Opinion#1: He (Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah) holds that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam (if a prohibited matter only adds a negative taste to a permitted dish), it is permitted. This seems to mean that those that forbade oil of Nochrim before Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah, such as the students of Shamai and Hillel, hold that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is forbidden. Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah who held it was permitted therefore permitted the oil. Shmuel agrees with his opinion, as he agreed with the words of Rebbi Simlai.

Opinion#1 (cont.): Later (67a), as well, regarding vinegar that was put in ground beans, Shmuel ruled that the law is that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is permitted.

Opinion#1 (cont.): Later (38b), the Gemara says without comment regarding cooked oil that if one would suggest the problem is that it was cooked by Nochrim (in their pots which have been used to cook unkosher food), there is no problem as it is Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam (as their pots are presumed to be Aino Ben Yomo)!

Question#1: The Ri pointed out, how can these Amoraim argue on our Rabbis Shamai and Hillel that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam should be permitted? While it is possible to say that oil should be permitted because the decree did not become widespread and most of the public could not abide by it (and it therefore was not a real decree), how can we permit anything else (that was deemed halachically forbidden)?

Question#2: There is another difficulty. If the Tana of our Mishnah holds that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is forbidden, we should ask a question from the Gemara later (39b) concerning honey. The Gemara asks, what should we suspect? If we should suspect that it was cooked by Nochrim, there is no problem as it is Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam! Why should this make a difference (in understanding our Mishnah)? The Tana of our Mishnah forbids Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam!

Opinion#2: The Ri therefore states that Shmuel also holds that when Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel decreed that oil should be forbidden, they did so due to a suspicion that this would cause intermarriage. However, being that olive oil does not promote intermarriage as much as wine, they needed a (i.e. an additional) secondary reason that the oil was in pots which contained prohibited foods. This is despite the fact that Beis Shamai and Beis Hillel in fact hold that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is permitted.

Opinion#2 (cont.): Shmuel also holds that due to these two reasons together they made the decree, even though each one alone was not reason enough. Shmuel's question to Rav is as follows. My position, that the decree regarding oil was not from the days of Daniel but rather from the time of Shamai and Hillel due to the reasons stated above, is understandable. This is because Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah could have permitted this, as the Gemara states he did later, because the prohibition had not spread. The reasons also did not seem to him to be valid, as the reason of intermarriage is not a strong reason to forbid olive oil. Additionally, we in fact hold that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is permitted!

Opinion#2 (cont.): However, according to you (Rav), Daniel made this decree. How could Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah nullify this decree? If its source is in a Pasuk, it is obvious that the decree already was kept amongst (most of) Bnei Yisrael!

Opinion#2 (cont.): Additionally, Shamai and Hillel lived more than three hundred years after Daniel. Rav states that while Daniel decreed that this applied in cities, Shamai and Hillel added that this should even apply in the fields, as explained later in the Gemara. If so, this implies that the decree had clearly been accepted practice in the fields! (This was Shmuel's question to Rav.)

Explanation: The Rashbam explains that the bread mentioned here is not actually bread, meaning that we cannot deduce from here that Daniel made a decree on the bread of Nochrim as well. Rather, it refers to (some say cooked) food that was from the king's house, known as Rifusha [in Old French].

Explanation (cont.): This is also apparent from the Pasuk that says, "And the waiter carried away their bread and gave them seeds." One cannot say that he took away their actual bread and that they would eat seeds without bread! (It must be that bread refers to the main food served by the king, not actual bread.)

Text: In the Mishnah (35b), the Rasham writes in the name of Rashi that we do not have the text mentioning Rebbi. This is because Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah, who was Rebbi's son's son, and his Beis Din permitted oil.

Text (cont.): The scholars of his generation inserted this fact into the Mishnayos that his grandfather had edited, being that he was the son of Rabban Gamliel who was mentioned in Avos (2:3). The Mishnah there states, "Rabban Gamliel, the son of Rebbi Yehudah ha'Nasi says that Talmud Torah is nice etc."

Observation: This Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah mentioned here is the Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah who is mentioned in the times of the Amoraim. However, when he is mentioned in the language of the Mishnah and Beraisa they called him Ha'Nasi. In the language of Amoraim, they called him Nesi'ah.

Implied Question: Rabeinu Yehudah pointed out that the Yerushalmi (here 2:8) states that Rebbi and his Beis Din permitted oil. In three areas Rebbi Yehudah Ha'Nasi and our Rabbis permitted: In Gitin (see 37a), oil, and sandals (see Nidah 25b). (This indicates that this Rebbi permitted oil, not Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah!)

