abaye also asked Rabah whether the owner is permitted to work with an animal whose skin he declared Hekdesh. He specifically asked about working with it, and not shearing it, should it be a sheep - because here too, shearing it will not affect the skin and will certainly therefore be permitted.

(b)We try to resolve the She'eilah from a Beraisa, which permits shearing an animal whose unborn fetus the owner declared to be an Olah - but prohibits working with it.

(c)And we answer that perhaps the Isur is only mi'de'Rabbanan, and the Rabbanan did not also forbid shearing the animal - for the same reason that it would not be forbidden, if the Isur was d'Oraysa (as we explained).

(d)We cannot answer Abaye's She'eilah too, by saying that it is Asur mi'de'Rabbanan - because the essence of his She'eilah was whether one is subject to Malkos for working with it (which would certainly be d'Oraysa) or not.

14)

(a)Abaye asked Rav Yosef whether somebody who Shechts a Chulin animal whose fetus is a Shelamim inside the Azarah, is Chayav - for Shechting Chulin in the Azarah ...

(b)... according to those who hold that if a Korban became pregnant, the fetus only adopts its mother's Kedushah when it is born.

(c)Rav Yosef quoted the Pasuk in Re'ei (from which we learn the prohibition of Shechting Chulin in the Azarah) "Ki Yirchak mim'cha ha'Makom ve'Zavachta", from which we Darshen the obligation to Shecht Chulin far away (outside the Azarah and not inside it - to preclude Abaye's current She'eilah, where he would have been forbidden to Shecht the mother outside the Azarah anyway.

(d)And when he quoted him the Pasuk in Acharei-Mos (regarding the Isur of Shechutei Chutz) "ve'Hevi'um la'Hashem" - he was resolving the reverse She'eilah (whether, if one Shechts a Chulin animal whose fetus is a Shelamim, outside the Azarah, one is Chayav for Shechutei Chutz.

(e)Rabah extrapolated from there - that one is only Chayav for Shechting an animal that one could have brought to the entrance of the Ohel Mo'ed to be Shechted, precluding the current case, where such an option does not exist.