In a case where someone says 'Ish P'lonii Yirshani' where he has a daughter, or 'Biti Tirshani' where he also has a son, based on which principle does the Tana Kama of our Mishnah rule 'Lo Amar K'lum'?
(b)
What does Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah say?
(c)
What can we extrapolate from the words of the Tana Kama? In which case would his words be effective?
(d)
What problem do we have with this from the Seifa of the Mishnah?
1)
(a)
In a case where someone says 'Ish P'lonii Yirshani' when he has a daughter, or 'Biti Tirshani' when he has a son, our Mishnah rules 'Lo Amar K'lum' on the basis of the principle - 'Kol ha'Masneh al Mah she'Kasuv ba'Torah, Tena'o Bateil'.
(b)
According to Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah, if he says it with regard to a potential heir, his words take effect.
(c)
We can extrapolate from the words of the Tana Kama that - if he would bequeath his property to 'Ben bein ha'Banim', his words would take effect.
(d)
The problem with this is that it seems to tally with the opinion of Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah in the Seifa (so what are they arguing about)?
2)
(a)
How do we establish Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah in an attempt to answer the Kashya?
(b)
We refute this suggestion however, on the basis of a Beraisa. How does Rebbi Yishmael, Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's son there define the Machlokes between his father and the Chachamim?
(c)
And what will the disputants then say in the case of Acher be'Makom Bas and Bas be'Makom Banim?
(d)
How do we establish the Machlokes in our Mishnah, based on the wording of Rebbi Yishmael B'no shel Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's statement?
(e)
How else can we reconcile the Reisha with Rebbi Yishmael B'no shel Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah?
2)
(a)
In an attempt to answer the Kashya, we establish Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah - by a brother where there is a daughter (but no son) and a daughter, where there is a son.
(b)
We refute this suggestion however, on the basis of a Beraisa. Rebbi Yishmael, Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's son there defines the Machlokes between his father and the Chachamim - by Ben bein ha'Banim and Bas bein ha'Banos ...
(c)
... but in the case of Acher be'Makom Bas' and 'Bas be'Makom Ben' - his father will concede.
(d)
Based on the wording of Rebbi Yishmael B'no shel Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's statement - we extrapolate that, according to the Tana Kama, they do indeed argue over Acher be'Makom Bas' and 'Bas be'Makom Ben'.
(e)
Alternatively, the entire Mishnah goes according to Rebbi Yishmael ... , and we merely need to add a few words which establishes the Machlokes by Acher be'Makom Bas' and 'Bas be'Makom Ben.
3)
(a)
We could explain that in the previous Mishnah (' ... ve'Im Amar mishum Yerushah, Lo Amar K'lum'), the Tana presents the case of Ben bein ha'Banim, and in this Mishnah, that of Acher be'Makom Bas ... , in keeping with the principle 'Zu ve'Ein Tzarich Lomar Zu'. What is an alternative (and better) way of explaining it?
(b)
According to the current explanation, what will Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah rule in a case where someone bequeaths his property to his uncle, there where he has a daughter and a brother?
3)
(a)
We could explain that in the previous Mishnah, the Tana presents the case of Ben bein ha'Banim, and in this Mishnah, that of Bas be'Makom ha'Ben ... , in keeping with the principle 'Zu ve'Ein Tzarich Lomar Zu'. Alternatively (and preferably) we can explain that - in the previous Mishnah, the Tana taught us the extent of the Tana Kama (that even Ben bein ha'Banim does not acquire), and in this Mishnah, that of Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah (that even Bas be'Makom Ben does).
(b)
According to the current explanation, in a case where someone bequeaths his property to his uncle, there where he has a daughter and a brother - Rebbi Yochanan will concede to the Chachamim that his words are invalid (since they are only valid there where he bequeaths to the one who directly follows the next of kin.
4)
(a)
Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah. What does Rava say?
(b)
How do we know that this ruling is confined to Ben bein ha'Banim, but does not extend to Bas be'Makom Ben?
(c)
Does it make any difference whether a man bequeaths half his property to one of his sons ...
1.
... or all of it?
2.
... orally or in writing?
(d)
How do we reconcile this ruling with Shmuel, who will rule later, that if someone writes all his property to his wife or to one of his sons, he merely appoints them as an Apotropos? Why the difference?
4)
(a)
Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah - Rava agrees.
(b)
This ruling is confined to Ben bein ha'Banim, and does not extend to Bas be'Makom Ben (as is evident from our final version of the Mishnah a little earlier) as well as from Shmuel himself, who ought otherwise to have given an indication to that effect, and from Abaye earlier, who explicitly equates the Din of Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah with 'Ben bein ha'Banim'.