Answer: Rabeinu Yehudah understands that there must be a mistake in the text. This is because the Yerushalmi asks, why don't we call this a permissive Beis Din? Every Beis Din that permits three things is called a permissive Beis Din! Rebbi Yudan the son of Rebbi Yishmael answers that his Beis Din argued upon his ruling regarding (the leniency of) Gitin. This means that he did not effectively permit three things.

Answer (cont.): If the Yerushalmi was discussing Rabeinu ha'Kadosh, it should have mentioned that he permitted something else as well! This is because in Chulin (6b), the Gemara states that Rebbi permitted Beis Shan (that it did not have the holiness of Eretz Yisrael and its produce could therefore be eaten without taking Terumos and Ma'aseros). This is also stated in the Yerushalmi in Dmai (2:1).

Answer (cont.): This is why it appears to Rabeinu Yehudah that the correct text in the Yerushalmi is Rebbi Yehudah Ha'Nasi, meaning Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah.

Observation: The Yerushalmi (here 2:8) also relates that Rav Yitzchak bar Shmuel bar Marta went to Netzivin. He found Rebbi Simlai Ha'Dromi who was sitting and teaching that Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah (see Seder Yaakov that this must be the correct text) and his Beis Dn permitted oil. Shmuel accepted this and ate such oil, while Rav did not. Shmuel said to Rav, "Eat (oil) or I will write about you that you are a Zaken Mamrei!" Rav replied, "When I went to Eretz Yisrael I found out who was saying it was permitted to eat oil. It was Simlai Ha'Dromi." Shmuel replied, "Do you think he is saying this based on his own opinion? He is saying this based on Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah and his Beis Din!" Shmuel persisted, and Rav ate from the oil.

Implied Question: The Gemara could have asked about (Daniel being the source for the decree against Nochri) wine. (Why didn't it ask this question?)

Answer: Being that it is discussing oil, it only asked about oil.

Explanation: The Rashbam explains that this question is both according to Rav and Shmuel. Shmuel also admits that this is part of the eighteen things. (See Avodah Berurah for different explanations of this Tosfos.)

Question: This is difficult. In Gitin (36b) regarding a Pruzbul, Shmuel states that a Pruzbul is a brazen act by the judges, and if I had the power to abolish it, I would! The Gemara concludes that Shmuel meant that if he had more power than Hillel, he would have abolished it.

Question (cont.): What would be the case? If Bnei Yisrael had already accepted Pruzbul, even if he was bigger than Hillel he could not repeal this custom! If it had not spread, why did he need to have more power than Hillel? Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah permitted oil even though he did not have as much power than those who previously forbade it, being that it was not widely accepted!

Answer#1: Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah did not permit oil for the sole reason that it was not widely accepted. It was also because most of the public could not abide by it. However, regarding Pruzbul, even though it was not widely practiced, most of the public would be able to abide by it.

Question: However, this is difficult, as it is strange to say that Pruzbul was not widely practiced when it is clearly a benefit for the lenders! (Why wouldn't every lender make a Pruzbul, as is indeed common practice today?)

Answer#2: It therefore appears that Pruzbul was clearly widely practiced.

Answer#2 (cont.): The difficulty regarding how he could have nullified this decree even if he had the power is answered by the following rule. Only regarding the eighteen things do we say that if Eliyahu comes to say that they should be repealed, we do not listen to him. The reason for this is as the Yerushalmi states, because they put themselves in danger (to institute them, see below).

Answer#2 (cont.): This was deduced by Rebbi Elchanan from the text of the Sefarim, as he found that in the old Sefarim it said, didn't Rav Mesharshiya say what is the reason etc.? This implies Rav Mesharshiya (who mentions the eighteen things in the Yerushalmi) is starting to say an answer (and is not part of the question, as Tosfos thought until now).

Answer#2 (cont.): This is the meaning (i.e. flow) of the Yerushalmi. It asks, how did Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah have the power...doesn't the Mishnah say that a Beis Din...Additionally, even if he was bigger, he cannot nullify one of the eighteen things. The Yerushalmi did not have to explain why (this is especially so by the eighteen things), as this is obvious (that they put themselves in danger to institute them).

Answer#2 (cont.): The Yerushalmi answers that Rav Mesharshiya said, what is the reason why the eighteen things cannot be nullified? It is because they have already spread amongst Bnei Yisrael. This is why even a bigger Beis Din would not be able to nullify it. This is as opposed to the decree of oil, that had not yet spread. This is why anyone could nullify the decree of oil, even though they had put themselves in danger.

