Rava asked whether Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's ruling ('Im Amar al Mi She'Ra'uy Leyorsho Devarav Kayamin') is confined to a Shechiv-M'ra, or whether it also extends to a Bari - even though he has not yet reached the stage of "ve'Hayah be'Yom Hanchilo es Banav".

To answer the She'eilah, Rav Mesharahaya cited a Beraisa with reference to 'Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin' - the condition that a husband writes in his wife's Kesubah, promising her that the sons that she bears him will inherit her Kesubah (over and above their regular portion of his inheritance), in the event that she dies before he does.

The Mishnah in Kesuvos says that even if the Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin has been omitted from the Kesubah - the wife's sons will nevertheless receive it.

Rebbi Nasan in a Beraisa, extrapolates from there that Rebbi learned his Mishnah like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah - because the Tana cites the Lashon of 'Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin' as 'B'nin Dichrin di'Yehavyan lichi Mina'i, Inun Yarsun Kesef Kesuvasech ... ' (permitting a man to bequeath to one of his sons at the expense of the others.

The author cannot be the Rabbanan - who hold that whatever is referred to as a Yerushah, the father does not have the authority to bequeath to one of his sons.

Rebbi replied that - 'Yasvun' T'nan' meaning that 'Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin' is a Matanah and not a Yerushah (in which case, even the Rabbanan will agree that this is permitted.

He retracted however, on the basis of a ruling that the sons are not permitted to claim 'K'suvas B'nin Dichrin from Meshubadin', announcing - 'I behaved childishly and spoke arrogantly against Nasan the Babylonian'.

That ruling would clash with his amendment inasmuch as if the wording was 'Yasvun' (implying a Matanah from now, [since there is no such thing as a Matanah after death] as opposed to 'Yarsun', which implies only after his death), then why could the sons not claim from Meshubadim, any less than the rest of the Kesubah, which their mother would be allowed to claim from Meshubadim.

The problem now is that - Rebbi Nasan's Kashya remains.

We have now resolved Rava's She'eilah (whether Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah incorporates a Bari, too) - because the Mishnah is speaking about a Matnas Bari, yet both Rebbi Nasan and Rebbi agree that, if the text in the Mishnah reads 'Yarsun', the author will be Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah (whose ruling clearly extends to a Bari).

Rav Papa pointed out to Abaye that, irrespective of the wording of the Mishnah, there is another problem with the entire institution of Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin inasmuch as - it is a 'Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam' (which is not Koneh).

We cannot circumvent the problem by establishing the Mishnah like Rebbi Meir, who holds 'Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam' - because here it is also to someone who is not yet born, in which case even Rebbi Meir concedes that the Kinyan is invalid.

Rav Papa therefore answers both Kashyos in one sweep by reminding us that - we are speaking about a Takanas Chachamim, who have the power (of 'Hefker Beis-Din Hefker') to give one person's property to someone else even if it, or he, is not yet in the world; and we use the same explanation to establish the Mishnah in Kesuvos even like the Rabbanan, who will admit, for the same reason, that here, the father may bequeath his property to one of his sons.

Abaye initially attempted to justify Rebbi's ...

... reply to Rebbi Nasan by explaining that - he was only answering Rebbi Nasan's use of the Lashon 'Yarsun', which suggests that he holds like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah.

... retraction by explaining it to mean that - he used the word 'Yasvun' (not because he needed to answer Rebbi Nasan's Kashya, but), because of Rav Papa's Kashya (from 'Ein Adam Makneh ... ').

He changed his mind however, by quoting the Seifa of the Mishnah 'Lo Kasav lah B'nan Nukvan di'Yehavyan lichi Mina'i Yehavyan Yasvan be'Veisi ad de'Tilakchun le'Guvrin' with regard to - the Takanah of 'Mazon ha'Banos'.

This now obviates the need to answer Rebbi Nasan at all - because the Lashon of the Seifa is one of Matanah, giving the Mishnah the format of 'la'Zeh bi'Yerushah, ve'la'Zeh be'Matanah', and we already learned that in such a case, even the Rabbanan concede that both are valid (even when it is to two people, such as here, where it involves both the sons and the daughters).

We did indeed conclude earlier that when the Yerushah and the Matanah involve two people, they require 'Toch K'dei Dibur' - and here, seeing as the two Takanos were initiated simultaneously, it is considered 'Toch K'dei Dibur'.

Rav Nechumi (or Rav Chananyah bar Minyumi) queried Abaye on his assumption that the two cases in the Mishnah in Kesuvos constitute 'Toch K'dei Dibur' - from the possibility that they might well have been established in two different Batei-Din, at two different times.