(c)
It makes no difference whether he bequeaths to one of his sons - half his property ...
1.
... or all of it ...
2.
... orally or in writing; either way, his words are valid.
(d)
We reconcile this ruling with Shmuel, who will rule later, that if someone writes all his property to his wife or to one of his sons, he merely appoints them an Apotropos - by establishing the latter where the father (or husband) gave the property as a Matanah (since the position of Apotropos is also a gift), whereas Shmuel is speaking here where he bequeathed it as a Yerushah, which cannot b construed as an appointment as an Apotropos.
5)
(a)
What does Rava learn from the Pasuk "ve'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav"?
(b)
Abaye queries this however, because he learns it from the Pasuk "Lo Yuchal Levaker". How does he learn Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's Din from there?
5)
(a)
Rava learns from the Pasuk "ve'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav" that - a father may bequeath his poperty to any one of his sons (of the next of kin, whoever they may be), like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah.
(b)
Abaye queries this however, because he learns it from the Pasuk "Lo Yuchal Le'vaker" - which implies that a father cannot deprive the B'chor of his Cheilek B'chorah, but a Pashut of his Chelek Pashut, he can.
6)
(a)
Rava answers Abaye by quoting Aba Chanan mishum Rebbi Eliezer in a Beraisa. What does Aba Chanan learn from "Lo Yuchal Levaker"? What would we have otherwise learned from "va'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav"?
(b)
Why would we have thought otherwise? What would we have learned from "va'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav"?
(c)
What is the 'Kal va'Chome'chor from Pashut?
(d)
How have we now refuted Abaye's Kashya on Rava?
6)
(a)
Rava answers by quoting a Beraisa, where Aba Chanan Mishum Rebbi Eliezer learns from "Lo Yuchal Le'vaker" that - a father cannot deprive the B'chor of his Cheilek B'chorah.
(b)
We might have thought otherwise - because we would have learned from a Pashut (in which connection we Darshen "va'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav", as we just explained) from a 'Kal va'Chomer (if a father can deprive a Pashut of his Cheilek Pashut, 'Kal va'Chomer' a B'chor of his Cheilek Bechorah) ...
(c)
The 'Kal va'Chomer' of B'chor from Pashut is - based on the advantage of a Pashut over the B'chor, inasmuch as a Pashut inherits from his father even what is Ra'uy, whereas a B'chor does not (as we have learned above).
(d)
We have now refuted Abaye's Kashya on Rava - because we see from the Beraisa that "Lo Yuchal Le'vaker" is needed for itself, to preclude a B'chor from the 'Kal va'Chomer', in which case, we cannot Darshen anything else from it.
130b----------------------------------------130b
7)
(a)
The Beraisa asks that now that the Torah has written "Lo Yuchal Levaker", why does it needs to add "Vehayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav"? What is the Kashya?
(b)
What does the Tana answer?
7)
(a)
Now that the Torah has written "Lo Yuchal Le'vaker" the Beraisa asks, why does it need to add "ve'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav"? - why can we not simply extrapolate that if a father is not permitted to deprive a B'chor of his Cheilek Bechorah, that he is permitted to deprive him or any of his other sons of their Cheilek Pashut?
(b)
The Tana answers that - if not for "ve'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav", we would rather have learned a 'Kal va'Chomer' from B'chor (who does not inherit Ra'uy) on to Pashut (who does), as we just explained, than preclude it from an inference.
8)
(a)
Rebbi Zerika ... Amar Rebbi ruled like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah. What did Rebbi Aba mean when he commented on this 'Horeh Itmar'?
(b)
What is the basis of their Machlokes?
(c)
The Beraisa says 'Ein Lemeidin Halachah Lo mi'Pi Limud ve'Lo mi'Pi Ma'aseh', incorporating the two alternatives that we just discussed. On what sort of ruling can one then rely?
(d)
The Beraisa actually states two cases 'Ad she'Yomru lo Halachah le'Ma'aseh; Sha'al ve'Amru lo Halachah le'Ma'aseh, Yeilech ve'Ya'aseh Ma'aseh'. What is the difference between them?
8)
(a)
Rebbi Zerika ... Amar Rebbi ruled like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah. When Rebbi Aba commented on this 'Horeh Itmar', he meant that - Rebbi did not just rule like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah theoretically, but that he actually issued a ruling accordingly in a case that was brought to him.