Answer#2 (cont.): They relied on Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel's words that a decree cannot be instituted for the pulic unless etc. This is why it was able to be permitted even by a smaller Beis Din. However, other decrees, even if they had already spread they can be nullified by a bigger Beis Din.

Answer#2 (cont.): Therefore, regarding Pruzbul we find that Shmuel says that if I would have more power than Hillel, I would nullify it, even though it had already spread.

Answer#2 (cont.): Here are the words of the Yerushalmi (which support this answer) in the first chapter of Shabbos. Rebbi Boon says in the name of Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel that we only learned this applies to everything besides the eighteen things. However, regarding the eighteen things, even a greater person could not abolish them, as they they put themselves in danger to institute them. This is because they stuck a sword in the Beis Hamedrash (and said that whoever wants to come in may do so, but nobody is allowed to leave, implying that they would be killed by sword if they tried to do so).

Explanation: It does not take effect like other decrees and can be nullified, even by a smaller Beis Din.

Explanation (cont): However, it does take effect insofar as that it needs to be declared permitted.

Proof: This is evident from the fact that the (official, though seemingly not widespread in practice) custom was that oil was forbidden, until Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah permitted it (which is why he had to permit it).

Observation: They also made this decree on the daughters of Kusim. These were two different decrees, and both were necessary, as explained in Shabbos (16b).

Explanation: The Gemara relies on the last part of the Pasuk (that a Jew cannot marry a gentile) which states, "And his daughter you should not take for your son." The prohibition of Lo Sischaten is referring to a convert, as stated in Yevamos (76a).

Explanation (cont.): Similarly, Rabeinu Elchanan explained the Gemara in Yevamos (79a) in this fashion. Regarding the sons of Shaul that were hung the Gemara asks, "Doesn't the Pasuk say, The fathers should not be killed for the sins of the sons?" This must be relying on the second part of the Pasuk which says, "A man will die for his sin." However, the first part of the Pasuk is established is Sanhedrin (27b) to be teaching that a father cannot give testimony for a son. [See also Tosfos in Kesuvos 29a, DH "Eilu."]

Explanation: It must be that this teaching is only referring to the previous Pasuk, "His daughter you should not take for your son." Other Nochrim who convert can be married by regular Jews.

Question: According to Rebbi Shimon, how can all Nochrim who convert be forbidden to marry Jews?! (The Maharsha explains that Tosfos means that "Ki Yasir" cannot be referring to the Pasuk, "Lo Sischaten." This would mean according to Rebbi Shimon that just as one cannot marry the seven nations even after they convert, so too one cannot marry any convert. However, we know one can marry a convert who is not from the seven nations!) This (all of Tosfos until now) was stated by the Rashbam.

Observation: We never see Rebbi Shimon quoted as making this statement. Rather, being that we know that Rebbi Shimon understands the parameters of a law based on its reason, it must be that the Pasuk, "When he will turn away" is an extra Pasuk (teaching us that one may not even marry a non-Jewish woman who is not from the seven nations and is not an idolater). The reason that "Ki Yasir" must be teaching this is because even if it would not be said, this reason (not to marry any non-Jewish woman who is into idolatry, even if she is not part of the seven nations) would be obvious. [See also Tosfos in Kidushin 68b, DH "Hanicha."]

Explanation: This means that a Kohen who has relations with her is liable to be punished due to his being with a Zonah.

Observation: The Gemara in Sanhedrin (82a) explains that the opinion that says one is liable for Nashga (Ishus, instead of Zonah) holds they do not make their women ownerless as far as allowing them to have promiscuous relations. This is why they cannot be liable for Zonah.

Question: Rebbi Moshe from Fostoish asked that our Gemara says that the Beis Din of the Chashmonaim decreed that a non-Jewish woman has the status of a Zonah. The Mishnah says in Yevamos (61b) that the Chachamim say that a Zonah (according to Torah law, which says that a Kohen may not be with a Zonah) is only a convert, freed slave, or someone who had illicit relations. This is the Zonah stated in the Torah. The Gemara explains that this is because Nochrim had relations with her when she was a Nochris. This implies that it is possible that a non-Jewish is called a Zonah (according to Torah law)! (Why did the Beis Din of the Chasmonaim have to make this decree?)

Answer: One can push this aside by saying that a convert is different, as she is now someone who can have Kidushin, and is therefore included in the Torah's prohibition that a Kohen cannot marry a Chalalah or Zonah. However, a Jew has no Kidushin in a Nochris, and therefore a Nochris cannot be who the Torah is talking about when it prohibits a Kohen from marrying a Zonah.

