Text: This is the text in the Sefarim, and it seems correct.

Proof: This is apparent from the Gemara later that says, "From everyone's words we learn that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is permitted." What does, "from everyone's words" mean? Even though this is how we explain the Mishnah, it is not apparent everyone agrees with this ruling!

Proof (cont.): However, if our text is "this is the law" we can say that Rav Yehudah explicitly teaches that this explanation is indeed the law. Similarly, Rebbi Yochanan's statement later is that if he added items that caused it not to taste good, it is Ta'am l'Fgam and permitted. It would seem that Rabah bar bar Chanah and Rav Dimi who also explained the Mishnah (and did not argue) hold like Rebbi Yochanan and Rav Yehudah.

Question: This is difficult. Why does Rav Yehudah say this if it is definitely beneficial?

Answer: The main improvement is only after they boil and then cool down (as opposed to the time it is added, during which it does not make a good taste and it is only "as if" because eventually it will be considered an improvement).

Explanation: Being that they were used to putting vinegar into this dish just as they would put vinegar on cress, as stated earlier (30b), "if cress have vinegar it fights the poison of the snakes," they called it cress. Rav Dimi is teaching that these beans would benefit from vinegar.

Explanation: This does not mean that the pot is deemed Pagum due to something else etc. This version of Reish Lakish is more stringent than the second version.

Explanation (cont.): This means that whatever Pegam the Chachamim permitted does not refer to a Pegam which is dependent on another factor, such as lack of salt or too much salt. Such a Pegam they certainly did not permit, as it is similar to a case where there would be no bad taste from salt and other spices and the prohibited item would add a good taste to the dish.

Explanation (cont.): Rather, what type of Pegam is permitted? A Pegam that is permitted is in a dish that is not missing anything, and it is not eaten. This means that when the prohibited item mixes with the dish it causes it to become Pagum and not eaten. This does not mean it cannot possibly be eaten, but rather it is Pagum ("off" from its usually good taste).

Explanation (cont.): Some say that Reish Lakish says that the Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam being discussed is not that people say this pot (is missing salt etc.). He is being lenient, and saying as follows. We do not say that the bad taste is from something else in order to forbid the dish, meaning that people say the bad taste is not from the prohibited item but rather from too much or a lack of salt. We do not say this (that the dish is forbidden because the bad taste is because of something other than the prohibited item in the mixture.)

Explanation (cont.): Rather, being that it causes a bad taste in this dish right now, whether there is a lack of salt or too much salt in this dish, it is permitted.

Opinion #1: Rashi in Chulin (98b) explains that from here we see that the concept "Ta'am k'Ikar" -- "taste is like physical presence" is not a Torah concept.

Opinion #1 (cont.): He explains that an example of this is milk that fell into meat, or forbidden fat that fell into a dish when melted, and is no longer extant.

Question #1: Rashi's case of milk falling into meat seems erroneous.

Question #1 (cont.): Even according to Rashi's explanation that Ta'am k'Ikar is not according to Torah law, he admits that meat and milk mixtures are Torah prohibitions (even if the milk is no longer noticeable), as the Torah forbade them to be cooked together, as stated in Chulin (108a). (If the Torah prohibited cooking them together, it even prohibited them cooked together when the milk would be absorbed through cooking into the meat!) [(The Maharsha says that the following line of Tosfos, which appears later in Tosfos, is supposed to appear here.) This is apparent from the fact that Abaye states that we see from here that taste alone without physical presence results in a Torah prohibition etc. (and Rava argues on him, see below).]

Question #2: Additionally, if someone eats meat and milk (cooked together) he is eating the physical prohibition when he eats the meat. This is as stated in the Gemara there (ibid.).

Opinion #2: Rather, one must say that the case (where Ta'am k'Ikar is not d'Oraisa) is where forbidden fat melted and became swallowed into the meat and only gives taste. It is not physically present. (See Avodah Berurah at length for the difference between fat which is not considered present when absorbed in meat, and milk which is considered present when absorbed into meat.)

