The Beraisa (regarding the Din of receiving a Pikadon from a woman, an Eved or a Katan) concludes that if any of them leave instructions at the time of death, to return the Pikadon to whoever it might be, one follows the instructions. The Tana refers specifically to the time of death - (not to preclude a case where they did so in their lifetime, but) because otherwise, in most cases, seeing as they are able to return the Pikadon themselves, the instructions would be superfluous.

When he adds 've'Im La'av, Ya'aseh Pirush le'Pirushan', he means - that if one does not trust them, one returns the Pikadon to their respective masters, in spite of their instructions.

It cannot mean that if they did not leave instructions, the Pikadon is automatically returned to the husband, the master or the father ... - because that would merely be repeating what the Tana already said in the Reisha.

Some versions add 've'Ika de'Amri, Ya'aseh Pirush le'Pirushan', implying that - one does not follow their instructions at all, but always returns the Pikadon to the husband, master or father ... .

This too, we reject however, on the grounds - that in the case that follows, Rav will then be ruling neither like the Reisha of the Beraisa nor like the Seifa.

When the wife of Rabah bar bar Chanah died, she left instructions to hand a set of very expensive ear-rings to Marsa and his daughter's sons. Marsa was one of Rebbi Chiya's brothers.

According to the first Lashon, Rav instructed Rabah bar bar Chanah to follow the previous ruling (depending on whether his wife was trustworthy or not). According to the second Lashon, he ordered him - to assess the financial status of those to whom his wife claimed that they belonged (to ascertain whether they might own such expensive ear-rings or not) (according to others, to ascertain whether his wife had attained the required social status to have such wealthy friends).

We learned in the Beraisa with regard to someone who accepted a Pikadon from a Katan 'Ya'aseh lo Segulah'. Rav Chisda interprets this to mean that he should sell it and invest in a Seifer-Torah - Reading in the Seifer is considered Peiros.

Rabah bar Rav Huna says - that they should buy the Katan a date-palm, from which he eats the Peiros.

They do not suggest investing in a business - because of the risk that it might fail.

We learned in our Mishnah that a father and son cannot establish a Chazakah on each other. Rav Yosef says 'Afilu Chalku', by which he means - that this ruling applies even if they split up (that the son left his father's house and became independent).

Rava says - that once the son leaves, they can establish a Chazakah on each other (like we explained in our Mishnah).

The general consensus of opinion in this matter (Rav Papi and Rav Nachman bar Ya'akov) is - like Rava.

The Beraisa which states that once a son leaves his father's domain and a woman receives a divorce from her husband - they are like two strangers (with regard to establishing a Chazakah on each other) too, supports the opinion of Rava.

According to Rav, if, following the death of the father, the eldest brother is managing the affairs of the house, and there are Onos - (Sh'tarei Mechirah) and other Sh'taros signed in his name, the onus lies on him to prove that the Sh'taros are in fact, his, and not the joint property of the siblings.

He claims to have received the property that he purportedly sold - from his maternal grandfather (assuming that his brothers are half-brothers on his father's side).

Rav's reason (despite the fact that the Sh'taros are written in his name), is - because a. he is the sole agent for the joint property belonging to all the siblings (whose documents are all written on his name), and b. we are not aware of his owning any property of his own.

According to Shmuel, since, when all's said and done, the Sh'taros in question are written in his name - it is his siblings who must prove that the property in question was their's and not his.

Shmuel referred to Rav as 'Aba', because that was his real name ('Aba Aricha'). We call him 'Rav' - because he was the Rebbe of Bavel (like 'Rebbi' was thus called because he was the Rebbe of Eretz Yisrael).

Shmuel maintains that, once the eldest brother dies, Rav will concede that (assuming that he left behind heirs) it would be up to the brothers to prove that they were joint owners - because the heirs of the deceased brother will not be able to prove that the property belonged to their father.

Rav Papa objects to Shmuel's ruling because - the Din of 'To'anin le'Yoresh' (claiming on behalf of the heir) is confined to claiming on behalf of the heir what the father might have claimed (and had the father asked for the onus of proof to be switched to his brothers [according to Rav], his claim would have been dismissed).

This case is worse that a case where, after living on the property for three years, the heirs claim that they received it from their father, who had previously lived on the property for one day, where they are believed, even though their father would not have been - because there, we claim on the Yesomim's behalf that their father purchased the field, an argument which he could have presented himself, and on which he would have been believed.

