1)
What does our Mishnah mean when it says 'Yesh Nochlin u'Manchilin'?
In that case, why does the Tana not simply say 'Nochlin Zeh es Zeh'?
What ruling do the following pairs have in common ...
... a father and sons, and paternal brothers?
... a man and his mother, a man and his wife and a man and his maternal aunt?
... a mother and her sons, a woman and her husband, a woman and her sister's son?
What is strange about the Tana's insertion of the third group?
1)
When our Mishnah says 'Yesh Nochlin u'Manchilin', it means that - the two relatives inherit each other.
The Tana does not simply say 'Yesh Nochlin Zeh es Zeh' - in order to balance with the Seifa 'Yesh Nochlon ve'Lo Manchilin'.
A ...
... father and sons and paternal brothers both belong to the category of 'Nochlin u'Manchilin'.
... man and his mother, a man and his wife and a man and his maternal aunt all belong to the category of 'Nochlin ve'Lo Manchilin'.
... mother and her sons, a woman and her husband, a woman and her sister's son all belong to the category of 'Manchilin ve'Lo Nochlin'.
What is strange about the Tana's insertion of third group is that - the Tana inserts it at all, since it is self-understood from the second group (a Kashya that will be dealt with in the Sugya).
2)
Who belongs to the group that the Tana lists as neither Nochel nor Manchil?
We just learned that a man inherits his mother's sister. What if she is her maternal sister (only)?
What is the Tana referring to if the text reads 'B'nei Achos' instead of 'B'nei Achyos'?
2)
The group that the Tana lists as neither Nochel or Manchil - is confined to maternal brothers.
We just learned that a man inherits his mother's sister - but not if she is her maternal sister.
According to the text that reads 'B'nei Achos' (instead of 'B'nei Achyos'), the Tana is referring to - the sons of his paternal sister.
3)
Which principle governs the distinction that cuts through the Mishnah between paternal relations and maternal ones?
In which case does a father not inherit his son?
3)
The principle that governs the distinction that cuts through the Mishnah between paternal relations and maternal ones is the principle 'Mishpachas Av Keruyah Mishpachah, ve'Ein Mishpachas Eim Keruyah Mishpachah'.
A father does not inherit his son - if the latter has children.
108b----------------------------------------108b
4)
We ask why the Tana first lists 'ha'Av es ha'Banim' and then 'ha'Banim es ha'Av'. Besides the opening Pasuk in Pinchas "Ish ki Yamus u'Vein Ein lo" (which gives precedence to the son inheriting his father), what logic prompts us to ask this Kashya?
Why does the Tana nevertheless do so?
4)
We ask why the Tana first lists 'ha'Av es ha'Banim' and then 'ha'Banim es ha'Av'. Besides the opening Pasuk in Pinchas "Ish ki Yamus u'Vein Ein lo" (which gives precedence to the son inheriting his father), the logic that prompts us to ask this Kashya is that - it is unconventional to open the proceedings with punishment (i.e. that a son died in his father's lifetime [and without children]).
The Tana nevertheless does so - because he gives precedence to whatever is learned from a D'rashah (i.e. from Torah she'be'al Peh) over than what is written directly in the written Torah. This answer will become clear immediately).
5)
What does the Pasuk in Acharei-Mos "She'er Avicha hu" teach us with regard to the Pasuk in Pinchas "u'Nesatem es Nachalaso li'She'eiro ha'Karov eilav"?
What do we learn from there concerning the order of precedence in the realm of Yerushah?
And how do we know that the father does not also precede the deceased person's son?
5)
The Pasuk in Acharei-Mos "She'er Avicha Hu" teaches us that - "She'ero" in the Pasuk in Pinchas "u'Nesatem es Nachalaso li'She'eiro ha'Karov eilav" refers to the deceased person's father.
We learn from there that - a father takes precedence over a brother.
And we know that the father does not also take precedence over the deceased person's son - because the Torah writes there "ha'Karov", indicating that 'ha'Karov Kodem' (and a son is closer than a father, as we will see shortly [and as we already explained]).
6)
On what grounds do we include a son but exclude a brother from the above two D'rashos, and not vice-versa? In which two areas does the Torah give precedence to a son over a brother?
In this context, what are the ramifications of ...
... "le'Ya'adah"?
... "le'Sadeh Achuzah"?
On what grounds do we reject the counter argument that a brother makes Yibum and not a son?
Why do we need to give this answer? Why can we not simply say that a son has precedence in two areas (Yi'ud and Sadeh Achuzah) whereas a brother has precedence in only one area (Yibum)?
6)
We include a son but exclude a brother from the above two D'rashos, and not vice-versa - because the Torah gives precedence to a son over a brother with regard to Yi'ud (marrying his father's maidservant) and Sadeh Achuzah (redeeming a field from Hekdesh).
In this context, the ramifications of ...
... "le'Ya'adah" are that - someone who buys an Amah Ivriyah has the option of using the money of the sale for Yi'ud (the Kidushin of an Amah Ivriyah), either himself or to his son, but not to anybody else (even his brother).
... "le'Sadeh Achuzah" are that - if the treasurer of Hekdesh sells the field that Reuven declared Hekdesh to a third party (even to Shimon, Reuven's brother), when the Yovel arrives, it goes to the Kohanim, but not if Reuven himself or his son redeems it.
We reject the counter argument that a brother makes Yibum and not a son on the grounds that - if the deceased left a son, then, to begin with, his mother would be exempt from Yibum (switching the precedence from the deceased's brother to his son).
The suggestion that a son has precedence in two areas (Yi'ud and Sadeh Achuzah) whereas a brother has precedence in only one (Yibum) is not good enough - because in Maseches Erchin, we only learn this with regard to Sadeh Achuzah by using the same argument 'K'lum Yesh Yibum ela be'Makom she'Yesh Ben?' (in which case, were it not for that argument, it would be one against one [Yibum against Yi'ud]).
7)
Why do we need to prove the fact that a son takes precedence over a brother? Why is it not evident from the order of the Pesukim, which place a son first?
do not query the D'rashah "ha'Karov Karov Kodem" by suggesting that perhaps a father is a closer relative than a son?
7)
We need to prove the fact that a son takes precedence over a brother, despite the order of the Pesukim, which place a son first because (as we shall see shortly), based on the fact that - we re-learn the Pasuk "ha'Karov", to teach us to follow the priority of the relationship, and not the order of the Pesukim.
We do not query the D'rashah "ha'Karov Karov Kodem" by suggesting that perhaps a father is a closer relative than a son, because there is no area of Halachah where a father takes precedence over a son (rendering the suggestion meaningless).