Opinion #2 (cont.): The taste is not considered prohibited according to Torah law. (The Maharsha says that the following line is supposed to appear earlier in Tosfos.) (This is apparent from the fact that Abaye states that we see from here that the taste alone and not the physical presence results in a Torah prohibition.)

Opinion #2 (cont.): If you think that regarding other prohibitions we say that taste without physical presence is a Rabbinic law, why don't we derive from meat and milk mixtures that Ta'am k'Ikar d'Oraisa? It must be we do not do so because it is a novel law. If so, the prohibition should apply even when there is no taste of either milk or meat, implying there is also no physical presence! Rather, it must be that regarding other prohibitions the law is Rabbinic, but regarding meat and milk mixtures we see that Ta'am k'Ikar is d'Oraisa. The law indeed follows Rebbi Yochanan who rules this way.

Proof: This is also implied in Chulin (ibid.) regarding a drop of milk. Abaye says that the taste, not the physical presence, is a Torah prohibition. If it would be a Rabbinic law etc. Rava says that the Torah forbade milk and meat when cooked. This implies that Rava holds that taste without clear substance, meaning Ta'am k'Ikar, is generally not a Torah concept. We always rule like Rava over Abaye.

Proof: Another proof can be brought from the Gemara in Chulin (98b) which says regarding the cooked leg of a ram brought by a Nazir (which is cooked together with the rest of the ram, but is only allowed to be eaten by the Kohen) that it is permitted from the normal rule of prohibition, as the Pasuk permits cooking the leg together with the ram (and for the rest of the ram to be consumed by the owner).

Proof (cont.): Rava says that this is only required due to the rule of Ta'am k'Ikar, which is the rule by Kodshim derived from the Pasuk, "From all that touches its meat, should be holy." The leg of this Korban is permitted. Being that Rava points out that Ta'am k'Ikar applies to Kodshim, the implication is that it does not apply to regular food.

Implied Question: The Pasuk commanding us to scald the vessels of Nochrim even though there was only unkosher taste in them cannot be used to derive that Ta'am k'Ikar is generally a Torah law. (Why not?)

Answer: This is a novel law, as even the food absorbed in a pot on that day clearly did not taste so good anymore, and even so the Torah forbade it to be used. This implies that it is a novel law from which we cannot derive other laws.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that in Pesachim (44b) the Gemara quotes the Pasuk, "soaked in grapes" regarding Ta'am k'Ikar. (This implies that the source for Ta'am k'Ikar is indeed a Torah law other than the prohibition against eating meat and milk cooked together, and can therefore apply to any prohibition!)

Answer: This derivation is not a Torah derivation, but rather an Asmachta. Ta'am k'Ikar is indeed not a Torah law (aside for Basar b'Chalav). This is the opinion of Rashi.

Opinion #2: Rabeinu Tam has difficulty with Rashi's opinion. Rebbi Yochanan holds in Pesachim (44b) that we derive Ta'am k'Ikar from the law of scalding vessels.

Implied Question: One cannot say that this teaching is merely an Asmachta (as we answered above).

Answer: The Gemara asks there, can this Pasuk of "soaked" be teaching us about permitted items combining with forbidden items? We require it to teach us Ta'am k'Ikar! This question implies that this is an actual derivation. Rebbi Akiva himself proves from here that permitted items combine with forbidden items to make a Nazir liable to receive lashes if he dips his bread in wine (and eats it), and there is enough bread and wine together to make him liable. The Rabbanan (argue on Rebbi Akiva and) prove from here the concept Ta'am k'Ikar.

Answer: It must be that just as this Pasuk is the source for Rebbi Akiva's Torah derivation regarding permitted items combining with forbidden items causing one to be liable to receive lashes, so too the Rabbanan hold this is a Torah teaching that Ta'am k'Ikar d'Oraisa.

