1)

(a)We just learned that, according to Ravina, even Raban Shimon ben Gamliel will agree that, if a Kohen married a Yevamah whose baby died within thirty days, she does not require Chalitzah. Rav Ashi asked Rav Oshaya Brei d'Rav Idi whether, if a Kohen married a woman who was pregnant or feeding within twenty-four months, we will make the same concession for a Kohen and permit him to remain with her without a Get. Rav Oshaya Brei d'Rav Idi replied in the negative - because, whereas in the case of a Safek Nefel, for the sake of the Kohen, we rely on the opinion of the Chachamim, who consider the baby to be a proper person, in our Mishnah, according to Rebbi Meir, the woman requires a permanent Get, and according to the Chachamim, at least a temporary one. So on what grounds can we justify allowing her to remain with the man who transgressed because he is a Kohen?

(b)If someone betroths a woman within three months of her widowhood or divorce, and runs away, Rav Acha and Rafram argue over whether he needs to write her a Get or not. Writing a Get might not be necessary - because the very fact that he ran away indicates that he does not wish to remain with her for the full forbidden period, so a Get is not necessary.

(c)When a case actually took place, Rafram demonstrated that he was the one to take the lenient view.

2)

(a)Rava asked Rav Nachman why a woman needs to wait three months, because, in case she is pregnant, we will not know whether the baby is a ninth-month baby from her first husband or a seventh-month baby from the second - on the grounds that we ought to follow the majority of women, who give birth after nine months.

(b)Rava reject Rav Nachman's ...

1. ... initial answer (that in his town, the women gave birth at seven months, and not at nine) - on the grounds that his town was not the majority of the world.

2. ... second answer (that, seeing as the pregnancy of all women who give birth at nine months is discernable, we automatically presume that, this woman, whose pregnancy was not discernable, has lost her 'Rov') - on the grounds that if the pregnancy of all women who give birth at nine months is discernible, then, seeing as this woman's pregnancy was not, then how can we even consider the possibility that maybe the baby is a ninth-month baby from the first husband?!

(c)So we emend Rav Nachman's words to read - seeing as the pregnancy of most women who give birth at nine months is discernible, we automatically rule that, this woman, whose pregnancy was not discernible, has lost her 'Rov'.

3)

(a)If a man marries a woman immediately after her husband died, and she gives birth at nine months, the Tana Kama of the Beraisa declares ...

1. ... that baby - eligible to marry a Kohen Gadol.

2. ... the next baby that is born to him - is a Mamzer mi'Safek.

(b)Abaye explains that, according to the Tana Kama, the second baby is a Safek Mamzer and forbidden to marry a Vaday Mamzer and is forbidden to marry a Vaday Mamzer. Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov, who says 'Ein Mamzer mi'Safek', then holds - that the second baby is not a Safek Mamzer but a Vaday Mamzer, and therefore permitted to marry a Vaday Mamzer.

(c)Rava disagrees with Abaye. He actually - inverts the Machlokes: According to the Tana Kama, the second baby is a Vaday Mamzer and is permitted to marry a Mamzer, whereas, according to Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov, he is a Safek Mamzer, and forbidden to marry a Vaday Mamzer.

4)

(a)We establish the Machlokes Abaye and Rava, with regard to Rebbi Elazar, who says in the Mishnah in Kidushin 'Vada'an b'Vada'an Mutar. Vada'an bi'Sefeikan, vice-versa or Sefeikan bi'Sefeikan Asur'. The reason for the latter part of the ruling is - because perhaps the one Safek is Kasher, and the other, Pasul, in which case one is bringing a Pasul into the Kehal Hash-m.

(b)The three cases of Sefeikan are - a Shtuki (whose mother shuts him up when he refers to her husband 'his father'); an Asufi (a waif whom they picked up in the street) and a Kuti.

(c)A Kuti is a Safek - because the Kutim are not particular about some of the major Halachos of Kidushin.