Answer (cont.): It also cannot be who the Torah is discussing when it says regarding a Kohen, "And he will not make his children mundane" as if he has children with a Nochris they are not even (halachically) considered his children!

Question#1: However, there is a difficulty. The Gemara says in Temurah (29b) that Abaye says that if a Kohen has relations with a Nochris he does not receive lashes. Rava says that he does receive lashes. This indicates that according to Torah law, Rava holds he receives lashes due to the prohibition of Zonah, even when she is a Nochris!

Question#2: The Gemara in Kidushin (78a) says that Rebbi Elazar bar Yakov, Rebbi Yehudah, Rebbi Yosi, and Rebbi Shimon argue regarding a convert marrying a Kohen. Even Rebbi Shimon only permits her to marry a Kohen if she converted when she was less than three, being that her Besulim grew back when she was a Jew. However, the Gemara indicates that an older Nochris is certainly classified as a Zonah!

Answer: Rava's opinion in Temurah (ibid.), the Gemara in Kidushin (ibid.), and the Gemara in Yevamos (ibid.) that imply that a Nochris is forbidden to a Kohen by Torah law and receives lashes for having relations with her is only when she has definitely had relations before. (This explanation is based on the text of the Bach in Tosfos. His text is supported by Tosfos in Sanhedrin 82a, DH "v'Idach.")

Answer (cont.): Abaye argues that the Kohen does not receive lashes because he holds that a Nochris Zonah who is forbidden to a Kohen according to Torah law is not forbidden because of the Pasuk prohibiting a Zonah, but rather because of the Pasuk states, "a Besulah from his nation" (Vayikra 21:14) excluding a convert. This is a negative prohibition implied by a positive prohibition, which does not warrant lashes. (The Mahari Shapira explains that Tosfos must be referring to a Pasuk in Yechezkel, "Only Besulos from the seed of the house of Israel" (44:22). He cannot be referring to "a Besulah from his nation" as this Pasuk is referring to a positive commandment that only applies to a Kohen Gadol.)

Answer (cont.): The decree of the Beis Din of the Chashmonaim is regarding a Nochris whom we are unsure whether or not he had relations. We will not give a Jew who has relations with her lashes, being that we are in doubt (about her status), even according to Rava.

Answer (cont.): However, according to Rabin the Chachamim decreed to make him liable for Zonah, and according to Rav Dimi they do not let their wives have promiscuous relations. Therefore, they did not make a decree that she is a Zonah.

Observation: The Gemara also states in Sanhedrin (ibid.) that the opinion that says Nashgaz did not say Nashga, as they do not have a status of being married.

Question: This is difficult, as the Gemara in Kidushin (21b) understands that the Pasuk "Eishes" stated by the Torah regarding Yefas Toar was in order to even permit a Nochri woman who was married. This clearly indicates that Nochrim are considered married!

Answer: There is clearly a Mitzvas Asei that Nochrim who are married are considered halachically married (and therefore a Jew who has promiscuous relations with a married Nochris, besides for transgressing Nashgaz also transgresses a Mitzvas Asei of "v'Davak b'Ishto"). This is why we require "Eishes" regarding Yefas Toar to permit Yefas Toar even if she is an Eishes Ish. (However, she is not considered married like Jews, which also have negative prohibitions regarding married women. Accordingly, when this opinion says they do not have Ishus, he means that there was no need to make a decree due to Ishus, as there is already a Torah prohibition.)

Implied Question: The Gemara teaches in Sanhedrin (52b), "Asher Yinaf Es Eishes Rei'eihu" excludes the wife of "others." Others refers to Nochrim. This implies that they have no status of marriage whatsoever!

Answer: This only refers to no punishment of death (for a Jew who has relations with a Nochris who is married to a Nochris).

Implied Question: The Yerushalmi states in Kidushin (1:1, see Yefei Einaim here) that if ten people had relations with a Zonah, the first one acquired her, and the others were liable for having relations with a married woman. The Gemara says that relations acquire for a Nochri. (This implies that they are liable to be killed. Additionally, it implies that the other nine are liable even though she is acting as a Zonah, not as his wife.)

Answer: This is specifically regarding Nochrim (with Nochri women). However, for a Jew to be liable for transgressing the positive command not to have relations with a married Nochri woman, she must have had relations with someone and be his full fledged wife.

Observation: Being that Rebbi Zeira says that each was by the other, the implication is that they all lived in the same generation during the time of Rebbi.