Implied Question: The Gemara in Chulin (108a) quotes Rava as saying that the Torah forbade meat and milk cooked together, implying that Rava argues on Abaye and holds that Ta'am k'Ikar is not a Torah law as we have explained according to Rashi. (Why isn't this proof that Ta'am k'Ikar is not d'Oraisa regarding prohibitions other than milk and meat cooked together?)

Answer: This is incorrect. Rather, Rava also certainly holds that Ta'am k'Ikar is a Torah law. In Zevachim (79a), Rava says that regarding some prohibitions we say Bitul b'Rov, and regarding some we say Nosen Ta'am (determines whether or not the prohibition is present in the mixture). Just as the method of Bitul b'Rov is a Torah method, so too Nosen Ta'am (Ta'am k'Ikar) is a Torah method.

Answer (cont.): In Chulin (108a), Rava is saying as follows to Abaye. You cannot prove from Basar b'Chalav that taste alone without substance, meaning Ta'am k'Ikar, makes something prohibited according to Torah law. This is because regarding Basar b'Chalav we say that the Torah prohibited it by being cooked. This is a way to push aside proof from Basar b'Chalav. However, certainly Rava agrees that Ta'am k'Ikar is always a Torah law, as derived in Pesachim (44b) from "soaked from grapes."

Implied Question: The Gemara in Chulin (98b) that discusses a cooked leg of a ram brought by a Nazir quoted Rava (who implies that Ta'am k'Ikar is not a Torah law). (How can we answer this question regarding Rava's statement?)

Answer #1: The correct text (of Rava's statement) is that we only require this to show that permitted items can combine with prohibition and still be permitted. Regarding Kodshim we know this is generally forbidden from the Pasuk, "From all that touches its flesh should be made holy."

Answer #1 (cont.): Yet here it is permitted. For example, if part of the shoulder of the ram together with the entire leg is outside of the sauce, and the rest of the ram is absorbing from the leg half the amount that is prohibited as stated in Chulin (99a), it is still permitted. (The Avodah Berurah explains that when the entire ram is in the sauce, the taste from the leg is Batel b'Rov. However, when it is out of the sauce with another piece of the ram, all of the taste goes into that piece and there should not be any Bitul b'Rov. This case requires the Pasuk in order to say that it can still be eaten by a regular Jew.) However, regarding regular food, we generally say that permitted items do not combine with prohibited items (to make an amount upon which one would be liable to receive lashes), as we do not derive Chulin from Kodshim.

Answer #2: Another way to explain this statement of Rava (according to the regular text) is that Kodshim is forbidden (Ta'am k'Ikar), as is Chulin. The Gemara singled out Kodshim because it is discussing the Pasuk, "From all that will touch its meat should become holy." If we do not find another Pasuk, this should indicate Ta'am k'Ikar. We can establish that this Pasuk dealing with the Chatas is indeed referring to Ta'am k'Ikar and not that permitted items combine with forbidden items. However, after we derive Ta'am k'Ikar from a different Pasuk ("Mishras"), certainly we establish that the Pasuk of Chatas teaches that permitted items combine with forbidden items.

Answer #2 (cont.): Even so, the Gemara quotes the Pasuk regarding Chatas to show Ta'am k'Ikar because the simple meaning of the Pasuk seemingly indicates Ta'am k'Ikar.

Answer #2 (cont.): The Gemara indeed often quotes a simple Pasuk as a source, even though it is not the source, such as when it quotes "the eighth day" to indicate that Bris Milah is done on Shabbos. This is despite the fact that the Gemara in Shabbos (132a) actually derives this from "eight days old." Similarly, a different Pasuk than the actual one is quoted to show that a Bris is done even when it means cutting off leprosy.

Answer (cont.): The Gemara implies that Ta'am k'Ikar is permitted regarding the ram of a Nazir. For example, the case could be where the leg is being cooked in a sauce along with part of the thigh while the rest of the ram is outside the sauce. The leg is not Batel b'Shishim, as there is not enough of the ram in the sauce. The leg therefore imparts taste into the sauce, and even so it is permitted (due to the Torah saying the leg should be cooked together with the rest of the ram).

