1) THE NECESSITY TO TEACH BOTH "DACHUY ME'IKARA" AND "DICHUY B'DAMIM"
QUESTION: Rebbi Yochanan states that if one of the partners of a jointly-owned animal designates his half of the animal as a Korban and then he purchases the other half from his partner and designates that half as a Korban as well, the animal has the Kedushah of a Korban but is unfit to be offered as a Korban. Rebbi Yochanan reasons that when the partner sanctified the first half of the animal he did not have the ability to sanctify the second half, and thus the animal was considered "pushed away" ("Dachuy") from being brought as a Korban.
The Gemara infers three things from the statement of Rebbi Yochanan. It infers that even live animals can be permanently disqualified from being brought as Korbanos. It also infers that a Korban that initially was unfit to be offered but then became fit to be offered remains disqualified even though the invalidating element has been rectified ("Dachuy me'Ikara Havah Dachuy"). Finally, it infers from Rebbi Yochanan's statement that there is a concept of "Dichuy b'Damim." RASHI (12b, DH Yesh Dichuy) explains that this means that even when an animal is sanctified with only Kedushas Damim (its value, but not its actual body, is sanctified), such as when one partner sanctified his half of the animal for its value, it still can affect the animal and make it ineligible from becoming sanctified later with a more significant Kedushah, Kedushas ha'Guf. (See other explanations for "Dichuy b'Damim" cited by Rashi in his following comments, and in TOSFOS DH u'Shema Minah in the name of RABEINU CHAIM, and in RABEINU CHANANEL (see Insights to 12b).)
TOSFOS, the RAMBAN (in Kidushin 7a), and others ask variations of a simple question on this explanation. Why does the Gemara infer that Rebbi Yochanan holds of both concepts, "Dachuy me'Ikara" and "Dichuy b'Damim"? Once he says that an animal that was "Dachuy me'Ikara" remains disqualified, it is obvious that there is "Dichuy b'Damim," since the Kedushah of an animal that was unfit to be offered as a Korban can be only Kedushas Damim! Why does the Gemara need to list "Dachuy me'Ikara" and "Dichuy b'Damim" as two separate concepts learned from Rebbi Yochanan's statement?
ANSWERS:
(a) TOSFOS (according to the text of the SHITAH MEKUBETZES) answers that there are cases in which the initial Kedushah of the animal or other item is a Kedushas ha'Guf, and, therefore, it is necessary to infer the two concepts ("Dachuy me'Ikara" and "Dichuy b'Damim") independently. An example of such a case is when a Kohen received the blood (Kabalas ha'Dam) of a Korban in a vessel which contained water. The blood -- which is Kadosh with Kedushas ha'Guf -- that falls into the water loses its status of blood, because the first drop of blood which enters the water is considered "Dachuy" -- pushed away -- from being blood and it becomes water. Even though enough blood later falls into the vessel to make the mixture look like blood, the concept of "Dachuy me'Ikara" applies and thus the mixture remains disqualified for Zerikah. In that case, "Dachuy b'Damim" would not apply, because the blood is Kadosh with Kedushas ha'Guf and not with Kedushas Damim. (Tosfos notes that there still would be an obligation to perform the Mitzvah of "Kisuy ha'Dam," covering the blood of birds and undomesticated animals, for blood that fell into water and eventually gave the water the appearance of blood, because there is no concept of Dichuy for Mitzvos.)
(b) The RITVA in Kidushin (7b) answers that even though "Dichuy b'Damim" includes cases of "Dachuy me'Ikara," the concept of "Dachuy me'Ikara" can apply to something that involves no degree of Kedushah and where "Dichuy b'Damim" (which applies to cases of Kedushas Damim) would not apply. An example of such a case is mentioned in the Gemara in Kidushin (47b). If a person appoints a Shali'ach to bring his fruits of Bikurim to Yerushalayim and the Shali'ach dies on the way, the owner does not read the Parshas Bikurim, even if he personally brings the fruits to Yerushalayim. The Ritva explains that this is because a Shali'ach who brings fruits of Bikurim does not read the Parshas Bikurim. Hence, once the Shali'ach took the fruits, the fruits become "Dachuy" -- pushed away -- from ever having the Parshas Bikurim read for them. Another example is a case in which a Nochri plants a tree in order to worship it as an Asheirah. Even if he later nullifies that tree from being an Avodah Zarah, a Jew may not use a branch from that tree for the Mitzvah of Lulav. (See Avodah Zarah 47a. Even though the Gemara there is in doubt about this Halachah, its doubt is based only on the fact that "Dichuy" might not affect Mitzvos. The Gemara takes it for granted, though, that "Dichuy" does apply even to a non-Kadosh object.)
(c) The RASHBA, SHITAH KADMONIS in the name of the RA'AVAD (in Kidushin 7b), and others explain that there are cases of "Dichuy b'Damim" in which "Dachuy me'Ikara" does not apply. For example, if a person was obligated to bring a Korban Chatas, and he designated money for that purpose, and then he became an idol-worshipper, his Chatas is no longer accepted (see 12b, and Chulin 5a). Even if he repents, the money that he designated may no longer be used to purchase the Korban, since it was "pushed away" from being accepted.
