QUESTION: The Beraisa teaches that an object becomes prohibited when it is worshipped even when it is worshipped through Ones, against the will of the person worshipping it. Rebbi Zeira asks how can an involuntary act cause the object to become prohibited? The verse says, "vela'Na'arah Lo Sa'aseh Davar" (Devarim 22:26), teaching that when one sins against his will, he is exempt from punishment.

How does Rebbi Zeira infer from this verse that the object that was worshipped should be permitted? The verse teaches only that the person who sinned involuntarily is not punished. It does not teach anything about whether or not the object of Avodah Zarah that was worshipped becomes prohibited!

ANSWER: TOSFOS (DH Maskif), RABEINU CHANANEL, and the RITVA explain that Rebbi Zeira seems to understand that when an act of worshipping Avodah Zarah is not punishable with death, the object that was worshipped does not become prohibited. What is the logic behind this?

(a) The simple understanding of Tosfos is that when a person worships Avodah Zarah involuntarily, even if he is required to give his life rather than to worship Avodah Zarah, nevertheless since the Aveirah was done b'Ones it is a less-severe Aveirah than worshipping Avodah Zarah willfully. This is why one is not punished for serving Avodah Zarah in such a manner. For the same reason, the object does not become prohibited; only when a person worships Avodah Zarah through a full-fledged Aveirah does the object become prohibited.

(b) The KOVETZ SHI'URIM (Kesuvos #5) cites the TESHUVOS CHEMDAS SHLOMO who explains the words of Tosfos differently. He suggests that when a person sins b'Ones, since his act was done without his will the act is not considered to be his act. (It is considered as though someone else bent this person's body down in front of an idol, which is not considered an act of idol-worship at all. See TOSFOS DH Kegon.) Therefore, just as a person who worships an idol b'Ones is exempt from punishment, the idol that he worshipped is also not considered to have been served by him (and those who forced him to bow down cannot prohibit the object that they do not own).

How does Rebbi Zeira derive this from the verse? The Kovetz Shi'urim suggests that there are two ways to understand why the verse exempts a person for sinning b'Ones. The first reason is that the sinner is not at fault, since the sin was not his choice. The second reason is that the act is not considered his act, as the Chemdas Shlomo suggests. The first reason does not suffice to exempt a person who sins with Avodah Zarah or with immoral relations, because a person is required to give up his life rather than to sin in such a manner. If he does not give up his life and he sins, then he is at fault. However, the verse exempts a person from punishment for a sin of immoral relations when he does not give up his life. Apparently, there is another reason to exempt him from punishment, and that is the reason of the Chemdas Shlomo: the act is not attributed to the one who performed it.

The RAMBAM (Hilchos Sanhedrin 20:2) writes that if a person commits a sin against his will when the Torah requires that he give up his life rather than transgress, he is not punished with death because of the verse, "vela'Na'arah Lo Sa'aseh Davar." Elsewhere, however, the Rambam writes (in Hilchos Yesodei ha'Torah 5:6) that if a person was so ill that the doctors warned him that if he does not eat an item prohibited because of Avodah Zarah, he will die, then he is not permitted to eat it, and if he does eat it, Beis Din punishes him with whatever punishment a person deserves for such a transgression. Why does the Rambam rule that he is punished in such a case if the Rambam himself rules that a person who transgressed and did not give up his life is not punished by Beis Din?

The Kovetz Shi'urim (Kesuvos #8) explains that there are two reasons to exempt a person from a punishment for a sin committed involuntarily, as explained above. When a person obeys the doctors' orders and eats a prohibited object in order to save his life, if that object is not an Avodah Zarah, he is exempt from punishment. He is exempt because he cannot be held accountable for a sin which was not his choice, since the Torah required that he do the act under such circumstances. When, however, a person transgresses the sin of Avodah Zarah because another person forces him to do so at the threat of his life, his exemption from punishment is not because he did not choose to do the act. On the contrary, the Torah required that he give up his life and he did not do so, choosing instead to do the sin. Nevertheless, he is exempt from punishment for the second reason -- an act done at the threat of one's life is not attributed to the person who did the act.

In contrast, when a person obeys the doctors' orders and eats an object of Avodah Zarah in order to save his life, he cannot be exempt from punishment for the first reason, because the Torah did not require him to eat the object to save his life; he did so based on his own free choice. He also cannot be exempt from punishment for the second reason, because when there is no other person forcing the person to transgress a Torah prohibition, the act inherently is his own act and is attributed solely to him. Therefore, in such a case the Rambam rules that the person is held accountable for his act and is punished by Beis Din accordingly.