Explanation: Our Gemara, which is referring to a case of taste without substance, is discussing a case of two items of "Min b'Mino" -- "two of the same type" where the minority is nullified to the majority according to Torah law. This is as stated in Zevachim (79a) that the Rabbanan say that we apply Batel b'Rov in a case of Min b'Mino.

Explanation (cont.): This means that according to Torah law we say Min b'Mino in such a case. However, according to Rabbinic law we only say Batel b'Shishim. This is as stated by Rav in Chulin (101a) that there is Bitul b'Shishim in such a case. This is why Rebbi Yochanan says that one is not liable to receive lashes in such a case (where there is Rov, but not Shishim).

Observation: Even if the prohibited taste and substance were present one would not receive lashes (if there was Rov without Shishim) unless he clearly noticed the prohibited item in the mixture.

Implied Question: Rebbi Yochanan said that if there is taste without substance one does not receive lashes. (If he held that one would not receive lashes even if there was substance, why didn't he say so?)

Answer #1: He wanted to teach that there is still a Rabbinic prohibition (when there is not Shishim, even though there is no substance).

Answer #2: Alternatively, Rebbi Yochanan said this because it is a set law, without his having to discuss whether he does notice the prohibited part of it or not (which one must do if discussing a case where the prohibited matter has substance). If he would say a case where the taste and substance were present, the implication would be that this is even if the taste and substance were present. This is why he discussed taste without substance, as the case is clear.

Answer #2 (cont.): When Rebbi Yochanans says that one receives lashes when there is taste and substance, he is referring to a case where the prohibited item is clearly recognizable

Opinion: Rabeinu Eliyahu also said that we can easily establish our Gemara as discussing a case of Min b'she'Aino Mino. When Rebbi Yochanan says, "taste without substance" he is referring to a case where there is not a Kzayis of prohibited matter that would be eaten Toch Kdei Achilas Pras. In such a case one does not receive lashes. When he discusses "taste and substance" for which one receives lashes, he is referring to a case when a Kzayis of prohibited matter will be eaten during Kdei Achilas Pras of eating the "permitted" food. In such a case, one receives lashes.

Opinion: Rabeinu Yosef adds that the Gemara could be discussing a case of enough prohibited item to be eaten Toch Kdei Achilas Pras. Even so, one would not receive lashes if only the taste and not the substance was present, even though we say Ta'am k'Ikar is a Torah law.

Opinion (cont.): How do we know that Ta'am k'Ikar is a Torah law? We know this from the Pasuk, "You should pass (the vessels of Nochrim) through fire." This implies that if one does not pass them through fire, they are prohibited. This is merely a positive commandment. However, there is no negative commandment, and therefore one does not receive lashes for transgressing this prohibition.

Question: This opinion is difficult according to Rabeinu Tam. Being that the Torah returned these prohibitions, it returned the negative commandment transgressed by eating Neveilah, forbidden fats, and other prohibitions to their place. (The prohibition is what is in the pot, not a special Torah positive commandment regarding Ta'am k'Ikar!)

Question (cont.): We say in Bechoros (15b) regarding unfit Korbanos that the Pasuk says, "You should sacrifice and eat meat." We derive from here that "you should sacrifice" but not use the shearings, "and you should eat" but it should not go to your dogs, "meat" and not milk. Accordingly, shearings are only prohibited due to a negative commandment implied by a positive commandment, just like unkosher vessels of Nochrim. Even so, the Beraisa in Bechoros (ibid.) states that if someone shears or uses for work an animal that is no longer fit to be a Korban, he receives lashes.

Question (cont.): Rather, it must be that the reason that one receives lashes for this is because the Pasuk states regarding animals without blemishes dedicated to be Korbanos, "You should not work...and you should not shear." If they receive a blemish and are redeemed they are permitted, as they become regular animals. When the Pasuk says, "you should sacrifice" and we derive, do not use the shearings, it is reestablishing the prohibition against shearing animals dedicated to be Korbanos. It is this Pasuk that causes one to receive lashes.

