Explanation #1 (Rashi): This excludes one who intends to eat in the Heichal. It does not disqualify, for we require intent in a place of blood, meat and Eimurim, i.e. outside the Azarah at the time when Bamos were permitted;

This excludes the Heichal. There is no Haktarah of Eimurim there, and meat is not eaten there.

Objection #1: Rashi erred about this. We find that meat is eaten in the Heichal, like it says below (63a) that if Nochrim surround the entire Azarah, Kohanim enter the Heichal and eat Kodshei Kodoshim there.

Objection #2: What was the question 'we should know this from the first verse, since the Torah used the word "Shelishi"!'?

This Shelishi is not written regarding Chutz li'Mkomo, rather, Chutz li'Zmano, and a place of [all] three (blood, meat and Eimurim) does not apply to Chutz li'Zmano, rather, to Chutz li'Mkomo!

Objection #3: [Rav Masnah] answers "one might have thought that Shelishi is a Prat." This Shelishi is written about Chutz li'Zmano, [to teach] about a place of three!

Explanation #2: "A place of three" means that intent disqualifies only on the outer Mizbe'ach, where all three of them are Kosher. This excludes the inner Mizbe'ach, on which we put only blood.

Rejection: This cannot be. The inner Matanos (i.e. on the inner Mizbe'ach), R. Shimon and Rabanan argue about them (43a). Rabanan obligate Kares for Pigul of them;

Also R. Meir and Rabanan hold like this below (42b) regarding the 43 [Haza'os] of Yom Kipur;

And above (14a), regarding Holachah of inner Chata'os [with improper intent], we say that it is Pasul, from a Kal v'Chomer.

And also in Gitin (54b), we say that a Kohen Gadol on Yom Kipur is Yochi'ach. If he says that he was Mefagel, he is believed.

Summation of rejection: In a place that does not have all three, there is not even a Pesul, like is proven below (36a).

Explanation #3: "In a place of three" means that the one having intent (Chutz li'Zmano or Chutz li'Mkomo) must stand in a place of three (where all three are Kosher). This excludes one who stands outside the Azarah and slaughters with a long knife.

Question: Also according to this Perush, it is difficult from inner Chata'os. It is not a place of three, and there is Pigul!

Comment - Answer: Outside the Azarah, all three are not Kesherim (i.e. at most one is Kosher), for blood and Eimurim are disqualified there;

However, [all three are Kosher inside. Tosfos brought above that sometimes meat is eaten inside, and] some blood is not disqualified in the Heichal, e.g. blood of inner [Chata'os], and Eimurim, if they were entered there, are not disqualified through this.

Rebuttal: This is wrong. Below (36a), it says that if one intended for [blood] that should be put outside, to put it inside, it is not Pasul, for it is not a place of three. Until here is a comment.

Explanation #4 (R. Yom Tov): "A place of three" is that he intends for Zerikah in a place where blood, meat and Eimurim are Pasul, e.g. he intends to throw blood of Kodshim Kalim outside of Yerushalayim;

However, if one intends to throw in Yerushalayim, no (it does not disqualify), for there is no Pesul of meat.

And Kodshei Kodoshim, [intent to throw] even in Yerushalayim [disqualifies], since for this Korban, all three of them are Pasul there.

Support: According to this, it is fine what was difficult to us above (27a) about the Beraisa of one who intended to put what should be put below above or vice-versa, [if he intended] immediately it is Kosher. It connotes that if not in its place is not like in its place, it is fine;

According to Explanation #4, it is because it is not a place of three (nothing is disqualified above or below).

Question: However, if so, why is it Pasul when he intends for tomorrow? It is not a place of three!

Suggestion: This is just like we find about intent to leave over, according to R. Yehudah.

Rejection: It connotes above that we need that reason only according to the conclusion that not in its place is like in its place!

Explanation #5: We discuss Shelishi regarding Chutz li'Zmano. We require intent to throw blood on a day that all three of them are Pasul, even to eat the meat, i.e. on the third day;

If he intended to throw blood of a Shelamim tomorrow, he was not Mefagel until it is three-fold in eating, i.e. for three days.

The same applies to Kodshei Kodoshim, [if he intended] to throw their blood tomorrow he made Pigul, for the time of their eating is not tomorrow. However, the verse is written about Shelamim, whose time [to become Pasul] is the third day.

