1) HAVING A WRONGFUL THOUGHT FOR AN "OLAS HA'OF" AND A "CHATAS HA'OF"
QUESTION: The Mishnah lists a number of cases in which a Kohen has a wrongful thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo during the Avodah of a bird offering. In one of the Mishnah's cases, the Kohen has in mind to eat half of a k'Zayis of the bird offering Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo, and he also has in mind to burn half of a k'Zayis of the bird offering Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo. In such a case, the Korban remains valid, because a thought of eating and a thought of burning do not combine, and thus the minimum amount (a k'Zayis) needed to disqualify the Korban through a wrongful thought has not been achieved.
The TIFERES YISRAEL and others ask that this teaching of the Mishnah seems unnecessary. Even if the two thoughts could combine, the thoughts still would not disqualify the Korban. The Mishnah earlier (29b, 35a) states that only a thought to eat, Chutz l'Zemano, a part of the Korban which is supposed to be eaten, or a thought to burn, Chutz l'Zemano, a part of the Korban which is normally burned, can disqualify the Korban. A thought to burn part of a Korban that is supposed to be eaten does not disqualify the Korban. An Olas ha'Of is completely burned on the Mizbe'ach, and none of it is eaten, while a Chatas ha'Of is completely eaten by the Kohanim, and none of it is burned! Hence, having a thought to eat any amount of an Olas ha'Of, or to burn any amount of a Chatas ha'Of, cannot disqualify the Korban. Why, then, does the Mishnah discuss this case of having a thought to eat half of a k'Zayis and to burn half of a k'Zayis of a bird offering?
ANSWERS:
(a) The TIFERES YISRAEL, RASHASH (31b), OR SAME'ACH (Hilchos Pesulei ha'Mukdashin 13:1) and others write that the Mishnah is listing cases of bird offerings which correspond to the cases of animal offerings that it lists earlier (end of the second Perek). Although this case does not actually apply to a bird offering (as mentioned above), the Mishnah mentions it here in order to parallel the earlier Mishnah.
(b) The KEREN ORAH answers that the Mishnah here is teaching a novel idea according to Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Eliezer (28a) argues with the principle mentioned above; he maintains that a thought to eat a part of the Korban that is supposed to be burned, or a thought to burn a part that is supposed to be eaten, does disqualify the Korban. The Mishnah is teaching that even according to Rebbi Eliezer, a bird does not become Pasul when one has a thought to eat half of a k'Zayis and to burn half of a k'Zayis, because thoughts of eating and burning do not combine.
(c) The SEFAS EMES answers based on the Gemara earlier (31a). The Gemara there teaches that when the fire of the Mizbe'ach consumes the Korban, this is called "eating." Why, then, does a thought of eating half of a k'Zayis and a thought of burning half of a k'Zayis not combine? The Gemara there answers that they would combine if the Kohen specifically has in mind a thought of eating and a thought of the "eating of fire" (while the Mishnah there (29b, 35a) is referring to thoughts of eating and "burning"). However, a thought of "burning" does not combine with a thought of "eating" -- even with a thought of the "eating of fire."
The Sefas Emes explains that when the Mishnah here mentions thoughts of eating and burning with regard to the bird offering, it refers specifically to the type of eating that is done with an Olas ha'Of -- the fire's consumption of the bird. However, since the Kohen has a thought of "burning," it does not combine with the thought of the "eating of fire."
(d) The Sefas Emes proposes another answer to this question. It is possible that when the Mishnah mentions that the Kohen has a thought to eat half of a k'Zayis and a thought to burn half of a k'Zayis, it means a thought to eat half of a k'Zayis of a Chatas ha'Of and a thought to burn half of a k'Zayis of an Olas ha'Of. The Mishnah is teaching that the thoughts do not combine.
Why, though, would one have thought that such thoughts could combine? Why should this Korban become disqualified because of a thought that the Kohen has about an entirely different Korban?
The YAD BINYAMIN explains the answer of the Sefas Emes based on the words of the IBN EZRA (Vayikra 5:7). In the Parshah of the Korban Oleh v'Yored, the Torah requires that one who is unable to bring a Chatas Behemah, an animal offering, must bring instead a Chatas ha'Of and an Olas ha'Of. Why must he bring an Olas ha'Of as well? The Ibn Ezra explains that since none of the limbs of the Chatas ha'Of are burned on the Mizbe'ach (since the Kohanim eat all of it), an Olas ha'Of must be brought in order for there to be some part of the Korban burned on the Mizbe'ach to take the place of the limbs of the Chatas Behemah. (See also OR SAME'ACH.)
In the case of a Chatas ha'Of and Olas ha'Of being offered in place of a Chatas Behemah, both bird offerings perform the function of a single Korban. Therefore, it indeed is logical to assume that thoughts about each one would combine to disqualify them! (Y. MONTROSE)
65b----------------------------------------65b
2) SEVERING BOTH "SIMANIM" OF A "CHATAS HA'OF"
OPINIONS: The Mishnah (65a) states that if, during the Melikah of the bird being offered as a Chatas ha'Of, one severs both Simanim in the bird's neck, the Korban becomes Pasul. This is based on the verse that says with regard to a Chatas ha'Of, "v'Lo Yavdil" -- "and he shall not separate" (Vayikra 5:8). The Gemara says that the Mishnah does not follow the view of Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon who said, "I have heard that one may sever [the two Simanim of] a Chatas ha'Of [and it remains valid]."