Question (cont.): In a similar fashion, when the Torah says regarding kashering vessels of Nochrim, "you should pass them through fire" referring to the vessels that have absorbed Neveilah, forbidden fats, and other prohibited items, and it implies that if you do not do so they are forbidden, it is reestablishing the prohibitions of Neveilah, forbidden fats, and other prohibited items to what is absorbed in these vessels. This teaches us that prohibited items emitted from a vessel are considered prohibited due to their original prohibition (before they entered the vessel).

Observation: Others answer this explanation, and I have explained this in the chapter "Gid ha'Nasheh" (in Chulin). However, I cannot explain this further because it appears to me that this topic is a tremendously big topic. This is why I had to cut off my discussion. However, the King of the Universe should help me write about a pot that is a Bas Yomah (Ben Yomo), and it will be for us like a Chomah (wall).

Question: Why don't we say that Rav Dimi also did not hold this way, and only explained the Mishnah which he possibly held was incorrect?

Answer: Being that we see Rebbi Yochanan also holds that this is referring to the Mishnah, and Rebbi Yochanan clearly holds that Nosen Taa'm l'Fgam is permitted, we assume that Rav Dimi who said this regarding the Mishnah also holds Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is permitted.

Question: What is his question? In the Gemara earlier (35b), Rebbi taught an entire Mishnah that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is forbidden regarding oil of Nochrim. The Gemara there explained clearly that this was because what is emitted from the vessel causes it to be forbidden. This is despite the fact that regular vessels are not a Ben Yomo.

Question (cont.): Similarly, when the Gemara later (75b) says that all of them (vessels of Nochrim) that have been used before they were immersed etc., we establish that one Beraisa (that says the vessels are forbidden) holds the opinion that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is forbidden.

Answer #1: The Gemara is trying to find a Tana who explicitly states that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is forbidden.

Answer #2: Alternatively, the Gemara means to ask if there is an opinion that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is forbidden even if the prohibited item itself (as opposed to it being absorbed or melted) would cause the mixture to taste bad.

Implied Question: This is not like the case of oil stated above. (Why not?)

Answer: If the oil would be extant it would cause a good taste, as explained earlier (see Tosfos 38b, DH "Iy").

Explanation: This is why Rebbi Meir derives from kashering Nochri pots that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is forbidden. However, Rebbi Shimon permits this, as he understands that a Ben Yomo has no bad taste at all.

Explanation (cont.): They are dependent on each other. The opinion that holds Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is prohibited holds that there is somewhat of a bad taste in a Ben Yomo, while the opinion that holds it is permitted says there is not.

Question: This is difficult, as in Pesachim (44b) there is an argument between Rebbi Akiva and the Rabbanan. Rebbi Akiva derives Ta'am k'Ikar from kashering Nochri vessels, while the Chachamim derive it from "Mishras" (soaked grapes). They do not derive from kashering because that is a novel law. Being that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is generally permitted, kashering must be a novel Torah prohibition. Rebbi Akiva holds that the Torah only prohibited a Ben Yomo, and therefore it is not referring to Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam. The Rabbanan must hold that there is a slight bad taste even in a Ben Yomo, which is why it is a novel law.

Question (cont.): Being that the Rabbanan say that there must at least a slightly bad taste in a Ben Yomo, why don't they derive from kashering Nochri vessels that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is prohibited? This is the same path of logic used here to explain Rebbi Meir! How can the Rabbanan there say in Pesachim (ibid.) that kashering is a novel law, as Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is generally permitted?

Answer: It must be that the Rabbanan (ibid.) indeed hold that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is prohibited in a case where if the prohibited item was extant it would provide a good taste. They indeed derive this from kashering vessels of Nochrim, as even a Ben Yomo has a slightly bad taste as stated there.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the Rabbanan there say that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is generally permitted. (How can we say they really hold it is forbidden?)