This explanation seems problematic. How can these Rishonim say that money designated to be used for a Korban is not considered "Dachuy me'Ikara" if the money could have been used, originally, to purchase a Korban? The money itself cannot be offered upon the Mizbe'ach, and thus it should be considered "Dachuy me'Ikara," as it was never fit to be offered!
Apparently, these Rishonim maintain that as long as there is no invalidating factor (Pesul) causing the money to be unfit for the purchase of a Korban, the money is considered "fit" for a Korban and not Dachuy. Money, or an animal, is considered Dachuy only when it has an invalidating factor that makes it unfit to be offered. The fact that money itself cannot be offered on the Mizbe'ach but must be used to purchase an animal is not considered an invalidating factor.
12b----------------------------------------12b
2) "DICHUY B'DAMIM" AND "DACHUY ME'IKARA" -- WHICH CONCEPT IS MORE NOVEL?
OPINIONS: Rebbi Yochanan states that if one of the partners of a jointly-owned animal designates his half of the animal as a Korban and then he purchases the other half from his partner and designates that half as a Korban as well, the animal has the Kedushah of a Korban but is unfit to be offered as a Korban. Rebbi Yochanan reasons that when the partner sanctified the first half of the animal he did not have the ability to sanctify the second half, and thus the animal was considered "pushed away" ("Dachuy") from being brought as a Korban.
The Gemara infers three things from the statement of Rebbi Yochanan. It infers that even live animals can be permanently disqualified from being brought as Korbanos. It also infers that a Korban that initially was unfit to be offered but then became fit to be offered remains disqualified even though the invalidating element has been rectified ("Dachuy me'Ikara Havah Dachuy"). Finally, it infers from Rebbi Yochanan's statement that there is a concept of "Dichuy b'Damim."
Which of these two principles, "Dachuy me'Ikara" or "Dichuy b'Damim," is a more novel concept?
(a) RASHI'S opinion is apparent from his explanation of "Dichuy b'Damim" (12b, DH Yesh Dichuy). He explains that "Dichuy b'Damim" means that even when an animal is Kadosh with only Kedushas Damim, "even when there is no Kedushas ha'Guf" (its value, but not its actual body, is sanctified), the Dichuy still can affect the rest of the animal and disqualify it from being offered later as a Korban. He concludes that the Gemara is teaching that Kedushas Damim is strong enough to "push away" the Kedushas ha'Guf. It is apparent from Rashi's words that it is much more fitting to apply Dichuy in a case of Kedushas ha'Guf, and "Dichuy b'Damim" is the more novel concept.
(b) The RAMBAM (Hilchos Ma'aseh ha'Korbanos 15:4) apparently disagrees. When he rules contrary to the view of Rebbi Yochanan, he states that in this case "the [Korban which is] Dachuy me'Ikara is not Dachuy. Even though the animal had Kedushas Damim, because it is a living animal we say that living animals cannot be pushed away (Dachuy)." From the wording of the Rambam -- who rejects the concept of "Dachuy me'Ikara" but entertains the possibility of "Dichuy b'Damim" -- it is evident that the Rambam maintains that "Dichuy b'Damim" is a stronger reason to apply Dichuy (and that Dichuy of Kedushas ha'Guf is a greater Chidush). The KESEF MISHNEH quotes the ME'IRI (who agrees with Rashi) who is unclear about the Rambam's intention. "Dachuy me'Ikara," as stated by Rashi, is obviously more of a reason to apply "Dichuy" than something which can never have any Kedushas ha'Guf at all. What does the Rambam mean?
The KEHILOS YAKOV (#11) explains that the Rambam agrees with the opinion of RABEINU CHANANEL cited by TOSFOS (12a, DH u'Shema Minah). Rabeinu Chananel learns that "Dichuy b'Damim" means that even the Kedushah of the monetary value of the animal is pushed away. The text of Rabeinu Chananel in Pesachim (98a) clearly shows that such monetary value which is pushed away (in that case, it is the value of a potential Korban Pesach) can no longer be channeled into the Korban of original intent, but rather it can be used only as a Nedavah.
According to Rabeinu Chananel's definition of "Dichuy b'Damim", there is a much greater Chidush in the concept of "Dichuy b'Damim" than in the concept of "Dachuy me'Ikara": "Dichuy b'Damim" teaches that the monetary value can no longer be used to purchase the same Korban. This is also the opinion of the Rambam.
The Kehilos Yakov is bothered by this explanation. Although Rabeinu Chananel's explanation is consistent with other Gemaras (such as the one in Pesachim 98a), it is difficult to understand his explanation in the context of the Gemara here. Where does the Gemara see in Rebbi Yochanan's statement that the monetary value of the animal is no longer valid to be used for offering a Korban? He notes that this question was addressed by the RITVA in Kidushin (7b). The Ritva explains that the words of Rebbi Yochanan, who says that the Korban is "Kedushah v'Einah Kereivah" (it is sanctified as a Korban, but cannot be offered), imply that the intended Korban can never be offered in any way from this animal, not even from its monetary value. (Y. MONTROSE)