(d)By establishing the Machlokes with regard to Rebbi Elazar, we mean - that they are trying at all costs, to establish Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov (whose Mishnah is 'Kav v'Naki' - not frequently mentioned, but when he is, it is Halachah). Consequently, those who consider Rebbi Elazar's Beraisa Halachah, establish Rebbi Elazar ben Yakov like him; whereas those who consider Hillel's Beraisa Halachah, establish Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov like him.

5)

(a)We just quoted Hillel, who says that all of the ten Yuchsin are permitted to each other. From the group,...

1. ... Kohani, Levi'i, Yisraeli, Chalali, we must preclude Chalali; from ...

2. ... Levi'i, Yisraeli, Chalali, Geiri, Charuri and Avadim Meshuchrurim - Kohani, and from ...

3. ... Levi'i, Yisraeli, Geiri, Charuri, Mamzeiri, Nesini, Shtuki and Asufi - Levi'i & Yisraeli.

(b)In the above Machlokes between Abaye and Rava - it is Rava who follows the opinion of Rav (Rebbi Elazar), and Abaye, the opinion of Shmuel (Hillel).

6)

(a)Abaye proves from another statement of Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov that he considers a Safek Mamzer like a Vadai Mamzer - because he says there that, if a man has relations with many women or vice-versa, it will result in a man marrying his daughter, his brother, his sister, and a world full of Mamzerim, because the Torah writes in Kedoshim "u'Mal'ah ha'Aretz Zimah".

(b)According to Rava - "Zimah" is the acronym of 'Zu Mah Hi' (denoting a Safek Mamzer).

(c)Over and above this - Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov forbids a man to marry two wives in two countries, in case the son of one meets the daughter of the other and (unaware of the fact that they share a common father, they will) get married.

(d)We reconcile this with Rav and Rav Nachman, who would marry a woman for a short time when they traveled to distant towns (to Dardeshir and Shechintziv, respectively, despite the fact that they had wives where they lived) - by restricting that practice to renowned sages, whose mothers would publicize their names when their daughters were born, and there was no fear of their half-brothers not knowing who they were.

7)

(a)We query Rav and Rav Nachman's practice from a ruling of Rava, who said - that a woman who accepts a man's proposal for marriage, needs to keep seven clean days.

(b)We reconcile Rav and Rav Nachman's practice with Rava's ruling - by pointing out that they used to arrange the short-term marriage through a Shali'ach well in advance of their arrival.

(c)Alternatively, the Rabanan did not actually marry the women in question, but - based on the principle 'Eino Domeh Mi she'Yesh Lo Pas b'Salo l'Mi she'Ein Lo Pas b'Salo', they only designated them, in case they wanted to live with them later.

(d)And Rava's ruling - is confined to where a proper marriage proposal, took place, not just a designation for a day, as was the case here (where the woman would be unlikely to develop such a strong desire for him that she would see blood).

8)

(a)Rebbi Eliezer ben Yakov in a Beraisa learns from the Pasuk in Mishlei "Al Tachresh al Re'echa Ra'ah, v'Hu Yoshev la'Vetach Itcha" - that it is wrong to marry a woman with the intention of divorcing her.

9)

(a)We now discuss a case where the Safek (son of the first [deceased] husband or of the second one [the Yavam]) and the Yavam both claim the inheritance of the first husband. The former argues that he is the son of the deceased husband, and therefore, the sole heir (since, if he is, there is no Din Yibum); whereas the Yavam claims that the Safek is his son, and that therefore, he is the Yavam, and the sole heir.

(b)Seeing as both of them have an equal claim (both are Safek heirs) - they divide the inheritance between them.

10)

(a)In a case where the Safek and the sons of the Yavam both claim the inheritance of the first husband - the Safek claims to be his son (in which case, the Yavam was not really a Yavam at all), and is the sole heir; whereas the sons of the Yavam claim that the Safek is their brother, and that he therefore receives an equal portion to them in their uncle's inheritance.

