If Shimon plants the fruit that Reuven sold him and it fails to grow, the Tana Kama exempts Reuven from responsibility. At the time of the sale - Reuven did not stipulate anything.

The basis of this ruling is - that there are always two reasons why a person might sell fruit; either for eating or for planting, in which case the seller is entitled to claim that he sold it for eating.

This ruling extends to flax - even though most people sell flax to plant ...

... because (as Shmuel will teach us shortly), we do not follow the majority in order to extract money from the defendant ...

... based on the principle - 'ha'Motzi me'Chavero overrides the Din of Rov)

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel precludes garden seeds from the current ruling - since they are not fit to eat, in which case one only buys them to plant, and it is obviously a false sale.

This case is even more obvious than one where Reuven sells Shimon wine and it turns out to be beer (where the sale is also invalid) - because here the seeds are not fit to eat at all, whereas there, there are people who want to purchase vinegar and not wine.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is coming (not to argue with the Tana Kama, but) - to explain his opinion, in which case there is no Tana who disagrees with him.

In spite of the fact that there is nothing he can do with the seeds other than burn them, Shimon is not even obligated to pay Reuven the price of fuel - because garden seeds do not make good fuel.

According to Rav, if Reuven sells Shimon an ox which turns out to be a goring ox, the sale is invalid - because that is not what he bought (much in the same way as someone who purchases wine that turns out to be vinegar).

Shmuel - accepts the seller's claim that he sold it in order to Shecht and eat.

Even Sumchus, who rules Cholkin (in Bava Kama, in the case where an ox gored a cow, and we find a stillborn calf beside the dead cow), will concede here that the sale is valid - since whereas there, we are in doubt as to when the calf was born, here all the facts are known, in which case we go after the one with the strongest argument (the seller in this case, because, since we do not follow the majority, the onus lies on the purchaser to stipulate that he is buying the Animal for plowing and not for eating.

According to Shmuel, the Din here is different than 'Yayin ve'Nimtza Chometz', where the sale is invalid - because there, the purchaser specifically said that he wants wine, whereas here he did not stipulate.

The reasin that we do not simply check whether Reuven usually sells for eating or for plowing (whether he is basically a butcher or a farmer) i - because we are speaking here about someone who sometimes sells for the one, and sometimes for the other.

The price might indicate what he sold it for - because the price of an Animal that is for plowing is generally much higher than one that is for eating.

In the previous Perek, in the case where Reuven sold a plow, and the price indicated that the ox was included in the sale - the Rabbanan did not consider the price as an indication.

Here however, they will concede that it is - because in addition to the fact that Shimon paid a high price, he is probably from the majority of people who purchase an ox for plowing (and, as we concluded, Reuven sells for plowing too); whereas there, having established the case where some people call an ox an ox, and not a plow, the price cannot determine that the purchaser is from the other group (and he should have stipulated that himself).

We do not look at the price in our case to determine whether Shimon bought the ox for eating or for plowing - because we are speaking where the price of meat jumped dramatically, so that there is no difference between the price of an ox for plowing and an ox for Shechting.

Despite the fact that, as we just explained, the purchaser received what he paid for, he might claim that the sale is invalid and that he wants his money back - to spare him the trouble of having to sell the meat.

Rav and Shmuel must be speaking where Reuven actually has money with which to pay - because otherwise he could anyway force Shimon to accept the Animal, as we learned in Bava Kama (the debtor can pay with any goods he wishes, and is not obligated to sell his Metaltelin in order to pay cash).

We can extrapolate from here that Rav Huna's D'rashah "Yashiv", 'le'Rabos Shaveh Kesef ke'Kesef' (permitting the debtor to pay with whatever he wishes [the source of the previous D'rashah]) - is confined to where the debtor does not have cash with which to pay, and that where he does, he is obligated to pay cash.

We cannot confine this inference to the actual money that Shimon paid Reuven (whereas other money that Reuven possessed would not preclude him from the right to pay Metaltelin) - because (bearing in mind that money is to spend) there is no S'vara to differentiate between the money that he received and other money.

The Machlokes between Rav and Shmuel now is - whether we go after the majority (of those who sell their Animals for plowing [Rav]), or not (Shmuel).

According to Shmuel - we only go after the majority in matters of Isur, but not of Mamon]).

We just concluded that Rav and Shmuel argue over whether a Rov (majority) will suffice to extract money from the defendant , and that even Shmuel agrees that it determines in matters of Isur, such as the case of nine shops - where someone purchased meat and did not remember from which butchery he bought it. Assuming that nine of those butcheries sold Kasher meat and one of them non-Kasher meat, the meat is Kasher.

The Mishnah in Kesuvos rules - that if a widow or a divorcee claims that she was a Besulah when she married (and is therefore entitled to a Kesuvah of two hundred Zuz), whereas the husband claims that she was an Almanah (who only receives a hundred) - she receives two hundred Zuz, provided witnesses testify that she married in the manner that Besulos do.

This implies however - that without witnesses, she is only entitled to a Manah, despite the fact thyat most women marry Besulos, thereby poding a Kashya on Rav.

Initially, we answer that most women marry as Besulos and all Besulos have a Kol that they did, and that consequently, since the woman under discussion did not have a Kol, and that consequently, the fact that there is no Kol outweighs the Rov). We refute this answer however, on the grounds that - if this was so, why would we even believe witnesses, who must be false, seeing as there was no Kol.

So we amend the previous answer to read (not that all Besulos have a Kol that they did, but) - that most Besulos have a Kol that they did (the lack of which negates the Rov, but not witnesses).

And we query Shmuel from another Beraisa, which rules that if Reuven sold Shimon an Eved who turns out to be ...

... a Ganav or a kidnapper - the sale is valid.

... an armed robber or a murderer who is wanted by the government - the sale is invalid.

According to Shmuel (who does not go after the majority in money-matters) the sale ought to be invalid in the Reisha too - because someone who pays money for an Eved expects to receive a healthy one, not one who is sick (in body or in mind).

The reason that the sale is valid, is (not because the majority of Avadim are Ganavim and kidnappers, and we go after the majority, but) - because all Avadim are Ganavim and kidnappers.