Answer: This is only regarding a real bad taste, meaning that if the prohibited item was extant it would cause a bad taste to this mixture. One cannot derive this type of bad taste is prohibited from kashering vessels of Nochrim, as the case there is that if the prohibited item were extant it would cause a good taste! (The bad taste is only due to it being absorbed in the vessel instead of physically present.)

Answer (cont.): When the Rabbanan say that kashering pots is a novel law, even though the absorbed taste is not like other such tastes that are deemed permitted, it means that were it not for the Pasuk stating that such pots are forbidden they would be permitted. We would say, why should what is absorbed in a Nochri pot or any other pot be prohibited? Even so, the Torah prohibited it. Being that the Torah prohibited it, we derive from it to other things like it. This means that other absorbed prohibited items that would give good taste if they were physically present are prohibited. The Rabbanan in Pesachim (44b) hold like our Mishnah earlier (35b). (See Avodah Berurah at length for an explanation of this part of Tosfos, including understanding why Tosfos apparently thinks we should derive from a novel law to the rest of the Torah.)

Explanation #1: There are three opinions (based on what we have just stated). Rebbi Meir in our Gemara holds that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is always prohibited, even if the bad taste would exist if the prohibited item was extant (and not merely absorbed). He derives this from kashering vessels of Nochrim. He does not derive from Neveilah at all to permit Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam because he says that Pasuk excludes a piece of meat that was always rotten (and never tasted good).

Explanation #1 (cont.): Rebbi Shimon permits Ta'am l'Fgam even when it would have tasted good had the forbidden item been extant. Being that it currently tastes bad, it is permitted. This is derived from Neveilah. He does not derive from kashering Nochri vessels, as he understands that a Ben Yomo does not taste bad at all (and this was the topic of the Torah's discussion regarding kashering).

Explanation #1 (cont.): The Rabbanan in Pesachim (44b) argue on Rebbi Akiva and hold that an item that tastes bad when physically present (in a mixture) is permitted. This is derived from Neveilah. However, if there is a bad taste now and there is no physical presence of the prohibited item, but the prohibited item would provide a good taste if it was physically present, it is prohibited. This is derived from kashering Nochri vessels that are a Ben Yomo which must have a slightly bad taste. This is also the opinion of the Mishnah earlier (35b), as I have explained.

Explanation #2: Alternatively, it is possible to say that the Rabbanan in Pesachim (44b) hold like Rebbi Shimon in our Gemara who says that Nosen Ta'am l'Fgam is always permitted.

Implied Question: This is despite the fact that the Gemara there says that a Ben Yomo has some bad taste, and according to Rebbi Shimon it must be that it does not have any bad taste at all. If it would have bad taste, Ta'am l'Fgam should always be prohibited, as is apparent from our Gemara. (How, then, can we reconcile Rebbi Shimon with the Rabbanan in Pesachim?)

Answer: It must be that Rebbi Shimon also admits that there is some bad taste in what is absorbed in the vessels. However, he does not derive from kashering to forbid general bad taste, for example what is absorbed in a pot that is not a Ben Yomo, because there is a lot of bad taste in such a pot. One cannot derive a very bad taste from the slightly bad taste found in a Ben Yomo. This is Rebbi Shimon's opinion.

Answer (cont.): Rebbi Meir understands that we derive a very bad taste from a slightly bad taste.

Proof #1: If the explanation is as we stated originally, that they argue regarding whether or not there is a slightly bad taste in a Ben Yomo, why don't we just analyze pots to see if there is a bad taste or not?

Proof #2: We can bring another proof to this understanding that Rebbi Shimon admits that there is a slightly bad taste to a Ben Yomo, as we have explained. If he held there was no bad taste at all, why would the Torah have to state that one must kasher Nochri vessels? This would be obvious, as being that there is a good taste in them they must be kashered, as we say Ta'am k'Ikar!