QUESTION: The Beraisa states that a person cannot prohibit an object that does not belong to him by worshipping it. However, a different Beraisa teaches that when one worships an animal involuntarily, b'Ones, the animal becomes prohibited from use as a Korban. According to some Amora'im, the second Beraisa means that when a person bows down to his friend's animal without permission to do so, he is able to prohibit the animal as an object of Avodah Zarah. This, however, contradicts the first Beraisa which states that one person cannot prohibit someone else's animal. How are the Beraisos to be reconciled?

Chizkiyah answers that the second Beraisa is discussing a person who not only bows down to his friend's animal, but who does an action with that animal, such as pouring wine between its horns to an Avodah Zarah (that is placed atop the animal). Rebbi Ada bar Ahavah rejects this answer, saying that the animal would not become prohibited in such a manner, but rather it would become merely a pedestal ("Bimus") for the Avodah Zarah to which the person poured the wine.

What is the intention of Rebbi Ada bar Ahavah? Even if the animal is only a pedestal for the Avodah Zarah, it still should become prohibited through the idol-worshipper's act. If an act of idol-worship can prohibit another person's animal as an Avodah Zarah, then it should also be able to prohibit another person's animal as a pedestal for Avodah Zarah ("Meshamshei Avodah Zarah")!

(a) RASHI writes that animals cannot become prohibited as "Meshamshei Avodah Zarah," objects used for the service of Avodah Zarah. What, though, is the reason for this? As the RITVA asks, why should there be any difference between making an animal an Avodah Zarah and making an animal Meshamshei Avodah Zarah?

The CHAZON ISH (YD 60:23 and 3:26) explains that the verse that teaches that an animal can become prohibited from use as a Korban if it is worshipped does not teach also that an animal can become prohibited from being brought as a Korban if it becomes Meshamshei Avodah Zarah. Therefore, Rashi teaches that when wine is poured on the animal, the animal does not become prohibited from being brought as a Korban.

Why should the fact that the animal was used only as Meshamshei Avodah Zarah allow the animal to be used for a Korban? The Gemara is discussing a case in which an act was done to make the animal an object of Meshamshei Avodah Zarah (that is, wine was poured on it). After all, an act of Avodah Zarah can prohibit an animal even from being used for ordinary, mundane purposes (as the Gemara teaches later, and as the Rishonim explain; see TOSFOS DH Hayesah).

Apparently, the Chazon Ish understands that the act of pouring wine makes only the object (on top of the animal) to which the wine is poured into an Avodah Zarah; the act does not make the animal a pedestal for the Avodah Zarah (Meshamshei Avodah Zarah).

Another possible understanding of Rashi is that an animal can never be considered a pedestal for an idol, because a living thing cannot become subordinate (as a pedestal) to another object.

(b) RABEINU CHANANEL explains that the animal does not become prohibited as a pedestal for Avodah Zarah, because once a pedestal is nicked or dented, it is permitted, as the Gemara says earlier (53b). Therefore, its owner simply can make a nick in the animal to permit it, and thus the Beraisa would not state unconditionally that the animal is prohibited.

The Ritva points out that, normally, an idol becomes permitted when it is nicked (through "Bitul") only when the idol is owned by a Nochri and is nicked by a Nochri. An idol owned by a Jew does not become permitted when it is nicked. Similarly, a pedestal owned by a Jew should not become permitted when it is nicked. The Ritva explains that Rabeinu Chananel allows Bitul for objects of Meshamshei Avodah Zarah, such as a pedestal, even if they are owned by a Jew. This is a minority opinion among the Rishonim. (See Ritva to 52a.)

(c) The RA'AVAD cited by the Ritva explains that an object is not considered a pedestal for Avodah Zarah unless it is constructed for that purpose. The Ritva rejects this explanation.

(d) The RAMBAN explains that the Gemara's question is not that when wine is poured on the animal the animal should be permitted. The animal certainly should be prohibited as Meshamshei Avodah Zarah. The Gemara's question, rather, is that the Beraisa being discussed is describing an object that was served as an Avodah Zarah itself ("Ne'evad"), and is not merely an object of Meshamshei Avodah Zarah. An animal on which wine was poured becomes a pedestal and not an Avodah Zarah.

(The Ramban apparently has the Girsa of the BACH, who omits the word "v'Sharyei" ("and it is permitted"), since the Ramban does not permit the animal, but rather he prohibits it because it is Meshamshei Avodah Zarah.)