(b)
The basis of their Machlokes is - which of the two is stronger, 'Halachah' (because by Horeh, one can never be sure that one understands the circumstances of the Rebbe's ruling), or 'Horeh' (because based on the principle 'Ma'aseh Rav', one never knows for sure that a theoretical ruling is not confined to one's learning, but that if a practical case occurred, the Rebbe might rule differently).
(c)
The Beraisa says 'Ein Lemeidin Halachah Lo mi'Pi Limud ve'Lo mi'Pi Ma'aseh', incorporating the two alternatives that we just discussed. One can only rely - on a ruling where the Rebbe specifically states that his ruling is 'le'Ma'aseh' (to act upon).
(d)
The Beraisa actually states two cases 'Ad she'Yomru Lo Halachah le'Ma'aseh; Sha'al ve'Amru Lo Halachah le'Ma'aseh, Yeilech ve'Ya'aseh Ma'aseh'. The difference between them is that - whereas in the former case, the Rebbe needs to specifically authorize the Talmid to act on his ruling, in the latter case this is not necessary, because it is obvious.
9)
(a)
What is the difference between 'Halachah' in a Mishnah or Beraisa (which we have basically been discussing until now), and 'Halachah' in the Gemara?
(b)
What is the reason for this distinction?
(c)
What did Rebbi Yochanan reply when Rebbi Asi asked him whether they could learn from his theoretical rulings?
(d)
Why would this fall away after his death?
9)
(a)
In a Mishnah or Beraisa (which we have basically been discussing until now) - 'Halachah' is not the last word, and therefore requires the Gemara's backing before it can be accepted; whereas 'Halachah' in the Gemara is final.
(b)
The reason for this distinction is - due to the fact that firstly a ruling in the former is often subject to further Machlokes, whereas the rulings of Rav Ashi in the Gemara are meant to be the last word for all times.
(c)
When Rebbi Asi asked Rebbi Yochanan whether they could learn from his theoretical rulings, he replied that - they should not do so until he told them that it was Halachah le'Ma'aseh.
(d)
This would fall away after his death - because the reason for his instructions (that he might change his mind) was no longer applicable then.
10)
(a)
What does the Tana mean when he adds 'u'Vilevad she'Lo Yedameh'?
(b)
Why can this not be a general statement that applies to all areas of Halachah?
(c)
To which area of Halachah does Rav Ashi therefore ascribe it?
(d)
What reason does the Beraisa give for this?
10)
(a)
When the Tana adds 'u'Vilevad she'Lo Yedameh', he means - that one should not not extrapolate from a given Halachah.
(b)
This cannot be a general statement that applies to all areas of Halachah - because that is the way Torah is learned (applying the Halachah from one case to another, via the attribute of 'Binah').
(c)
Rav Ashi therefore ascribes it to the area of - T'reifos, where only those T'reifos listed by Chazal are forbidden ...
(d)
... because, as the Beraisa explains, there are limbs (such as the junction of nerves) which render the animal T'reifah, if they are severed at a certain point, but Kosher if they are cut to the bone a little higher up (even though more of the limb has been cut off).
11)
(a)
What did Rava instruct Rav Papa and Rav Huna b'rei de'Rav Yehoshua to do in the event that they found an error in a ruling of his ...
1.
... during his lifetime? Why is that?
2.
... after his death? Why is that?
(b)
What sort of ruling was he referring to? How come that it was in writing?
(c)
Why, when Rebbi changed his ruling from the night to the morning, did he exclaim that maybe he had erred? Why was it not obvious that he had?
(d)
What do we learn from the Pasuk in Divrei Hayamim "ve'Imachem bi'Devar ha'Mishpat"?
11)
(a)
Rava instructed Rav Papa and Rav Huna b'rei de'Rav Yehoshua, in the event that they found an error in a ruling of his ...
1.
... during his lifetime - not to tear it up but to bring it to him, and he would either resolve their problem or concede that they were right.
2.
... after his death - neither to tear it up (in case he was right), nor to abide by it (because a Dayan can only go by what he sees ['Ein le'Dayan Ela Mah she'Einav Ro'os']).
(b)
He was referring to a ruling that he had written and handed to a litigant, who asked for a written proof of the ruling. Otherwise, the Gemara was not transcribed (until Ravina and Rav Ashi transcribed it).
(c)
When Rebbi changed his ruling from the night to the morning, he exclaimed that maybe he had erred. It was not obvious that he had - because in matters that depend on Shikul ha'Da'as (human judgment), there are sometimes two sides to the coin, either of which may be the correct one.
(d)
We learn from the Pasuk in Divrei ha'Yamim "ve'Imachem bi'Devar ha'Mishpat" the principle - 'Ein le'Dayan Ela Mah she'Einav Ro'os'.