Abaye answered from the Mishnah in Kesuvos, where Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah rules that a daughter's rights to Mezonos only take effect after her father's death - which he learns from Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin, which is a Yerushah, and can only take effect then.

Abaye tried to prove from there that - the two Takanos must have been instituted by the same Beis-Din. Otherwise, how could Rebbi Elazar ben Azaryah learn one from the other.

We reject Abaye's proof however on the grounds that - even if they were instituted by two different Batei-Din, it is possible that the one modeled its Takanah on the other (to avoid people asking why the Chachamim instituted them at different times).

What we have now achieved is - to vindicate Rebbi, who is forced to amend the Mishnah of Kesuvas B'nin Dichrin from 'Yarsun' to 'Yasvun', in order to establish it like the Chachamim too (and not just like Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah, even though he rules like him anyway, as we learned on the previous Daf).

This does not affect our proof however, that Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's ruling extends to a Bari which is evident already from Rebbi Nasan's Kashya.

Rav Yehudah Amar Shmuel rules that if someone writes all his property to his wife - he has merely appointed her an Apotropos (a guardian) over his estate.

Shmuel is speaking about a Shechiv-M'ra (who is concerned that his children should respect their mother) ...

... because we assume that - a father would not leave his sons penniless, giving everything to his wife.

Nevertheless, we will later classify this as one of the three Halachos without a logical reason - because in spite of the reasoning, we would not normally ignore a written document on the basis of a S'vara.

This Halachah is cited here - because Rava will shortly repeat the She'eilah that he asked with regard to Rebbi Yochanan ben Berokah's opinion 'be'Bari Mai?'

It is obvious that Shmuel's Takanah applies equally to a case where a father bequeaths all his property to his oldest son. We are not sure whether it also extends to a younger one ...

... because whereas, on the one hand, a father definitely would like the brothers to show respect to their older brother, it is not certain that he would wish them all to respect a younger one (and if not, then he really intended to bequeath everything to him).

We resolve the She'eilah by citing Rav Chanila'i bar Idi Amar Shmuel, who states that - the above ruling even extends to a baby in his cot (clearly incorporating a younger brother).

By 'Peshita B'no ve'Acher, Acher be'Matanah, u'Beno Apotropos', we mean that - if a Shechiv-M'ra leaves his property to anyone other than a son, it is considered a Matanah, whereas if he leaves it to his son, he appoints him an Apotropos (as we just learned).

Initially, we refute the suggestion that it speaks in one case, where a man writes half his property to his son and half to someone else - because then, seeing as he did not leave all his property to his son, why should that person receive everything?

We could resolve this problem - by adding that there are other sons, in which case, Shmuel's ruling might apply, since the father left nothing for the remaining sons.

Yet we finally reject that explanation - because it will then differ from the She'eilos that follow, which are all two separate cases and not one, as we shall now see.

We erase the text 'Ishto ve'Acher, le'Acher be'Matanah, ve'Ishto Apotropos', - because, since, all the dual cases are two independent cases (as we just explained) , it would be pointless to repeat what Shmuel has already taught specifically.

Shmuel concedes that 'Ishto Arusah ve'Ishto Gerushah, be'Matanah' - because he loves neither of them sufficiently to want his children to respect them.

In a case where a Shechiv-M'ra left everything to his son, if he also left behind ...

... a wife but no other sons then - he has given him a Matanah (because a man does not expect his wife to respect his son).

... a wife and sons then - he has appointed him an Apotropos, since he wants his brothers to pay him respect, as we learned earlier.

We already issued a ruling in the case of a betrothed woman and a divorced wife, and we now ask what the Din will be if a Shechiv-M'ra bequeaths all his property to one of three women; two of them, a daughter where there are sons (her brothers), and a daughter where there are brothers (her uncles). The third case is - where he bequeaths all his property to his wife, where there are sons from another wife (her step-sons).

The basis of these She'eilos is - whether a man would want his sons to respect his wife who is not their mother but their sister, their niece or their step-mother.

Ravina states that all the above five women do not acquire except for a betrothed woman and a divorced wife. The only two that do, according to Rav Ivya in the name of Rava are - where there are brothers and where there are step-sons, as it is not feasible for a man to want them to respect their niece and their stepmother.

The sole case over which they therefore argue is - the latter one, whether he expects his sons to respect their sister (Ravina) or not (Rav Avira).