Rav Papa substantiates his Kashya by citing Rava, who ruled that the pair of wool-comer's scissors which Yesomim inherited from their father was to be returned forthwith - because the original owner had witnesses that their father had borrowed them from him (whereas according to Shmuel, Rava ought to have asked the owner to substantiate his claim).

Rava's ruling in turn, is based on a statement of Rav Huna bar Avin, who ruled that - objects which people tend to lend or to rent out must be returned, and the borrower is not believed to say that he purchased them without solid proof that he did.

The conclusion regarding Rav Papa's query on Shmuel's ruling is - 'Kashya'.

Rabeinu Chananel draws a distinction between 'Tiyuvta' - which is final, and 'Kashya' - which is not (meaning that we know that the Kashya is answerable, though we don't know what the answer is).

We reject this distinction - because we maintain that there is no difference, in fact, between the two, except that, when the Kashya is from a Mishnah or Beraisa, Chazal use the Lashon 'Tiyuvta', and when it is based on a statement of an Amora, 'Kashya'.

Despite the principle that the Halachah is like Shmuel in money-matters, the Rashbam rules completely like Rav - because Rav Chisda, Rabah and Rav Sheishes all hold like Rav, and what's more, Rav has the support of a Beraisa (as we will see shortly).

Rabeinu Chananel quoting R. Yisrael Gaon rules - like Rav (not the way Shmuel quoted him) in the case where the eldest brother died.

Rav Chisda qualifies Rav's ruling (that the onus of proof of ownership lies with the elder brother) - by confining it to where everything is shared, but if for example, they each make their own dough, he will no longer need to prove that the Sh'taros are indeed his (because we will then say that he saved up the extra bits of dough to obtain funds to purchase his own property).

According to Rabah, the proof Rav requires is witnesses. Rav Sheishes holds that - it will suffice to verify his Sh'tar in Beis-Din.

They must be arguing according to Rav, and not Shmuel - because according to Shmuel, Rav Sheishes should have said that the siblings must invalidate their brother's Sh'tar (not verify it).

Based on the fact that there is no indication or reason to rule like one more than the other, Rabeinu Chananel rules - like Rabah, because Rav Sheishes agrees with his ruling (whereas Rabah does not agree with that of Rav Sheishes).

Rava asked Rav Nachman whether he held like Rav or Shmuel, Rabah or Rav Sheishes, to which he replied - that he knew of a Beraisa which supports Rav (though it gives no indication whether it follows the opinion of Rabah or Rav Sheishes).

The Beraisa incorporates in this ruling - the case of an Almanah whom Beis-Din appointed as an Apotropus over the Yesomim's property, and who, like the oldest brother, must bring proof that any Sh'taros that are written in her name, she inherited independently.

The Tana introduces the latter with 've'Chein' (implying 'even an Almanah'), because we might otherwise have thought that the woman is believed more than the oldest brother, on account of the great honor that she deems it, to be trusted by Beis-Din in this way (and for which reason, we would have thought that she would not dream of claiming anything belonging to the Yesomim).

Nevertheless, perhaps she is not believed - because we suspect her of taking liberties, in return for looking after the Yesomim's property without remuneration (see Tosfos DH 'de'Tarcha').

The Tana mentions that the Almanah inherited the Sh'taros from her paternal grandfather (not to preclude if she inherited them from her father, which would make no difference to the ruling, but) - to balance the Reisha, which speaks about the oldest brother inheriting the property from his maternal grandmother, as we explained above.

Our Mishnah concludes 'Bameh Devarim Amurim be'Machzik, Aval be'Nosen Matanah ve'ha'Achin she'Chalku ve'ha'Machzik be'Nechsei ha'Ger, Na'al, Gadar u'Paratz ... '. The problem with this is that the word 'Aval' implies that all the latter cases are not subject to Chazakah.

We solve the problem by inserting a phrase that confines the earlier statement to a three-year Chazakah, and the latter phrase to a regular Kinyan Chazakah.

Rav Hoshaya (or Sheravya) cites a Beraisa be'Kidushin de'Bei Levi: 'Na'al, Gadar u'Paratz Kol she'Hu be'Fanav, harei Zu Chazakah' - with reference to a regular Kinyan Chazakah pertaining to a sale.

We might infer from here that if the purchaser made the Kinyan not in the seller's presence, then he does not acquire the property, but Rava interprets it to mean that it is not necessary to instruct the purchaser to go and acquire it, whereas if it takes place outside of his presence, he does ...

... even if the latter has already paid, in a place that is, where a transaction concerning Karka requires a Sh'tar.

Even in such a place however, the purchaser will acquire the field with money alone - if the seller stipulated that he should.