Rav Chisda explains that the dispute is based on a different argument -- whether or not the failure to perform Mitzuy (pressing the blood out against the wall of the Mizbe'ach) renders the Chatas ha'Of invalid. The Tana Kama maintains that failure to perform the Mitzuy disqualifies the Korban. Therefore, one may not sever the Simanim of a Chatas ha'Of, because doing so would constitute performing an act of an Olas ha'Of for a Chatas ha'Of (as will be explained below). Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon maintains that the failure to perform Mitzuy does not disqualify the Korban, and, therefore, cutting both Simanim is not considered an act of an Olas ha'Of, but rather merely an act of cutting.
How does this explain the argument between the Tana Kama and Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon with regard to whether or not one may sever the two Simanim of a Chatas ha'Of?
(a) RASHI (DH Tana Kama Savar, and DH v'Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon Savar) explains that the Tana Kama maintains that severing both Simanim of a Chatas ha'Of renders it invalid because the same Avodah which is done for an Olas ha'Of (Melikah with Havdalah, followed by Mitzuy) is being done for the Chatas ha'Of. If the Kohen cuts both Simanim of the Chatas ha'Of, then he must perform Mitzuy right away, because if he waits, all of the blood will flow out of the bird. Thus, the Kohen is performing the same Avodah as he performs for an Olas ha'Of.
Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon agrees that if the Kohen actually performs this sequence of procedures (Melikah with Havdalah, followed by Mitzuy) for a Chatas ha'Of, the Chatas ha'Of becomes Pasul. However, since he maintains that the Korban is valid even if no Mitzuy is done, it is possible for the Chatas ha'Of to remain valid even if Havdalah was done, because the Kohen does not have to do the Mitzuy. Consequently, even when both Simanim are cut the Avodah done for the Chatas ha'Of is not the same as the Avodah done for the Olas ha'Of.
Rashi understands that according to both Tana'im, the verse of "v'Lo Yavdil" is not a prohibition against cutting both Simanim of a Chatas ha'Of. Rather, it is a prohibition against performing the Avodah of a Chatas ha'Of in the manner of the Avodah of an Olas ha'Of. This prohibition is transgressed only by doing both Havdalah and Mitzuy (unlike the simple meaning of the words in the verse). When Rav Chisda says that Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon maintains that Havdalah is just an act of cutting, he means that Havdalah without Mitzuy will not make the Korban be like an Olas ha'Of, and therefore it is considered merely like cutting.
(b) TOSFOS (DH v'Rebbi Elazar) argues with Rashi's explanation. Tosfos explains that the prohibition of "v'Lo Yavdil" is, as the words imply, a prohibition against doing Havdalah alone. How, then, can Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon maintain that a Chatas ha'Of to which Havdalah is done can remain a valid Korban? Tosfos answers that Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon is discussing a case in which the Haza'as ha'Dam was done before the Havdalah. Since the necessary Avodos involving the blood of the Chatas ha'Of were already performed, cutting the Simanim at this time no longer renders the Korban invalid. However, Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon would agree that if the Havdalah was done before the Haza'as ha'Dam, then the Korban would be Pasul, since its Avodah was done like that of an Olas ha'Of.
The KEREN ORAH and CHAZON ISH understand that Tosfos disagrees not only with Rashi's explanation (that the problem with cutting both Simanim of the Chatas ha'Of is that one thereby does both Havdalah and Mitzuy), but also with Rashi's reasoning. According to Rashi, the verse of "v'Lo Yavdil" is not a prohibition against cutting both Simanim of a Chatas ha'Of. Rather, it is a prohibition against performing the Avodah of a Chatas ha'Of in the manner of the Avodah of an Olas ha'Of. According to Tosfos, the verse specifically prohibits the action of cutting both Simanim of a Chatas ha'Of.
Tosfos maintains that there is only one Tana in the Gemara who understands "v'Lo Yavdil" differently -- Rebbi Shimon ben Elyakim. He understands that Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon's opinion is that the verse of "v'Lo Yavdil" does not mean "and he shall not separate," but rather it means, "and he does not need to separate." According to this interpretation, Rebbi Shimon ben Elyakim maintains that even if the Havdalah was done before the Haza'as ha'Dam, the Chatas ha'Of remains valid, because there is no verse which teaches that a Chatas ha'Of must be done without Havdalah.
(c) Tosfos later (on 66a) quotes RABEINU TAM who says that even Rebbi Shimon ben Elyakim agrees with Tosfos' earlier explanation of Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon's opinion. He agrees that there is a prohibition against cutting the Simanim before Haza'as ha'Dam. When Rebbi Shimon ben Elyakim says that "v'Lo Yavdil" means "and he does not need to separate," he understands that the verse is addressing a situation in which the Kohen does Havdalah after Haza'as ha'Dam and before Mitzuy. One might have thought that a Kohen who is about to press the blood of a Chatas ha'Of onto the Mizbe'ach should definitely sever the Simanim first, since this will cause more blood to be pressed onto the Mizbe'ach. Rebbi Shimon ben Elyakim learns that, according to Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon, the verse of "v'Lo Yavdil" teaches that this is not necessary. (Y. MONTROSE)