[Rava] said "we need [Shelishi] to teach a place Meshulash", i.e. if he intended to throw blood of Shelamim on the third day, he made Pigul, but before the third day, he did not make Pigul.

Implied question: It says below (56b) that Kodshim that are eaten for one day and a night, intent for their blood after Shki'ah [disqualifies, even though still they may be eaten]!

Answer: That is like the opinion that does not require a place Meshulash. Tana'im argue about this below (36b).

Rejection: This Perush is not possible at all. Our entire Sugya discusses a place that is Meshulash!

Explanation #1 (Rashi): A Zav or Zavah ceased [seeing emissions] and began counting [seven clean days], and counted four or five days.

Question: This is not called Chezkas Taharah!

Explanation #2: Rather, we discuss on their seventh day, after they immersed.

A Zav or Zavah immerses during the day. If they immersed on their seventh day, and afterwards touched Taharos or had Bi'ah and saw [an emission] afterwards before nightfall, they are Tamei retroactively;

If she waited to have Bi'ah until night, and afterwards saw, she is Temei'ah only from now and onwards.

Limitation: However, according to R. Yosi, who says in Pesachim (81a) that he is not Tamei retroactively, this cannot be.

Question: Why do we need a verse? What is the source that Lo Yeratzeh should apply, that we need a verse to exclude it?!

Question: Also R. Eliezer expounds that it is not disqualified on the third day, and even so he needs a verse that a Kohen is not disqualified!

Answer: Since R. Eliezer does not expound Lo Yechashev to teach that it is disqualified through intent, we can say that it is an expression of importance (he will not be esteemed), and comes to say that even the Kohen is disqualified, if not that a verse explicitly excludes this.

However, Ben Azai expounds Lo Yechashev to be an expression of intent. Automatically, it does not discuss the Kohen.

Explanation #1 (Rashi): This refers to money that he stole.

Explanation #2: It seems that it discusses a vow, like it says in Shabbos (32b) that a man's wife dies due to the sin of vows, for it says "Lamah Yikach Mishkavcha mi'Tachtecha."

Implied question: [Ben Azai] expounds here "sin in you, but not in your wife (she will not die due to this)"!

Answer: We discuss when he fulfilled [his vow] afterwards, but he transgressed Bal Te'acher.

Explanation #1 (Rashi): E.g. [he had improper intent in] Shechitah and Holachah.

Below, it says "since the Reisha discusses two Avodos, also the Seifa discusses two Avodos." Rashi says that [the Seifa] returned to discuss [two Avodos] to teach the law of joining a half-k'Zayis, which we do not learn from the Reisha. This is difficult. (Since the Chidush is about joining, the Seifa itself would have sufficed!)

Explanation #2: It seems that two Avodos is like in Me'ilah (4a). It explains that the first Siman (foodpipe or windpipe, he cut with intent) Chutz li'Zmano, and the second Siman Chutz li'Zmano. This is [one Avodah] like two Avodos. One Avodah is one Siman.

Consequence: According to this, we must say that Ilfa holds that Shechitah applies from the beginning to the end (from when he begins cutting until it is finished, i.e. when the majority of both Simanim are cut, all of this is considered Shechitah), and one can be Mefagel in half a Matir;

If he held that Shechitah applies only at the end (the moment Shechitah is finished), intent in two Simanim is like intent in one Siman, since the intent takes effect only at the completion of Shechitah of the majority.

Distinction: However, R. Yochanan can hold like Abaye, who says that R. Meir agrees about "l'Chatzos", that both of them take effect. Precedence (of one intent before the other) does not apply;

However, "a k'Zayis tomorrow and a k'Zayis outside", even regarding one Siman, they argue, and precedence applies at the beginning of a Siman and at its end.

Below, (30a) Abaye said "the first Siman... the second Siman." He mentioned something specific, and according to Ilfa;

However, according to R. Yochanan, he could have mentioned one Siman at its beginning and its end, for R. Yochanan holds that Shechitah applies from the beginning to the end, in Chulin (29b). If so, he holds here that they argue also about one Siman!

R. Yochanan could also hold like Rava, that they argue also about "l'Chatzos", and all the more so about one Siman he argues, for precedence applies to one Siman, since Shechitah applies from the beginning to the end. This is a comment.