(b)The Rabanan suggested to Rav Mesharshaya that this was similar to the Mishnah in Nos'in al ha'Anusah, which talks about the Safek (seventh-month first husband, ninth-month second one) against the sons of the two husbands - where between them, they inherit him, but he does not inherit them (because each one can say to him 'Prove that you are our brother, before you take with us'!).

(c)The equivalent Din here would be - that the Safek (who receives a portion whosoever son he is) could say to them 'Prove that you are my brothers before you take with me'!).

(d)Rav Mesharshaya told them that the cases were not even similar - because whereas there (in Nos'in al ha'Anusah), each set of brothers knows exactly whose heir he is, here, the Safek does not, making him no less a Safek (Halachically) than they. Consequently, the amount that the sons of the Yavam agree is his due (as a brother of theirs) he takes at the outset; whereas the balance (over which they are arguing), they take half and he takes half.

11)

(a)Rav Mesharshaya therefore compares the Mishnah in Nos'in al ha'Anusah to the Safek and the sons of the Yavam who are both claiming the inheritance of the Yavam. After the Safek has taken half the property of the dead man (see Tosfos DH 'Amar'), he claims that the sons of the Yavam must give him, either an equal share in their father's property (in which case, he will return his half of the first brothers property), or they give him the other half of their share in their uncle's property.

(b)He would be interested in doing this - in a case where the Yavam was far more wealthy than his brother.

(c)Rebbi Aba Amar Rav says 'Kam Dina' - which means that, having issued their initial ruling (placing half the property of the first brother in his possession), Beis-Din will not retract from it.

(d)Rav Yirmeyahu says - 'Hadar Dina', meaning that, having received half the inheritance of the first brother, he is now entitled to claim that he is an heir of the second brother, and Beis-Din will even reverse their initial ruling in support of his claim.

12)

(a)And we query their Machlokes in that it appears to mimic a Machlokes in Kesuvos between Admon and the Rabanan, who argue over a case where someone who owned a field that was surrounded by four other fields, goes overseas, and when he returns nobody remembers through whose field his path led. According to Admon, he may take the shortest route (which will be explained shortly). According to the Rabanan - he will have to either pay whatever price he is asked for a route to his field, or to fly there through the air.

(b)We initially think that Admon is right - because we assume that the Mishnah speaks in a case where the four fields that surround the field in the middle are all owned by one man (who has no option but to give him a path to his field).

(c)Rav Yehudah Amar Rav makes us wonder how Admon could ever have said such a thing - by establishing our Mishnah when the four fields are owned by four different owners.

(d)When Rava says that if four came on the strength of four or on the strength of one, even Admon will agree - he means that if the man in the middle has to contend with four owners, even Admon will agree that each owner can push him on to the other three (in effect, meaning that he has no claim against them).

13)

(a)And the Machlokes is in a case when one man comes on the strength of four. Admon maintains that the man can claim a path 'mi'Mah Nafshach' (seeing as he is the sole owner of the four fields, and he cannot deny that, originally, he [the owner of the middle field] had a path leading to his field). According to the Rabanan however - the man who owns the four fields can counter by saying that if the claimant is silent, he will sell him a path for the going price (see Tosfos DH 'da'Amar'), but if not, he will return the four Shtaros to their original owners, and then what will he do?

(b)We try to establish Rebbi Aba (whom we just quoted) like the Rabanan - because they too, maintain 'Kam Dina', in spite of the claimant's argument of 'mi'Mah Nafshach'; and Rav Yirmeyahu like Admon - because he holds 'Hadar Dina', on account of it).

(c)However, we conclude ...

1. ... Rebbi Aba will maintain that even Admon agrees with him - because Admon only said his Din in the case of the fields, where the claimant had a definite claim (of a path to his field), whereas in our case, the Safek does not know for sure whether he is the heir of the first brother or of the second.

2. ... Rav Yirmeyahu will maintain that, even the Rabanan agree with him - because the owner of the four fields has the leverage of being able to return them to their original owner, which the sons of the Yavam in our case do not have.